


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
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
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
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MILITARY UNIFORMS OF ALL AMERICAN WARS.

THE
VOLUNTEER SOLDIER
OF AMERICA.

BY JOHN A. LOGAN.

WITH
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AND
MILITARY REMINISCENCES


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To The Immortal Host
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CITIZEN-SOLDIERS
and SAILORS

Who from LEXINGTON
to APPOMATTOX have won
The Liberty of the Republic
maintained its honor and
preserved its integrity
This Volume is

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John A. Logan

THE VOLUNTEER SOLDIER OF AMERICA.

MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR.

By C. A. LOGAN, LL.D.

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THE present volume constitutes the last literary work of General John A. Logan. It was commenced in February, 1886, while its author was still engaged with the proof-reading of "The Great Conspiracy," and it assumed its present completed form by the first of December last. The statement of this fact will serve to convey some idea of the methodical industry that enabled a man of almost uninterrupted public occupation to accomplish, amid the absorbing duties of his position, the large amount of literary labor that it is well known he regularly performed. During the sessions of Congress, no member of either branch composing it was more diligent in the performance of committee-work nor more prompt in attendance upon the sessions of the body of which he was a member than he. There were no questions of general importance in the discussion of which he did not actively participate; and it was no unusual thing for him to be engaged far in the night in the consultation of records and documents relating to topics and measures under consideration by the Senate.

After the daily adjournments, his house was thronged until a late hour—often much too late—with friends, and with those desirous to consult him upon the business in which they happened to be interested. During the Congressional vacations calls were made upon him from every direction to deliver addresses, or to lend his valuable aid in the work of important campaigns.

His capacity for continuous labor became the admiration of those at all acquainted with his busy round of life. An interesting

anecdote is related by Senator Cullom, of Illinois, illustrative of his habit of constant work. General Logan dined with his colleague, Senator Cullom, only a few days prior to the open development of his fatal sickness. During the course of after-dinner conversation, the General remarked that he had just completed for the press a volume upon "The Volunteer Soldier." Senator Cullom made an observation expressive of surprise that his colleague should be able to find time to perform so large an amount of literary labor, in addition to that demanded by his already onerous official occupations. To this the General replied, with a smile: "The fact is, Senator, that however late I may be in going to bed, I rise very early, and thus I have a good hour and a half for work before the most of my neighbors get their eyes open in the morning."

By reference to General Logan's correspondence, it has been found that, under date of the 5th of December last, he addressed guarded communications—not being very familiar with the methods of the trade—to each of two well-known book firms, one established in the East and the other in the West, upon the subject of the publication of a proposed volume upon "The Volunteer Soldier." A reply from each of these is upon file, in which is stated the desire of the firm to negotiate for the production of the work.

After these replies were received, the author re-read his manuscript, and almost immediately upon completing his final review—it being then toward the middle of December—he sought a bed from which he never again rose in life. For nearly two weeks he lay upon it, bearing suffering patiently while there was hope of recovery; and when it became apparent that he was engaged in his last struggle, he comforted his wife and children, and before losing consciousness gave expression to the impressive and noble utterance: "If this is the end, I am ready!"

In three weeks, to a day, from the date of addressing the publishers upon the subject of his latest book, the weary man had rested from his labors; his last earthly contest had been entered upon and finished; and, indifferent to the adulations of fame, voice-

less in response to the frantic calls of family, careless of the stings of detractors, that followed him with unrelenting energy to the very line separating the known from the unknown, he had closed the record of a splendid career, and bequeathed it as a rich legacy to the youth of America.

The volume now given to the public as a posthumous work is an important contribution to the national interests, and a production possessed of a number of elements which give it a very original and in some respects a very extraordinary character.

Its importance is largely to be found in the circumstance that it is an experienced military man — having studied for a number of years, under the advantages of an official position, the military system of the country — the author imparts to his fellow-citizens the matured results of his study, and makes a demonstration of the necessity of a radical reform. He shows quite conclusively that as now constituted the system is wrong *ab initio*; and that while the theory of our government reposes the defense of the Republic upon its citizen-soldiery — in opposition to the method of the standing army adopted by centralized governments — the actual practice erects an exclusive military establishment, to which are attached the essentials of a caste or class-distinction, and within the mechanism of which reside all of the possible dangers belonging to the military establishment of an absolute monarchy.

With his usual vigor of attack the author masses a potential array of facts upon which he erects batteries of argument, which without doubt must carry conviction to the general people, and soon or late result in an entire remodeling of the American military system upon something like the broad and safely sustaining basis so sagaciously pointed out by the great General.

The strong warp of the fabric which the hand of the soldier-statesman has dexterously woven into the present volume is represented by the volunteer soldiery, while the woof of the finished texture rests upon that element as does a stately edifice upon an immovable foundation wall. General Logan is conceded to have

been the strongest type of the American volunteer soldier of the period in which he lived; and most efficiently has he done battle in behalf of that great bulwark of our national existence and security.

Devoted through life to the principle involved in the idea creating what may be termed a *civilian* soldier; indefatigable in the care of the volunteer patriots while marshaling them against the grim dangers of war; untiring in his efforts in civil position to secure to them the just recognition of services impossible of over-estimation, his last efforts were put forth for the interests — double though identical — of the citizen-soldiery and of the Republic whose national life it sustains.

While the argument of the work is so strong as to carry conviction by storm, its construction evinces artistic skill and completeness. With the boldness and open honesty of a man who never fought under cover of a masked intention, he does not hesitate to express his views in language not to be disguised in its true meaning by any insubstantial device of word-gilding. But while, as always, he states facts, and comments upon them in unalloyed English, he deals in no invective, nor does he exhibit unnecessary harshness. His charge is as crushing as it is brilliant; but it is also as open as it is vigorous. The unbiased reader of the following pages must pronounce the book energetic in style, though dispassionate and logical in argument; earnest in effort, but impartial in judgment; just without uncalled-for bitterness; vehement in the maintenance of opinion; national in purpose, and unpartisan in spirit.

As the author has so well remarked, the present war literature covers, in detail, every battle and engagement that took place during the late rebellion. The book has a much broader purpose than the eulogy of individual heroism and achievement, however merited. Though there is scarcely a page that does not dwell upon the American volunteer, yet the volunteer soldiery is considered in the aggregate, and, with the exception of those individuals presented by way of pointing the argument, not in the

separate sense. The author has studied the volunteer in the light of the system he represents, and his appeal is made in behalf of the system.

The work is not only original in thought and in matter, but, as before remarked, it is extraordinary in some of its features. Attacks have been made heretofore, as we learn from the author, upon the aristocratic tendencies of the West Point institution; but no such complete analysis of the American military system, in its bearing upon the future necessities of the Republic, has ever appeared in print. General Logan has brought to the consideration of the question treated the expert knowledge of a great soldier, made practical in application to the needs of the state by the ripe culture and experience of a no less great statesman. The book, while offering a deservedly glowing tribute to the individual volunteer, will be considered a sterling contribution to the permanent interests of the country. It comprehends a calm, dignified, and exhaustive discussion of a very important public question, which must make the volume alike valuable to the soldier and civilian. It will be read by citizens of to-day, and placed in the library for reference in the future.

One of the strong points of the work that securely hold the initial ends of the developing argument is that which conclusively demonstrates the existence of a special aptitude in all individuals gifted in a specific direction above their fellow-men. The author emphasizes this indisputable fact, and exemplifies it by citing the cases of a large number of the most eminent soldiers of American history; and while he utters eloquent and unselfish tributes to the great men who preceded him, as also to those who were his actual contemporaries, the reader will be struck with the charming *naïveté* which proves him to have been utterly unconscious that he, himself, was one of the best exemplars of the proposition he was laboring to establish. If men are born with the military genius, John A. Logan was one of the number.

It does not fall within the purpose of the present memoir to

present an extended biographical sketch of the distinguished author of the following pages—a man whose whole career was a faithful representation of the truth embodied in the maxim, "*Per angusta ad angusta.*" His life story has already been told in various special volumes; while the eulogies that have been pronounced upon him in both branches of the National Congress by men of all parties; in the various state legislatures; and during innumerable memorial services held in various parts of the country, have acquainted the American people with the virtues of a public man whose character and career will always be quoted for the emulation of youth.

While a biography proper could hardly be attempted in a space as limited as that assigned to a memorial note, nevertheless, some of the strong features of the character now being considered, and especially as they seem naturally to be suggested by the author's volume, may be appropriately touched upon.

General Logan was one of the men that, upon appearing in a public place, immediately claim the general attention. Above the medium height, his fine physique gave assurance of great muscular strength and activity. His hair was as black and lustrous as the wing of a raven; the head massive; its contour bold and striking; the forehead broad and high, showing great breadth and depth of brain structure; the eyebrows heavily formed of rich black hair; the nose large and of Grecian caste; the mouth neither large nor small, under the play of the muscles surrounding it, as moved by the varying conditions of excitement, grief, pleasure, anger, determination, etc., was a study for the physiologist; while the chin, broad and symmetrical, lent completeness to a head and face of classical beauty. But the particular feature which most riveted attention was the eye. The sclerotic, as visible from the front of the ball, was of a limpid white, while the darkness of the pupil resembled "night, with hue so black." As the diamond flashes out its richest colors in response to the questioning gleam of light, so the eye of this gifted man was illuminated

with distinctive rays, in obedience to the separate emotions calling them forth. Amid the roar of battle, as he rode at the head of his troops, sword in hand and head uncovered, that wonderful eye shone like a meteor, and inspired his men to deeds of desperate valor. Upon the floor of Congress, or in general debate, it was not difficult to predict, by means of the play of light in the eyes, the precise moment when the gathering storm would break; while those that knew him intimately could read his every emotion as he conversed among his friends in the domestic or in the social circle. If the writer were called upon for an opinion as to the more exclusive location of the compelling magnetism that so enlisted the enthusiasm of those with whom he came in contact, the opinion would place it in the organ spoken of. When he felt kindly toward an individual, his honest soul shone forth through the dark eye, and one could see at a glance that the language of the eye ratified the words of the mouth.

The character of General Logan was compounded of an unusual number of the strongly typical elements. Considered from the premise offered by mere anatomical circumstance, it may be said to be rare to find such profuse development, in the same individual, of so many of the higher traits. Of the elements going to make up this rich combination, apart from those exclusively related to strong intellectuality, the chief were honesty, in the broad and not the vulgar sense; great energy; iron determination; unflinching courage; much religious sentiment; great love of fellow-man, and a laudable ambition to play the life-part well.

The honesty of his nature rose far above the narrow and even degrading precept which urges honesty because it is the best policy. The nobility of his moral constitution scorned the word *policy* in all of its base acceptations. He was never known to bend the knee at the command, nor to listen for a moment to the suggestions, of mere expediency in shaping his public or private action. He was for a measure, or he was against it, in the open daylight, and before all opinions. He was for a man, or he was against him, in the face

of the multitude, and before high heaven. He was as inflexible in declining to embrace the party-advantage offered by the recent Ohio Senatorial case as he was firm in the refusal to follow the dictum of the party caucus in the attack made by an administration, of which he was a warm personal and political friend, upon a Chairman of the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, for whom he had no sympathy beyond that inspired by the demands of justice. In both cases he stood for principle in sacrifice of expediency.

Of the *post-obitum* tributes that have been rendered to General Logan by political and personal opponents—and these tributes have been many—not one has failed to dwell upon this high characteristic of the deceased soldier and statesman. His intense honesty was built upon a principle as firm as the granite of mother earth, and duplicity, concealment, and the tricks of time-servers were utterly antagonistic to his nature. “Logan struck hard,” said one of his Southern eulogists, “but his friends and enemies alike knew just where to find him.”

His great energy was based upon a physical structure of typical soundness, and of ideal construction. From the time when, as a boy, he burned the midnight oil in his father's home, in order to conquer a better education than his surroundings afforded, through the whole period of an active life, his energy was tireless, and, as a consequence, almost always effective in the accomplishment of a purpose. His determination and strong will-power, embodying resolution and persistence in maintaining it, were notable constituents of his character. The determination was of the sort that demands an exhaustive consideration of the factors belonging to a question—or of a motive for action—and a satisfying reason for decision; and the determination once formed upon such a basis was almost changeless. No menace could influence; no suggestion of a temporizing policy could turn; no pleading could melt him from a course that he had once settled upon as that which was just and proper to be pursued. It would be untrue to assert that he never

erred, because such a claim can only be sustained for infallibility; but it can safely be said that, when he erred, it was never against justice, but always upon the side of truth, and of a worthy cause.

The courage of the man was a sublime quality. It had nothing of the subtle or the secretive in it, but belonged to the order which has characterized the martyrs of the world when battling for principle and meeting death to sustain it. It possessed all that is noble of the supposed fearlessness of the lion, shorn of every element underlying the crouch and sudden spring of the cat family. It was a befitting counterpart of, and a supplement to, the open honesty of his mold.

The religious sentiment was wholly untinged with the cant of mere profession. It was a positive quality, built upon early education, deep study of the subject, and an innate reverence of the good. In no phase of its existence was it pretentious, nor approximative to the pharisaical. It was unboastful and unheralded; but its results ran through the whole texture of his life-work, stamping upon it the ineffaceable mark of the broad religion of humanity.

The love of fellow-man, which was one of the most striking, as it was one of the most ennobling features of General Logan's character, was the inherent quality of a fine nature, the polish of which its possessor had not attempted to heighten by the aid of factitious art.

No man could be a truer or stronger friend than General Logan was. His fidelity has passed into a proverb. No effort was too great to make in behalf of a deserving friend, no season too unpropitious in which to remember him. But the quality of faithful adherence to friends had a broader and deeper foundation in his relations with men than that underlying the obligation to return a favor, which obligation has taken its place as a leading article in the creed of the purely professional politician. He believed in God, and he likewise believed in man. He had the most implicit confidence in human nature. Though he was one of the strongest

of men, Titanic in physique and gigantic in intellect, he had the heart of the youth before the revelations of later life have been spread before him. In spite of the betrayals and the shameless ingratitude which constantly met him in his intercourse with men, he never lost faith in his fellow-man to the day of his death. When an example was presented which revealed the darker side of human character, he persisted in believing it to represent an exception to, and not the general rule itself. He judged mankind and its impulses under the light reflected from his own character. He was himself honest, faithful, charitable, and true, and he therefore believed that men in general were endowed with similar traits. He was wholly unconscious of the possession of such an exceptional wealth of the rarest virtues of humanity. Thus feeling, while his heart was always open to those about him, he made the same demand upon his friends, and upon the public, in their relations to him, that was fulfilled to them in his own character. It was when this demand was unmet, that in the shock of disappointment he would frequently give vent to some strong expression of indignation. But any such ebullition was momentary, and seldom represented a lasting feeling. Disappointment in some act of a friend broke upon him with the suddenness of the flash from a gun; but the effect ceased with the rapidity that the noise following it rolls away.

General Grant used to relate that when he was President, Senator Logan and Senator Morton of Indiana would come to him, each with thirteen requests; of the thirteen he would grant *eleven* to Senator Logan and *two* to Senator Morton. The latter would go away much pleased, and boasting of his influence with the administration, while the former would grumblingly declare that Grant never did anything for him. The anecdote was meant to be illustrative, not literal, of course; but it well represents the point of General Logan's character now dwelt upon. His reasoning would run thus: If he, Logan, were President, and his friend Senator Grant should prefer thirteen requests, he would comply with ~



GENERAL LOGAN A GODFATHER DURING THE STORM OF BATTLE.

“baker’s dozen” of them, and then throw in a gratuity for extra measure—a something in the nature of what our Spanish-American neighbors call a *yappa*. He was constantly judging men in this way and making this sort of demand upon them. Notwithstanding his grumbling, as General Grant called it, the public will not soon forget General Logan’s devotion to his chief. His gallant fight for a third term for the great soldier, his long and finally successful contest in Congress to place the latter upon the retired list of the army, and his oration at the tomb of General Grant, at Riverside, upon the last memorial day, an oration which, as said by the Rev. John P. Newman, in his late eulogy on General Logan, “will never die,” must always be remembered as proof of his unfaltering loyalty to friend and principle alike.

But his warmth of heart radiated beyond the close circle of personal friendship and reached the larger sphere wherein moves mankind in general. Many anecdotes are told illustrative of his kind nature. One of the most touching of these was an actual incident of his soldier life. It occurred during the operations against Atlanta. General Logan at the head of his corps had made a sweeping movement to get into the rear of Hood’s army. After a skirmish near Flint River, an old shell-torn cabin was discovered by his men in which were found an aged woman and her daughter, the latter of whom had just given birth to her first child, while shot and missile were whizzing and hissing through the cabin and over her head. Information of the circumstance was carried to the General, and it was not long before the great soldier was inside the cabin himself. When he beheld the harrowing scene there presented, his feeling was deeply moved. “Boys,” he said, “fix up the roof with some of the old slabs from the stable; clear things up a little; and I don’t think it would hurt you any to leave a part of your rations.” The command and the suggestion were complied with in a wonderfully short time. The cabin was repaired and the larder supplied most bountifully.

Upon the suggestion that the child should be christened, the

chaplain was sent for, and General Logan stood godfather to the infant, who was then called *Shell-Anna*. In turning to go, the General took out a gold pocket-coin—gold coin was scarce in that day—and, giving it to the old dame as a christening-gift, hurried away to the stern work before him. But as he strode out of the cabin, his comrades could not fail to notice that

Something upon the soldier's cheek
Washed away the stains of powder.

His love for the soldiers that fought the battles of their country was genuine and unselfish. His regard for them through the war was evinced in ceaseless efforts to promote their welfare. During his subsequent legislative career, as a member of the House and of the Senate, the advocacy of the rights and just interests of the volunteer soldiers, who, as he constantly proclaimed, had given us all of the country we possess, became something akin to the requirements of a religious creed.

A volunteer soldier himself, he was fully acquainted with the great sacrifices of the class to which he belonged; and probably the most bitter of all regrets brought to him by the defeat of the Republican party in 1884 was the knowledge that much of his usefulness to the volunteer soldiers lay deeply buried under that defeat. With a faith in Logan that never faltered, they refused to believe that he was not as potent to assist them under the new *régime* as under the party whose especial and most loved children they were. They flocked to his house as of old, while he patiently listened to their stories as always before. With a burst of disappointment he would declare that he could do nothing with the party now in power, clothed with it, as it was, by the misguided people whom the Union soldiers had fought and defeated in the effort to destroy the Government. A friend was sitting with the General and Mrs. Logan, not many months ago, when a volunteer soldier, lame from a wound and broken in health, presented himself with a request a compliance with which would have placed the

General in the position of an applicant for a favor from an Administration with which he was not in political sympathy. As the man proceeded to tell a story of suffering, the fire began to flash from the eyes of the listener, and, as the tale was concluded and the request preferred, the General rose to his feet, paced the room and gave vent to unsuppressed indignation. The soldier sat, with amazement upon his face, not knowing whether he or others had provoked the storm.

“Don't you know that I can do nothing for you; that I have never asked a political favor of this Administration and that I never will?” he said, with the darkened look upon his face so threatening to his opponents. The poor soldier, wholly mistaken as to the moving impulse of the sympathizing man's excitement, stole out of the room, abashed and disappointed. The storm soon began to abate, and after a further half-hour's conversation, during which he had evidently been revolving something in his mind, he rose and said to Mrs. Logan: “Mary, I can ask nothing of this Administration myself, but I've got to do something for that poor fellow or I sha'n't sleep well to-night.” With these words he started to put into execution a plan that he had been silently considering, and which, while relieving the General from all personal obligation, soon brought to his astonished and grateful comrade all he had asked.

A laudable ambition to do everything well was still another of General Logan's characteristics. He was no pretender, no sciolist, in anything. What he did was well done, and the applause of his fellow-men was pleasing to him. While, as has been said, he was oblivious to his own rare merits of character, he was fully aware of his power. A man of strength, he possessed that assertion which self-consciousness of strength invariably brings; but he was not presumptive, nor was he despotic. He had the strength of a giant, but he never used it as a giant. A misrepresentation of his character in the respect now being considered asserted him to be scheming for the Presidency. Never was a charge more baseless. He would have been glad to be President, without doubt, because

he knew that he could be useful to his country, and because, too, it would have been an additional honor to those he had already received from his fellow-citizens. Is there an American who, with full belief that he could discharge the duties of the Presidency well, would not be glad to be President, or who would not be flattered by the recognition of personal merit which the selection for the position implies? One would not like to believe that there is. But the assertion that General Logan schemed for the Presidency is false in every sense. His honesty forbade it. One of his strongest traits, as before observed, was that he would never palter to any interest upon the ground of personal expediency.

Many proofs of this assertion could be found with little search; but for such proof the search need go no farther than the present book, which, notwithstanding the proximity of the next Presidential contest, was prepared for immediate publication by General Logan, under the full realization that it would awaken hostility against him within the circle of extended influence that he has so boldly attacked in the following pages. A friend conversed with him upon this very point in November last, when General Logan emphatically declared that he "would rather be the instrument for the reform of an abuse so vital to republican existence, than to be President of the United States."

The preceding review of the prominent traits of General Logan is necessarily more brief than a full consideration of his rare character would require of a biography proper. His greatness was not constituted of a single element, but was the product of a combination—a *tout ensemble*—of rare and striking qualities. He was considered a strong man, not simply because of his splendid physical build, but also because of the possession of those rugged qualities of leadership and command which caused him to tower far above the more than ordinary men among whom his life was spent. His powerful frame; his commanding presence; his resolute purpose; his magnificent courage, which often bordered upon the audacious; his disregard of all personal precautions against bodily ills; his

always animated face and ever sparkling eye, conveyed the idea of typical strength. Other men would talk with him of their own death as an unavoidable event; but no one ever suggested the idea of death in connection with John A. Logan, the very embodiment of all that is vigorous in life. He himself appeared never to have entertained the thought. In all the years of close personal intercourse which a near friend enjoyed, he does not remember even an allusion by the General to the possible event of his own death. The play of his mind ran above the perishable though stalwart body which actually inclosed and bore the mental organ. When the compelling messenger came to demonstrate that his iron-cased manhood was vulnerable as is all human life, it seemed wholly impossible to his friends to acquiesce in the absolute demonstration presented to their bewildered senses. There are those of his intimates who cannot yet realize that he is gone never to return. His devoted and grief-crushed wife still exclaims, in the agony of his protracted stay, "Oh, I never believed that my darling husband *could* die!"

The public services of General Logan were rendered in the double capacity of statesman and soldier. In the *forensis strepitus* his commanding form and lofty mental attributes were backed by that inscrutable magnetism which his presence everywhere inspired, and by an eloquence of speech whose special characteristics were peculiarly his own. With a deep, rich voice, the rise and fall of which seemed set to music; with flashing eye and speaking gesture; with intense earnestness and overwhelming logic, he achieved the very ideal of effective oratory. In pure extempore efforts some of his colleagues, as also some of his adversaries, might have surpassed him in the classicism of their diction, in the severe construction of their sentences, and in the perfect poise of their periods; but in the incomprehensible "something" upon which General Logan dwells in the present volume, and which gives a special character to all human productions and efforts, it may fairly be said that he had few rivals and

no superiors among the distinguished men of his time. He possessed this "something" to a remarkable extent, and one of its strongest characteristics in his case was its originality. No one who heard his public addresses several years ago, when the "fiat-money" theory appeared at its fullest tide, will forget how effectively General Logan demonstrated the fallacy of the doctrine by an illustration original, simple, and convincing. Holding up to the audience a Roman gold coin, of the era of the Empire, he would simply ask if that coin were worth as much now as when issued by the dead government which coined and gave it currency. Then, with the other hand holding aloft a bill of the Confederate States, he would naïvely inquire whether that piece of paper had any inherent value. The homely illustration went direct to the point, and needed no further elaboration.

The legislative record of the country for the past twenty years attests the important services in varied directions that General Logan rendered, and much of the benefit of wholesome legislation during the period mentioned is largely to be credited to his clear judgment and strong advocacy. Rich and valuable as have been his services in the legislative direction, there will be none to dispute that the ground upon which he will go into future history must cover his services not only as a statesman, but also as a soldier of the Republic.

Washington, Greene, Scott, Taylor, Kearney, and Grant were soldiers by gift of birth, and John A. Logan was their peer in natural endowment. His discourse upon the subject of an "inherent fitness" for the military profession, as contained in the following pages, assumes under his conclusive argument the character of exact demonstration. The one feature lacking to give it completeness is the absence of his own name from the generous list of those whom he characterizes as soldiers by natural inspiration. Admittedly he was the great volunteer General of the civil war; and no history of our country can be authentic which does not represent him as one of the central figures of that great conflict.

It may here be remarked that the word "volunteer" is used in this and in other parts of the memoir simply to represent the method by which one has become a soldier, and not to imply distinctions of quality pertaining to the two classes of military men. The author of this volume has annihilated the heretofore accepted dictum that the great soldier can only become such through academic training; while the general assumption of West Point officers of a superiority to the volunteer, by reason of the mere fact of graduation from a military school, became a demonstrated absurdity during the last war, through the lamentable failures of so large a proportion of them in actual battle. It is a fact resting upon a basis of ample proof, that the most serious of all mistakes made, and the most hurtful of all blunders committed during the civil conflict, were those of the regular army officers. General Logan was a volunteer soldier, but there was no regular officer that is now called who equaled the record of the former as a successful soldier. The record of General Logan is that he never made a mistake in any of his plans against the enemy; that he was never surprised nor deceived by the movements of his adversary; that he *was never defeated in any engagement or battle that he directed*. For what West Point officer may the same record be claimed? As will appear farther on, had his advice been followed by the regular officers superior to him in rank, though manifestly inferior in military skill, some very great mistakes with their serious consequences might have been avoided. Without anticipating what is to be spoken of in detail in a future chapter, Corinth and Atlanta may here be pointed to.

John A. Logan was a volunteer in the Mexican War at twenty years of age. In 1861 he relinquished a seat in Congress, abandoned party friends (being then a Democrat), and ruptured personal affiliations and kindred ties to take command of a volunteer regiment in defense of the Union. From the rank of colonel he rose through the intermediate grades to that of major-general, and in the remarkable series of battles comprising those of Belmont, Fort

Henry, Donelson, Corinth, Memphis, Port Gibson, Raymond, Champion Hills, Vicksburg, Resaca, the Big and the Little Kenesaw Mountain, Decatur, Atlanta, Jonesboro, and of those attending the marches through the Carolinas, General Logan bore a glorious and, it may be said, an indispensable part.

So full is the record of this able soldier that no requirement exists to dwell upon his military character and achievements in this memoir; and, but for an occurrence which has transpired since his lamented death, the memoir would be closed from this point. The third part of the present volume is devoted to "a demand for justice to the volunteer soldier," and the occurrence alluded to has devolved upon his friends the imperative duty to make a demand for justice to the distinguished and never-to-be-forgotten volunteer soldier John A. Logan.

How strange are the developments and the revenges of Time, and how marvelous it seems that the full exemplification of General Logan's truly great character should partly come through the disaster of his own death!

It is well known to all military men who participated in the Civil War that, after the death of General McPherson, General Logan was deprived of the promotion that rightfully belonged to him, which injustice was greatly increased by the publication of the "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," written ten years after the close of the war. In this work the author of the "Memoirs" gives to the world an explanation of the motives prompting him to the course pursued toward the great volunteer General, derogatory to the military ability and personal character of the latter, an explanation which the author of the "Memoirs" has since attempted to soften but which he has steadily refused to retract. The "Memoirs" were published in 1875, and up to the day of his death, eleven years later, General Logan held in his possession *personal* letters which of themselves constitute his full vindication. General Logan refused to give publicity to these letters because of their personal character, up to the period of his death, and they

would never have been given to the press by his friends under any other circumstance than that now to be mentioned.

To the end that the whole merits of the case may be understood, no apology seems to be needed for the quotation of various documents directly relating to the subject.

Upon the 17th of July, 1864, General Sherman with his army began the forward movement that resulted in the capture of Atlanta. The advance was attended with preliminary skirmishing, until upon the 22d the enemy made a temporarily successful move upon the left flank of the Union Army, and the battle of Atlanta, as it has since been called, was precipitated and fought. In the early morning of that day the commander of the main army (General Sherman) had issued an order¹ informing General McPherson, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, and directing him to move his army rapidly toward East Point. This order was borne to McPherson by Lieutenant Willard Warner, of General Sherman's staff. The former received the information with surprise, but at once proceeded to send an order to General Logan in furtherance of the instructions of his superior.² Doubting the correctness of the opinion as to the evacuation of Atlanta, McPherson ordered his

¹ "General Sherman believes that the enemy have evacuated Atlanta, and desires you to move rapidly forward beyond the city towards East Point, leaving General Dodge, of the Sixteenth Corps, upon the railroad to destroy it effectually."

² "THREE AND ONE-HALF MILES EAST OF ATLANTA, GA., July 22, 1864.

"Major-General John A. Logan, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps :

"The enemy having evacuated their works in front of our lines, the supposition of Major-General Sherman is that they have given up Atlanta, and are retreating in the direction of East Point.

"You will immediately put your command in pursuit to the south and east of Atlanta, without entering the town. You will seek a route to the left of that taken by the enemy, and try to cut off a portion of them while they are pressed in the rear and on our right by Generals Schofield and Thomas.

"Major-General Sherman desires and expects a vigorous pursuit.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

"JAMES B. MCPHERSON, Major-General."

horse and rode down to the headquarters of General Logan, to talk the matter over with him in person. General Logan was most positive that Atlanta had not been evacuated. Firing began almost immediately between the pickets, when the fact of an impending battle became indisputable. General Logan had already prepared his troops for march, under McPherson's written order; but, with the certainty of an attack, the order of General Sherman was disregarded, and General Logan took his command into line of battle under fire of the enemy. The latter had made a surprise so clever that in the absence of the cavalry under Garrard upon McPherson's flank, the orderlies and clerks at headquarters were formed into a picket, to keep off the enemy's skirmishers until the headquarters of the Army of the Tennessee could be moved to a place of safety. Then McPherson rode over to the commanding General's headquarters, to report the dispositions for the battle that he had made, in violation of the order of the early morning. Convinced of error regarding the supposed evacuation of Atlanta, the commanding General gave assent to McPherson's course. The exposed position of the Seventeenth Corps upon the left wing, caused by the order mentioned, had not been wholly covered at one o'clock, when McPherson rode out to see the progress of affairs. In passing along a narrow path he ran upon an ambuscade, was fired upon and killed.

Upon the death of McPherson, General Logan, as the senior officer in rank, took command of the Army of the Tennessee, by order of the commanding General. No orders whatever were issued to General Logan concerning the impending battle, or, if issued, as afterward stated, they were never received by him, and therefore the severe battle of that day was fought by General Logan according to his own plan and under his personal direction. Further still, the historic battle of the 22nd was fought almost alone by the Army of the Tennessee, and to the gallant soldiers and officers composing it, led by the irresistible Logan, who covered himself with unfading glory upon that eventful day, is due the

sole credit of the splendid victory which was the prelude to the fall of Atlanta.

By his previous record in all of the hard-fought battles of the West up to that point, by his brilliant success in leading the army to victory upon that memorable 22nd day of July, and by his actual seniority of rank, General Logan possessed a triple claim to promotion to the permanent command of the Army of the Tennessee, for which he was more competent at that moment than any officer then in the military division of the Mississippi, as has already been stated by General Grant in his published "Memoirs." This claim, as is well known, was disregarded; and another officer, General O. O. Howard, was called from a different department, in order to be placed in command of the laurel-crowned Army of the Tennessee.

The sublimity of General Logan's nature, and his possession of the qualities indispensable to the true soldier, were never more brilliantly demonstrated than at this threatened crisis, for crisis it could certainly have been made. Smarting under a sense of the injustice inflicted upon their leader, many of his gallant comrades advised him to resent it. General Logan felt the sting most keenly, but he was too much of a soldier to falter for a moment in his duty as a defender of his country. Although the ex-commander-in-general has openly stated otherwise, General Logan had no personal ambition save that to do his duty well; and the strongest refutation of the more than insinuation that as a "political general" he subordinated duty to self-interest, is to be found in the fact that he not only fell quietly back to his old command, but that his influence was successfully exerted to induce his friends to accept the injustice in the lofty spirit exhibited by himself.

Under the implied stigma of the injury now related General Logan fought through the war, and at its close returned to begin that brilliant legislative career of over twenty years with which his fellow-citizens are now familiar.

Some ten years after the close of the war, the "Memoirs" of

General Sherman were published. The author's account of the events succeeding the death of General McPherson is as follows:

"But it first became necessary to settle the important question of who should succeed General McPherson? General Logan had taken command of the Army of the Tennessee by virtue of his seniority, and had done well; *but I did not consider him equal to the command of three corps.* Between him and General Blair there existed a natural rivalry. Both were men of great courage and talent, but were *politicians* by nature and experience, and it may be that for this reason they were mistrusted by regular officers like Generals Schofield, Thomas and myself. It was all-important that there should exist a perfect understanding among the army commanders, and at a conference with General George H. Thomas at the headquarters of General Thomas J. Woods, commanding a division in the Fourth Corps, he (Thomas) remonstrated warmly against my recommending that General Logan should be regularly assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee by reason of his actual seniority. We discussed fully the merits and qualities of every officer of high rank in the army, and finally settled on Major-General O. O. Howard as the best officer who was present and available for the purpose; and on the 24th of July I telegraphed to General Halleck this preference, and it was promptly ratified by the President. General Howard's place in command of the Fourth Corps was filled by General Stanley, one of his division commanders, on the recommendation of General Thomas. *All these promotions happened to fall upon West Pointers, and doubtless Logan and Blair had some reason to believe that we intended to monopolize the higher honors of the war for the regular officers.* I remember well my own thoughts and feelings at the time, and feel sure that I was not intentionally partial to any class. I wanted to succeed in taking Atlanta, and needed commanders who were purely and technically soldiers, *men who would obey orders and execute them promptly and on time;* for I knew that we would have to execute some most delicate maneuvers, requiring the utmost skill, nicety, and precision. I believed that General Howard would do all these faithfully and well, and I think the result has justified my choice. *I regarded both Generals Logan and Blair as 'volunteers,' that looked to personal fame and glory as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, and not as professional soldiers.*"¹

When these lines were penned, ten years had elapsed since the occurrence to which they relate. General Logan had accepted the injury done him by a higher official, and had honorably completed his military service with the expiration of the war. He had buried all personal feeling of disappointment, and in the halls of Congress was rendering valuable aid to the difficult work of reconstruction. After the expiration of a decade the ex-commander of the Army of

¹Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 85. The italics are not the author's.

the West broke the silence of past events by the publication of his "Memoirs," in which General Logan was openly arraigned in the terms above quoted, and that, too, in a volume bearing the substantial character of an official record.

There need be no concealment of the fact that this last blow was severely felt by General Logan. And yet, like the man that he was, he neither resented it nor permitted his indignant friends to resent it for him, although through all those years he possessed some interesting documents, which will presently be given to the reader. Representations of a kindly character were made, however, by friends to the author of the "Memoirs," in appeal to his sense of justice, that he might be induced to undo a wrong which, with the generation of men cognizant of the facts, was more likely to injure him than to injure the object of the attack.

General Logan stifled the sense of injury a second time, and continued his efforts for usefulness to his country. Ten fateful years again flew by, when a message came to the venerated Logan which took him beyond the reach of life's fitful fever with all of its frightful apparitions.

In two days after the death of General Logan, the following correspondence was given to the New York *Tribune*, from which paper it is now reprinted:

NEW YORK, Dec. 28, 1886.

WHITELAW REID, ESQ.

Dear Sir: The recent sad and unexpected death of General John A. Logan makes it opportune, in my judgment, to make plain what otherwise might remain obscure, touching our personal relations. To this end I prefer to make public a correspondence between us in the month of February, 1883, which resulted from speeches made at the "Corkhill Banquet," given me on the 8th of that month in Washington, in anticipation of my retirement from the active command of the army. There were present at that banquet many most distinguished men: Justices Miller, Matthews, and McArthur; Senators Sherman, Logan, Hawley, and Allison; Mr. Speaker Keifer, of the House; General Sheridan, Mr. Henry Waterson, and others, who responded to toasts and sentiments. A full account of this banquet was at the time published, and I extract such parts of the remarks made by General Logan in response to the toast of "The Volunteer Soldier" as explain the succeeding correspondence:

"They were ready in the storm and in the sunlight; they were ready in dark-

ness or daylight: when orders came they marched, they moved, they fought; whether their guns were of the best quality or not; whether their clothing was adapted to their condition or not; whether their food was all they would have asked or not—was not the question with these men. The question was, ‘Where does Sherman want us to go, and when must we move?’ Sir, these men marched with him through valleys, over hills and mountains, across rivers and over marshes, and the only question asked in all these campaigns was, ‘Where is the enemy?’ There were no questions of numbers or time. And for General Sherman I will say that there was not a soldier who bore the American flag or followed it, not a soldier who carried the musket or drew a saber, who did not respect him as his commander. There was not one, sir, but would have drawn his sword at any time to have preserved his life. There is not one to-day, no matter what may be said, who would dim in the slightest degree the luster of that bright name, achieved by ability, by integrity, and by true bravery as an officer. And in conclusion let me say this: While that army, when it was disbanded, was absorbed in the community like rain-drops in the sand—all citizens in the twinkling of an eye, and back to their professions and their business—there is not one of these men, scattered as they are from ocean to ocean, who does not honor the name of the man who led them in triumph through the enemy’s land. Wherever he may go, wherever he may be, whatever may be his condition in life, there is not one who would not stretch out a helping hand to that brave commander who led them to glory. Speaking for that army, if I may be permitted to speak for it, I have to say: May the choicest blessings that God showers upon the head of man go with him along down through his life. It is the prayer of every soldier who served under him.”

GENERAL SHERMAN TO GENERAL LOGAN.

“WASHINGTON, D. C., Sunday, Feb. 11, 1883.

“GEN. JOHN A. LOGAN, *U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C.*

“*Dear General:* This is a rainy Sunday, a good day to clear up old scores, and I hope you will receive what I propose to write in the same friendly spirit in which I offer it.

“I was very much touched by the kind and most complimentary terms in which you spoke of me personally at the recent Corkhill banquet on the anniversary of my sixty-third birthday, and have since learned that you still feel a wish that I should somewhat qualify the language I used in my *Memoirs*, Volume II., pages 85 and 86, giving the reasons why General O. O. Howard was recommended by me to succeed McPherson in the command of the Army of the Tennessee, when by the ordinary rules of the service the choice should have fallen on you. I confess frankly that my ardent wish is to retire from the command of the army with the kind and respectful feelings of all men, especially of those who were with me in the days of the Civil War, which must give to me and to my family a chief claim on the gratitude of the people of the United States.

“I confess that I have tortured and twisted the words used on the pages referred to, so as to contain my meaning better without offending you, but so far without success. I honestly believe that no man to-day holds in higher honor than myself the conduct and action of John A. Logan from the hour when he

realized that the South meant war. Prior to the war all men had doubts, but the moment Fort Sumter was fired on from batteries in Charleston these doubts dissipated as a fog, and from that hour thenceforth your course was manly, patriotic, and sublime. Throughout the whole war I know of no single man's career more complete than yours.

"Now as to the specific matter of this letter. I left Vicksburg in the fall of 1863 by order of General Grant in person, with three divisions of my own corps (Fifteenth) and one of McPherson's (Sixteenth), to hasten to the assistance of the Army of the Cumberland (General Rosecrans commanding), which according to the then belief had been worsted at Chickamauga. Blair was with us, you were not. We marched through mud and water four hundred miles from Memphis, and you joined me on the march with an order to succeed me in command of the Fifteenth Corps, a Presidential appointment, which Blair had exercised temporarily. Blair was at that time a member of Congress, and was afterward named to command the Seventeenth Corps, and actually remained so long in Washington that we had got to Big Shanty before he overtook us. Again, after the battles of Missionary Ridge and Knoxville, when Howard served with me, I went back to Vicksburg and Meridian, leaving you in command of the Fifteenth Corps along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur. I was gone three months, and when I got back you complained to me bitterly against George H. Thomas that he claimed for the Army of the Cumberland everything and almost denied the Army of the Tennessee any use of the railroads. I sustained you, and put all army and corps commanders on an equal footing, making their orders and requisitions of equal force on the depot officers and railroad officials in Nashville. Thomas was extremely sensitive on that point, and, as you well know, had much feeling against you personally, which he did not conceal. You also went to Illinois more than once to make speeches and were so absent after the capture of Atlanta, at the time we started for Savannah, and did not join us until we had reached Savannah.

"Now I have never questioned the right or propriety of you and Blair holding fast to your constituents by the usual methods; it was natural and right, but it did trouble me to have my corps commanders serving two distinct causes, one military and the other civil or political; and this did influence me when I was forced to make choice of an army commander to succeed McPherson. This is all I record in my Memoirs; it was so, and I cannot amend them. Never in speech-writing, or record, surely not in the Memoirs, do I recall applying to you and Blair, for I always speak of you together, the term of 'political general.' If there be such an expression I cannot find it now, nor can I recall its use. The only place wherein the word 'politics' occurs is in the pages which I have referred to, and whereon I explain my own motive and reason for nominating Howard over you and Blair for the vacant post. My reason may have been bad; nevertheless, it was the reason which decided me then, and as a man of honor I was bound to record it. At this time, 1863, Thomas being dead, I cannot say any more than is in the text, viz.: that he took strong ground against you, and I was naturally strongly influenced by his outspoken opinion. Still I will not throw off on him, but state to you frankly that I then believed that the advice I gave Mr. Lincoln was the best practicable. General Howard had been with me up to Knoxville, and had displayed a zeal and ability which then elicited my hearty approbation; and as

I trusted in a measure to skillful maneuvers rather than to downright hard fighting, I recommended him. My Memoirs were designed to give the impressions of the hour, and not to pass judgment on the qualities of men as exemplified in after life.

"If you will point out to me a page or line where I can better portray your fighting qualities, your personal courage, and magnificent example in actual combat, I will be most happy to add to or correct the Memoirs; but when I attempt to explain my own motives or reasons, you surely will be the first man to see that outside influence will fail.

"My course is run, and for better or worse I cannot amend it; but if ever in your future you want a witness to your intense zeal and patriotism, your heroic personal qualities, you may safely call on me as long as I live. I surely have watched with pride and interest your career in the United States Senate, and will be your advocate if you aim at higher honors. I assert with emphasis that I never styled you or Blair 'political generals,' and if I used the word 'politics' in an offensive sense, it was to explain my own motives for action, and not as descriptive.

"Wishing you all honor and happiness on this earth, I am, as always, your friend,
W. T. SHERMAN."

GENERAL LOGAN TO GENERAL SHERMAN.

"Personal.

UNITED STATES SENATE,

"WASHINGTON, D. C., SUNDAY, February 18, 1883.

"GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

"*My Dear Sir:* I have delayed acknowledging your letter of the 11th inst. up to this time, for the reason that I have been so much engaged every moment of time that I could not sooner do so. For your expression of kindly feelings toward me, I tender my grateful acknowledgments.

"I am inclined, however, my dear General, to the opinion that, had you fully understood the situation in which I was placed at the times mentioned by you, that I returned North from the army for the purpose of taking part in the political contests then going on, that perhaps your criticism on my then course would not have been made. I did not do it for the purpose of 'keeping a hold on my people.' I refused a nomination in my own State for a very high position, for the reason that I would not have anything to do with parties while the war should last. In 1863, when I went home to canvass in Illinois, and to help in Ohio, General Grant was fully advised, and knows that, although I had to make application for leave of absence, I did not do it of my own volition, but at the request of those high in authority. So when I left on leave, after the Atlanta campaign, to canvass for Mr. Lincoln, I did it at the special and private request of the then President. This I kept to myself, and have never made it public; nor do I propose to do so now, but feel that I may in confidence say this to you, that you may see what prompted my action in the premises. I have borne, for this reason, whatever I may have suffered by way of criticism, rather than turn criticism on the dead.

"So far as General Thomas having feeling in the matter you mention, I presume he entertained the same feeling that seemed to be general, that no one with-

out a military education was to be trusted to command an army. This, I think, was the feeling then, and is now, and will ever be; I find no fault with it. This, as a rule, is probably correct, but the experience of the world has occasionally found exceptions to this rule. I certainly never gave General Thomas any occasion to have strong feelings against me. I did complain that I was not on an equality with him while I commanded between Decatur and Stevenson, that my passes on the roads were not recognized, and I have General Thomas' letter afterward, admitting the fact, and apologizing to me for the conduct of his officers in this matter. I at all times coöperated with him cordially and promptly during my stay at Huntsville, and at all other times subsequent. Certainly I did for him afterward what few men would have done. When ordered to Nashville with a view of superseding him, at Louisville, when I found the situation of matters, I wrote and telegraphed Grant that he, Thomas, was doing all he could, and asked to be ordered back to my own command, which was done. This I say to show my kind feeling for him, and to say that if I ever did anything to cause him to complain of me, I was not aware of it.

"One thing, my dear General, that I feel conscious of, and that is that no man ever obeyed your orders more promptly, and but few ever did you more faithful service in carrying out your plans and military movements than myself.

"I may have done yourself and myself an injustice, by not disclosing to you the cause of my returning North at the time I did, but you have my reasons for it, I felt in honor that I could rest.

"This letter is intended only for full explanation, and for yourself only. I do not feel aggrieved, as you think, but will ever remain your friend.

"Yours truly,

JOHN A. LOGAN."

I now, with reverence for his memory, admiration for his heroism in battle, and love for the man, hereby ratify and confirm every word of his letter of February 18, 1883.

I was fully conscious that General Logan felt deeply what he believed at the time a great wrong to himself, and that he yet continued, with unabated ardor, zeal, and strength, to fight to the end for the cause we both held sacred. For the twenty-one years since the war has ended we have been closely associated in the many army societies which treasure the memories of the war, have shared the same banquets, and spoken to the same audiences. Only recently, at San Francisco, Seattle, and Rock Island, we were together, each a rival to give pleasure and do honor to the other; and still later, within the past month, he was at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, his rooms next to mine, and not a night passed but we were together discussing old or new events. Both of us were men of strong opinions, sometimes of hasty expression, yet ever maintaining the friendship which two soldiers should bear to each other. Most undoubtedly did I expect him to survive me, and I have always expressed a wish that he, the then strongest type of the volunteer soldier alive, might become the President of the United States.

It is ordered otherwise; but as it is, he has left to his family a name and fame which could have been little increased had he lived to attain the office for which so many good men contend, spite of the experience of the past.

When the Society of the Army of the Tennessee holds its next meeting, in Detroit, next September, if living, I may have more to say on this subject.

Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

The reader will not fail to note that in the open, frank, *personal* letter of General Logan, under date of February 18, 1883, he explains to his former commander the true secret of his absence from the army and of his presence in the North during certain political campaigns, which secret reveals the simple fact that the absence was not in compliance with his own desire, but in obedience to the personal request of President Lincoln. He takes pains to state in the letter that he had never made this request public, and that, having no purpose to do so, he had "suffered criticism, rather than turn criticism on the dead."

A perusal of the correspondence, as published in the *Tribune*, will prompt the impartial reader to ask why, if it were meant to render belated justice to General Logan, it was not published with the consent of the General while living; or why, publication being delayed until after his decease, it was not published with the consent of his family and friends. If there were any possible vindication in the communication of General Sherman herein quoted, General Logan would never have availed himself of it under the possible necessity of being compelled to divulge a secret which, without the knowledge of attendant circumstances, might tarnish the fame of a martyred hero, nor would General Logan's friends, with full knowledge of his sentiments, have consented to the publication after his death of a confidence that he had guarded so religiously during life.

The pure character and unselfish official career of Abraham Lincoln need no further eulogy from his countrymen to insure just appreciation of that great man, at the present day or in future time, but the connection is a suitable one in which to offer such remarks upon the political incidents of General Logan's military life as may here be made.

The following quotation from the "Memoirs" of General

Grant (vol. I, p. 243) will recall General Logan's political position at the outbreak of the war and furnish the key to the subsequent difficult position in which he was placed :

“ The ten regiments which had volunteered in the State service for thirty days,” says General Grant, “ it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the National service if called upon within that time. When they volunteered, the Government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. Men were called now for three years or the war. They felt that this change of period released them from the obligations of re-volunteering. When I was appointed colonel, the Twenty-first Regiment was still in the State service. About the time they were to be mustered into the United States service—such of them as would go—two members of Congress from the State, McClernand and Logan, appeared at the capital, and I was introduced to them. I had never seen either of them before, but I had read a great deal about them, and particularly about Logan, in the newspapers. Both were Democratic members of Congress, and Logan had been elected from the Southern district of the State, where he had a majority of *eighteen thousand over his Republican competitor*. His district had been settled originally by people from the Southern States, and at the breaking-out of secession they sympathized with the South. At the first outbreak of war some of them joined the Southern army; *many others were preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the Union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which the National troops had to pass in Southern Illinois as it was in Kentucky or any of the border slave States. Logan's popularity in this district was unbounded. He knew almost enough of the people by their Christian names to form an ordinary Congressional district. As he went in politics, so his district was sure to go.* The Republican papers had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. Some were very bitter in their denunciations of his silence. Logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by threats. He did, however, come

out in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of Congress which was convened by the President soon after his inauguration, and announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the Union. But I had not happened to see that speech, so that when I first met Logan my impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. The gentleman who presented these two members of Congress asked me if I would have any objections to their addressing my regiment. I hesitated a little before answering. It was but a few days before the time set for mustering into the United States service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or for the war. I had some doubt as to the effect a speech from Logan might have, but as he was with McClernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were well known, I gave my consent. McClernand spoke first, and Logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equaled since for force and eloquence. *It breathed a loyalty and devotion to the Union which inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear arms against it. They entered the United States service almost to a man.*

“General Logan went to his part of the State and gave his attention to raising troops. *The very men who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in Southern Illinois became the defenders of the Union. Logan entered the service himself, as colonel of a regiment, and rapidly rose to the rank of major-general. His district, which had promised at first to give much trouble to the Government, filled every call made upon it for troops without resorting to the draft. There was no call made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for. That Congressional district stands credited at the War Department today with furnishing more men for the army than it was called upon to supply.*”

This frank and generous statement of the great commander of the Union hosts sets forth in forcible terms the political influence which General Logan possessed at the outbreak of hostilities, and

the inestimable service that this single man rendered to his imperiled country. Much could be added to it, in illustration of the sacrifices of a personal nature that he was compelled to make in adopting the course pursued. Full justice for these sacrifices must be left to his biographers proper.

The remarkable power possessed by General Logan at the beginning of the war was added to, year by year, until the period of his death; and it came to be recognized that as Logan went, so went not only his old district, but also the State of Illinois. His following then, and in all of the after years, was so largely *personal* in character, that a very grave political question, it is to be feared, has been presented to his party by his premature taking-off.

But to resume the principal topic. The preliminary proclamation of emancipation had been issued upon the 22d of September 1862, and the fall elections of that year had resulted in the defeat of the Republicans in the pivotal States of New York, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Upon the 1st of January, 1863, the formal Proclamation of Emancipation was issued. It is unnecessary in this connection to dwell upon the position of the Government at that time. No one knew better than President Lincoln himself the legal weakness of that proclamation, and probably no one foresaw more clearly than he its possible effects in alienating the war element of the Northern Democrats from the support of the Administration in the prosecution of hostilities. As the year wore on, and the fall elections once more approached, the danger of a majority in the Lower House adverse to the continuance of the war began seriously to be felt. It was a period of deep apprehension with those realizing the situation. At such a crisis what was more natural than that the Administration, in the effort to avail itself of every agency in the election of a Congress that would vote the means necessary to carry on the war, should request the man who had shown himself possessed of the magnetic power in Illinois, described by General Grant, and who was known to be almost as influential in the neighboring State of Indi-

ana, more doubtful in loyalty still than Logan's own State, to come back for a short period, in order to lend as effective aid to the Union at home as any single man could possibly render at the front?

General Logan had resigned a seat in Congress, to which he had been just elected, to go to the war. He had been importuned in the summer of 1862 to return from the army, and to again accept a seat in Congress. This request had been refused by him in a letter of lofty patriotism, in which he declared that he could have no political aspiration while the war lasted. But, to further the cause of the Union, he returned for a brief period in 1863, to a duty at home which no one could perform as well as he.

In the fall of 1864 the Presidential question was again impending, and, though Atlanta had fallen, the opposition to the war had grown to alarming proportions, and through its nomination of a former Union general, the result of the election seemed not at all assured to the Republicans. Another appeal was made to the man who, on forum and field, had proven himself a Colossus in defense of country. Again he returned to his home, and after the election of an Administration pledged to a maintenance of the Union, and to the prosecution of the war until the defeat of rebellion had become an accomplished fact, he went back to his active command, and remained in the field until the close of hostilities.

It hardly need be said that the call upon General Logan by President Lincoln in no sense implied the base personal motive that has been imputed to it since the ill-advised publication of the private letters between the first-named and General Sherman, in 1883. The prime object of the patriotic Lincoln and his co-laborers was to save the Union by placing its destinies in the hands of its friends.

The foregoing relation covers the precise basis upon which the charge that Logan was a "political general" rests. The author of General Sherman's "Memoirs," in his letter of February 11, 1883, heretofore given, distinctly denies using the word "politics" in the work mentioned as applied to Generals Logan and Blair, anywhere

else than as used in the pages which have already been quoted. The following paragraph, however, is to be found in the "Memoirs" (vol. II., page 130):

"All the army, officers and men, seemed to relax more or less, and sink into a condition of idleness" [after the capture of Atlanta]. "General Schofield was permitted to go to Knoxville, to look after the matters in his department of the Ohio, and Generals *Blair and Logan went home to look after politics.*"

Is there no sarcasm in that closing sentence? Had they failed to go home "to look after politics" in assistance of other efficient workers at the home end of the contest, what condition, it may be asked, might have confronted the brave boys in blue at the very beginning of "the march to the sea"?

Now that the admission of General Logan's letter to General Sherman, of February 18, 1883, has been made public, the reminder will be permitted that General Grant in his "Memoirs" corroborates the assertion of the letter, though the contained fact is delicately and impersonally stated in the following words: "Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. About this time they left to take part in the Presidential election which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus and Ransom. *I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the War Department.*" (Memoirs of General Grant, vol. II., p. 352.)

Arrived at this point, new evidence of General Logan's remarkable character will be presented to demonstrate not only that he was one of the 'most unselfish and one of the most punctiliously honorable of men, but also that he possessed those very features of strict subordination and unambitious patriotism that should ever characterize the soldier of the Republic. The documents now to be given were in General Logan's possession from the date they bear to the period of his death. They tell an interesting story, the disclosure of which is fully warranted by the publication of General Logan's private letter of February 18, 1883.

The battle of Atlanta had been fought and won on the 22nd of July, 1864, by General Logan and the superb Army of the Tennessee. The General had executed a most brilliant and perilous movement, under cover of darkness, upon the night of July 27, by which his army was swung into a new and better position. His soldiers were filled with enthusiasm for their daring and brilliant leader, and they, as well as he, expected that he would be given the promotion to which he was entitled. Instead of receiving this promotion, however, a West Point officer was called from a department of the East, though then personally present in the West, and placed in command of the Army of the Tennessee, in contravention of the equities of the case, as also of the interests of the country. As a supplement to this act the author of General Sherman's "Memoirs" (published, as before said, ten years after the close of the war) declared, in explanation of the motive through which General Logan was deprived of the promotion, that he, the author, did not consider General Logan "*equal to the command of three corps.*"

The following documents will give the opinion of the author of the "Memoirs" at the date of the occurrence itself:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
"IN THE FIELD, NEAR ATLANTA, GA., July 27, 1864.

"GENERAL JOHN A. LOGAN.

"*Dear General:* Take a good rest. I know you are worn out with mental and physical work. No one could have a higher appreciation of the responsibility that devolved on you so unexpectedly, and the noble manner in which you met it. I fear you will feel disappointed at not succeeding permanently to the command of the army and department. I assure you, in giving preference to General Howard I will not fail to give you every credit for having done so well. You have command of a good corps, a command that I would prefer to the more complicated one of a department, *and if you will be patient it will come to you soon enough. Be assured of my entire confidence.*

"After you have rested come down to General Davis' position, and then to the new position of your corps. Assume command of it, and things will move along harmoniously and well. If I can do anything to mark my full sense of the honorable manner in which you acted in the battle and since, name it to me frankly and I will do it. General Howard and I will go off to the right, to survey the new field and prepare the way for the troops. Your friend,

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General."

The italics are not part of the original document.

It will be observed that this letter breathes a tone of confidence not to be mistaken in the military ability of General Logan, while the open assurance that if the latter would be patient "the more complicated command of a department" *would come soon enough*, discloses the commanding General's opinion of General Logan as a soldier after the battle of Atlanta. This opinion stands in remarkable contrast with the statement of the "Memoirs" above quoted, viz.: that the commanding General failed to promote General Logan to the vacant post because he did not consider him equal to the command of three corps. General Logan had commanded three corps that very day, and had won a brilliant victory. The prestige of actual demonstration already belonged to him. Nor will the further tribute of the above letter to General Logan's character pass the observant reader. So impressed was the commander with the noble bearing of his subordinate, that he expressed his entire willingness to do anything that he could to mark his full sense of the honorable manner in which he (General Logan) "had acted in the battle and since."

This was not the first expression made by the same officer upon General Logan's capabilities as a soldier. The latter, it will be remembered, had been named brigadier-general for gallant services, at the instance of General Grant, and his confirmation to this rank was made March 3d, 1862. In the operations before Corinth, General Logan's brigade was placed under orders of General Sherman, and in the affairs of May 28th and 29th, 1862, General Logan's services were of such importance as to elicit the warm acknowledgments of his superiors. These were made in an official report, dated May 30th, in which report General Sherman says: "I feel under special obligation to this officer, General Logan, who, during the two days he served under me, held critical ground on my right, extending down to the railroad. All that time he had in his front a large force of the enemy, but so dense was the foliage that he could not reckon their strength save from what he could see on the railroad track."

The narrative is momentarily interrupted at this point with the purpose to relate an incident before Corinth which is strongly illustrative of the military sagacity of General Logan, and which also places in contrast the practical acumen of the volunteer with the set methods and the dogmatic rules of the mere academic soldier.

When the advance was being slowly but cautiously made upon Corinth, after the battle of Shiloh, General Logan, being stationed near the railroad, was induced, through circumstances related by some of his men, to believe that the rebels were evacuating Corinth. With ears to the rails he could hear through the quiet of the night trains entering Corinth empty and going out loaded. Satisfied that the enemy was about to retreat, he informed General Grant of his belief, who reported it to General Halleck, then at the head of the Western Department as organized at that time. General Halleck impatiently declared that General Logan was mistaken, and substantially said that, being only a "volunteer, he did not know what he was talking of." A little later Logan assured himself more firmly than before of the correctness of his opinion, and again reported it through Grant to the General commanding. Halleck, with an oath, declared that the enemy was receiving reinforcements with every incoming train, and that the next day would witness a fierce battle. Further than this, he unreservedly told General Grant that if Logan sent any more reports of that kind he would have him placed under arrest. This is stated upon undeniable authority, though General Grant, in his own "Memoirs," with his usual charity, omits this part of the facts in relating the occurrence.

When day returned and the General commanding the Union forces ventured a reconnoissance, it was found that the enemy had fled from Corinth, and thus it became demonstrated that, had the advice of the volunteer General to attack at once been followed, the rebel army, surprised at night upon the retreat, would, in all probability, have been wholly captured, and the war abbreviated

in consequence by a very considerable period of time. This sad mistake was made, not by a volunteer officer, but by General Halleck, the "Old Brains" of the regular army.

After the battle of Raymond, which was so splendidly won by Logan and his brave men through the impetuous assault upon the rebel line under Gregg, General Logan's ability was so manifest that Grant has said of him at this stage of his career as follows: "I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army, and both equal to a much higher command." (Memoirs of General Grant, vol. I., p. 497.)

After the brilliant series of battles that finally led to the fall and occupation of Vicksburg, in all of which General Logan bore a conspicuous part, the great leader of the Union armies, who was no less generous than great — an attribute which, it may be said in passing, is an inseparable accompaniment of all real greatness — records his admiration of General Logan's military genius in the statement that he "ended the campaign *fitted to command an independent army.*" (Memoirs, vol. I., p. 573.)

This was the testimony of General Grant, that superb man and soldier, in July, 1863, while the private letter of General Sherman, under date of July 27, 1864, above given, not only bore a like testimony, but declared that the command itself would come soon enough, with patience.

It is well known to the reader familiar with the history of the Civil War that General Hooker, a brilliant West Point officer, then commanding the Twentieth Army Corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi, under General Sherman, also expected to be transferred to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and that because he failed to receive it he sulked and asked to be relieved of his command during the advance upon the enemy.

This action of General Hooker created much sensation among regular army officials, while the palpable injustice done to General Logan and his lofty bearing under the wound gave rise to com-

ments that induced the commanding General to again attempt the defense of his course. Under date of August 16, something more than a fortnight after the first letter to General Logan, heretofore given, General Sherman addressed to him a communication of which the following is a verbatim copy, with the exception of the italics :

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

“IN THE FIELD, —, August 16, 1864.

“*General Logan* : I made a letter (official) to the War Department, explanatory of certain matters personal to yourself and others, and instructed Dayton to furnish you a copy. He says he has done so. I intended to have sent it you with a private note. I think my official letter ought to be satisfactory to you, and if so, *you are at liberty to furnish a copy of the part relating to yourself to your friends at home, and you may even publish the part named. But keep the original and be careful not to give copy of the part relating to Hooker to any person.* The War Department has a right to the fullest intelligence, but it is not well to publish our opinions when controverted, as they lead to discussions which cannot do any good; *but I do think, as between you and Hooker, no soldier or gentleman will hesitate to say that if I did injustice to either or both, you have best vindicated yourself by standing fast. You will never lose by such a course, and I hope, even now, you feel so.*

“Your friend,

“W. T. SHERMAN.”

The official report which accompanied this second letter is as follows :

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

“IN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, GA., August 16, 1864.

“MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.:

“*General*: It occurs to me that preliminary to a future report of the history of this campaign, I should record certain facts of great personal interest to officers of this command.

“General McPherson was killed by the musketry fire at the beginning of the battle of July 22. He had in person selected the grounds for his troops, constituting the left wing of the army; I being in person with the center—General Schofield.

“The moment the information reached me I sent one of my staff to announce the fact to General John A. Logan, the senior officer present with the Army of the Tennessee, with general instructions to maintain the ground chosen by McPherson if possible, but if pressed too hard to refuse his left flank; but at all events to hold the railroad and main Decatur road; that I did not propose to move or gain ground by that flank, but rather by the right; and that I wanted the Army of the Tennessee to fight it out unaided. General Logan admirably conceived my orders and executed them, and if he gave ground on the left of the Seventeenth Corps it was properly done by my orders; but he held a certain hill by the right

division of the Seventeenth Corps, the only ground on that line the possession of which by an enemy would have damaged us by giving a reverse fire on the remainder of the troops. General Logan fought that battle out as required, unaided; save by a small brigade sent by my orders from General Schofield to the Decatur road, well to the rear, when it was reported the enemy's cavalry had got into the town of Decatur and was approaching directly on the rear of Logan; but that brigade was not disturbed, and was replaced that night by a part of the Fifteenth Corps next to Schofield, and Schofield's brigade brought back so as to be kept together on its own line. General Logan managed the Army of the Tennessee well during his command, and it may be that an unfair inference might be drawn to his prejudice because he did not succeed to the permanent command. I was forced to choose a commander not only for the army in the field, but of the Department of the Tennessee, covering a vast extent of country, with troops well dispersed. It was a delicate and difficult task, and I gave preference to Major-General O. O. Howard, then in command of the Fourth Army Corps, in the Department of the Cumberland. Instead of giving my reasons, I prefer that the wisdom of the choice be left to the test of time.

"The President kindly ratified my choice, and I am willing to assume the responsibility. I meant no disrespect to any officer, and hereby declare that General Logan submitted with the grace and dignity of a soldier, gentleman, and patriot, resumed the command of his corps proper (Fifteenth), and enjoys the love and respect of his army and his commanders. It so happened that on the 28th of July I had again thrown the same army to the extreme right, the exposed flank, when the enemy repeated the same maneuver, striking in mass the extreme corps deployed in line, and refused as a flank (the Fifteenth, Major-General Logan) and he commanded in person. General Howard and myself being near, and that corps as heretofore reported, repulsed the rebel army completely, and next day advanced and occupied the ground fought over, and the road the enemy sought to cover. General Howard, who had that very day assumed his new command, unequivocally gives General Logan all the credit possible, and I also beg to add my most unqualified admiration of the bravery, skill, and nerve, more yet, good sense, that influenced him to bear a natural disappointment, and do his whole duty like a man. If I could bestow on him substantial reward it would afford me unalloyed satisfaction, but I do believe in the consciousness of acts done from noble impulses, and gracefully admitted by his superiors in authority, he will be contented.

"He already holds the highest known commission in the army, and it is hard to say how we can better manifest our applause.

"At the time of General Howard's selection Major-General Hooker commanded the Twentieth Army Corps in the Army of the Cumberland, made up for his special accommodation out of the old Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, whereby Major-General Slocum was deprived of his corps command. Both the law and practice are and have been to fill vacancies in the higher army commands by selection. Rank or dates of commission have not controlled, nor am I aware that any reflection can be inferred unless the junior be placed immediately over the senior; but in this case General Hooker's command was in no way disturbed. General Howard was not put over him, but in charge of a distinct and separate army, no indignity was offered or intended, and I must say that General Hooker

was not justified in retiring. At all events, had he spoken or written to me, I would have made every explanation and concession he could have expected, but could not have changed my course, because, then as now, I believed it right and for the good of our country and cause. As a matter of justice, General Slocum, having been displaced by the consolidation, was deemed by General Thomas as entitled to the vacancy created by General Hooker's voluntary withdrawal, and has received it.

With great respect,

“W. T. SHERMAN,

“Major-General Commanding.

“Official Copy.

“L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.”

The interesting character of these documents will appear at a glance. They tell a faithful story of the prevailing indignation caused by the injustice done to the gallant Logan, while they bring their author to the witness-stand in defense of the injured man. No praise could be greater than that so freely bestowed upon him who proved conclusively by his conduct through the bitter ordeal that, as a man, his character was most lofty; that as a soldier, he was the peer of any of his contemporaries; and that, as a patriot, his whole impulse was most unselfish. After perusal of these documents, it seems difficult indeed to realize that the writer of General Sherman's "Memoirs" could have publicly declared the opinion that General Logan as an officer was incompetent to command "three corps," and that he could more than intimate that, as a soldier, he subordinated the military character to political ambition. In view of the resentful course pursued by the West Pointer, General Hooker, the writer of the letter of August 16 was ready to affirm that, if he had done injustice to either (Logan or Hooker), *Logan had best vindicated himself by standing fast*. A volume could render no higher tribute to the soldier than these few words of the commanding General.

A curious confirmation of this testimony is presented by another letter, which may now be given to the public, since it leaves its author in no worse position than his published record in this connection has already left him.

If the West Point officer commanding the Military Division of the Mississippi was lavish in his tributes to the great volunteer, the

professional soldier, who believed himself a victim of the same blow dealt to General Logan, was not less sparing of praise when declaring that he could have remained under the command of General Logan without the sacrifice of honor and principle.

The following document completes the list of papers herein presented to the public as part of the history of this remarkable occurrence:

“HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH CORPS, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
“NEAR ATLANTA, GA., JULY 27, 1864.

“MAJOR-GENERAL LOGAN.

“*Dear General:* On receiving news this morning that Major-General Howard had been assigned to the command of your army, I asked to be relieved from duty with this army, it being an insult to my rank and services. *Had you retained the command I could have remained on duty without the sacrifice of honor or of principle.* As it is, God bless and protect you. We will meet when this war is over.

“Your friend and servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

“Major-General.”

As a continuing climax to this overwhelming array of testimony in proof of General Logan's splendid military ability, the following statement of the great captain of the Union armies may here be quoted:

“Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of Atlanta, having passed successively through all the grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division, and army corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly-contested battle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as a commander in that engagement, and I can bear testimony from personal observation that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive which actuated Sherman in taking

an officer from another army to supersede General Logan. I have no doubt whatever that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; *though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as Logan would have done.*"¹

A point in the career of General Logan which bears closely upon the subject under consideration remains to be touched upon.

The General commanding the Military Division of the Mississippi had told General Logan, in his letter of July 27, 1864, herein quoted, that the command of a Department would come soon enough to him (Logan), if he would but be patient. Within less than six months thereafter, the prediction was fulfilled in a wholly unexpected manner. The incident about to be related has received many versions, but, owing to the modesty of General Logan, no one of them has been wholly correct. The authentic account is now given of an act which of itself is sufficient to prove the singularly pure character of General Logan, and to furnish a triumphant release from the false position in which he was placed before, and the doubly embarrassing one in which he was fixed after, the publication of the "Memoirs" of General Sherman.

When the march to the sea was about to be commenced, the rebel General Hood was left in the rear of General Sherman's army, under the expectation that General Thomas would be well able to take care of him. Thomas was at Nashville, and Hood boldly invested the position of the latter at that point. General Grant, with the fear that Hood would succeed in passing north of the Cumberland River, and thus create a panic in the Northern States, became very urgent that Thomas, whose force was superior to that of Hood's, should move against the latter. Thomas delayed until Grant threatened to displace him if he did not move at once. Even this menace did not induce him to give bat-

¹Memoirs of General Grant, vol. II., page 353.



GENERAL LOGAN HURRYING FROM CONGRESS TO THE FIELD OF BULL RUN.

tle to the enemy. Upon this state of the case General Grant sent General Logan, whom the former says in his "Memoirs" he "knew to be a gallant and efficient officer," to relieve Thomas at Nashville. Logan took the order, as bound to do by duty, and started to the West; but, instead of proceeding to Nashville with all haste he remained in Cincinnati for some time, with the purpose of giving Thomas a fair opportunity to move if he intended to. Reaching Louisville on the 17th of December, General Logan found that news had just arrived there of Thomas' brilliant battle of the 15th, which news he immediately telegraphed to General Grant, and prepared to return to his own command under Sherman.

Growing out of this occurrence, a question was subsequently raised in the interest of General Schofield, who at that time commanded the Army of the Ohio. This question lasted long after the close of the war, and drew forth two letters from General Grant to General Logan upon the subject, dated respectively January 25, 1884, and February 14, 1884. As tending still further to place General Logan's magnanimous course in this episode wholly beyond question, extracts from both letters mentioned are here given:

"NEW YORK CITY, January 25, 1884.

"GENERAL JOHN A. LOGAN, WASHINGTON, D. C.

"*My Dear General:* * * * P. S. I recollect some years after the Rebellion that General Schofield asked me if I intended his supersedure by your going to relieve General Thomas, and that I told him I had not. He was in command of the Army of the Ohio by assignment of the President, and General Thomas was in command of the Army of the Cumberland by a similar assignment. The two armies coming together naturally fell under Thomas, who was the senior. Whether your order, as written, would have given you command of the whole without regard to seniority, it is impossible for me to say now without seeing the order. If it did not, you would naturally have commanded the whole by reason of seniority if you were the senior, and my recollection is you were. General Schofield, I remember, was appointed a major-general before you were, but not confirmed by the Senate, and was not, if my recollection serves me right, confirmed as a major-general when I took command of the military division, but I assigned him to the command of the Army of the Ohio, and he was afterwards confirmed, but I do not know of what date.

"Very truly yours,

U. S. GRANT,

"Per F. F. WOOD."

"UNITED BANK BUILDING, WALL STREET AND BROADWAY,

"NEW YORK, February 14, 1864.

"HON. JOHN A. LOGAN, U. S. SENATE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

"*Dear Sir:* In reply to your letter of the 11th, I have to say that my response must be from memory entirely, having no data at hand to refer to, but in regard to the order for you to go to Louisville and Nashville for the purpose of relieving General Thomas, I never thought of the question of who should command the combined armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio. I was simply dissatisfied with the slowness of General Thomas' moving, and sent you out with orders to relieve him. No doubt if the order had been carried out the question would immediately have arisen as to who was entitled to the combined command, provided General Schofield was senior in rank to you, which I do not know that he was. I know that his confirmation as a major-general took place long after yours, but I do not know the date of his commission. The question in that case of the command of the whole would have been settled in a very few hours by the use of the telegraph between Nashville and Washington. I was in Washington when you arrived at Louisville and telegraphed me that General Thomas had moved, *and, as I remember the telegram, expressing gratification that he had done so.* I was then on my way to Nashville myself, and remained over a day in Washington hoping that Thomas might still move. Of course I was gratified when I learned that he had moved, because it was a very delicate and unpleasant matter to remove a man of General Thomas' character and standing before the country, but still I had urged him so long to move that I had come to think it a duty.

"Of course in sending you to relieve General Thomas I meant no reflection whatever upon General Schofield, who was commanding the Army of the Ohio, because I thought that he had done very excellent service in punishing the entire force under Hood a few days before, some twenty-five miles south of Nashville.

Very truly yours,

"U. S. GRANT,

"Per FRANK F. WOOD."

The italics do not appear in the original document.

This testimony, offered by General Grant himself, will shed additional luster upon the character of John A. Logan, the unselfish, unambitious, patriotic volunteer of the Rebellion. Had General Logan really been a spurious soldier, compounded of political influence and military pretension; had it been true that he entered the army to subserve personal and political ambition, this was the opportunity that he would have eagerly embraced to grasp not only the command of a single army department, but a possible, and perhaps a probable, double command of the combined armies of Thomas and Schofield. General Logan, being well aware, too, at the time of its occurrence, of the circumstance sub-

sequently stated in the "Memoirs" of General Sherman, viz.: that General Thomas had determinedly remonstrated with the commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi against the promotion of the former to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, made vacant by the death of McPherson, would have here found the presenting opportunity, not only to subserve the aspirations of a vaulting ambition, but also to administer retributive justice, or injustice, as one may view the case.

A professional soldier of the stamp so well depicted in the present volume might have grasped the opportunity with eager haste. But General Logan was not that sort of soldier. He had no petty feelings of revenge in the make-up of his noble character. He never met an enemy in that kind of way. He believed Thomas to be capable and that his delay in moving was unavoidable. The volunteer soldier scorned to win preferment at the expense of a competent officer. The horse may be led to the water, but he cannot be compelled to drink. General Logan started to comply with the order of his chief, but he delayed its execution in order to give General Thomas every opportunity to save his reputation, and when information of Thomas' victory reached him at Louisville he telegraphed the news to General Grant and expressed his satisfaction with the result, as will now be seen by the letters just given.

This plain recital of facts not to be disproved sweeps away many aspersions against General Logan and places him before his countrymen upon a pinnacle of greatness. No fair judge, after learning the indisputable truth, can fail to accord to him the qualities of a rare military genius and of a man of remarkable personal character.

There are men too ungenerous to acknowledge an error, and there are others too selfish to entertain the idea of even-handed justice, much less to give it practical application. All men are liable to err in judgment. Says the Hippocratic maxim, "Art is long, life is short, experience deceptive, and judgment difficult." If a mistake as to General Logan's military and personal character

had been made, how nobler would its prompt and frank acknowledgment have been?

Standing in the clearer light of the present day and under the full illumination of all the facts connected with the injury done to the volunteer soldier in the person of General Logan, can any one fail to recognize its true cause in the moving influence and inspiration of the professional military man, the product of a system whose evil character has been so well depicted and so strongly arraigned by General Logan in the present volume? General Grant, "an accident of the system," was one of the most capable soldiers America has produced, and, while possessed of the sterling genius of a great leader, he was also endowed with the high impulses and the generous nature of a true soldier. He made the mistakes common to humanity, but there is no instance upon record showing him to have been slow in recognizing and in acknowledging them.

No purpose is here entertained to assault personal motives nor to make acrimonious charges against personal character. The full statement of the facts connected with the grossest injury ever done to General Logan has been made in this paper with the principal purpose to render tardy justice to his character in a volume which will, probably, reach every military reader of the country, as well as all civilians having an interest in public affairs; and it has been made with the secondary purpose to offer the incident itself as one of the strongest proofs possible to be adduced of the errors of our present military system, so ably discussed by General Logan in the present work. There is reason to suppose that the commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi had no wish to injure General Logan personally; and there is every inducement to believe that his action in the case was purely the outgrowth of his professional military education. It has been said in these pages and elsewhere that General Braddock, the professional officer, could not accept the advice of the volunteer soldier and aide, George Washington, "because the military edu-

cation " of the former " was against it." In the case of the flagrant wrong perpetrated upon the volunteer General John A. Logan by the regular officer we are presented with a glaring instance of the dangers of an exclusive military establishment as " the repository of the military knowledge of the country ;" and we are urgently admonished thereby of the necessity to correct the system by diffusing military education among the people at large, and by committing the defense and honor of the country to their safer keeping.

The life-work of the lamented Logan is completed. He died after a long public service, with the honors of an appreciative people thickly heaped upon him. No mere sketch like the present could do more than outline his great character and touch upon the prominent points of his splendid career. He was not wholly understood by his contemporaries, and by many he was wholly misconceived. Removed from the arena of life, and safe from the attacks caused by personal promptings, he will be better known and understood in the future as his extraordinary character is more fully depicted and his great services to the country become more familiarized to the people at large. He was the equal in many of his forensic attributes of such statesmen and orators as Jefferson, Hamilton, Webster, and Clay; while a comprehensive survey of his military character and record will not fail to inspire the belief that he was possessed of great military possibilities. With prescience as great as that of Wellington, the inspiration of his leadership was as marvelous as that of Napoleon I. With all the ability of the former to plan a campaign, he was as irresistible in its execution as the latter. Like Napoleon at Lodi, and elsewhere, he *led* his troops to the fight. Unlike many great generals, he never directed them from the rear.

Under the restrictions of our system it is difficult to call into full development the inherent military genius of the simple American citizen; while, by reason of the non-military character of the Government itself, but little opportunity is offered to create great

leaders whose qualities as soldiers may bear comparison with the noted conquerors of the older world.

The author of this volume, speaking from the standpoint of the volunteer soldier, has exhibited to the view of his readers the discrimination of the Government—as directed by the regular army influence—against the citizen-soldier; while the incident connected with his own military career, already dwelt upon in this memoir, whereby his rise to more important commands indisputably was arrested by reason of his non-professional military character, gives practical exemplification of the disheartening conditions under which inborn military talent is compelled to fight its way to recognition.

Upon the other side of the case, though the military opportunities of the nation are unstintedly held out to the professional soldiers educated at its National Academy, the extensive and continued practice of war, so necessary to the achievement of superlative military eminence, is lacking under the traditional peace policy of the American Government. It was the opinion of Napoleon Bonaparte, as it has been, also, of other noted modern captains, that Hannibal, in consideration of all his attributes, is entitled to be deemed the greatest soldier ever produced in any age or country. But Hannibal was reared in a camp from the age of eleven years, and accompanied his father, a distinguished soldier, in all of the latter's campaigns. Bonaparte himself was upon the battle-field during nearly the whole period of his adult life up to the time of his permanent imprisonment. No such opportunities as those possessed by the soldiers named for acquiring the art of war can be extended under a form of government similar to our own.

The circumstances noted render it impossible to estimate General Logan's military genius to the full extent. Had the military power of the Government been as firm in the support of the volunteer during the recent war as it was of the West Point soldier, the whole military aspect of the Rebellion might have been different

from that which it actually bore. That he possessed the instinct of the soldier to a remarkable degree, instructively as well as amusingly appears from the well-attested incident of his appearance upon the battle-field of the first Bull Run, to which he had hurried from his seat in the House of Representatives while it was still in session, and in broadcloth suit and high silk hat performing service as a private, with a gun borrowed from a wounded soldier. His bravery, courage, dash, energy, sagacity, and magnetism rendered him one of the most successful officers—and, considering his grade and position, perhaps the most successful officer—that the civil conflict produced. Had he been unhampered by the prevailing prejudice against the volunteer; had rank and command been accorded to him as his developing merits warranted, and strict justice required, the war would have been considerably abbreviated in duration, and the *personnel* of its great actors would have been somewhat changed.


With enthusiastic warmth General Logan has applauded the services of General Henry Knox, the great artillerist of the Revolution as well as the first War Secretary of the new nation; and he has closed his eulogy with a tribute to the latter's character both beautiful and just. In concluding this memoir no more fitting summary of the character of John A. Logan can be found than that embraced in the words that he has applied to General Knox :

“He was an American volunteer, a distinguished soldier, an eminent statesman, and an admirable civilian.” Surely no “higher meed of praise can be rendered to any of the world's toilers than this.”

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 1, 1887.



CAMP LIFE. AT CORINTH.



HOSPITAL SCENE.



FORAGING.

SCENES FROM ARMY LIFE.

THE
VOLUNTEER SOLDIER
OF AMERICA.

PREFATORY NOTE.

THE following pages have been written amid the engrossing cares and occupations of an official life. The labor involved in their preparation has constituted a pleasant task for the writer, since they cover a subject which has ever been near his heart—the glories as well as the interests of the volunteer soldiery of America.

No more fascinating theme than that presented by the citizen of the United States, when, leaving the pursuits of peaceful life, he arrays himself in the garb of the soldier and takes the field in defense of country and principle, can be found in any chapter of the world's history. It is wholly safe to say that in his character of defender of right and justice, with no feature of the despoiler and oppressor, and in his attributes of lofty patriotism, of unselfish, inflexible, and enduring courage, of patience under suffering, and of moderation under victory, and finally of effectiveness in the dread perils, the sudden surprises, and the capricious results of battle, he has had no faithful counterpart in any age of the world.

Pleasant as has been the author's task, however, he has performed it under the continuous pressure of a regret, that some other, with more abundant leisure

and a more eloquent pen than he possesses, has not undertaken it.

As the writer has endeavored to show in the body of this volume, the volunteer soldier, standing for and in place of a permanent army—that curse of monarchies, and despoiler of the liberties of the masses—is the Atlas upon whose broad shoulders are safely borne our republican institutions; and, while no occasion exists for magnifying the importance of this basic element of our national fabric, yet there does exist an imperative demand, not only that it should be surrounded with conditions to insure its greatest effectiveness in the service of the government—thus displaying wisdom in the interest of the general people—but also that enlarged measures in the interest of the soldier himself may be made to reflect the appreciation as well as the high justice belonging to the American name.

That our present system of military organization and instruction is wrong in that it is inadequate to meet the necessities of our modern republic, and therefore short-sighted in conception, and dangerous in its faultiness, and in that it represents a degree of injustice wholly foreign to the American character, the author has attempted to show in the following pages. To what extent he has succeeded in this, the people of the republic—the great arbiters of its destinies—must decide. That in the exposition of the subject which he has herein made he reflects the general sentiment of the volunteer soldiery, he has every reason to believe; and that the appeal he

has made in its behalf will not be disregarded by his fellow-citizens, he entertains an abiding confidence.

Absorbed in public duties, and deeply earnest in the subject which he has attempted to treat, the author has given more attention to the presentation of facts than to a display of rhetoric, while he has sought rather to follow truth through the channels of argument and deduction than to array his sentences in the beauties of precise metrical composition. In the eyes of some his style may be deemed didactic, and therefore unsuited to the subject; but he hopes that it will be generally seen that his presentation of well known historical facts has been indispensable to the illustration of the subject, and to a just appreciation of the legitimate deductions belonging to it. Therefore history and biography have been freely drawn upon in the following pages—not for the instruction of the reader, who perhaps may be better versed in both than is the author himself, but for the better illumination of the subject directly under treatment.

The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the various general works upon American history and biography which so well adorn the general literature of our country, and also to several special authors whose names are directly given in the letter-press in connection with the quotations from their books.

With these observations, the author submits his work to the intelligence and impartial justice of his fellow-citizens.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

THE AMERICAN CITIZEN-SOLDIER.

THE late war between the American States was the legitimate climax of several coöperating forces. It was fruitful in cause, and prolific of results. A brief retrospection of a few historical facts will serve as a useful means to break the ground of the subject which it is proposed to discuss in the present volume.

Prior to the notable event of 1775—the spilling of the first American blood, by the British troops, at Lexington—forty centuries, of which the modern world has record more or less direct and authentic, had lent their aid to the human race in the evolution of its destiny. The problem of man's social and political life had been worked at through the ages, and the answer, involving the happiness and freedom of mankind, was still unfound when the conflict referred to above occurred. Nations had been born and had become great in population and power; these had declined, and finally had passed from the memory, and in many cases, save through uncertain tradition, even from the record of men. Myriads of human beings had been marshaled in battle, and millions of human lives had been sacrificed upon bloody fields. Generals had become renowned; kings had

strutted their brief hour upon the stage; emperors had ruled with iron hand; despots had oppressed the groaning millions; political rulers had slain them in the pretended interests of government, and ecclesiastical authorities had burned them through the demands of mistaken religion. The years had clustered into centuries, the centuries into ages, and the same devices of the few to enslave the many had been repeated with the regularity of planetary movement.

With the march of time the stock of human knowledge had increased; invention had been stimulated, the arts improved and diffused, letters cultivated, and the sciences rounded into enduring form. Whatever might have been the inherent attributes of the primeval man, age had tutored, experience had perfected, and increased knowledge had polished him, by the close of the mediæval period of the world's history. There had then been men, great in every walk of life—great artisans, great inventors, great builders, great painters, great sculptors, great orators, great poets, great generals, and great rulers. But when the eighteenth century of the Christian era had unfolded three-fourths of its weary length, it is gravely to be doubted whether the condition of the common people, as it relates to the economy, political and personal, of the masses in whole and in detail, was upon any higher plane under the reign of George III. of England, as an example, than under many dynasties of the ancient world whose career had closed forever. Personal liberty under constitutional government was a shade of the night, not

yet compacted into an entity of the day. The aspiration for it lurked under cover of darkness; but the resolution to possess it had not walked out into the light. The spirit of progress had gently tapped at the door of each opening century, soliciting a recognition of the common people. The small republics of Greece, the republic of Rome, the Italian republics under the Lombardian League, the Dutch republic, the republic of Switzerland, and, in a certain sense, Europe under the feudal system, had turned a listening ear, but quickly closed the door again. It seems a notable circumstance that at the beginning of the modern era, when new impetus had been given to learning, the kings of the world came solidly to the front and crushed all semblance of popular government.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the sentiment of democracy had taken deep root among the masses of the two leading nations of Europe—England and France. The seed that had been sown through the successive eras was incubating, and at the beginning of the year 1775 the world stood upon the threshold of a period wherein a decade of the future was destined to surpass in substantial results a century of the past. Through a marvelous ordering of events, the initial struggle of the human race for existence and expansion had been limited to the continent that witnessed its birth. A world virgin in every just sense had been reserved for its second growth. A continent embracing every possibility of nature had been in hiding from the other hemisphere

since the early morning of creation. Mankind had passed the stage of preparation. The idea of personal liberty, embracing the broad doctrines of human rights, had issued from the matrix of Time. Its growth was about to commence, activity in the new direction to begin. The unknown world had been torn from its concealment, and the strongest manhood of the old continent had sought its shores. The ancient conflict between the masses and the masters was still raging when the Declaration of July 4th, 1776, arrested the attention of the world. A fiat had gone forth proclaiming the inalienable rights of man. The conflict was transferred to the new hemisphere; forces were raised; man was pitted against man; the fruits of peaceful labor were consumed; human life was sacrificed without stint; but in the end a republic was formed which was declared to be founded upon the freedom and equality of the masses, and the kingship of the common people.

Three-quarters of a century sped away—a mere click of the machinery marking the flight of time—and a wonderful development of the human race, in both hemispheres, had taken place. In the Old World the people had fairly caught the spirit of liberty. It was no longer talked of with bated breath. Kings and emperors became alarmed at the diffusion of broad ideas among the masses, and began to tremble before the developing power and boldness of their subjects. A spasmodic effort to form a republic in the heart of Europe took place; concessions were elsewhere wrung from the rulers. Reforms,

social, political, and religious, were granted, and the chains were struck from the limbs of eight hundred thousand human beings held in bondage in the various British Colonies.

In the New World, the example of the United States had been followed by the Spanish-American colonies; and a group of republics, through the fructifying influence of the period, had sprung into existence, and extended to the farther extremity of the southern continent. Education had become general, labor honorable, and personal worth and industry safe passports to respect and competence. Learning had been advanced, the great inventions extended and perfected, and previously untamed forces of nature had been harnessed to the service of mankind.

During this brilliant progress of the race a remnant of the ancient tyranny, which still clung to the American free government, had been rapidly growing like a malignant germ, and securely fastening itself upon the social and political life of the individuals and States of the southern portion of the American Union. The colonists of 1776 had attempted to apply the knife to the fatal growth of human bondage, but they failed to extirpate it *en masse*. Subsequent experience soon brought to notice that the signers of Independence Hall, when declaring all men to be free and equal, had made a fatal omission. They had not inserted after the word "men" the words "regardless of color or condition." In declaring for "free men," they had in view *white* men only. The movement for freedom, then, was *partial*. The idea of freedom had been

the child of the ages, but in their hands it lacked development and expansion. Under a government formed upon the basis of universal freedom, millions of people were born in a slavery as absolute and despotic, as blighting and destructive as any known to recorded history. The results were legitimate, and to have been expected. Slavery in theory and in practice debased the servant, and developed the master into a being as foreign to the atmosphere of the nineteenth century as the air-breathing animal is to life under the water. He became the anomaly of the age. His gaze was backward, and his yearning was for the effete and exhausted things of the past. Believing in the theory of slavery, he denied the doctrine of universal equality. A disbeliever in the government of the masses, his ideal was achieved in the rule of the many by the few. In the year 1861, amidst the exuberant growth of republican principles, he cultivated the heresy of caste, and was ready to commence the work of undermining a structure that had been reared by the irresistible forces of human evolution. Scouting equality, he became an aristocrat. The material was ready, and but a spark was required to kindle the fire. Given the relating data, and the result could have been calculated with the accuracy of a problem in mathematics.

Four years of bloody internecine strife rectified the omission of the Declaration, broadened its sentiments, and made it the Magna Charta of all mankind, destined to last while the human race endures.

Able pens have already transcribed with faithful

accuracy the events of the late enforced civil war. Its details have been described with absorbing interest and historic justice. Its battle-fields have been mapped, its campaigns by land and sea exemplified, and the brave officers that led our conquering legions have received their merited eulogiums. In face of the present post-bellum literature, it may appear to many that no room exists for further authorship upon the subject. The fact is, however, that a most important part of the history of the great struggle remains to be written — that part relating to the *volunteer soldier and sailor*.

All wars, great or otherwise, have been attended with the display of personal valor; and in their course military genius has been developed as a legitimate result of the presenting opportunity. This genius, as all impartial historians must admit, was profuse of growth during the recent inter-State conflict, while the individual heroism of the rank and file has stamped the American subaltern as a soldier *sui generis*. A careful consideration of all the circumstances of the war as they relate to both officers and men, in the aspect of soldiers, will develop some curious, interesting, and, it may be, some very useful facts and lines of reflection. It is one of the objects of the present volume to bring these into strong relief, and to give them a prominence such as the author believes they have not heretofore received. The facts will be openly and fairly stated as the

volume proceeds, let them affect whom they may, and the legitimate deductions will be drawn in whatsoever direction they may lead.

The author would not detract in the most infinitesimal degree from the already recorded tributes to the patriotism, the bravery and the rare military qualities of the conspicuous leaders of the late war. He would rather add an additional tribute of his own to the merited eulogiums upon those whose recent deeds have become an imperishable part of the history of their country. He would be generous, and he would likewise be just. But no record of the war would be wholly just that failed to portray the unique character of the American citizen-soldier, and no deduction from the lessons of the conflict can cover the ultimate logic of the case that does not consider as one of the premises this character of the soldier as it bears upon the future of his country. Official leadership is a prime factor in the issue of battles, but much of the interest of the engagement clusters around the common soldier, as well as about the officer. No estimate of battle results can be considered wholly safe that fails to include both officers and men. Indeed, it may be broadly alleged that there has been no battle fought since the beginning of human contention, where the common soldiers did not largely outnumber the officers, not alone in the ranks of the contestants, but also in the lists of the killed and wounded. Had it been ordered otherwise from the beginning, the study of the

rise and fall of nations would have been greatly simplified to the modern student.

Soldiers, then, have fought the battles of the world. The officers have directed them.

Within the rank and file of the Union army all classes of men were largely represented. The artisan, the farmer, the laborer, the clerk, the lawyer, the doctor, the student, the man of letters, the man of wealth, as well as the man without means — all of these voluntarily left families and friends, and many of them comfortable homes and more or less remunerative occupations, to suffer the hard fare of a common soldier's life. The case of the inventor of the sewing-machine, who, though possessing a large private fortune, became a soldier in the ranks upon the pay of twenty-two dollars per month, must be well remembered.

A motive powerful and far-reaching prompted these sacrifices ; and beneath that motive there are surely to be found those influences that have made the American soldier, from the Revolution of 1776 to the close of the slaveholders' rebellion, different from any other in the history of battle-fields. He is neither a soldier by hire nor a soldier by compulsion, either of whom performs his duties in a mechanical and perfunctory manner, and wholly unstimulated by the lofty incentive actuating the American volunteer. The battle-fields of the world, from the earliest authentic record of human struggles upon the plain of Shinar, through all subsequent eras to the American Revolution, have swarmed with soldiers

whose services had either been purchased by some sort of pecuniary recompense, or secured by the iron hand of compulsion. The Hessians at Trenton furnish a modern illustration of this class of soldiers, and the rude warriors under the feudal system are an example from the middle ages. The keen incentive actuating a soldier striving for a principle, moved by patriotism and sustained by a sense of right and justice, has been wholly absent from the class of soldiers alluded to.

The American volunteer, so far as mere physical strength, strong endurance, and iron courage are concerned, may not be a better "Greek" than he who fought the battles of Sparta and Athens twenty-five centuries ago, but there are circumstances connected with the modern American that have made him the most invincible of soldiers. What are these circumstances? They belong strictly to his Americanism.

Briefly stated, it may be said that he is an integral part of the government and country for which he fights. He is a citizen of the freest government that the world has yet seen. There is no avenue of life closed to him; no possibility denied him. From a private station he may pass to high political position. In his humblest and most obscure capacity his voice is as potent in the direction of the national affairs as is that of the richest and most prominent citizen. Today poor in purse, half a dozen years may not elapse until industry and enterprise bring him honest fortune. Whether poor or rich, the beneficent laws of his country give him personal guarantees

not enjoyed in any other land. However poor, or however rich, he has a personal and direct interest in the government. He belongs to it; he is part of it. He helps to make its laws, to elect its officials, to direct its affairs.

Further than this, he is a man of intelligence. Institutions and means of acquiring learning are accessible to him. Day schools are abundant for the child, and other schools for the individual of any age. Newspapers—those great educators of the whole people—are within the easy reach of all. Libraries are abundant and books are cheap. The public affairs of the country are carried before the masses and discussed by the public men. The voter of the country may be called a court of last resort. Stimulated by motives of direct interest, he has become an umpire whose judgment seldom errs.

The circumstances stated give the soldier of America a purely distinctive character. He follows the banner of no potentate as hireling, dependent, vassal, or menial. He is a free man, fighting for home, family, country, and the government of which he is a factor. His arm is raised for a principle, for right, for justice. The immense difference between the man who is a soldier through such considerations, and him who is one by mere occupation or by force, need not be dwelt upon.

The climax, however, would hardly be complete without mention of an additional circumstance pertaining to the character of the American volunteer. His whole training from childhood, whether his lot be cast in a large

community or upon the frontier of the country, where he becomes a *quasi* soldier through force of surroundings and mode of life, has given him a character of independence, of self-reliance, of quick action, and ready command of expedients. These qualities imply wonderful fitness for the soldier. Brave by an inheritance from hardy forefathers, vigorous through the training of American life, with intellect developed by education, the American soldier surely stands without a rival.

The attempt to add to the history of our various conflicts a missing chapter which shall have for its direct purpose the rendering of full justice to the gallant volunteers of America, will necessarily lead the author to a consideration of the subject in its several relations, and in a somewhat extended manner; and deductions may be finally arrived at that may have a useful bearing upon the military future of our country. In order to give to the subject, as it is designed to be treated, an easy flow and a natural direction, the first part of the volume will be devoted to a consideration of the experiment of military education in the United States; the second part, to the results of that experiment, embracing certain statistics of an instructive character; and the third part to the invocation of justice to the volunteer soldier, and to the volunteer system of America. In this portion of the volume it is the author's intention to outline some suggestions concerning the military necessities of the national future.

PART I.

HISTORY OF
MILITARY EDUCATION
IN THE
UNITED STATES.

HISTORY OF MILITARY EDUCATION.

CHAPTER I.

WEST POINT ON THE HUDSON—ITS HISTORY AS A MILITARY POST DURING THE REVOLUTION—PLAN OF GENERAL BURGOYNE TO CUT AND CRUSH THE COLONIES—THE VOLUNTEERS SURROUND AND CAPTURE THE BRITISH EXPEDITION—THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER A NEW FEATURE IN THE HISTORY OF BATTLE-FIELDS—BENEDICT ARNOLD AND MAJOR ANDRÉ.

THE locality on the Hudson River embraced within the term West Point is one of historic interest to the American. At an early period it was called the "Gibraltar of America;" but, from the outbreak of the Revolution to the period of Arnold's treason, its position and possession covered vastly more in relation to ultimate consequences than can be alleged of the water-passage by Gibraltar in any period of which we have record. If Burgoyne's and Clinton's expeditions had succeeded in their object in October, 1777, there can be little doubt that the colonists would have been crushed and that the present American States might still be British dependencies. Or, if Arnold's treason had succeeded, three years later, there is at least the probability that a like result would have ensued.

After the Independence had been secured, West Point, though abandoned as a military post, was soon selected as the locality upon which to establish a military academy; and at this time it is the only institution supported by the Government of the United States for the education of officers for the army. Many of the names that will appear upon the subsequent pages of this volume are to be found upon the register of the Academy, while some of the reflections connected with the subject of the book are intimately related to the school and the system it represents. In view of these circumstances the author purposes to devote a certain space to the consideration of West Point in its double character of defensive post and military academy, and, as germane to the subject of military education, to touch upon the sister institution at Annapolis. Though details of the operations centering toward West Point, during the Revolutionary War, are to be found in all histories and text-books upon the subject of our national struggle for independence, the author will be pardoned for a condensation of some of the most important events in connection with it.

As early as the beginning of 1775 the necessity to erect fortifications that might command the passage of the Hudson River became apparent to the American colonists, in view of the rupture, then inevitable and closely impending, with the mother country. The strategic importance of this water-way had been learned by the British Government during the course of its previous struggle with France. This knowledge led the British

commanders, at the beginning of the war as well as at a later period of hostilities, to determined efforts to obtain its control.

With the object of presenting the reasons underlying the importance of this control, in a manner at once brief and clear, the following extract is made from a well-written work, published in 1863 :

“The student of American history is familiar with the fact that to obtain control of the navigation of the Hudson River was a favorite project with the British Government, during the whole progress of the War of Independence.

“In order to a proper understanding of the reasons on which this project is based, we should examine with some attention the topography of the river, not simply as limited to the section of country through which its waters flow, but taking a broader view and regarding its connection with those more remote and wide-spread regions that find through it their most direct and natural channel to the seaboard.

“Even at the present day, when the skilled enterprise of a numerous and commercial people has linked the interior to the coast by many and various artificial channels, the great thoroughfare of the State of New York holds a preëminent position, mainly due to its unrivaled natural advantages. But these advantages were of paramount importance, both before and during the Revolutionary struggle, when the canoe of the Indian or the bateau of the *voyageur* furnished the most convenient and speedy transportation for purposes either of commerce or war. Then, to the north, at the head of boat navigation, the Hudson was connected by an easy portage with Lakes George and Champlain, and through them with the St. Lawrence, the great river of the Canadas; whilst, toward the west, its principal affluent, the Mohawk, gave easy access, scarcely interrupted by a few short portages, to the basin of the great lakes, and to the magnificent river system of the Mississippi.

“Thus established by nature as the main artery connecting a vast network of interior water communications with the Atlantic

and draining the resources of almost half a continent, the Hudson occupied a position of highest strategic importance.

“The British Government had been taught this fact in the course of the long struggle between England and France, then but recently terminated. They knew that by the possession of the Hudson they could separate the eastern part of the province of New York and the provinces of New England from the remainder of the confederacy, and thus, by cutting off communication between these points, speedily reduce the patriots to subjection. Hence, in a letter dated London, July 31, 1775, conveying to the colonists the plan of operations decided upon by the British Government, it is said that their design is: ‘To get possession of New York and Albany; to fill both of these cities with very strong garrisons; to declare all rebels who do not join the King’s forces; to command the Hudson and East Rivers with a number of small men-of-war, and cutters stationed in different parts of it, so as to cut off all communication by water between New York and Albany, except for the King’s service; and to prevent also all communication between the city of New York and the provinces of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and those to the southward of them. By these,’ continues the letter, ‘the administration and their friends fancy that they shall soon either starve out or retake the garrisons of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, and open and maintain a safe intercourse and correspondence between Quebec, Albany, and New York, and thereby afford the fairest opportunity to their soldiery and the Canadians, in conjunction with the Indians, to be procured by G. J. (Col. Guy Johnson, a son-in-law of Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Province of New York), to make continual irruptions into New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Connecticut, and so distract and divide the provincial forces as to render it easy for the British army at Boston to defeat them, break the spirits of the Massachusetts people, depopulate their country and compel an absolute subjection to Great Britain.’”¹

As heretofore remarked, the colonists were as much alive to the strategic importance of the Hudson as were

¹History of West Point: By Capt. Edward C. Boynton, A. M., Adjutant of the Military Academy, 1863.

the English; and after preliminary resolution of the Continental Congress upon the subject, the Provincial Congress of New York passed a resolution on the 18th of August, 1775, directing that the fortifications be at once erected which were recommended by a committee of the body which was previously raised for the purpose of considering and reporting upon the matter. A commission was thereupon named to carry out the order of the local congress.

Resulting from this action, the work of fortifying the Hudson was immediately begun. As appears from a report made by Lord Stirling to General Washington, under date of June 1, 1776,¹ the works consisted of a fort located about four miles above Stony Point, upon the west bank of the river, which was called Fort Montgomery; of one upon Constitution Island, on the east side of the river, and about six miles above the latter; and of some lines of water-batteries fronting the river. To these were also added obstructions to the channel of the stream. No work was located at West Point in this first plan of fortifying the Highlands, though Lord Stirling, in the report above alluded to, recommended the building of a redoubt upon the point.

These fortifications, rude and inefficient for the purpose of defense, cost an amount of money very considerable for those days; and the expenditure was more deeply felt because it was destined to be almost entirely lost.

¹Am. Arch., IV, VI, 672.

One of the most critical events of the war, if indeed its whole issue did not directly depend upon it, was now about to transpire. One of the crises out of whose throes the fate of men and nations have often been evolved, was about to break over the heads of the actors in the struggle of that day. From the impending crash a new nation must spring into life, or perish in the germ. It is a recital of absorbing interest, and can well be dwelt upon in a volume like the present.

Mention has been herein made of the realization by both parties to the contest of the importance of commanding the Hudson River. The colonists made an early movement to defend it, but the British were still earlier in the conception of a plan that, in the nature of a *coup de main*, might take the river as a base, and cut the rebellious child through the middle at a single blow.

Let us take a brief survey of the facts and of the position at that time.

The first struggles between the colonists and the mother country took place in New England, then comprised of the colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Descended from the Puritans, who had braved every danger and undergone every hardship in order that they might breathe the air of freedom, the colonists of that section were the first to resent the growing demands upon them. It was at Boston that a ship's cargo was thrown overboard, and at Lexington that the first armed conflict took place. These colonies were considered the hot-bed of the

rebellion, and it was deemed to be of the first importance to shear them of their influence with the others, and to bring them to a speedy submission.

Loyal Canada was upon the north, and New York City, which had been taken by Lord Howe in the summer of 1776, was upon the south. A line drawn between these localities would effectually cut New England from the sister colonies. A broad-sheeted and safely navigable river was representative of that line in its more important part.

One of the chief actors in the events so soon to follow was the British General John Burgoyne. Born in England, he received the benefits of a fine literary education, and at an early age he entered the British army, and reaped the advantages of a thorough military training. As a brigadier-general he won distinction in Portugal, at Alcantara, and at Villa Franca. Arriving in Boston in the spring of 1775, he was present at the battle of Bunker Hill. Returning to England in December, 1776, he presented to the ministry a plan of campaign, which was adopted; and Burgoyne, with the rank of Lieutenant-General, was sent back to America to assist in carrying it out. The noble river discovered by Hendrik Hudson was marked out as the flood beneath which the freedom of America was to be submerged.

A strong remnant of the force that had defended Canada against the previous attack made by the Americans still remained. Seven thousand veteran troops were sent from England to Canada, with a thorough artillery equip-

ment, the whole being officered by men of military training and experience. Stores in abundance were provided, and success seemed almost assured in advance of the army movement.

With this force Burgoyne was to set out upon the march toward the south, by the line of the small northern lakes and the Hudson River. At the same time a British column was to be sent northward from New York City by Sir Henry Clinton, the commanding General at the latter place. Burgoyne was to sweep down to Albany, crushing resistance as he went, and Clinton's force was to join him at that point, after having brushed away the fortifications of the Highlands. Both forces were largely composed of veteran soldiers, with officers of ability, training, and experience. The conclusion seemed foregone; the collapse of the insurrection was *un fait accompli*.

For a time Burgoyne carried everything before him. Crown Point came without a struggle, and Ticonderoga was abandoned. General Schuyler had been in command of the Americans, and, before being superseded by General Gates, had offered the first check the invader had received, by obstructing Wood Creek and the roads over which he must pass.

The sun which had shone so brightly upon Burgoyne's departure for the south soon became obscured, then deeply clouded, and finally went down upon the collapse of his expedition. Having sent two detachments to Bennington for stores, the one under command of Colonel Baum and the other of Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman,

they were met by General John Stark and his Green Mountain boys. This rough soldier declared to his men that they must either take the red-coats before night, or else behold "Molly Stark a widow." The enemy was almost destroyed in the contest that followed.

During all this time the American volunteer had been coming upon the scene. Men were flocking from the valleys and the hillsides with rifles that never failed of aim. Burgoyne began to realize that there were some chances of failure. The Americans were strongly massed at Stillwater, half way between Saratoga and Albany, under Gates and Arnold.

Burgoyne looked anxiously for advices from the expedition which was to meet him from the south. Lord Howe had drawn a considerable number of men from New York, for the campaign against Washington and Philadelphia, and Sir Henry Clinton was thereby prevented from dispatching his expedition until after the arrival of reinforcements from England. The delay was one of the unexpected events that so frequently modify the best-laid plans of men. It was like the charge of the "Old Guard" over the sunken road at Nivelles, as described by Victor Hugo. But for that sunken road, Napoleon might not have lost Waterloo.

The reinforcements came at last, and the expedition was then embarked on a flotilla, under convoy of some British men-of-war. It proceeded up the Hudson; the Americans were driven from their fortifications, which they destroyed upon evacuation. The British were about

to continue the advance up the river, when information was received of Burgoyne's defeat at Bemis' Heights and the capitulation of his whole army. After an effort to rebuild one of the forts, the expedition hastily returned to New York, and the spectators of the Old World began to realize the mettle of the people who had deliberately pledged to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, for the establishment of a free nation in America.

This brilliant victory was soon followed by its legitimate consequences. The American Commissioners who had been in Europe endeavoring to obtain recognition of the new republic, and an alliance offensive and defensive, were upon the point of leaving Paris with failing hope, nay, almost with despair. As soon as reliable information of this disaster to the British arms reached Europe, the whole scene changed with magical quickness. For the first time since the beginning of the struggle the true character of the American citizen-soldier was fully recognized, and the potential military resources of the colonists entirely comprehended. The Old World had been one vast military encampment from the earliest dawn of history. The soldier was an institution coeval with the birth of nations. He was the prop of thrones, the first and last hope of royalty. Rulers knew all about him. He commanded a certain price, and rendered a certain service. He was a piece of military machinery. He was wound up at the beginning of a battle and ran down after the execution of certain mechanical movements.

He moved in military grooves as fixed as the orbit of the earth. When circumstances placed him on the side of victory he accepted it as an event in which he had no particular interest; when the laws of war decided him beaten, he quietly surrendered his arms and the cause for which he had fought at one and the same time. When his officers bid him to advance, he advanced; and when the exigencies of battle suggested retreat, he often went at once without standing upon the order of going.

But away off in the wilds of America a soldier had been found totally different from any that had ever walked a battle-field. Upon one day he was a civilian quietly following the plow; upon the next he became a soldier, knowing no fear and carrying a whole destroying battery in his trusty rifle. He was a soldier from conviction to principle, from loyalty to his country, from duty to his family. He moved with the discipline of the educated soldier, but he fought with the desperation of a lion at bay. He followed the commands of his superiors when they led to victory, but in his military lexicon there was no such word as fail.

Burgoyne had not progressed very far with his expedition until he learned the character of the enemy he was to deal with. The accomplished General St. Leger received the first blow, from the American soldiers under General Herkimer. The next came from the gallant old General John Stark, with his Green Mountain boys, who defeated the trained forces under Baum and Breyman, both of whom were soldiers by education. So disastrous

were these reverses in their effect that it may be said the expedition was defeated before the full army under Gates and Arnold was encountered by Burgoyne at the heights of Bemis.

All along the line of that perilous march the American citizen-soldiers swarmed from their cabins to meet the invader. Many fell into the ranks and fought until victory was assured. Others swung their rifles on their shoulders, and, taking a lunch prepared by their wives and daughters, went out for a day's sport with the red-backs. Perched in trees, lying behind fences, peeping over rocks, the unerring rifle of the Americans lessened the British force by a man at every curl of smoke that rose upon the breeze.

Fighting was still to come, lives were to be sacrificed, and hardships to be met and endured; but when the events leading to the capitulation of October 15, 1777, became known to the world, the independence of the United States was practically assured. The American Commissioners in Europe found their difficulties lifted, like a fog before the rising orb of day. Within four months of Burgoyne's surrender, France had acknowledged the new government by treaty, and had furnished fleets for its assistance. Spain and Holland soon followed in recognition, convinced that all the power of Albion was impotent to subdue the invincible soldier of America.

One circumstance connected with the events here dwelt upon may be placed in somewhat stronger light

than given in the text of the narrative. It bears upon a point that will again be touched upon in these pages. It has been said that Burgoyne was a soldier by education, experience, and professional calling. The same remark is true of his principal officers, St. Leger, Baum, Breyman, Hamilton, Spaight, Goll, and others. His troops, with the exception of the Indian allies, were specially selected from veterans of the British army. His whole equipment of arms, artillery, stores, etc., was complete.

With the exception of General Horatio Gates, the principal American officers were without military education other than that derived from service during the war then progressing, or during the previous campaigns against the Indians or the French. Herkimer was a civilian, having had a short previous service in the militia. Schuyler had a simple militia experience; Stark was a farmer originally; Arnold was engaged in trade in early life, etc. The American troops had only such experience in war as was incident to pioneer life, under which every man was the defender of his own home and family, tilling the fields with his rifle beside him, and sleeping in his cabin with a waking hand, ready to grasp his weapon upon the first signal of danger.

General Horatio Gates, who superseded General Schuyler in the American command, during Burgoyne's campaign, and who claimed the credit of the victory, was a soldier by profession, having been born in England, the regular army of which he entered at an early age. The record shows that the victory over Burgoyne had been

prepared beforehand by Schuyler and Stark, and that in the actual conflict between the two armies so much of the result was due to Arnold that Gates became intensely jealous of him. The defeat which Cornwallis subsequently inflicted upon General Gates proved that his first military education gave him no advantage over other American generals.

The expedition of General Burgoyne, then, furnishes the example of a contest between a body of professional soldiers, led by professional officers, against a body of men, soldiers only by incident and not by life-occupation, the latter of whom were commanded by officers risen to command because of demonstrated military talent and fitness. Numerically, the contending forces were nearly equal; in all things pertaining to equipment and other adjuncts the British troops enjoyed a great advantage. *A priori* reasoning would have given the victory to the latter. But in spite of the conditions in their favor they were unsuccessful in the object of the campaign. Why?

The happy thwarting by the colonists of the skillful movement just narrated did not have the effect to render them insensible to the danger of a repetition of the attempt. Within seven weeks of the formal surrender of Burgoyne, General Washington addressed the following note to General Putnam, under date of December 2, 1777:

“DEAR SIR: The importance of the Hudson River in the present contest and the necessity of defending it are subjects which have been so frequently and fully discussed and are so well under-

stood that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon them. These facts at once appear when it is considered that it runs through a whole State; that it is the only passage by which the enemy from New York or any part of our coast can ever hope to co-operate with an army from Canada; that the possession of it is indispensably essential to preserve the communication between the Eastern, Middle and Southern States; and, further, that upon its security in a great measure depend our chief supplies of flour for the subsistence of such forces as we may have occasion for in the course of the war in the eastern or northern departments, or in the country lying high up on the west side of it. These facts are familiar to all; they are familiar to you. I therefore request you, in the most urgent terms, to turn your most serious and active attention to this infinitely important object. Seize the present opportunity and *employ your whole force and all the means in your power for erecting and completing, as far as it shall be possible, such works and obstructions as may be necessary to defend and secure the river* against any future attempts of the enemy. You will consult Governor Clinton, General Parsons, and the French engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Radiere, upon the occasion. By gaining the passage, you know the enemy have already laid waste and destroyed all the houses, mills, and towns accessible to them. Unless proper measures are taken to prevent them, they will renew their ravages in the spring, or as soon as the season will admit, and perhaps Albany, the only town in the State of any importance remaining in our hands, may undergo a like fate, and a general havoc and devastation take place. To prevent these evils, therefore, I shall expect that you will exert every nerve and *employ your whole force in future, while and whenever it is practicable, in constructing and forwarding the proper works and means of defense*. The troops must not be kept out on command and acting in detachments to cover the country below, which is a consideration infinitely less important and interesting."

As a result of renewed effort in this direction, a commission was appointed by the Provincial Convention of New York toward the middle of January, 1778, to proceed to the Highlands, and with the military authorities to make report as to the most eligible points for defensive

work, after having personally inspected the several passes of the river.

This committee, as appears from the record, reported as follows, under the date of Wednesday, January 14, 1778:

“Your committee, who were sent to ascertain the places for fixing a chain and erecting fortifications for obstructing the navigation of the Hudson River, beg leave to report that they have carefully viewed the ground on which Fort Clinton lately stood, and its environs, and find that the ground is so intersected with long, deep hollows that the enemy might approach without any annoyance from the garrison within the fort to within a few yards of the walls, unless a redoubt should be raised to clear the hollows next the fort, which must be built at such distance from the fort that it could not be supported from thence in case of an assault, so that the enemy might make themselves masters of the redoubt the first dark night after their landing, which would be a good work ready to their hand for annoying the fort and facilitating their operations against it; and, together with the eminences and broken ground within a short distance of the fort, would render it impossible for the garrison to resist a general assault for many hours together. Another objection that appeared to the committee was the want of earth on the spot, which would reduce the engineer to the necessity of erecting his works entirely of timber, which must be brought to Pooploop’s Kill in rafts, and from thence drawn up a steep and difficult road to the top of the hill. The rafts cannot be made till the water is warm enough for men to work in it, by which it is probable that a fort cannot be erected before the ships of the enemy will come up the river.

“Besides, at this place the chain must be laid across the river, so that it will receive the whole force of the ships coming with all the strength of the tide and wind on a line of three or four miles. Add to these, if the enemy should be able to possess themselves of the passes in the mountains through which they marched to the attacks of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the militia of the country to raise the siege.

“Upon viewing the country at and about West Point, the committee found that there were several places at which the enemy might land and proceed immediately to some high grounds that would command a fort erected at West Point, at the distance of six or seven hundred yards, from which they might carry on their approaches through a light, gravelly soil, so that it would be impossible for the fort to stand a long siege. But to balance this disadvantage in this place, there is plenty of earth. The timber may be brought to the spot by good roads from high grounds at the distance of one to three miles. Three hundred feet less of chain will be requisite at this place than at Fort Clinton. It will be laid across in a place where vessels going up the river most usually lose their headway. Water-batteries may be built on both sides of the river for protecting the chain and annoying the ships coming up the river, which will be completely commanded from the walls of the fort. There are so many passes across the mountains to this place that it will be almost impossible for the enemy to prevent the militia from coming to the relief of the garrison.

“From these considerations the committee are led to conclude that the most proper place to obstruct the navigation of the river is at West Point; but are at the same time fully convinced that no obstructions on the banks of the river can effectually secure the country, unless a body of light troops, to consist of at least two thousand effective men, be constantly stationed in the mountains while the navigation of the river is practicable, to obstruct the enemy in their approach by land.

“JOHN SLOSS HOBART.

“HENRY WISNER.

“JOHN HATHORN.

“ZEPH. PLATT.”

Within a short time after the making of this report a work was begun at the locality indicated, and water-batteries so placed as to be protected by it. This work was called Fort Arnold until the infamous attempt of the General of that name to betray his country, when it became known as Fort Clinton. In addition to the

other works erected at West Point during the early part of 1778, a chain and boom were constructed, to be drawn across the river for the purpose of completely obstructing the passage. Portions of this chain and boom still remain, as relics of the part played by West Point in the war of the Revolution.¹

The failure to obtain possession of the Hudson River by force of arms did not lessen the determination of the British commander at New York to achieve a result so vitally important to the success of the British cause. The chief instrument in the second attempt was treachery, and a successful issue was more nearly obtained by the British from this resort than from the open campaign of Burgoyne and Sir Henry Clinton.

Benedict Arnold was the only citizen-soldier of America who drew his sword upon his country in its first great peril. Arnold left a mercantile business to enter the service of his country. Upon several occasions he exhibited great military skill and bravery. At the battle of Bemis' Heights, which witnessed the defeat of Burgoyne, he so nearly divided the honors with Gates that the latter became very jealous of him. Although a man of undoubted talent and courage, he was possessed of many detestable personal qualities. Under the spur of a fancied neglect or oversight in the matter of promotion, Arnold determined to betray the cause he had so efficiently sup-

¹For a compact account of the establishment of West Point, and much information in detail concerning it, the reader is referred to the interesting volume of Captain Boynton, before quoted herein.

ported. With this purpose in view, he solicited and obtained the command of West Point. He then entered into negotiations with Sir Henry Clinton, through Major André, to practically deliver the fortifications of the Hudson into the hands of the British. The plot was perilously near to success, and only failed through the intrepidity and loyal honesty of three representatives of the volunteer soldiery of America.

Major André, the British spy, had received full written descriptions of the defenses at West Point, with Arnold's disposition of their forces, which latter were to be so arranged that both fortifications and defenses might easily fall into the hands of the enemy. With these treacherous documents concealed in his stocking, he was on his way to New York to consummate a victory that only treachery could achieve. If André had reached his destination unmolested, there was still a chance that the colonists might fail. But Burgoyne had been the victim of a previously unknown sort of soldier; and as André rode quietly along, secure in the belief that the coveted prize was soon to be in possession of the English, he was affrighted by an apparition that apparently sprang upon him from the bowels of the earth. It was the *American volunteer*—vigilant, patriotic, and incorruptible. In the very moment when the British spy thought himself secure from further danger of molestation, and when, doubtless, he was congratulating himself upon the great service he had rendered to his sovereign, as also the personal reward that was sure to follow it, the ever-watchful volunteer

emerged from beneath the covering of a wayside bush, and crushed the beast before it could make a spring.

John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Van Wert were three representatives of the volunteer soldiery of the United States. In frustrating the base plan of Benedict Arnold to betray his country, they earned a fame that will live as long as patriotism, valor, and faithfulness are worshiped as virtues to be emulated by the free citizens of the United States.



CAPTURE OF MAJ. ANDRE BY THE INCORRUPTIBLE VOLUNTEERS, JOHN PAULDING, DAVID WILLIAMS, ISAAC VAN WERT.

CHAPTER II.

MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES—THE NATURE OF GENIUS—AN INHERENT SOMETHING IN EVERY INDIVIDUAL THAT GIVES SHAPE TO HIS DESTINY—FALLACY OF THE POPULAR BELIEF IN THE EXCLUSIVE EFFICACY OF SPECIFIC EDUCATION IN THE LIFE-CALLINGS—CITATION OF CELEBRATED EXAMPLES OF GREAT SOLDIERS AND OF GREAT INVENTORS—GROWTH OF THE SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF MILITARY EDUCATION AFTER THE REVOLUTION—THE ATTEMPT OF WASHINGTON TO DIFFUSE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE AMONG THE PEOPLE, AND TO MAKE SOLDIERS WITHOUT RESORTING TO THE DANGERS OF A STANDING ARMY—GENERAL KNOX'S HISTORIC PAPER ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITIA—HIS BRILLIANT MILITARY CAREER.

KNOWLEDGE is to be considered as much in the nature of an acquisition as is property; and experience and training are indisputably necessary to the attainment of skill in any of the varied occupations of life. These are fundamental truths, but in their practical application they do not reach to the extent that seems indicated by their abstract statement. Out of their general formulation and unrestricted acceptance there has grown a great deal of mischievous error. It is a fact not to be gainsaid that instruction conveys to the pupil the

technical knowledge connected with the craft or profession he purposes to acquire, which, when the correlating manual or mental training that pertains to it is added, may give him the character of an expert, with varying degrees of excellence.

In the results of human achievement, however, there is something beyond the features of mere technical education and training that constantly obtrudes itself as a chief factor of the whole problem of life-calling.

The observation of this fact—or this *something*, rather—probably corresponds pretty closely in date with the origin of man himself; and it is this observation, doubtless, that has given rise to an error antipodal in character to that mentioned above, which, coming down from a Latin author, has formulated itself in the English proverb, “Poets are born, not made.” In the sense that men are born so endowed with the faculties of the poet that they have no need to study the rules of verse, nor to acquire a knowledge of history and literature in all of its departments, nor to become familiar with nature in its every aspect, the proverb is fallacious in conception and in declaration. If it be construed, however, in the sense of its evident meaning, viz.: that the making of a successful poet implies the possession of inherent qualities in the particular individual, which qualities by aid of appropriate adjuncts are capable of high development, the saw represents a truth susceptible of profuse demonstration in every channel of life.

The Sacred Writings have informed us that an indi-

vidual called Nimrod was "a mighty hunter." This statement will, upon reflection, yield testimony very ancient in character. The hunter Nimrod lived in prehistoric time. It is not the simple fact that a man standing in the early morning of human creation should be fond of hunting, that interests a people moving away down the valley of Time "in some wee short hour ayont the twal." It is the adjective that gives the statement importance. The assertion that Nimrod was a *mighty* hunter implies a superiority in craft and skill above all other hunters of Nimrod's epoch. It conveys the idea of an excellence beyond that obtained from set precept and rule. It involves, of a necessity, the possession of some particular attribute of the individual that made him marked among those who followed the chase. This piece of information concerning Nimrod is all that we have of him in the present age. Short as the statement is, however, and important as it may appear, reflection will show that a great truth lies under it. The word *mighty*, which distinguishes Nimrod from all others of his time, illustrates the nature of the *something* above referred to—a *something* within the individual which in its crudity resembles a jewel in the rough, and in its full development and blaze of power the same jewel after it has passed the hands of the skillful lapidary, when it exhibits, not only the art employed in the cut and polish of the stone, but likewise the native flash, the brilliant fire inherent in the gem.

The general drift of the modern popular judgment

tends to the side of special education and training as the agents that make not only poets, but likewise soldiers, doctors, lawyers, ministers, musicians, artists, artisans, etc. "There is no royal road to mathematics," says another proverb, by which we are to understand that men become mathematicians only by hard labor at books, under the grinding hand of direct tuition. The amount of money that is expended in our modern age by fond parents in the effort to make musicians and singers of daughters that have "no music in their souls;" to make artists of those that have no appreciation of color and no eye for symmetry; to make great lawyers of youths that have no logical faculty in their mental make-up, would soon pay off our national debt if applied to that purpose. The shores of the fast-rolling, roaring, surging stream of modern life are strewn with the wrecks of young men and women who have been stranded by the vain attempt to educate them for parts for which they had no fitness. Some youths are "taught" the law, who, after the bitter disappointments of a few years, relinquish it with the belief that under our modern system talent is rarely appreciated. Others, still, are "taught" to be soldiers, for service upon land or sea. Many of these, being diligent students, rank high in their classes, and sometimes even carry off the honors of the institution. In the overwhelming majority of these cases, as the record will show, the brilliant student, after leaving his *alma mater*, sinks into obscurity and is never heard of again in his profession. Opportunities for distinction come and pass, and

he makes no mark. Some illustrations of the truth of this observation will be presented in the subsequent pages.

Between the extreme statements of the two proverbs formulated above, viz.: "Poets are born, not made," and "There is no royal road to mathematics," the safe truth will be most surely found. The striking of the golden mean, the *aurea mediocritas* of the Latin writer, will develop the actual fact in this as in all other matters. Men become great lawyers only through the possession of a natural aptitude or talent, supplemented by a sufficient book-knowledge of laws, statutes, codes, rules of procedure, decisions, etc.; and they become great soldiers through special bent, and the acquisition of those branches of knowledge that are considered technical to the military art.

As before remarked, however, the drift of practical opinion in the modern day is toward a belief in the essential and exclusive nature of special education and training in all the varied directions of life. It is wholly unnecessary to the present purpose to discuss the inherent talent, aptitude, bent, direction, or *something*, belonging to the individual, under its metaphysical aspect. The practical fact is, that it appears in all the problems of life-occupation, thwarting the efforts of anxious parents and confounding the hopes and predictions of friends. It may reside in the physical or in the mental constitution of the individual. It may be a faculty or functional manifestation of the intellectual organ, or it may belong

to the physical structure itself. Whatever its precise nature, one thing is certain, viz.: that it is born with the individual; and, other things being equal, it forever shapes and determines the destiny of the individual possessing it. It is not made by art, nor created by education. It is not called into being by opportunity, though it is chiefly through opportunity that its presence may become known. Having no form, it cannot be seen by the eye; but, manifesting its existence by character and demonstration at once striking and convincing, it is not slow to enforce recognition. We have learned to call the quality or attribute under consideration by the Latin word *genius*.

It is believed that every human being of normal constitution possesses genius in greater or less degree. It flows in different channels, but it presides over all human effort. Cyrus the Persian, Alexander the Hellene, Julius Cæsar the Roman, and the first Napoleon illustrate its military development. The inventors of printing, of the use of steam, of the application of electricity, etc., demonstrate it in the direction of mechanics; while a man in Paris has acquired, in late years, a cosmopolitan reputation in the fabrication of female costumes. It is claimed, by those familiar with such things, that in his particular pursuit he stands without a rival in the history of the world. As no such claim can be made in behalf of either Cyrus, Alexander, Cæsar, or Napoleon, the genius of the modern individual in his own sphere of activity seems greater than that of those renowned soldiers of the past.

In one direction it may be said that he surpasses them in their own profession—that of dress-parade.

The foregoing general observations will serve to preface the subject which the author intends to present and somewhat fully to discuss in the ensuing chapters—that of military education.

After the close of the Revolutionary War, certain of the leading statesmen of the day became impressed by the necessity demanding the establishment of an institution for the military education of the future soldiers of the country. National independence had been secured after a struggle reaching over a period of eight years, but the uncertain future still lay before the young nation as an unsolved problem. The conflict between the rulers and the ruled had reached a critical point the world over. The establishment of such a republic as that contemplated and declared by the people of the United States was a dangerous experiment for the crowned monarchs of the old hemisphere, and our forefathers fully realized the perils that menaced it. The dissensions and jealousies of the older nations among themselves seemed to be a beacon-light of safety in the immediate present, but the fact that a readiness for war is the best security of peace was patent enough to the men who had passed through the fires of the Revolution.

It is not strange, then, that an early movement in the matter of military education took place. The expediency of a military school had been suggested, indeed, soon after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, but it

was discussed after the close of the war, for nearly twenty years, before positive enactment gave such definite form to the subject as resulted in the location of a school for military instruction at West Point, in the State of New York.

Before proceeding to review the immediate measures through which the school referred to was actually founded, it will be interesting to consider the opinions of some of the men upon whom had devolved both counsel and direction during the bitter struggle that finally gave independence to the colonies, upon the subject of the future military necessities of the young nation.

With the whole force of his mind directed to the elaboration of a system of government that should give permanence to the nation in whose interest he had made so many sacrifices, General Washington, after his inauguration as President, became foremost in the effort to devise a plan which, while adequate to afford military defense against the attempts of foreign enemies, should be shorn of the dangers to republican government of a large standing army. In this effort he was seconded by some of the ablest statesmen of that early day, prominent among whom were Jefferson, Hamilton, Knox, and others.

In a special message to the United States Senate, at the first session of Congress, President Washington, under date of August 7th, 1789, called the attention of its members to the subject referred to, as follows:

“Along with this object I am induced to suggest another, with the national importance and necessity of which I am deeply im-

pressed. I mean some uniform and effective system for the militia of the United States. It is unnecessary to offer arguments in recommendation of a measure on which the honor, safety, and well-being of our country so evidently and so essentially depends; but it may not be amiss to observe that I am particularly anxious it should receive as early attention as circumstances will admit, because it is now in our power to avail ourselves of the military knowledge disseminated through the several States by means of the many well instructed officers and soldiers of the late army, a resource which is daily diminishing by death and other causes. To suffer this peculiar advantage to pass away unimproved, would be to neglect an opportunity which will never again occur, unless, unfortunately, we should again be involved in a long and arduous war.”¹

No action upon this recommendation, so strongly expressed, was taken by the Senate. One of the most comprehensive state papers of that early day had been prepared by General Knox upon this subject, and formally presented, in his character of “Secretary for the Department of War,” to the consideration of Congress. After this it was revised by President Washington, so as to conform it to his own views, and transmitted by him to Congress, at its second session in New York, with the following message :

“Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives :

“The Secretary of the Department of War has submitted to me certain principles to serve as a plan for the general arrangement of the militia of the United States.

“Conceiving the subject to be of the highest importance to the welfare of our country, and liable to be placed in various points of view, I have directed him to lay the plan before Congress, for their information, in order that they may make such use thereof as they may judge proper.

“January 21, 1790.”²

¹ Journal of the First Session of the Senate, p. 55. ²Op. cit., p. 107.

The paper of General Knox is in the nature of a special report. Covering as it does the views of Washington at that time, as well as of its author, the document possesses high importance as representative of the experience brought by the war to those who, after having assisted to call a new nation into life, were laboring to surround it with conditions most surely conducive to its future well-being. This consideration alone would be a sufficient excuse for the introduction into the present volume of such parts of a state paper as might be not alone instructive as to things of the past, but even suggestive as to things of the future, when viewed at the present day.

In addition to the consideration just mentioned, however, there exists another that amply justifies the republication of the whole report, as well as of many other documents relating to the subject now being treated. The records of our national history are contained in volumes that are of extremely difficult access to the general people. They are scattered through the journals of both houses of Congress, in executive departments, in the volumes designated "American State Papers," in the "American Archives," and in a host of other volumes. These works are not upon sale in the book-stores, and are only to be found to a limited extent in private libraries.

Away from the large centers, and especially from the seat of government at Washington, it is hardly possible for the general public to consult state and national records with a view to following the history and course of any particular subject. To some who honor this book

with perusal the relating documents will, without doubt, be familiar; but it is safe to say that to the overwhelming majority of its readers the records bearing upon the subjects treated are wholly inaccessible. With a view of remedying this deficiency, and of popularizing, as far as the influence of the volume extends, a knowledge of the subject in a bibliographic sense, the author has decided to place all documents bearing upon the topic under treatment in these pages in full before his readers, in order that the book may have value as a work of easy reference if it shall possess no other claim upon the public favor.

The author of the paper presently to be copied, General Henry Knox, was an American by birth and training. Born in an humble sphere, he received only a common-school education, and began the business of life as an ordinary tradesman. Early in his career he began to evince a fondness for the military art, which soon led to his connection with a local artillery company. Applying himself with much zeal to the study of military science, he subsequently distinguished himself as a volunteer aide to General Ward, at the battle of Bunker Hill.

The sagacious eye of Washington soon after fell upon him as one of the volunteer officers upon whom the country must rely in the impending struggle with the British. As early as November, 1775, he was placed in command of the artillery and sent to the Canadian border upon an important mission—that of procuring cannon and ordnance stores from the forts upon the frontier. This

mission was consummated with brilliant success. One year after this service he was made a Brigadier-General, and commanded the artillery of the main army throughout the war. In most of the important battles of the Revolution, he lent an aid to their successful issue at once brilliant and decisive. One year before the close of hostilities, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and after their termination he rendered important service in arranging with Sir Guy Carleton for the surrender of New York.

Henry Knox was a worthy representative of the American citizen-soldier. He was a man whose natural bent or genius led him from the counter of the tradesman to the brilliant command of an army. With nothing but the common-school education of the time (which was a very different thing from the common-school education of to-day) as an adjunct, he achieved a success in the profession of arms which no system of mere education could have brought him, had not the inspiration of the soldier led him with invisible hand to the consummation of his destiny. Nor, to place it under the opposing light, is it at all probable that the most careful preliminary education in the best of military schools could have rendered General Knox's subsequent military career any more brilliant than it actually became under stimulus of the native fire which gave motion and direction to that career. Earlier and more extended experience it might have given him. But the accomplishments of genius, like water, never mount higher than the source, and they will

attain that level in spite of the most formidable obstructions. A little rivulet springing from the mountain-side will cut its way through pristine rocks which have been upheaved by the fires of earth, apparently with the particular object to block the way of the brook in its noisy march to the sea. But, scorning the rocks, it chisels its bed through the dark granites, and draws a line of glittering light from the frowning mountain to the deep-rolling ocean, and forever marks an oasis of refreshment to the thirsty traveler in his weary journey of life.

At the close of the war, in 1783, General Knox was still a very young man, being only thirty-three years of age. The country could not afford to lose the services of one who had borne so prominent a part in the past, and who promised so much of usefulness in the future. He was made Secretary of War in 1785, and held the position for a period of ten years. He had given much thought to a subject that had engaged the general attention, and the report made by him embraces his views of it. This report may be found in the "American State Papers, Military Affairs, volume I." It was submitted to the first Congress at its second session by President Washington, to whom it was addressed. Its text is as follows:

"WAR OFFICE, January 18, 1790.

"*Sir:* Having submitted to your consideration a plan for the arrangement of the militia of the United States, which I had presented to the late Congress, and you having approved the general principles thereof, with certain exceptions, I now respectfully lay the same before you, modified according to the alterations you were pleased to suggest. It has been my anxious desire to devise

a national system of defense adequate to the probable exigencies of the United States, whether arising from internal or external causes, and at the same time to erect a standard of republican magnanimity independent of and superior to the powerful influences of wealth.

“The convulsive events, generated by the inordinate pursuit of riches or ambition, require that the Government should possess a strong corrective arm.

“The idea is therefore submitted, whether an efficient military branch of government can be invented with safety to the great principles of liberty, unless the same shall be formed of the people themselves and supported by their habits and manners.

“I have the honor to be, sir, with the most perfect respect,

“Your most obedient servant,

“H. KNOX,

“*Secretary for the Department of War.*

“The President of the United States.”

THE INTRODUCTION.

“That a well constituted republic is more favorable to the liberties of society, and that its principles give a higher elevation to the human mind than any other form of government, has generally been acknowledged by the unprejudiced and enlightened part of mankind.

“But it is at the same time acknowledged that, unless a republic prepares itself by proper arrangements to meet those exigencies to which all states are in a degree liable, its peace and existence are more precarious than the forms of government in which the will of one directs the conduct of the whole for the defense of the nation.

“A government whose measures must be the result of multiplied deliberations is seldom in a situation to produce instantly those exertions which the occasion may demand; therefore it ought to possess such energetic establishments as should enable it, by the vigor of its own citizens, to control events as they arise instead of being convulsed or subverted by them.

“It is the misfortune of modern ages that governments have been formed by chance and events, instead of system; that, without fixed principles, they are braced or relaxed from time to time

according to the predominating power of the rulers or the ruled ; the rulers possessing separate interests from the people, excepting in some of the high-toned monarchies, in which all opposition to the will of the princes seems annihilated.

“Hence we look round Europe in vain for an extensive government rising on the power inherent in the people, and performing its operations entirely for their benefit. But we find artificial force governing everywhere, and the people generally made subservient to the elevation and caprice of the few, almost every nation appearing to be busily employed in conducting some external war, grappling with internal commotion, or endeavoring to extricate itself from impending debts which threaten to overwhelm it with ruin. Princes and ministers seem neither to have leisure nor inclination to bring forward institutions for diffusing general strength, knowledge, and happiness, but they seem to understand well the Machiavellian maxim of politics—divide and govern.

“May the United States avoid the errors and crimes of other governments and possess the wisdom to embrace the present invaluable opportunity of establishing such institutions as shall invigorate, exalt, and perpetuate the great principles of freedom ; an opportunity pregnant with the fate of millions, but rapidly borne on the wings of time, and which may never again return.

“The public mind, unbiased by superstition or prejudice, seems happily prepared to receive the impressions of wisdom. The latent springs of human action, ascertained by the standard of experience, may be regulated and made subservient to the noble purpose of forming a dignified national character.

“The causes by which nations have ascended and declined through the various ages of the world may be calmly and accurately determined, and the United States may be placed in the singularly fortunate condition of commencing their career of empire with the accumulated knowledge of all the known societies and governments of the globe.

“The strength of the Government, like the strength of any other vast and complicated machine, will depend on a due adjustment of its several parts. Its agriculture, its commerce, its laws, its finance, its system of *defense*, and its manners and habits, all require consideration and the highest exercise of political wisdom.

“It is the intention of the present attempt to suggest the most

efficient system of defense which may be compatible with the interests of a free people—a system which shall not only produce the expected effect, but which in its operations shall also produce those habits and manners which will impart strength and durability to the whole Government.

“The modern practice of Europe with respect to the employment of standing armies has created such a mass of opinion in their favor that even philosophers and the advocates for liberty have frequently confessed their use and necessity in certain cases.

“But whoever seriously and candidly estimates the power of discipline and the tendency of military habits will be constrained to confess that, whatever may be the efficacy of a standing army in war, it cannot in peace be considered as friendly to the rights of human nature. The recent instance in France cannot with propriety be brought to overturn the general principle, built upon the uniform experience of mankind. It may be found, on examining the causes that appear to have influenced the military of France, that, while the springs of power were wound up in the nation to the highest pitch, the discipline of the army was proportionately relaxed. But any argument on this head may be considered as unnecessary to the enlightened citizens of the United States.

“A small corps of well-disciplined and well-informed artillerists and engineers and a legion for the protection of the frontiers and the magazines and arsenals are all the military establishment which may be required for the present use of the United States. The privates of the corps to be enlisted for a certain period, and after the expiration of which to return to the mass of the citizens.

“An energetic national militia is to be regarded as the *capital security* of a free republic, and not a standing army forming a distinct class in the community.

“It is the introduction and diffusion of vice and corruption of manners into the mass of the people that renders a standing army necessary. It is when public spirit is despised, and avarice, indolence, and effeminacy of manners predominate and prevent the establishment of institutions which would elevate the minds of the youth in the paths of virtue and honor, that a standing army is formed and riveted forever.

“While the human character remains unchanged, and societies and governments of considerable extent are formed, a principle

ever ready to execute the laws and defend the state must constantly exist. Without this vital principle the government would be invaded or overtured and trampled upon by the bold and ambitious. No community can long be held together unless its arrangements are adequate to its probable exigencies.

“If it should be decided to reject a standing army for the military branch of the Government of the United States, as possessing too fierce an aspect and being hostile to the principles of liberty, it will follow that a well-constituted militia ought to be established.

“A consideration of the subject will show the impracticability of disciplining at once the masses of the people. All discussions on the subject of a powerful militia will result in one or other of the following principles:

“First, either efficient institutions must be established for the military education of the youth, and that the knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused throughout the community by the means of rotation; or,

“Secondly, that the militia must be formed of substitutes, after the manner of the militia of Great Britain.

“If the United States possess the vigor of mind to establish the first institution, it may reasonably be expected to produce the most unequivocal advantages. A glorious national spirit will be introduced, with its extensive train of political consequences. The youth will imbibe a love of their country; reverence and obedience to its laws; courage and elevation of mind; openness and liberality of character, accompanied by a just spirit of honor; in addition to which their bodies will acquire a robustness greatly conducive to their personal happiness as well as the defense of their country, while habit with its silent but efficacious operations will durably cement the system.

“Habit, that powerful and universal law, incessantly acting on the human race, well deserves the attention of legislators, formed at first in individuals by separate and almost imperceptible impulses, until at length it acquires a force which controls with irresistible sway. The effects of salutary or pernicious habits, operating on a whole nation, are immense, and decide its rank and character in the world.

“Hence, the science of legislation teaches to scrutinize every national institution, as it may introduce proper or improper habits,

to adopt with religious zeal the former and reject with horror the latter.

“A republic constructed on the principles herein stated would be uninjured by events sufficient to overturn a government supported solely by the uncertain power of a standing army.

“The well-informed members of the community, actuated by the highest motives of self-love, would form the real defense of the country. Rebellion would be prevented or suppressed with ease; invasions of such a government would be undertaken only by madmen, and the virtues and knowledge of the people would effectually oppose the introduction of tyranny.

“But the second principle—a militia of substitutes—is pregnant, in a degree, with the mischiefs of a standing army, as it is highly probable the substitutes from time to time will be nearly the same men, and the most idle and worthless part of the community. Wealthy families, proud of distinction which riches may confer, will prevent their sons from serving in the militia of substitutes; the plan will degenerate into habitual contempt; a standing army will be introduced, and the liberties of the people subjected to all the contingencies of events.

“The expense attending an energetic establishment of militia may be strongly urged as an objection to the institution. But it is to be remembered that this objection is leveled at both systems, whether by rotation or by substitution, for, if the numbers are equal, the expense will also be equal. The estimate of the expenses will show its unimportance when compared with the magnitude and beneficial effects of the institution.

“But the people of the United States will cheerfully consent to the expenses of a measure calculated to serve as a *perpetual barrier* to their liberties, especially as they well know that the disbursements will be made among the members of the same community, and, therefore, cannot be injurious.

“Every intelligent mind would rejoice in the establishment of an institution under whose auspices the youth and vigor of the Constitution would be renewed with each successive generation, and which would appear to secure the great principles of freedom and happiness against the injuries of time and events.

“The following plan is formed on these general principles:

“First, that it is the indispensable duty of every nation to

establish all necessary institutions for its own perfection and defense.

“Secondly, that it is a capital security to a free state for the great body of the people to possess a competent knowledge of the military art.

“Thirdly, that this knowledge cannot be attained, in the present state of society, but by establishing adequate institutions for the military education of youth, and that the knowledge acquired therein should be diffused throughout the community by the principles of rotation.

“Fourthly, that every man of the proper age and ability of body is firmly bound by the social compact to perform, personally, his proportion of military duty for the defense of the state.

“Fifthly, that all men of the legal military age should be armed, enrolled, and held responsible for different degrees of military service.

“And sixthly, that, agreeably to the Constitution, the United States are to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

CHAPTER III.

CONCLUSION OF GENERAL KNOX'S PAPER—LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS FOUNDED UPON THE SAME—DISAPPOINTMENT OF GENERAL KNOX IN THE BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS—THE PROBLEM, HOW TO MAKE A TRAINED SOLDIER WITHOUT ATTACHING HIM TO A PERMANENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT—INTERESTING DOCUMENTS BEARING UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY SCHOOL AS THE BEST MILITARY HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC—THE INITIAL ERROR OF THE FOREFATHERS IN FAILING TO PROVIDE FOR A GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION OF THE MASSES.

THE interesting introduction to the paper of Secretary Knox, quoted in the last chapter, is followed by his plan of organizing the citizen-soldiery. Even at this later day of our history there is much in the second portion of the paper valuable in its suggestive character. The author commends it to the careful perusal of his readers, because containing germs of thought capable of useful development under favoring circumstances.

The remainder of the paper is as follows :

THE PLAN.

“The period of life in which military service shall be required of the citizens of the United States to commence at eighteen and terminate at the age of sixty years.

“The men comprehended by this description, exclusive of such exceptions as the legislatures of the several States may think proper to make, and *all actual mariners*, shall be enrolled for different degrees of military duty and divided into three distinct classes.

“The first class shall comprehend the youth of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years of age, to be denominated the *Advanced Corps*.

“The second class shall comprehend the men from twenty-one to forty-six years of age, to be denominated the *Main Corps*.

“The third class shall comprehend, inclusively, the men from forty-six to sixty years of age, to be denominated the *Reserved Corps*.

“All the militia of the United States shall assume the form of the legion, which shall be the permanent establishment thereof.

“A legion shall consist of one hundred and fifty-three commissioned officers, and two thousand eight hundred and eighty non-commissioned officers and privates, formed in the following manner :

1. *The Legionary Staff.*

“One Legionary or Major-General.

“Two Aides-de-Camp of the rank of Major, one of whom to be Legionary Quartermaster.

“One Inspector and Deputy-Adjutant-General of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

“One Chaplain.

2. *The Brigade Staff.*

“One Brigadier-General.

“One Brigadier Inspector, to serve as an Aide-de-Camp.

3. *The Regimental Staff.*

“One Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant.

“Two Majors.

“One Adjutant.

“One Paymaster or Agent.

“One Quartermaster.

4. *Two Brigades of Infantry.*

“Each brigade of two regiments ; each regiment of eight companies, forming two battalions ; each company of a captain,

lieutenant, ensign, six sergeants, one drum, one fife, and sixty-four rank and file.

5. *Two Companies of Riflemen.*

“Each company to have a captain, lieutenant, ensign, six sergeants, a bugle-horn, one drum, and sixty-four rank and file.

6. *A Battalion of Artillery,*

Consisting of four companies, each to have a captain, captain-lieutenant, one lieutenant, six sergeants, twelve artificers, and fifty-two rank and file.

7. *A Squadron of Cavalry,*

Consisting of two troops; each troop to have a captain, two lieutenants, a cornet, six sergeants, one farrier, one saddler, one trumpeter, and sixty-four dragoons.

“In case the whole number of the advanced corps of any State should be insufficient to form a legion of this extent, yet the component parts must be preserved and the reduction proportioned, as nearly as may be, to each part.

“The companies of all corps shall be divided into *sections* of twelve each. It is proposed by this division to establish one uniform vital principle, which in peace and war shall pervade the militia of the United States.

“All requisitions of men to *form an army*, either for State or Federal purposes, shall be furnished by the advanced and main corps, by means of the sections.

“The executive government, or commander-in-chief of the militia of each State, will assess the numbers required on the respective legions of these corps.

“The legionary general will direct the proportions to be furnished by each part of his command. Should the demand be so great as to require one man from each section, then the operation hereby directed shall be performed by single sections. But if a less number should be required, they will be furnished by an association of sections, or companies, according to the demand. In any case it is probable that mutual convenience may dictate an agreement with an individual to perform the service required. If, however, no agreement can be made, one must be detached by an indiscriminate draft, and the others shall pay him a sum of money

equal to the averaged sum which shall be paid in the same legion for the voluntary performance of the service required.

“In case any sections or companies of a legion, after having furnished its own quota, should have more men willing to engage for the service required, other companies of the same legion shall have permission to engage them. The same rule to extend to the different legions in the State.

“The legionary general must be responsible to the commander-in-chief of the militia of the State that the men furnished are according to the description, and that they are equipped in the manner and marched to the rendezvous conformably to the orders for that purpose.

“The men who may be drafted shall not serve more than three years at one time.

“Reserved corps, being destined for the domestic defense of the State, shall not be obliged to furnish men, excepting in cases of actual invasion or rebellion; and then the men required shall be furnished by means of the sections.

“The actual commissioned officers of the respective corps shall not be included in the sections, nor in any of the operations thereof.

“The respective States shall be divided into portions or districts, each of which to contain, as nearly as may be, some complete part of a legion.

“Every citizen of the United States who shall serve his country in the field for the space of one year, either as an officer or soldier, shall, if under the age of twenty-one years, be exempted from the service required in the advanced corps. If he shall be above the age of twenty-one years, then every year he shall so serve in the field shall be estimated as equal to six years' service in the main or reserved corps, and shall accordingly exempt him from every service therein for the said term of six years, except in cases of actual invasion of, or rebellion within, the State in which he resides. And it shall also be a permanent establishment that six years' actual service in the field shall entirely free every citizen from any further demands of service, either in militia or in the field, unless in cases of invasion or rebellion.

“*All actual mariners*, or seamen, in the respective States, shall be registered in districts and divided into two classes. The first

class to consist of all the seamen from the age of sixteen to thirty years, inclusively. The second class to consist of all those of the age of thirty-one to forty-five, inclusively.

“The first class shall be responsible to serve three years on board of some public armed vessel or ship-of-war, as a commissioned officer, warrant officer, or private mariner, for which service they shall receive the customary wages and emoluments.

“But should the State not demand the said three years’ service during the above period, from the age of sixteen to thirty years, then the party to be exempted entirely therefrom.

“The person so serving shall receive a certificate of his service on parchment, according to the form which shall be directed, which shall exempt him from any other than voluntary service, unless in such exigencies as may require the services of all the members of the community.

“The second class shall be responsible for a proportion of service in those cases to which the first class shall be unequal. The numbers required shall be furnished by sections, in the same manner as is prescribed for the sections of the militia.

“OF THE ADVANCED CORPS.

“The advanced corps are designed not only as a school in which the youth of the United States are to be instructed in the art of war, but they are, in all cases of exigence, to serve as an actual defense to the community.

“The whole of the armed corps shall be clothed according to the manner hereafter directed, armed and subsisted at the expense of the United States; and all the youth of the said corps, in each State, shall be encamped together, if practicable, or by legions, which encampments shall be denominated the *annual camps of discipline*.

“The youth of *eighteen* and *nineteen* years shall be disciplined for *thirty* days successively in each year; and those of twenty years shall be disciplined only for ten days in each year, which shall be the last ten days of the annual encampments.

“The non-commissioned officers and privates are not to receive any pay during the said time; but the commissioned officers will receive the pay of their relative ranks, agreeably to the Federal establishment for the time being.

"In order that the plan shall effectually answer the end proposed, the first day of January shall be the fixed period for all who attain the age of eighteen years, in any part, or during the course of each year, to be enrolled in the advanced corps, and to take the necessary oaths to perform, personally, such legal military service as may be directed, for the full and complete term of three years, to be estimated from the time of entrance into the said corps, and also to take an oath of allegiance to the State and to the United States.

"The commanding officer or general of the advanced legions of the district shall regulate the manner of the service of the youth, respectively, whether it shall be in the infantry, artillery, or cavalry; but, after having entered into either of them, no change should be allowed.

"Each individual, at his first joining the annual camps of discipline, will receive complete arms and accoutrements, all of which, previously to his being discharged from the said camps, he must return to the regimental quartermaster, on the penalty of — dollars, or — months' imprisonment.

"The said arms and accoutrements shall be marked, in some conspicuous place, with the letters M. U. S. And all sales or purchases of any of the said arms or accoutrements shall be severely punished, according to law.

"And each individual will also, on his first entrance into the advanced corps, receive the following articles of uniform clothing: One hat, one uniform short coat, one waistcoat, and one pair of overalls, which he shall retain in his own possession, and for which he shall be held accountable, and be compelled to replace all deficiencies during his service in the annual camps of discipline.

"Those who shall serve in the cavalry shall be at the expense of their own horses and uniform helmets and horse furniture; but they shall receive forage for their horses, swords, pistols, and clothing, equal in value to the infantry.

"At the age of twenty-one years, every individual having served in the manner and for the time prescribed shall receive an honorary certificate thereof, on parchment, and signed by the legionary general and inspector.

"The names of all persons to whom such certificates shall be given shall be fairly registered in books to be provided for that purpose.

“And the said certificate, or an attested copy of the register aforesaid, shall be required as an indispensable qualification for exercising any of the rights of a free citizen until after the age of — years.

“The advanced legions, in all cases of invasion or rebellion, shall, on requisition of lawful authority, be obliged to march to any place within the United States; to remain embodied for such time as shall be directed, not to exceed one year, to be computed from the time of marching from the regimental parade; during the period of their being on such service, to be placed on the continental establishment of pay, subsistence, clothing, forage, tents, camp equipage, and all such other allowances as are made to the Federal troops at the same time and under the same circumstances.

“If the military service so required should be for such a short period as to render an actual issue of clothing unnecessary, then an allowance should be made in proportion to the annual cost of clothing for the Federal soldier, according to estimates to be furnished for that purpose from the War Office of the United States.

“In case the legions of the advanced corps should march to any place in consequence of a requisition of the General Government, all legal and proper expenses of such march shall be paid by the United States. But, should they be embodied and marched in consequence of an order derived from the authority of the State to which they belong, and for State purposes, then the expenses will be borne by the State.

“The advanced corps shall be constituted on such principles that, when completed, it will receive one-third part and discharge one-third part of its members annually. By this arrangement two-thirds of the corps will at all times be considerably disciplined; but, as it will only receive those of eighteen years of age, it will not be completed until the third year after its institution. Those who have already attained the ages of nineteen and twenty years will, in the first instance, be enrolled in the main corps.

“But one-half the legionary officers to be appointed the first and the other the second year of the establishment.

“The officers of each grade in the States, respectively, shall be divided into three classes, which shall by lot be numbered one, two, and three, and one of the said classes, according to their numbers,

shall be deranged every third year. In the first period of nine years, one-third part will have to serve three, one-third part six, and one-third part nine years. But, after the said first period, the several classes will serve nine years, which shall be the limitation of service by virtue of the same appointment; and in such cases, where there may not be three officers of the same grade, the limitation of nine years' service shall be observed. All vacancies occasioned by the aforesaid derangements or any casualties shall be immediately filled by new appointments.

“The captains and subalterns of the advanced corps shall not be less than twenty-one nor more than thirty-five, and the field officers shall not exceed forty-five years of age.

“Each company, battalion, and regiment shall have a fixed parade or place at which to assemble. The companies shall assemble at their own parade and march to the parade of the battalion, and the battalions to the regimental parade, and when thus embodied the regiment will march to the rendezvous of the legion. Every commanding officer of a company, battalion, and regiment will be accountable to his superior officer that his command is in the most perfect order.

“The officers to receive subsistence money in lieu of provisions, in proportion to their respective grades, and those whose duties require them to be on horseback will receive forage in the same proportion.

“Every legion must have a chaplain of respectable talents and character, who, besides his religious functions, should impress on the minds of the youth at stated periods, in concise discourses, the eminent advantages of free governments to the happiness of society, and that such governments can only be supported by the knowledge, spirit, and virtuous conduct of the youth, to be illustrated by the most conspicuous examples of history.

“No amusements should be admitted in camp but those which correspond with war—the swimming of men and horses, running, wrestling, and such other exercises as should render the body flexible and vigorous.

“The camps should, if possible, be formed near a river, and remote from large cities. The first is necessary for the practice of the maneuvers, the second to avoid the vices of populous places.

“The time of the annual encampments shall be divided into six

parts or periods, of five days each; the first of which shall be occupied in acquiring the air, attitudes, and first principles of a soldier; the second in learning the manual exercises, and to march individually and in small squads; the third and fourth in exercising and maneuvering in detail, and by battalions and regiments; in the fifth, the youth of twenty, having been disciplined during the two preceding annual encampments, are to be included. This period is to be employed in the exercise and tactic of the legion, or, if more than one, in executing the grand maneuvers of the whole body—marching, attacking, and defending, in various forms, different grounds and positions; in fine, in representing all the real images of war, excepting the effusion of blood.

“The guards, and every other circumstance of the camp, to be perfectly regulated.

“Each State will determine on the season in which its respective annual encampments shall be formed, so as to best suit the health of the men and the general interests of the society.

“The United States to make an adequate provision to supply the arms, clothing, rations, artillery, ammunition, forage, straw, tents, camp equipage, including every requisite for the annual camps of discipline; and also for the pay and subsistence of the legionary officers, and for the following general staff: One inspector-general, one adjutant-general, one quartermaster-general, with a deputy for each State.

“These officers will be essential to the uniformity, economy, and efficacy of the system, to be appointed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution of the United States.

“The quartermaster-general shall be responsible to the United States for the public property of every species delivered to him for the annual camps of discipline, and his deputy in each State shall be responsible to him.

“At the commencement of the annual camps of discipline the deputy quartermaster will make regular issues to the legionary or regimental quartermasters, as the case may be, of all the articles, of every species, provided by the United States.

“The returns for the said articles to be examined and certified by the highest legionary or regimental officer, as the case may be, who shall be responsible for the accuracy thereof.

“At the expiration of the annual camps of discipline, all public

property (clothing excepted) shall be returned to the deputy quartermaster of the State, who shall hold the legionary quartermaster accountable for all deficiencies. All the apparatus and property so returned shall be carefully examined, repaired, and deposited in a magazine, to be provided in each State for that purpose, under the charge of the said deputy quartermaster, until the ensuing annual encampment, or any occasion which may render a new issue necessary.

“Corporal punishments shall never be inflicted in the annual camps of discipline; but a system of fines and imprisonment shall be formed for the regular government of such camps.

OF THE MAIN CORPS.

“As the main and reserved corps are to be replenished by the principle of rotation from the advanced corps, and ultimately to consist of men who have received their military education therein, it is proper that one uniform arrangement should pervade the several classes.

“It is for this reason the legion is established as the common form of all the corps of the militia.

“The main legions, consisting of the great majority of the men of the military age, will form the principal defense of the country.

“They are to be responsible for their proportion of men, to form an army whenever necessity shall dictate the measure; and on every sudden occasion to which the advanced corps shall be incompetent, an adequate number of non-commissioned officers and privates shall be added thereto, from the main corps, by means of the sections.

“The main corps will be perfectly armed, in the first instance, and will practice the exercises and maneuvers four days in each year, and will assemble in their respective districts by companies, battalions, regiments, or legions, as shall be directed by the legionary general, but it must be a fixed rule that in the populous parts of the States the regiments must assemble once annually and the legions once in three years.

“Although the main corps cannot acquire a great degree of military knowledge in the few days prescribed for the annual exercise, yet, by the constant accession of the youth from the advanced

corps, it will soon command respect for its military discipline as well as its numbers.

“When the youth are transferred from the advanced corps they shall invariably join the flank companies, the cavalry or artillery of the main corps, according to the nature of their former services.

OF THE RESERVED CORPS.

“The reserved corps will assemble only twice annually for the inspection of arms, by companies, battalions, or regiments, as shall be directed by each State. It will assemble by legions whenever the defense of the State may render the measure necessary.

“Such are the propositions of the plan, to which it may be necessary to add some explanations.

“Although the substantial political maxim which requires personal service of all the members of the community for the defense of the State is obligatory under all forms of society, and is the main pillar of a free government, yet the degrees thereof may vary at the different periods of life, consistently with the general welfare. The public convenience may also dictate a relaxation of the general obligation as it respects the principal magistrates, and of the ministers of justice and of religion, and perhaps some religious sects. But it ought to be remembered that measures of national importance never should be frustrated by the accommodation of individuals.

“The military age has generally commenced at sixteen and terminated at the age of sixty years, but the youth of sixteen do not commonly attain such a degree of robust strength as to enable them to sustain without injury the hardships incident to the field; therefore the commencement of military service is herein fixed at eighteen, and the termination, as usual, at sixty years of age.

“The plan proposes that the militia shall be divided into three capital classes, and that each class shall be formed into legions, the reasons for which shall be given in succession.

“The advanced corps and annual camps of discipline are instituted in order to introduce an operative military spirit in the community, to establish a course of honorable military service which will, at the same time, mold the minds of the young men to a due obedience of the laws, instruct them in the art of war, and, by the

manly exercises of the field, form a race of hardy citizens, equal to the dignified task of defending their country.

“An examination into the employments and obligations of the individuals composing the society will evince the impossibility of diffusing an adequate knowledge of the art of war by any other means than a course of discipline during the period of nonage. The time necessary to acquire this important knowledge cannot be afforded at any other period of life with so little injury to the public or private interests.

“Without descending to minute distinctions, the body of the people of the United States may be divided into two parts—the yeomanry of the country, and the men of various employments, resident in towns and cities. In both parts it is usual for the male children, from the age of fourteen to twenty-one years, to learn some trade or employment, under the direction of a parent or master. In general, the labor or service of the youth, during this period, besides amply repaying the trouble of tuition, leaves a large profit to the tutor. This circumstance is stated to show that no great hardships will arise in the first operations of the proposed plan. A little practice will render the measure perfectly equal, and remove every difficulty.

“Youth is the time for the State to avail itself of those services which it has a right to demand, and by which it is to be invigorated and preserved. In this season the passions and affections are strongly influenced by the splendor of military parade. The impressions the mind receives will be retained through life. The young man will repair with pride and pleasure to the field of exercise, while the head of a family, anxious for its general welfare, and perhaps its immediate subsistence, will reluctantly quit his domestic duties for any length of time.

“The habits of industry will be rather strengthened than relaxed by the establishment of the annual camps of discipline, as all the time will be occupied by the various military duties. Idleness and dissipation will be regarded as disgraceful and punished accordingly. As soon as the youth attain the age of manhood, a natural solicitude to establish themselves in the society will occur in its full force. The public claims for military service will be too inconsiderable to injure their industry. It will be sufficiently stimulated to proper exertions by the prospect of opulence attend-

ing on the cultivation of a fertile soil, or the pursuits of a productive commerce.

“It is presumed that thirty days annually during the eighteenth and nineteenth, and ten days during the twentieth year, is the least time that ought to be appropriated by the youth to the acquisition of the military art. The same number of days might be added during the twentieth as during the two preceding years were not the expense an objection.

“Every means will be provided by the public to facilitate the military education of the youth, which it is proposed shall be an indispensable qualification of a free citizen; therefore, they will not be entitled to any pay. But the officers, being of the main corps, are in a different predicament. They are supposed to have passed through the course of discipline required by the laws, and to be competent to instruct others in the military art. As the public will have but small claims for personal service on them, and as they must incur considerable expenses to prepare themselves to execute properly their respective offices, they ought to be paid while on actual duty.

“As soon as the service of the youth expires in the advanced corps they are to be enrolled in the main corps. On this occasion the Republic receives disciplined and free citizens, who understand their public rights, and are prepared to defend them.

“The main corps is instituted to preserve and circulate throughout the community the military discipline acquired in the advanced corps; to arm the people and fix firmly, by practice and habit, those forms and maxims which are essential to the life and energy of a free government.

“The reserved corps is instituted to prevent men being sent to the field whose strength is unequal to sustain the severities of an active campaign. But by organizing and rendering them eligible for domestic service, a quarter proportion of the younger and robust part of the community may be enabled, in case of necessity, to encounter the more urgent duties of war.

“It would be difficult, previously to the actual formation of the annual camps of discipline, to ascertain the number in each State of which it would be composed. The frontier counties of several States are thinly inhabited, and require all their internal force for their immediate defense. There are other infant settle-

ments, from which it might be injurious to draw away their youth annually for the purpose of discipline.

“No evil would result if the establishment of the advanced corps should be omitted in such districts for a few years. Besides, the forbearance in this respect would lessen the expense, and render the institution more compatible with the public finances.

“The several State legislatures, therefore, as best understanding their local interests, might be invested with a discretionary power to omit the enrollments for the advanced corps in such of their frontier and thinly inhabited districts as they may judge proper.

“If the number of three millions may be assumed as the total number of the inhabitants within the United States, half a million may be deducted therefrom for blacks, and, pursuant to the foregoing ideas, another half million may be deducted on account of the thinly settled parts of the country.

“The proportion of men of the military age, from eighteen to sixty years inclusively, of two millions of people, of all ages and sexes, may be estimated at four hundred thousand. There may be deducted from this number as actual mariners about fifty thousand, and a further number of twenty-five thousand to include exempts of religious sects, and of every other sort which the respective States may think proper to make.

“Three hundred and twenty-five thousand, therefore, may be assumed as the number of operative, fencible men to compose the militia, the proportion of the several classes of which would be nearly as follows:

“Firstly, the advanced corps, one-tenth, composed of the youth of the ages of eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years.....	32,500
Secondly, the main corps, six-tenths and one-twentieth.....	211,250
Thirdly, the reserved corps, two-tenths and one-twentieth.....	81,250
	325,000
* * * * *	

[NOTE.—Here follows a detailed estimate of the expense of the annual camps of discipline as proposed in the foregoing plan, which, as being without immediate interest to the readers of this volume, is omitted.]

“Thus, for a sum less than four hundred thousand dollars annually, which, apportioned on three millions of people, would be little more than one-eighth of a dollar each, an energetic republican militia may be durably established, the invaluable principles

of liberty secured and perpetuated, and a dignified national fabric erected on the solid foundation of public virtue.

“The main and reserved corps must be perfectly organized in the first instance, but the advanced corps will not be completed until the third year of its institution.

“The combination of troops of various descriptions into one body, so as to invest it with the highest and greatest number of powers in every possible situation, has long been a subject of discussion and difference of opinion. But no other form appears so well to have sustained the criterion of time and severe examination as the Roman legion. This formidable organization, accommodated to the purposes of modern war, still retains its original energy and superiority. Of the ancients, Polybius and Vegetius have described and given the highest encomiums of the legion. The former, particularly, in his comparative view of the advantages and disadvantages of the Macedonian and Roman armies and their respective orders of battle, has left to mankind an important and instructive legacy. Of the moderns, Mareschal Saxe has modeled the legion for the use of firearms and strenuously urges its adoption in preference to any other form. And the respectable and intelligent veteran, late inspector-general of the armies of the United States,¹ recommends the adoption of the legion.

“‘Upon a review,’ says he, ‘of all the military of Europe, there does not appear to be a single form which could be safely adopted by the United States. They are unexceptionally different from each other; and, like all other human institutions, seem to have started as much out of accident as design. The local situation of the country, the spirit of the government, the character of the nation, and, in many instances, the character of the prince, have all had their influence in settling the foundation and discipline of their respective troops, and render it impossible that we should take either as a model.’

“The legion alone has not been adopted by any, and yet I am confident in asserting that, whether it be examined as applicable to all countries or as it may immediately apply to the existing or probable necessity of this, it will be found strikingly superior to any other.

¹ Alexander Hamilton.

“1st. Being a complete and little army of itself, it is ready to begin its operations on the shortest notice or slightest alarm.

“2d. Having all the component parts of the largest army of any possible description, it is prepared to meet any species of war that may present itself; and,

“3d. As, in every case of detachment, the first constitutional principle will be preserved and the embarrassments of drafting and detail, which in armies differently framed too often distract the commanding officer, will be avoided.

“It may easily suggest itself from this sketch, that, in forming a legion, the most difficult task is to determine the necessary proportion of each species of soldiers which is to compose it. This must obviously depend upon what will be the theater and what the style of the war. On the plains of Poland whole brigades of cavalry would be necessary against every enemy, but in the forests and among the hills of America a single regiment would be more than sufficient against any. And as there are but two kinds of war to which we are much exposed, viz.: an attack from the sea-side by an European power, aided by our sworn enemies settled on our extreme left, and an invasion of our back settlements by an Indian enemy, it follows, of course, that musketeers and light infantry should make the greatest part of our army.

“The institution of this section is intended to interest the patriotism and pride of every individual in the militia to support the legal measures of a free government, to render every man active in the public cause by introducing the spirit of emulation and a degree of personal responsibility.

“The common mode of recruiting is attended with too great destruction of morals to be tolerated, and is too uncertain to be the principal resource of a wise nation in a time of danger. The public faith is frequently wounded by unworthy individuals who hold out delusive promises which can never be realized. By such means an unprincipled banditti are often collected for the purpose of defending everything that should be dear to freemen. The consequences are natural: such men either desert in time of danger or are ever ready, on the slightest disgust, to turn their arms against their country.

“By the establishment of the sections an ample and permanent source is opened whence the state in every exigence may be sup-

plied with men whose all depends upon the prosperity of their country.

“In cases of necessity an army may be formed of citizens whose previous knowledge of discipline will enable it to proceed to an immediate accomplishment of the designs of the state, instead of exhausting the public resources by wasting whole years in preparing to face the enemy.

“The previous arrangements necessary to form and maintain the annual encampments, as well as the discipline acquired therein, will be an excellent preparation for war. The artillery and its numerous appendages, arms, accoutrements of every kind, and all species of ammunition, ought to be manufactured within the United States. It is of high importance that the present period should be embraced to establish adequate institutions to produce the necessary apparatus of war.

“It is unworthy the dignity of a rising and free empire to depend on foreign and fortuitous supplies of the essential means of defense.

“The clothing of the troops could with ease be manufactured within the United States, and the establishment in that respect would tend to the encouragement of important manufactories.

“The disbursements made in each State for the rations, forage, and other necessary articles for the annual camps of discipline would most beneficially circulate the money arising from the public revenue.

“The local circumstances of the United States, their numerous sea-ports, and the protection of their commerce require a naval arrangement. Hence the necessity of the proposed plan, embracing the idea of the States obtaining men on republican principles for the marine as well as the land service. But one may be accomplished with much greater facility than the other, as the preparation of a soldier for the field requires a degree of discipline which cannot be learned without much time and labor, whereas the common course of sea service on board of merchant vessels differs but little from the service required on board of armed ships; therefore, the education for our war in this respect will be obtained without any expense to the State. All that seems to be requisite on the head of marine service is that an efficient regulation should be established in the respective States to register all actual seamen,

and to render those of a certain age amenable to the public for personal service if demanded within a given period.

“The constitutions of the respective States, and of the United States, having directed the modes in which the officers of the militia shall be appointed, no alteration can be made therein. Although it may be supposed that some modes of appointment are better calculated than others to inspire the highest propriety of conduct, yet there are none so defective to serve as a sufficient reason for rejecting an efficient system for the militia. It is certain that the choice of officers is the point on which the reputation and importance of a corps must depend; therefore, every person who may be concerned in the appointment should consider himself as responsible to his country for a proper choice.

“The wisdom of the States will be manifested by inducing those citizens of whom the late American army was composed to accept of appointments in the militia. The high degree of military knowledge which they possess was acquired at too great a price and is too precious to be buried in oblivion. It ought to be cherished and rendered permanently beneficial to the community.

“The vigor and importance of the proposed plan will entirely depend on the laws relative thereto. Unless the laws shall be equal to the object, and rigidly enforced, no energetic national militia can be established.

“If wealth be admitted as a principle of exemption, the plan cannot be executed. It is the wisdom of political establishments to make the wealth of individuals subservient to the general good, and not to suffer it to corrupt or attain undue indulgence.

“It is conceded that people, solicitous to be exonerated from their proportion of public duty, may exclaim against the proposed arrangement as an intolerable hardship. But it ought to be strongly impressed that, while society has its claims, it also has its indispensable obligations. That to attempt such a degree of refinement as to exonerate the members of the community from all personal service is to render them incapable of the exercise and unworthy of the character of freemen.

“Every State possesses not only the right of personal service from its members, but the right to regulate the service on principles of equality for the general defense. All being bound, none can complain of injustice on being obliged to furnish an equal

proportion. Therefore, it ought to be a permanent rule that those who in youth decline or refuse to subject themselves to the course of military education established by the laws, should be considered as unworthy of public trust or honors, and be excluded therefrom accordingly.

“If the majesty of the laws should be preserved inviolate in this respect, the operations of the proposed plan would foster a glorious public spirit, infuse the principles of energy and stability into the body politic, and give a high degree of political splendor to the national character.”

The foregoing classic production is reproduced in these pages with the object already stated as a preface to the quotation of the paper itself, and not with a view to urge the adoption of the plan proposed for the military training of the youths of America. This plan was considered impracticable in the period of its origin, and it is greatly more susceptible of being so considered in the present condition of the United States. The paper has been fruitful of good results, however. It led to the establishment of a military law under the operation of which some effective preparation was made for meeting the British foe a second time. Further than this, it enunciates certain principles underlying a free and healthy growth of republican institutions, which must live as golden maxims as long as the Republic exists, and which deserve inculcation as an essential element of the education of American youth. It constitutes, also, a valuable part of the subject treated in this division of the present volume—the history of military education in the United States—and in that respect will serve the author as a convenient text upon which to base some of the remarks

that it is his purpose to make in succeeding pages. In every sense, then, it will be interesting as well as instructive to take a rapid glance at the direction which the subject followed under subsequent legislation.

General Knox's paper, as heretofore stated, was submitted to Congress by President Washington, through means of a special message, on January 21, 1790. For a period of some six months its recommendations were informally considered and discussed by both Senators and Representatives. As a result of the deliberation then given to the subject, a bill was drafted and introduced into the House of Representatives on July 1, 1790, which was entitled, "An act more effectually to provide for the national defense by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States." The plan adopted in the bill, while covering some of the features recommended by General Knox, was wholly different in general construction, as well as in practical detail, from that proposed by the early War Secretary. Great diversity of opinion seems to have been entertained regarding the act as it became ultimately formulated. Having been read twice and referred to a committee of the whole house on the date above given, no further action seems to have been taken upon it until December 14 following, when it was again read twice, the original draft having been modified probably, and again referred to the committee of the whole. It was considered by this committee during four different sessions, when the bill was referred to a special committee, which committee reported a substitute bill on

January 4, 1791. During the previous consideration of a militia bill protests had been sent to Congress against the passage of such a law, and in January, 1791, the "Quakers of New England" forwarded a vigorous protest against that under consideration. Whether in consequence of this or not, Congress adjourned without further action upon the subject. At the first session of the Second Congress, upon November 21, 1791, the bill was again read the first time. Upon February 21, three months later, it was considered in the committee of the whole, and after receiving consideration in several sessions of the committee, it passed the House on the 6th of March. Upon the 20th of the latter month it was reported to the Senate and read for the first time. After having been considered by the latter body at several sessions, it was amended and sent back to the House for concurrence in the amendments. The Senate amendments being disagreed to, a conference committee was appointed, which resulted in the withdrawal of the amendments, when the bill was sent to the President, and received his approval on May 8, 1792. This act, though since amended in some particulars and added to, in order to meet the requirements of subsequent events, still stands as the basis of our present militia law.

Under the act mentioned, an immediate movement began in all the States to comply with its provisions. It was soon found to be deficient, however, in two vital points: first, in its bearing upon the rights reserved to the States; and second, in the failure to provide means

for enforcing the requirement of the law concerning the duty of each citizen to furnish his own arms and accoutrements at his personal expense. In March, 1794, the House of Representatives appointed a committee to report what amendments and alterations were necessary to make the bill effective ; and in December of the same year Secretary Knox made a special report upon the difficulties and inconveniences that had occurred in the execution of the act. From this time forward the subject claimed the attention of Congress, until the period when complications with the English Government began plainly to foreshadow the proximity of another war with that haughty power.

In his message of December 3, 1805, Thomas Jefferson urged the necessity of organizing and disciplining the militia, as did also President Madison in his message of November 29, 1809. The War of 1812 soon after broke upon the country, but when the British soldier again invaded America he found his old enemy, the American volunteer, ready to receive and welcome him. The militia training of the preceding years, though it had been imperfect, had nevertheless been productive of some result. The historians of that war have dwelt upon the deficiencies of our raw, undisciplined troops, and to some extent their strictures are just. The judgment of their British adversaries, however, was somewhat analogous to that of one of Shakspeare's characters, who, in speaking of his wound, averred that it was "not so deep as a well, nor so wide as a church-door; but 'tis enough." Lord

Pakenham found *raw troops* at New Orleans, and he also found *raw cotton* there, greatly to his sorrow.

For the information of those desiring to follow the legislation of the Government concerning the organization, disciplining, and calling into general service of the militia of the country, the following principal acts may be consulted: The original act of May 8, 1792, above cited; an act providing arms for the militia throughout the United States, July 6, 1798; the additional act of March 2, 1803; an act to provide for organizing the militia of the District of Columbia, March 3, 1803; an act establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States, April 10, 1806; an act to provide for calling forth the militia, April 18, 1814; an act concerning field officers of the militia, April 20, 1816; an act to establish a uniform mode of discipline and field exercise for the militia, May 12, 1820; an act to reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United States, March 2, 1821; act of March 19, 1836; act of July 29, 1861; of July 2, 1862, and of July 29, 1862.

The foregoing brief review of the question of the militia will not fail to impress the reader with the conviction of the great importance constantly attached to the problem of our national defense by our people and by our legislators. Admitted by all that a standing army is a standing menace to free institutions, the difficulty with which our predecessors grappled, and which still remains without satisfactory solution, is how to make a trained soldier of an ordinary citizen without attaching

him to a permanent and exclusive military establishment. Though the American people from their earliest history have been accustomed to the use of fire-arms, and though in all the stations of life, from that of frontiersman to that of denizen of a city, they have been taught the lessons of self-defense, yet past experiences, from the first battles of the Revolution to the earlier conflicts of the Rebellion, have not failed to demonstrate the necessity of discipline and training for the making of an efficient soldier. To fight behind a breastwork or rampart chiefly requires cool nerve and good aim, but to win victories in the open field, and especially where large bodies of men are pitted one against the other, requires precise discipline, harmony of movement, and celerity of action. Training alone can impart these qualities to the soldier.

Such considerations, in connection with the study given to the subject in the direction of training a body of effective militia, led at a very early day to the suggestion of a permanent military school, to be organized and maintained by the General Government. As stated in the earlier part of the present chapter, the first suggestion in this direction was made soon after the Declaration of Independence had been signed, through a resolution of the Continental Congress, adopted on October 1, 1776, ordering the raising of a committee of five "to prepare and bring in a plan of a *Military Academy* of the army." Action ceased with the passage of this resolution until after the close of the Revolutionary War. In April,

1783, at the instance of Colonel Alexander Hamilton, then chairman of the Committee for Peace Arrangements, the opinions of the prominent officers of the army as to what ought to constitute a proper peace establishment were obtained in writing through the General-in-chief. Among the opinions called forth by the official request above mentioned, the following are of particular interest, as illustrative of the development of the idea of a regularly organized military school:

“Brigadier-General Huntingdon declared that ‘West Point has been held as the key to the United States. The British viewed it in the same point of light, and will, it is presumed, keep their eye upon it as long as they regret their loss of the country, or have a passion for power and conquest.

“‘West Point is exposed to a *coup-de-main*, and ought, therefore, to be always in a complete condition of defense. With a little more expense than that of maintaining a garrison of five hundred or six hundred men, it may be made a safe deposit, where every military article may be kept in good repair; and, with a small additional expense, an academy might be here instituted for instruction in all the branches of the military art.’¹

“Colonel Timothy Pickering, the Quartermaster-General of the army, after combatting the idea of instituting academies for military purposes at the different arsenals in the United States, a scheme that had found favor with some of the officers, proceeds to say: ‘If anything like a military academy in America be practicable at this time, it must be grounded on the permanent military establishment for our frontier posts and arsenals, and the wants of the States separately, of officers to command the defenses on their sea-coasts.

“‘On this principle it might be expedient to establish a military school or academy at West Point. And that a competent number of young gentlemen might become induced to become students, it might be made a rule that vacancies in the standing

¹ Correspondence of the Revolution, Sparks. IV., 27.

regiment should be supplied from thence, those few instances excepted where it would be just to promote a very meritorious sergeant.

“For this end the number which shall be judged requisite to supply vacancies in the standing regiment might be fixed, and that of the students, who are admitted with an expectation of filling them, limited accordingly.

“They might be allowed subsistence at the public expense. If any other youth desired to pursue the same studies at the Military Academy, they might be admitted, only subsisting themselves.

“Those students should be instructed in what is usually called military discipline, tactics, and the theory and practice of fortification and gunnery.

“The commandant and one or two other officers of the standing regiment, and the engineers, making West Point their general residence, would be the masters of the academy; and the inspector-general superintend the whole.”¹

“These suggestions, though not productive of immediate results, did not fail to arrest the attention of statesmen and legislators on the general subject of military education at a later day.

“They perceived that, although the ordinary subordinate and mechanical duties of a soldier and officer might be performed without especial training, the higher class of duties and the capacity for command could be understood and exercised only by those whose intellectual faculties had been carefully cultivated. They felt that the common interpretation of the axiom that “knowledge is power,” significant and important as it is, was not its noblest and worthiest interpretation.

“Power over matter and over the minds of others is not the choicest gift of knowledge, enviable and glorious though it be: it is, in truth, a dangerous gift. But power over the mind of its possessor, purifying and elevating it, subduing all that is low or selfish to the authority of duty and virtue, this is the distinguishing, the kingly gift of knowledge. They felt, therefore, that the moral as well as the intellectual virtue should be sedulously nurtured. They were convinced, also, that in a free state it was most impolitic and unsafe for the army to be separated in habits, interests, and feelings from the other orders of society; and they recog-

¹Writings of Washington, Sparks, VIII., 417.

nized in knowledge, which is, in a great measure, the result of mutual interchange of thoughts, the true principle of amalgamation.

“Many of them had been observers or partakers of the moral dangers of a military life; they were aware of the impoverished means of the members of the army, and of the probable inability of the country, for a long period, to provide more for them than a mere support; and they were, consequently, solicitous to impart to them knowledge, “in itself an economical possession,” the pursuit of which is inconsistent with, and destroys the desire for, indulgence in idle or vicious amusements. To these general considerations were added others, growing out of our peculiar form of government, and the sentiments and prepossession of the people.

“As an almost necessary consequence of the national experience during the War of the Revolution, the subject of military education first presented itself in connection with the organization and improvement of the militia. While they bore grateful testimony to the services and valor of those of their countrymen who upheld the standard of the United Colonies in the hours of darkest gloom, they could not be insensible that the struggle for independence would have been sooner triumphantly closed if those gallant men had been disciplined, or had been led on by officers accomplished in the various branches of the art of war. They accorded a cordial tribute to the few brave spirits who devoted all the skill and science they had acquired in “the Seven-years’ War,” which commenced in 1754, to the formation of military habits in the new levies, which were raised in rapid succession during the whole progress of the contest. But they had before them the admissions of these officers, and of their beloved commander, that the difficulties of their perilous undertaking would have been greatly diminished if a knowledge of the theory and science of war had been more generally diffused through the army.

“A striking illustration of the justness of these views is contained in an official report made by General Knox, then Secretary of War, to the President, January 21, 1790. In this report the position is laid down that “all discussions of the subject of a powerful militia will result in one or other of the following principles:”¹

“1. Either efficient institutions must be established for the

¹ Pennsylvania Daily Advertiser, Feb. 3, 1790.

military education of youth, and the knowledge acquired therein be diffused throughout the country by the means of rotation ; or,

“‘2. The militia must be formed of substitutes, after the manner of the militia of Great Britain.’

“‘If the United States possess the vigor of mind,’ says the Secretary, ‘to establish the first institution, it may reasonably be expected to produce the most unequivocal advantages, and a glorious national spirit will be introduced with its extensive train of political consequences.’

“The only provision immediately applicable (in this able state paper) to the present inquiry is that which required the young men, from the age of eighteen to twenty years, to be disciplined for thirty days successively in camps of instruction, where, in addition to their military tuition, they were to receive lectures from the chaplains explanatory of the value of free governments, and of their dependence upon the knowledge and virtue of the youth of the country. A proposition similar to this, with the exception that the term of instruction was limited to six days instead of thirty, was submitted to the House of Representatives in 1821. And it may induce those who are inclined to adopt this course to be reminded how soon it was abandoned by its first projectors. The obvious objections arising from the expenditure of time and money, from the loss occasioned by the periodical abstraction of labor, and from the but too probable formation of licentious or indolent habits, seem to have been justly regarded as decisive.

“But the principle underlying all these propositions continued to germinate, and stimulated those entrusted with the direction of the national affairs to labor for the establishment of an institution at which young men might receive a military education, who, when separated from it and scattered throughout the length and breadth of the land, might serve as instructors of the untrained militia in times of peace, and upon the outbreak of war furnish a powerful aid in organizing and concentrating the enormous military resources of the country.

“Herein lies the chief, and by far the most valuable and comprehensive motive which gave origin to the Military Academy. Remote from foreign jealousies and hostile powers save those hidden in our own forests, it was foreseen that the presence of large standing armies was inimical to republican development, and that

an army as small as that of the United States has always been, and ought ever to be, could only supply an insignificant quota upon emergencies of great magnitude.

“Absorbed in the temptations and allurements to the acquisition of wealth which the numerous fields of American enterprise and labor afford, it is in vain in time of peace to expect civilians to qualify themselves for the performance of military duties, with little or no prospect of pecuniary remuneration or military renown; and were even any such inclined, there are no institutions where the necessary qualifications could be secured.”¹

¹ Quotation from the History of West Point, by Captain Boynton.

CHAPTER IV.

EFFORTS TO RENDER THE MILITIA LAW EFFECTIVE — ACTION OF CONGRESS — REPORT OF SECRETARY KNOX UPON THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE BILL — THE ACT OF MAY 9, 1794, TO RAISE A CORPS OF ARTILLERISTS AND ENGINEERS, THE REAL STARTING-POINT OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY — ITS TEXT IN FULL — THE ADDITIONAL ACT OF APRIL 27, 1798 — SECRETARY M'HENRY — FULL TEXT OF HIS HISTORIC PAPER.

AS heretofore stated, the bill growing out of Secretary Knox's remarkable paper upon the subject of organizing the militia, entitled "An Act more effectually to provide for the national defense, by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States," became a law on May 8, 1792. Almost coeval with the first attempts to put the law into operation, a realization of the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of giving it practical application and usefulness, began to appear to the whole people. Such far-seeing minds as that of Washington discerned at a glance that some other expedient must be resorted to in order to accomplish the hope of constituting the able-bodied citizens of the country, within the limits of proper age, into an efficient military reserve, to be drawn upon at will whenever a necessity for their services might present itself. Hence, in less than twenty months after the pass-

age of the militia bill, we find him, in his message to Congress, in December, 1793, carefully feeling his way, through suggestion, to a subsequent open recommendation to establish a military school which might "afford an opportunity for the study of those branches of the art which can scarcely ever be attained by practice alone."

From this time forward the whole country was upon the inquiry to discover the best solution of the question. The militia law was discussed as the common topic of conversation. Many of the States endeavored earnestly to give it vitality by local legislation. The European systems were quoted and discussed. Some authorities upon military subjects favored this measure, and others favored that; but running beneath all propositions, and finally appearing as the close of all argument upon the matter, was the sentiment leading to the establishment of a school for the military education of our youth. In this last conclusion there was not so much of a conflict with the idea of a military establishment as would appear from a casual consideration of the matter. Farther on in this volume, the subject in this aspect will be referred to again.

But the sentiment in favor of the school continued to grow as the defects of the militia bill became more apparent. The friends of the militia system made a prolonged battle in its behalf. At almost every session of Congress, dating from 1794, only two years after the passage of the militia bill, until the year 1819, a committee was raised in the House of Representatives charged with the duty to report any alterations that

might be necessary to make effective the law entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the national defense by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States."

Upon the 24th of March, 1794, Mr. Cobb, chairman of one of these committees, made the following report to the members of the House at the first session of the Third Congress:

"That they [the committee] are impressed with the importance of a more energetic system for the establishment of a uniform militia than what is contemplated by the present existing law of the United States; but, in viewing this subject, as applied to the Constitution of the United States, and the powers therein expressly reserved to the different States, they have their doubts how far Congress can, consistent therewith, make any important alterations or amendments to the present law; and, as the right of training the militia is constitutionally reserved to the States, if they can be impressed with the importance of exercising this power and directing its operation, more especially to the light infantry and grenadier companies of each regiment, an efficient force may be thereby created, and equal to any that can probably be obtained by any additional law of the United States, made under the constitutional powers of Congress. Under this view of the subject, and until further experience shall be had under the existing law, the committee are of the opinion that no amendment is necessary to the act establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States."

At the second session of the same Congress, under date of December 29, 1794, Mr. Giles, from the committee appointed to prepare a plan to better organize, arm, and discipline the militia of the United States, made the following report:

"That they are of the opinion the plan for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, already adopted by law, may be made

competent to all the purposes of an efficient militia, by remedying the difficulties and inconveniences which have occurred in the execution of the same.

“That the principal difficulties and inconveniences which have occurred in the execution of the militia system particularly respect the incompetent provisions for arming them, and for calling them forth to execute the laws of the United States, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

“It appears to the committee that the principal defects in the existing provisions for arming the militia consist in the want of a competent source of supplying the arms; the want of some provision for furnishing persons with arms who may be deemed unable to furnish themselves; and the want of adequate and uniform penalties to enforce a compliance with the requisitions of the existing militia laws.

“The committee, not having that part of the subject committed to them which respects the calling forth of the militia, recommend the following resolutions:

“*Resolved*, That the act entitled ‘An act more effectually to provide for the national defense, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States,’ ought to be amended; and that further provision ought to be made by law for arming the militia of the United States, and for enforcing the execution of the existing militia laws by adequate and uniform penalties.”

While the color of individual opinion upon the subject assumed every possible shade of intensity between the extremes of expression represented in the foregoing reports, it is interesting to note that the two chief men through whose earnest counsel definite action upon the creation of a militia army had found direction in the enactment of the militia bill—that is to say, President Washington and his distinguished War Secretary—came to the front again in connection with the movement relating to the militia. Under order of the President, General Knox submitted to the House of Representatives upon the 10th of Decem-

ber, 1794, a statement of such difficulties and inconveniences as had occurred in the execution of the act now being considered. The main part of this report is as follows :

“That a difficulty of primary importance appears to oppose the execution of the first section of the before recited act. The militia are requested to arm and equip themselves at their own expense; but there is no penalty to enforce the injunction of the law.

“The subscriber is informed that several States have passed auxiliary laws to the act of Congress. The laws of the following States upon this subject are in his possession, viz.: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina. The penalties, by these, for non-equipment and armament, appear to be according to the following extracts :

* * * * *

“But it is certain that, were the penalties greatly enhanced, an insuperable difficulty would occur in obtaining the requisite number of arms in any reasonable period. The numbers comprehended in the act, from eighteen to forty-five years of age inclusively, deducting the exempts and mariners, may be estimated probably at about four hundred and fifty thousand men. Of these, probably, not one hundred thousand are armed as the act requires, although a greater number might be found of common and ordinary muskets, without bayonets. The deficiency cannot be supplied from Europe under the present circumstances. The only solid resource to obtain is the establishment of manufactories within each State.

“The deficiency of arms cannot be more forcibly exemplified than that to arm the militia lately called into service, estimated at fifteen thousand, the number of ten thousand arms have been issued from the public arsenals. Loss and injury must be expected to arise upon the articles issued.

“No adequate provision appears to be established by the act for securing the obedience of the militia to the call of the executive of the United States.

“It would seem essential that any law which the Congress should pass upon the subject of the militia should contain within itself all the necessary provision for its complete execution.

"The late experiment proves, at least in some parts, that the laws were inefficient, and had it not been for voluntary zeal, which came to its aid, the community might have experienced great evils.

"It would appear to be essential that when the militia are in actual service they ought to be bound by the military code of the United States.

"The enrollment of men of the ages specified in the act, notwithstanding the exemptions, holding them responsible for military service, and enforcing the same, appears to be a circumstance which may operate injuriously to the industry and convenience of the community.

"Of the returns enjoined by the tenth section of the said act, the following only have been received:

	<i>From 16 to 40.</i>	<i>40 to 60.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Massachusetts.....	54,428	22,819	77,247
Connecticut.....			15,851
New Jersey.....			25,887
Georgia.....			10,120

"Whether the act in question is susceptible of such alterations and amendments, on its present principles, as will secure the advantages to be derived from a well-organized militia, or whether a limited but select and efficient corps of militia, formed on a principle of rotation or otherwise, and taken from the classes least injurious to the industry of the community, would not better fulfill that object, and at the same time better comport with economy, are questions which the wisdom of Congress alone is competent to decide."

The foregoing report of Secretary Knox appears regretful in tone. The idea of constituting an efficient body of citizen-soldiers upon the principle of rotation had been one of his most cherished projects. He had given much thought to the principle underlying a conception which contemplated an immense army of well-drilled, efficient soldiers, springing, upon their country's call, from all of the private and industrial channels of the land; an

army of veteran warriors, created from a multitude of civilians—an irresistible horde that, like the men of Roderick Dhu, should leap from the ground at the sound of a bugle-horn, and after performing their work in behalf of an imperiled country, might sink quietly back again into the civil pursuits of life, while all the panoply and circumstance of glorious war should vanish into thin air, like a dread specter of the night before the approach of “jocund day.”

But General Knox's elaborate and cherished plan had not met the sympathy and cordial approval that he confidently expected his fellow-citizens would accord to it. He had been met half-way, that was all. The Congress had enacted his “Hamlet,” but with the character of Hamlet left out. They had accepted his child, but had surrounded it with conditions of life that rendered death in infancy an inevitable sequence. He was too much of a patriot to be resentful, and he had the best interests of his country too much at heart to rejoice in a failure that doubtless he himself had foreseen. Within a twelve-month from the date of the report above quoted this able man was destined to lay aside the cares of state, and retire to his own hospitable home for the rest of his life. The tranquil suggestions of the closing paragraphs of the report are marked with dignity and unselfish patriotism. He had done his work faithfully, laboriously, patriotically. He bowed to the superior “wisdom of Congress,” and without pride, without malice, he soon after made his exit from an arena that he had dignified and adorned. He

was an American volunteer, a distinguished soldier, an eminent statesman, and an admirable civilian. What higher meed of praise can be rendered to any of the world's toilers than this?

For many years subsequent to the passage of the militia law herein cited it continued to be the subject of warm discussion among the people at large as well as in Congress. It was repeatedly referred to committees with the purpose of discovering some amendment that might make it practical for the original purpose. As late as the 22d of January, 1819, a member of the House, Mr. Harrison, made an interesting report upon the law and the subject which it covers, which report concluded by copying *in extenso* the famous paper of General Knox, already quoted in these pages, submitted by him to Congress in the year 1790.

But, though the bill remained unamended, the idea of General Knox—the rotation principle upon which he insisted—was finding expression in another direction. The Secretary's plan comprehended different classes in the military service, one of which was to be a school in which the youth of the United States were to be instructed in the art of war. From this first grade, designated by him the "advanced corps," the next class, called the "main corps," which was to consist of those who were to constitute the active military force of the country, was to be replenished upon the principle of rotation. It was the design to constitute the "advanced corps" upon such principles that, when completed, it would receive one-third

part and discharge one-third part of its numbers annually. By this arrangement one-third part would be well disciplined, and one-third part, of course, would consist of undisciplined youths. After the system had been established for a proper time the "main corps," constituting the effective army of the Republic, would consist of thoroughly trained and disciplined soldiers.

Pending the discussion which followed the evident failure of the militia law in 1793 and 1794, the rotation principle of General Knox's plan found vent in an entirely different direction, as just observed. A bill had been introduced, which became a law on the 9th of May, 1794, providing for "raising and organizing a corps of artilleryists and engineers." As this bill may be considered the real *point d'appui* which has found the full extension in an organized school of military instruction possessing a local habitation as well as a name, it will interest the reader to peruse it in full. It is as follows :

"An act providing for raising and organizing a corps of artilleryists and engineers.

"SECTION 1. *Be it enacted*, etc., That the number of seven hundred and sixty-four non-commissioned officers, privates, and artificers, to serve as privates and musicians, shall be engaged for the term of three years by voluntary enlistments, and that the proper proportion of commissioned officers shall be appointed to command the same.

"SEC. 2. That the aforesaid commissioned and non-commissioned officers, privates, artificers, and musicians shall be incorporated with the corps of artillery now in the service of the United States, and denominated the corps of artilleryists and engineers, and that the entire number of said corps, exclusively of the commissioned officers, shall be nine hundred and ninety-two.

“SEC. 3. That the organization of the said corps be as herein mentioned, to-wit: One lieutenant-colonel commandant, one adjutant, one surgeon; four battalions, each to consist of one major, one adjutant and paymaster, and one surgeon's mate; and four companies, each to consist of one captain, two lieutenants, two cadets with the pay, clothing, and rations of a sergeant, four sergeants, four corporals, forty-two privates, sappers, and miners, and ten artificers to serve as privates, and two musicians.

“SEC. 4. That the additional commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, privates, artificers, and musicians, by this act directed to be raised, shall receive the same pay and allowances in all respects as the troops already in the service of the United States; and they shall also be governed by the same rules and articles of war which have been or may be by law established.

“SEC. 5. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to provide, at the public expense, under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States, the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus for the use and benefit of the said corps.

“SEC. 6. That the President of the United States shall cause such proportions of the said corps to serve in the field, on the frontiers, or in the fortifications of the sea-coast, as he shall deem consistent with the public service.”

Two features of this act are particularly noticeable: first, that the purpose of scholastic training for the corps is distinctly enunciated, and provision made for books, instruments, and apparatus, at the public expense, through which to carry it out; and, second, that the grade of *cadet*, up to that time entirely new in the American service, was unequivocally created. The word *cadet* is borrowed from the French and means, in that language, a younger brother. The English usage of the word, as defined by Webster in the latest edition of his dictionary, is as follows: “A gentleman who carries arms in a regiment as a private man, with a view to acquire military skill and ob-

tain a commission. His service is voluntary, but he receives pay, and thus is distinguished from a volunteer." This distinction between a *cadet* and *volunteer*, it may be remarked, *en passant*, has been strongly perpetuated down to the present time. The name changes, but the distinction becomes greatly intensified as the cadet passes from pupilage to the full character of soldier.

This act, as will be observed, provides no location for the school which it created, the corps being subject in respect of location to the order of the President. As Aristotle imparted his system of philosophy to his pupils while walking in the Lyceum at Athens, so these embryonic soldiers received their instruction while upon the march. The new school, therefore, was *peripatetic*, and perhaps the scholars were less *apathetic* in consequence.

Four years more of experience, and a corresponding period of general discussion and argument as to the necessities of the hour and of the future day, glided rapidly by and brought into active life the Fifth Congress of the United States. The belief in the expediency of educating officers of the army at the national expense had slowly but surely gained converts among our forefathers. Upon the 27th of April, 1798, another act was approved providing for an additional regiment of artillerists and engineers with a corresponding number of *cadets*, "with the pay, clothing, and rations of a sergeant," and directing the Secretary of War to provide, at the public expense, all necessary books, instruments, and apparatus, for the use and benefit of the regiment. The school was still

peripatetic and subject to *walking* orders from the President. Four years more, however, were destined to change all this and settle the pupils, now pretty well worn with an eight years' march, permanently upon the banks of the beautiful Hudson River.

These four years had been pregnant of change. The beloved commander of the Revolution, like the prophet Moses, had led his people to a full view of the promised land that millions now enjoy; and, after "life's fitful fever," he had wrapped his cloak about him and lain down to the rest that knows no waking. The second President of the United States had assumed direction. The gallant, brilliant, patriotic Knox had retired from the War Office, and McHenry, a former aide-de-camp to General Lafayette, a member of the Continental Congress from 1783 to 1786, and one of the framers of the Constitution of the United States in 1787, had taken Knox's place on January 27, 1796. The latter—McHenry—had served as Secretary of War until the 13th of May, 1800; he had made a most important contribution to the progressive movement destined to terminate in the erection of a fixed establishment for imparting a military education to American youth; and, in his turn, he had passed the still uncompleted task to other hands.

The present review of the military education movement in the United States now approaches a period of great interest. The narrative has reached the threshold of the actual achievement of a project toward which the logic of events had been steadily carrying the whole sub-

ject. The current had been running in a set direction and, instead of being itself deflected, had carried all argument before it.

The difficulty of access to the early records of our Government by the general people has been stated elsewhere in this volume. Conformably to the purpose then announced, to place the records relating to the subject under discussion in a shape to be easily reached by those having an interest in it, the author proceeds to quote at length two documents of the time now spoken of, that have an interest but little less intense than the classic paper of Secretary Knox, already given to the reader of these pages. These documents are from the pen of James McHenry, mentioned above as the successor of Knox in the Department of War. The first reflection caused by their perusal must be upon the immense stride which the subject had taken in less than a single decade. From the mere suggestion of Washington, in 1793, to the papers of McHenry, in 1800, there appears a development of this particular subject only to be explained by the fact that it occurred in a nation which, from a condition of colonial dependence, has, in little more than one hundred years, become the exemplar of all others, compelling the most powerful of them, through mere force of example alone, to adopt reforms and measures of progress that, in the absence of it, certainly could not have been reached by ordinary course in a period of five hundred years. The author trusts that he speaks without bombast, and with no more than a becoming national

pride. In the first agitation of the subject, the idea of schooling had been limited to a very simple basis. Under the hand of McHenry, it approached in character and scope the most extensive military schools of Europe. Nor did it stop with the education of soldiers for service upon land, but also embraced a *naval* education for the soldiers of the sea, if such an expression may be deemed admissible. As to the influences of the period, which served to fructify the seed of the tree that was now assuming such wide-spreading proportions, the author reserves his remarks for a subsequent chapter.

The paper of Secretary McHenry, like that of Secretary Knox, is here given in full, without apology for the insertion of such parts as may be considered not immediately relative to the subject under treatment.

At the first session of the Sixth Congress President John Adams, under date of January 13, 1800, transmitted by special message to the Senate and House of Representatives a report of the Secretary of War, made to him upon the 5th of the same month, containing "various matters in which the honor and safety of the nation are deeply interested." In transmitting it to the two houses he recommended the matter "to their serious consideration."

The following is the report as sent :

"The Secretary of War respectfully requests the attention of the President of the United States to certain measures and arrangements which appear to him to be indispensable to the improvement of our military system, and solicits, if it shall be thought proper, that the same may be submitted to Congress.

“No sentiment is more just than this, that in proportion as the circumstances and policy of a people are opposed to the maintenance of a large military force, it is important that as much perfection as possible be given to that which may at any time exist.

“It is not, however, enough that the troops that it may be deemed proper to maintain be rendered as perfect as possible in form, organization, and discipline: the dignity, the character to be supported, and the safety of the country further require that it should have military institutions, should be capable of perpetuating the art of war, and of furnishing the means for forming a new and enlarged army, fit for service in the shortest time possible, and at the least practicable expense to the state.

“Let it not be presumed that a country, however distantly situated from other nations, or favored by the courage and genius of its inhabitants, can neglect with impunity military institutions, or that it may safely consider all regular force to be useless except when there is an enemy present to employ it. A country which acts upon such a maxim will invariably attract injuries and enemies, and sooner or later sink by internal discords, or see its noble spirit broken down by repeated humiliations, and the whole people thus prepared for the last stage of national degradation.

“If the farmer would secure his flocks, he must go to the expense of shepherds; if preserve his crops, he must enclose his fields. In like manner, to insure safety to the nation, it is necessary that the leading avenues into it be guarded by troops and fortifications. Before the invention of gunpowder, the smallest villages were invested with walls, so that a long siege was often requisite to reduce them. Since that epoch, the history of almost if not every war contains undeniable proofs of the utility of fortifications, and the necessity of disciplined troops to the defense of a country. Would it be wise or expedient in us to pursue a different course, and shut our eyes against the innumerable facts on record in favor of their essentiality? Are we without regular troops, we may soon lose the military art; are we without engineers, not a little of the money employed on fortifications will be always hazarded, if not actually thrown away, and generals of the most consummate genius forced to capitulate in the field, whose retreat might have been covered by a fortification, or the battle decided in their favor by a happily contrived intrenchment.

“Since, however, it seems to be agreed that we are not to keep on foot numerous forces, and it would be impossible, on a sudden, to extend to every essential point our fortifications, military science in its various branches ought to be cultivated with peculiar care in proper nurseries, so that a sufficient stock may always exist, ready to be imparted and diffused to any extent, and a competent number of persons be prepared and qualified to act as engineers, and others as instructors to additional troops, which events may successively require to be raised. This will be to substitute the elements of an army to the thing itself, and will greatly tend to enable the Government to dispense with a large body of standing forces, from the facility which it will give of procuring officers and forming soldiers promptly in all emergencies.

“No sound mind, after a fair view of the subject, can doubt the essentiality of military science in time of war any more than the moral certainty that the most pacific policy on the part of government and the most solemn and well-observed treaties will not preserve a country from being engaged in war more or less frequently. To avoid great evils, we must either have a respectable force always ready for service, or the means of preparing such a force with certainty and expedition. The latter, as most agreeable to the genius of our Government and Nation, is the object of the following propositions:

“**1ST. A MILITARY ACADEMY.**

“This object has frequently engaged the favorable attention of the Legislature, and some laws toward its consummation have been passed. These, however, being yet inadequate to afford the requisite instruction to officers and others in the principles of war, the exercises it requires, and the sciences upon which they are founded, the adoption of a more perfect plan is conceived to be indispensable for the purposes. With this view, the following plan is respectfully suggested, formed upon those of institutions of a similar nature, from which the nations who have founded them derived the most decided advantages:

“It is proposed that this academy shall consist of four schools, one to be called ‘The Fundamental School;’ another, ‘The School of Engineers and Artillerists;’ another, ‘The School of Cavalry and Infantry;’ and a fourth, ‘The School of the Navy;’ and to be provided with the following officers, professors, and teachers:

- “A Director-General to superintend the first three schools.
- “A Director of the Fundamental School.
- “A Director of the School of Engineers and Artillerists.
- “A Director of the School of Cavalry and Infantry.
- “A Director of the School of the Navy.
- “Six Professors of Mathematics.
- “Four Professors of Geography and Natural Philosophy.
- “Two Professors of Chemistry, including Mineralogy.
- “Three Architects.
- “Four Designing and Drawing Masters.
- “One Riding Master.
- “One Fencing Master.
- “To be thus distributed among the several schools :

To the Fundamental School.

- “One Director.
- “Four Professors of Mathematics.
- “Two Professors of Geography and Natural Philosophy.
- “One Designing and Drawing Master.
- “One Professor of Chemistry.

To the School of Engineers and Artillerists

- “One Director.
- “Two Professors of Mathematics.
- “Two Professors of Geography and Natural Philosophy.
- “One Professor of Chemistry.
- “Two Architects.
- “Three Designing and Drawing Masters.

To the School of Cavalry and Infantry.

- “A Director.
- “A Riding Master.
- “A Fencing Master.

To the School of the Navy.

- “A Director.
- “A Professor of Mathematics.
- “A Professor of Geography and Natural Philosophy.
- “An Architect.
- “One Designing and Drawing Master.

“The Fundamental School is designed to form engineers, including geographical engineers, miners, and officers for the artillery, cavalry, infantry, and navy; consequently, in this school are to be taught all the sciences necessary to a perfect knowledge of the different branches of the military art.

“The School of Engineers and Artillerists, to teach those admitted therein, and appointed and designed for engineers, the *application* of the theoretic knowledge which they had acquired in the Fundamental School, to the construction of all sorts of fortifications and military buildings appertaining thereto; to mines and counter-mines, sieges, attack and defense; to mineralogy, to the art of projecting and constructing bridges, roads, and canals and maritime posts, and all works relative thereto; to all geographic and topographic operations, the calculations relative to the same; to designing and drawing charts, etc.

“To those appointed or designed for the artillery service, the application of the theoretic knowledge acquired in the Fundamental School; to the construction of gun-carriages, pontoons, the fabrication of cannon and fire-arms, and to all the maneuvers of war which depend upon artillery.

“The School of Cavalry and Infantry, to teach those admitted therein, and appointed to or designed for the cavalry, the tactics, exercise, and police of cavalry; those for the infantry, the tactics of infantry, and all that concerns the police of an army in the field and in quarters.

“The School of the Navy, to teach those appointed to or designed for this service the application of the knowledge acquired in the Fundamental School in arithmetic, algebra, geometry, statics, and navigation. To this end, after having passed examination, they shall make voyages or cruises under skillful officers for certain periods, during which time they ought to be exercised in the maneuvers and observations most useful in service, and be instructed in whatever respects rigging of vessels of war, pilotage, and the management of cannon.

Functions of the Principal Officers.

“The Director-General to have the general superintendency of the schools, particularly of the Fundamental School; to occupy himself incessantly with the means of attaining the ends of the institution, which is the greatest possible instruction to the pupils.

“He will inform himself of their progress in their studies relative to the service to which they are destined, and collect all the facts proper to be laid before the President, to enable him to form an opinion of the fitness of any individual who has not had one for an appointment; or in case he has to judge how and when his talents can, upon occasion, be most beneficially employed.

“He will attend particularly to the execution of whatever respects the admission of pupils; their transfer from the school of theory into that of practice; their passage from one class or division in the same school to another, and the examinations which they ought to respectively undergo.

“He will propose a list of the officers of the army proper to be received into the schools, and will furnish the Secretary of War with information, from time to time, relative to their progress, conduct, and capacity to fill positions to which their genius and knowledge may particularly point.

“He will give such certificates to the officers, cadets, or pupils, as they shall have merited.

“The directors of each of the military schools will receive from the Director-General instructions detailing their functions and powers; to him they will make their reports.

“With respect to the School of the Navy, the director thereof will receive his instructions from the Secretary of the Navy.

“The Director-General, and the other directors, to be officers of the army and navy, according as the studies and exercises of the particular school shall be most intimately connected with either service.

“These schools to be provided with proper apparatus and instruments for philosophical and chemical experiments, for astronomical and nautical observations, for surveying, and such other processes as are requisite to the several topics and branches of instruction.

“The site of Schools of Engineers and Artillerists and of the Navy ought to be on navigable water. For this purpose a piece of ground ought to be purchased, sufficient for experiments in tactics, gunnery, and fortification. The situation upon a navigable water is also requisite, to admit of specimens of naval construction and naval exercises.

“It would also tend greatly to the perfection of the plan if the

academy of artillerists and engineers was situated in the neighborhood of foundries of cannon and manufactories of small arms.

“Barracks and other proper buildings must be erected for the accommodation of the directors, professors, and students, and for the laboratories and other works to be carried on at the respective schools.

“The cadets of the army, and a certain number of young persons destined for military and naval service, ought to study at least two years in the Fundamental School; and, if destined for the corps of engineers or artillerists, or for the navy, two years more in the appropriate school; if for the cavalry or infantry, one year more in the appropriate school. But persons who, by previous instruction elsewhere, may have become acquainted with some or all of the branches taught in the Fundamental School, may, after due examination by the directors and professors of that school, be either received then for a shorter time, or pass immediately to one or other of the schools of practice, according to the nature and extent of their requirements and intended destination.

“In addition to these, detachments of officers and non-commissioned officers of the army ought to attend one or other of the schools, in rotation, for the purpose of instruction and exercise, according to the nature of the corps to which they respectively belong.

“It may be noticed also, in this place, that it would be a wise addition if Government would authorize such a number of sergeants, supernumerary to those belonging to the regiments on the establishment as would suffice with them for an army of fifty thousand men. All the supernumeraries to receive according to their capacity instruction at the academy and to be occasionally sent to do duty with the army.

“This outline of a military academy which is conformable to that of similar institutions in other countries, particularly in France, is not meant to imply anything conclusive: the plan may be modified, perhaps, to advantage. At all events it ought to be left with the President to proportion the number of cadets and others to be admitted into the schools, and to prescribe definitively relative to the requisites to entitle to admission, the periods of novitiate, transfers from the schools to particular corps, and whatever respects organization, regulations, and police.

“And here it may be proper to observe that, though provision should be made by law for the proposed establishment in its full latitude, yet it may be left in the discretion of the President to appoint so many of the professors and masters only as experience shall show to be necessary.

“Will it be thought superfluous to remark, relative to the utility of this institution, that it is from the military schools of France have issued those generals and other officers whose skill and recent achievements in war have rendered them subjects for military history and enabled the present governors of that nation, successively, and almost instantaneously, to form immense disciplined armies?

“Is it not greatly desirable to be so provided and prepared for all emergencies?

“An enemy who meditates invasion will naturally examine what he will have to encounter before he undertakes it. Acting with common prudence, he must proportion his military array to the obstacles in fortification and disposable force it will have to overcome, and which may be so stationed and improved as to require from him an army and apparatus expensive beyond his resources to support. Our country, by a skillful application of very moderate means, may thus avert from its bosom the most expensive and calamitous wars.

“In treating upon such an institution it was encouraging to reflect that, happily, it coincided with your uniform wish to see our country placed in a situation which would entitle the just maxims of its policy to be respected and enable it to meet any adverse accidents it may be reserved to encounter.

“The measure proposed has also the high sanction of our late venerated President, whose talents and services were devoted, not to produce personal results, but to render a whole people great, flourishing, and happy.

“‘The institution of a military academy,’ this great man observes in his last impressive speech, ‘is also recommended by cogent reasons. However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge for emergencies.

“‘The first would impair the energy of its character, and both would hazard its safety, or expose it to greater evils, when war

could not be avoided. Besides that, war might often not depend upon its own choice. In proportion as the observance of the pacific maxims might exempt a nation from the necessity of practicing the rules of the military art, ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting by proper establishments the knowledge of that art. Whatever argument may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is at once comprehensive and complicated; that it demands much previous study, and that the possession of it, in its most improved and perfect state, is always of great moment to the security of a nation. This, therefore, ought to be a serious care of every government, and for this purpose an academy, where a regular course of instruction is given, is an obvious expedient which different nations have successfully employed.'

"Will not the patriotism and good sense of our country readily consent to found an institution, at a moderate expense, recommended by such authorities, and which must produce the happiest effects? And yet it ought not to excite surprise if, in a season of profound peace, the minds of a generality of a people, partaking of the public calm, should become inattentive to the storm that may be collecting at a distance. Are we in the midst of that profound peace universal on earth; ought the watchmen of a nation to trust to such evanescent and deceptive appearances? And will not an intelligent people, instructed by the wisdom of ages, and having every reason to confide in those to whom they have assigned the direction of their affairs, gladly see establishments arise and arrangements made which shall render the thunder harmless when it shall burst over their heads? In such conjunctures (and such must happen to the United States), corps of well instructed officers and troops are to a country what anchors are to a ship driven by a tempest towards a rocky shore."

CHAPTER V.

CONCLUSION OF SECRETARY M'HENRY'S REPORT—SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT CONCERNING A MILITARY SCHOOL, FEBRUARY 13, 1800—PRESENTATION OF A BILL ESTABLISHING A MILITARY ACADEMY, MARCH 19, 1800—PASSAGE OF THE ACT OF MARCH 16, 1802—FULL TEXT OF THE LAW.

THE first portion of Secretary McHenry's report has been given in full in the preceding chapter, devoted, as it is, to the project of a National Military Academy. The second and concluding portion of the paper proposes "a modification of the two regiments of artillerists and engineers, so as to create, instead thereof, one regiment of foot artillerists, another of horse artillerists, and a third of engineers." As there is much matter under this branch of the paper which has no special relevance to the subject now under consideration, only such quotations need be made as seem to have a useful bearing upon it for the present purpose.

The acts of May 9, 1794, and April 27, 1798, which create two regiments of artillerists and engineers, have already been quoted in these pages. These acts establish, for the first time, the grade of cadet in the United States Army. Under the acts named the officers of artillerists and engineers were united in a single corps.

Upon the subsequent establishment of the military school at West Point a different arrangement was adopted.

The opening paragraph of Secretary McHenry's paper, in its second branch, treats of the point thus:

"It is conceived that the entire union of the officers of artillerists and engineers, in one corps, as in our present establishment, is not advisable. The art of fortification and the service of artillery, though touching each other in many points, are in the main distinct branches, and each so comprehensive that their separation is essential to perfection in either. This has been ascertained by long experience. Among the powers of Europe there is not one recollected which, at the present day, is not conscious of this truth. When any of them have attempted to unite the corps, the disadvantages which resulted were soon felt to be so momentous as to produce conviction that each requires a separate organization. Such a union was once attempted in France.

"According to an ordinance of the 8th of December, 1755, the artillery and engineer corps of that nation, which had been separate, were combined into one. The experiment, however, was of short duration. In 1758 the engineer corps was disjoined from the corps of artillery, and called, as before, the corps of engineers, since which time these corps have remained separate.

"The two regiments of artillerists and engineers consist of the following officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, each of, viz.:"¹

* * * * *

"Let the regiments of foot artillerists and horse artillerists consist each as follows, viz.:

"One Lieutenant-Colonel Commander.

"Three Majors.

"One Adjutant,

"One Quartermaster, } each being a Lieutenant.

"One Paymaster,

"One Surgeon.

"Two Surgeon's Mates.

"Twelve Captains.

¹ Here follows the list already given in the acts named.

“Twenty-four Lieutenants, besides the three above mentioned.

“Twenty-four Cadets.

“Three Sergeant-Majors.

“Three Quartermaster Sergeants.

“Forty-eight Sergeants.

“Forty-eight Corporals.

“One Chief Musician.

“Twelve Musicians.

“Seven hundred and eighty privates, including artificers.

“The artificers, forming a part of each company in the regiments as they now exist, to form two companies of miners and two companies of artificers, to be arranged as will be hereafter noticed.

“It is also proposed: First, in the event of war, that these two regiments shall be augmented to the complement of officers and men composing the existing regiments of artillerists and engineers. Second, the regiment of horse artillerists shall perform their service on horseback during the war only. Third, that provision be made to enable the President of the United States, in case war shall break out between the United States and a foreign European power, or in case imminent danger of invasion of their territory by any such power shall, in his opinion, be discovered to exist, to organize and cause to be organized two additional regiments of horse artillery. Fourth, that the officers which shall become supernumerary by this aforesaid organization shall, at the discretion of the President, be transferred to fill vacancies in other regiments on the establishment corresponding with their grades, or be retained to fill appropriate vacancies which shall happen in their respective regiments by deaths, resignations, etc.

“In addition to the economical effect of the latter arrangement, it may be mentioned that the officers to one whole battalion of the second regiment of artillerists and engineers have not yet been appointed.

“The regiment of engineers consisting entirely of officers, if we exclude the companies of miners, it remains to speak of its organization.

“Let it consist of, viz.:

“Two Lieutenant-Colonels, one first and one second, as already provided by law.

“Three Majors.

“Twelve Captains.

“Twenty-four First Lieutenants.

“Twenty-four Second Lieutenants.

“Twenty-four Cadets.

“The companies of miners and their labors to be under the direction and immediate command of officers of this corps, and to make a part thereof.

“It will be perceived, and it is observed with regret, that the engineer regiment cannot be immediately formed by the mere act of transferring into it officers from any of the existing regiments. In order to answer its high destination it must be filled slowly, and under the exercise of great caution and responsibility.

“For this purpose selections may be made from among the officers of the army, and others who shall have passed through the military schools and prescribed examinations, and who obtain certificates of their possessing the requisite knowledge and qualifications.

“It may also be permitted, in cases of uncommon urgency, requiring the completion of the corps, to choose officers among our citizens whose professions or functions are most analogous to those of engineers, after an examination by a special commission named by the President.

“But let it be remembered that this corps is too essential to the success of military operations to be hurried in its formation, or composed of other than persons qualified to discharge its high and important functions. Is authority necessary to support this truth? A general of the first reputation as a commander observes on this subject, in speaking to his government of an officer who had been killed in action, ‘He was the best officer of engineers, a body on which so much of the success of campaigns and the fate of a country depend, and where the least fault may be attended with the most fatal consequences.’

“The horse artillery being a subject that cannot fail to attract attention, it will not, it is conceived, be deemed superfluous to submit a few observations and facts relative to its structure, advantages, and importance.

“The Prussians were the first who employed horse artillery, invented by the great Frederick at a time when the league which was formed against him called upon his genius to multiply his

resources. It was then that the same army, transported with a celerity and precision till then unknown in war, was seen to triumph against superior forces during the same campaign, upon opposite frontiers to the east and to the west of his states. It was then were seen horse artillery accompanying strong advanced bodies of cavalry, without embarrassing or retarding their rapid marches and evolutions.

“Horse artillery was introduced into the Austrian army during the reign of Joseph II., but it was not made a principal object, and remained in a state of imperfection. The cannoneers were transported upon the ridges of covered caissons, stuffed in the attitude of men on horseback. These carriages were called *wurstwagen*.

“Some attempts were made in France to introduce the horse artillery before the revolution there. The subject, however, was not well understood. The general officers who were present at the attempt proposed to place the cannoneers, like the Austrians, on *wursts*.

“In 1791 Mr. Duportail, Minister of War, authorized the commandant of the division of military to form two companies of horse artillery. The success of this experiment was decisive, and answerable to the Minister's expectations. The officers and men were, in a few weeks, in a condition to maneuver with light troops.

“In 1792 Mr. Narbonne, who succeeded to Mr. Duportail, composed a committee of the most enlightened officers of the army to examine and decide upon the means of improving and extending in the French army the use of horse artillery.

“As no better idea can be given of this new military arm than what is reported of the result of this conference, the Secretary takes the liberty to introduce it.

“These officers resolved, as fundamental points:

“1. That a numerous horse artillery, well served and kept complete in cannoneers and horses, was the most certain mean to protect the evolution of troops *indifferently instructed*, to support their attacks with bayonets, and to render null, by positions seasonably taken and with celerity, the advantage which troops *better disciplined* might confidently promise themselves from superiority in maneuvers.

“2. That with respect to the employment of this arm, the rules of service, instruction, etc., the horse artillery ought to differ

from the field artillery only in having its pieces so managed as to be drawn with the utmost celerity wherever they can produce the greatest effect, and in the cannoneers being able to follow their guns and commence action as soon as they are placed.

“3. That to fulfill this object it is more convenient to have the cannoneers all mounted on horses than a part of them on *wursts*, because on horses they are less subject to accidents, their movement more rapid, their retreat more secure, and the replacing of horses easy.

“4. That, without excluding any caliber, it appears pieces carrying balls of eight and twelve pounds, and howitzers, may be most advantageously employed.

“5. That it is unnecessary to discipline a horse artillerist in the maneuvers of cavalry; that this would be a departure, without utility, from the principal object; that it is enough for him to know to sit firm on his horse, to mount and descend quickly, and conduct him boldly; that it is not requisite to oblige him to preserve any order in following his piece, leaving it to his intelligence to learn, if he chooses, to execute the maneuvers of cavalry.

“6. That the maneuver *à la prolonge* ought to be employed in every case in which it is practicable to use it. That, the horses remaining attached while the pieces are firing, one gains all the time which would be lost in removing or replacing the *avant train*, and thus one may pass fosses and rivers with the utmost celerity and profit of positions.

“7. That in order to form at once a requisite number of companies of horse artillery, without weakening the artillery regiments, it is sufficient to employ for every piece two skillful cannoneers, and to draw upon the infantry for the rest.”

Thus much of this valuable report is quoted in order to exhibit the arguments, among others, which finally led to the permanent Military Academy at West Point. There is a large amount of matter contained in the report untouched in these pages, because of having no direct connection with the subject under consideration, but interesting, nevertheless, to those desirous of

exhausting it in its several parts. For a perusal of the full report the reader is referred to the "American State Papers," Vol. I.—Military Affairs, page 133.

The foregoing report, after having been considered in the House of Representatives, was referred to the "Committee of Defense," of which committee Hon. Harrison G. Otis was chairman. Through this official certain inquiries were submitted to the Secretary of War, which brought from him a further paper bearing date of January 31, 1800, which latter was communicated to the House upon the 13th of February following. This supplemental paper is designed to afford estimates of the necessary buildings, the salaries of professors, and to give the *coup de grace* in favor of the establishment of the school, by the offering of such arguments as had not before been used. The paper contains much valuable and interesting material. Standing immediately before the culminating act which brought into existence the military school, whose imperfect utility under the established system has been amply demonstrated since its origin, the author will be permitted to quote liberally from the document alluded to. Referring to the report dated January 13, 1800, which formulates the plan for the Military Academy, the Secretary says:

"The report contemplates certain military schools as an essential mean, in conjunction with a small military establishment, to prepare for and perpetuate to the United States, at a very moderate expense, a body of scientific officers and engineers, adequate to any future exigency, qualified to discipline for the field, in the

shortest time, the most extended armies, and to give the most decisive and useful effects to their operations.

“It is not conceived the United States will ever think it expedient to employ militia upon their frontiers, or to garrison their fortified places in time of peace, nor that they will be disposed to place their reliance, for defense against a foreign invading enemy, upon militia alone, but that they will, at all times, maintain a body of regular troops, commensurate with their ability to maintain them, and the necessity or policy that may demand such an establishment.

“To qualify and keep our citizens in general, of suitable bodily ability, prepared to take the field against regular forces, would demand the most radical changes in our militia system, and such uninterrupted series of training, discipline, and instruction, to be applied as well to the officers as to the men, as comports with regular troops only, while in its results the measure would be found, on account of the loss to the community, occasioned by the abstraction of labor or occupation and direct cost, greatly to exceed in expense what would be required to support a moderate military establishment. This position, which is thought to be a sound one, does not bring into view the effects of the measure upon the morals, industry, and habits of the citizens.

“Practically considered, may we not as well calculate to be commodiously lodged, and have the science of building improved, by employing every man in the community in the construction of houses, and by excluding from society, as useless, architects, masons and carpenters, as expect to be defended efficiently from an invading enemy by causing every citizen to endeavor to make himself master of the several branches of the art of war, and excluding engineers, scientific officers, and regular troops.

“There is certainly, however, a system as it respects our militia which, if resorted to and persevered in, may secure the utility of their services in times of danger, without much injury to the morals or materially affecting the general industry of the nation.

“When the perfect order and exact discipline which are essential to regular troops are contemplated, and with what ease and precision they execute the different maneuvers indispensable to the success of offensive or defensive operations, the conviction cannot be resisted that such troops will always have a decided advantage

over more numerous forces composed of uninstructed militia or undisciplined recruits.

“It cannot yet be forgotten that in our Revolutionary War it was not until after several years’ practice in arms, and the extension of the periods for which our soldiers were first enlisted, that we found them at all qualified to meet in the field of battle those to whom they were opposed. The occasional brilliant and justly celebrated acts of some of our militia during that eventful period detract nothing from this dear-bought truth. With all the enthusiasm which marked those days, it was perceived and universally felt that regular and disciplined troops were indispensable, and that it was utterly unsafe for us to trust to our militia alone the issue of the war. The position, therefore, is illustrated that even in times of greatest danger we cannot give to our militia that degree of discipline or to their officers that degree of military science upon which a nation may safely hazard its fate.

“The great man who conducted the war of our Revolution was continually compelled to conform his conduct to the circumstances growing out of the experimental lessons just mentioned. What was the secret of his conduct? Must it be told? It may, and without exciting a blush or uneasy sensation in any of his surviving companions-in-arms. He had an army of men, but he had few officers or soldiers in that army. Both were to be formed, which could not be effected in a single campaign, or while his regiments were continually returning home, and, like the waves of the sea, each in their turn lost in the abyss and succeeded by new ones. It was not till after he was furnished with a less fluctuating and more stable kind of force, that he could commence, with a prospect of advantage, military instructions, or enforce the ordinances of discipline; and even then he felt that time and instructors were required to render his labors useful and enable his army to meet the enemy upon anything like *equal terms*. Are we to profit by, or is this experience to be lost to our country?

“The art of war, which gives to a small force the faculty to combat with advantage superior numbers, *indifferently instructed*, is subjected to mechanical, geometrical, moral, and physical rules; it calls for profound study; its theory is immense, the details infinite; and its principles rendered useful only by a happy adaptation of them to all the circumstances of place and ground,

variously combined, to which they may be applicable. Is it possible for an officer of militia to obtain a competent knowledge of these things in the short space his usual avocations will permit him to devote to their acquisition? Is it possible for any officer, having acquired knowledge of these details, this theory, and these principles, to carry them into practice with a handful of militia, in the few days in each year allotted by law to trainings and exercises? Is that perfect subordination and obedience of men to their officers, and of each *inferior* to his *superior officer*, through all the grades of rank, from the corporal up to the commander-in-chief, which forms a vital principle essential to the force and energy of armies, to be acquired by or communicated to a body of militia organized and trained according to our laws? And does it consist with a humane and enlightened policy to march men so imperfectly instructed and disciplined, unless in cases of the last extremity, against veteran troops (where this principle reigns in full activity) commanded by skillful and scientific officers? Admitting, however, that militia officers, during the few months the law permits their corps to be retained *in actual service*, could render their men, by incessant instruction, capable of fulfilling the object of their destination; yet, as that advantage is but momentary, as these borrowed instruments must be quickly returned to the depot which furnished them, as new ones must be resorted to and successively instructed, what can be expected from such a system but perpetual incoherence between the means and the end, and certain shipwreck to the best connected and combined military projects? This, to be sure, is the old story; it cannot, however, be too often repeated, because it can never be refuted.

“The secret of discipline, and the importance of military science, were well known to those ancient governments whose generals and troops have filled the world with the splendor of victories. According to *Scipio*, nothing contributed to the success of enterprises so much as skill in the individual officers. The severity of the Roman discipline is well understood, and the estimation in which it was held by *Cæsar*. *Livy* has observed that *science* in war does more than force. *Vegetius*, that it is neither *numbers* nor *blind valor* which insures victory, but that it generally follows *capacity* and *science in war*. *Machiavel*, who has written upon military affairs, placed so much dependence on an exact discipline

and military science as to efface from his list of great generals all those who with *small armies* did not execute *great things*. But to the committee it is unnecessary to repeat the authorities of generals and writers of the first reputation to show the high importance attached to military science and discipline in all ages of the world, or resort to history for evidence of its effects. They must be well acquainted with the facts, and, no doubt, will give them their due weight in considering the subjects now before them.

“There is, however, an authority so much in point relative to the essentiality of the institution in question that I cannot forbear to mention it.

“The Marshal de *Puissegur*, who has left an excellent treatise on the art of war, the result of his experience, observes:

“I have been, perhaps, at as many sieges as any of those in service, and in all sorts of grades: as subaltern, I have commanded troops and working parties in a siege; as major, I have conducted to the trenches and posts to which they were destined troops and laborers; I have been major of brigade, marshal de camp, and lieutenant-general; however, as I have not learned fortification, my practice has not enabled me to acquit myself in conducting attacks, so that I should be obliged to suffer myself to be instructed in many things by the lights of engineers, their practice being founded upon principles which are known to them, an advantage I have not in this branch of war.’

“This is the candid acknowledgment of a man who had served sixty years in the army; who had learned the military art under a father that, in forty years’ service, had been present at two hundred sieges; and who had himself passed through all the military grades, and arrived from an inferior to a superior rank but after having deserved each successive promotion by some distinguished action.

“A slight attention to circumstances, and the actual position of our country, must lead to the conviction that a well connected series of fortifications is an object of the highest importance to the United States, not only as these will be conducive to the general security, but as a mean of lessening the necessity, and consequently the expense of a large military establishment.

“By strongly fortifying our harbors and frontiers we may reasonably expect either to keep at a distance the calamities of war or

render it less injurious when it shall happen. It is behind these ponderous masses only that a small number of men can maintain themselves for a length of time against superior forces. Imposing, therefore, upon an enemy who may have everything to transport across the Atlantic the necessity of undertaking long and hazardous sieges, increases the chance against his undertaking them at all, or, if he does, in despite of such circumstances, insures to us the time he must consume in his operations to rally our means to a point and unite our efforts to resist him.

"We must not conclude from these brief observations that the service of the engineer is limited to constructing, connecting, consolidating, and keeping in repair fortifications. This is but a single branch of their profession, though indeed a most important one. Their utility extends to almost every department of war and every description of general officers, besides embracing whatever respects public buildings, roads, bridges, canals, and all such works of a civil nature. I consider it, therefore, of vast consequence to the United States that it should form in its own bosom and out of its own native materials men qualified to place the country in a proper posture of defense, to infuse science into our army, and give to our fortifications that degree of force, connection, and perfection which can alone counterbalance the superiority of attack over defense.

"With these advantages in prospect, is it not incumbent upon us to hasten with all reasonable diligence the commencement and completion of an institution essential to realize them? And are expenditures which give such valuable results to be otherwise viewed than as real economy? It is a well-known fact that England had neither native artillerists nor engineers before the time of the Duke of Cumberland and until after the establishment of military schools."

The Secretary then proceeds to present an estimate of the cost of the schools recommended in his former report, both for buildings and salaries of professors. It is unnecessary to give these estimates in detail, but a statement of the total sum may not be without interest. Two plans for buildings were presented by different

architects. One of these plans called for an expenditure of \$38,846.00, and the other for an outlay of \$80,000.00. The combined salaries of all the professors in the Fundamental School and in the School of Artillerists and Engineers were estimated at a total of \$10,489.20 annually.

The close of the paper under consideration is as follows:

“The committee, while they perceive that the seed which it is now proposed to sow is to yield a future harvest, will, at the same time, justly appreciate the various beneficial consequences which must result from the immediate adoption, and the striking inconveniences and danger to be apprehended from a postponement of the measure.

“Whether our country is to be plunged into a war, or enjoy, for a length of time, the blessings of peace and interior tranquility; whether the portentous events which have afflicted Europe, and, in their progress, threatened the United States, are to subside into a settled state of things; whether the blessings of peace and the customary relations among the transatlantic powers are to take place, or hostilities shall be continued, protracted, and extended beyond their present limits—in either view, it is equally a suggestion of policy and wisdom to improve our means of defense, and give as much perfection as possible to such establishments as may be conceived essential to the maintenance of our rights and security from insults.

“The unavoidable collisions growing out of trade, and the reciprocal restrictions of great commercial states; the apprehensions and jealousies natural to powers possessing contiguous territory; the inefficacy of religion and morality to control the passions of men or the interest and ambition of nations; the impossibility, at times, for governments to adjust their differences, or preserve their rights, without making sacrifices more to be dreaded than the hazards and calamities of war—all these considerations, illustrated by volumes of examples, teach the soundness of the axiom,

Si vis pacem para bellum. And what time more proper to prepare the materials for war than a time of peace, or more urgent than that in which a nation is threatened with war?"

It may here be recalled that under the acts of 1794 and 1798 the cadets therein provided for received instruction in mathematics alone, at West Point, under the direction of a private citizen, Mr. George Barron. The developments arising from the attempt to educate young men for soldiers under the system of ordinary school teaching, proved conclusively the inutility of the acts mentioned, so far as they related to the military education and discipline of a cadet designed for the army. It had quickly become apparent to all who had given the matter any attention that either the whole attempt at a scholastic military education must be abandoned, or that a specific military institution must be created and located at a fixed point, and the corps of students subjected to military rules and discipline.

The reports of Secretary McHenry, above quoted, constituted the last act in the conflict which had been maintained for several years between those in favor of the project of a military academy and those opposed to the measure—those, in brief, who, being wiser than their generation, did not believe in it, in the form at least under which it was urged. The battle-ground had been fought over by the contestants; the opponents of the measure had been slowly driven from their positions; the ammunition of oratory had been lavishly used. The failure of the first attempt under the acts above cited had then created

a revulsion somewhat in favor of the objectors, when the sturdy Secretary of War made a final bayonet charge and carried the work. The institution at West Point was soon after established, and the question of adapting it to a proper usefulness and confining it within proper limits has been handed down to the actors of the present day.

The reports of Secretary McHenry must be conceded to be able papers, but it seems surprising to the reader of the present time that they should have aimed so far and fallen so short of the real mark. They state indisputable truth and urge it with warmth and energy, but they do not state the whole truth, because only certain factors in the problem sought to be solved were taken into consideration. The whole force of the two documents is expended in the attempt to prove what must have been at that day, as it is at the present, a recognized truism, viz.: that training, discipline, and knowledge of relating branches of education increase the efficiency of a soldier. No one can doubt such a proposition for a single moment. Art and science are mighty agents in the game of battles, but they do not constitute that supreme power, that crushing, sweeping, irresistible agency that decides the issue of great battles, and that has deeply engraven upon the granite shaft forever commemorative of military achievement such names as those of Cyrus, Alexander, Hannibal, Pompey the Great, Cæsar, Charlemagne, Frederick the Great, Napoleon I., of Washington, and of Grant. The strength of the Secretary's argument is unimpeachable so far as it relates to the value of education and discipline

for the soldier. But, as so often occurs in the course of argumentative effort, facts certain in themselves are in this instance applied to and made to support false conclusions. Thus it happened that, while our predecessors placed a just value upon special military education, they were impelled, by influences to be spoken of hereafter, to seek practical development of the idea in a measure the wisdom of which, called in question by many of that day, has been negatived by the lapse of time and experience.

Let us briefly follow the legislative events succeeding the presentation of the last two reports above quoted. Upon the 19th of March, 1800, Mr. Otis, from the committee appointed by the House, presented a bill establishing a military academy. Having been read twice and opposition to it being manifested by some of the members, it was referred to the committee of the whole. No action was had upon it until the 28th of April following, when, after consideration and further opposition, it was postponed, until the first Monday in December following, by a vote of 64 in the affirmative to 23 in the negative. No further action upon the bill was taken until after the lapse of more than one year, when, upon the 11th of January, 1802, it was again put upon reading in the House. Considerable opposition was manifested in the latter body during the progress of the bill, and many amendments, some of which were adopted, were offered to it. The bill finally passed the House on the 21st of January, by a vote of 77 against 12. Being sent to the Senate, it was again amended by that body. These

amendments having been concurred in by the House, the bill was enrolled and sent to the President on the 15th of March, and returned by him approved on the following day, March 16, 1802.

The text of the bill is here given in full, for the benefit of those wishing to consult it in its entirety :

“An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States.

“SECTION 1. *Be it enacted*, etc., That the military peace establishment of the United States, from and after the 1st of June next, shall be composed of one regiment of artillerists and two regiments of infantry, with such officers, military agents, and engineers as are hereinafter mentioned.

“SEC. 2. That the regiment of artillerists shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, four majors, one adjutant, and twenty companies, each company to consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, two cadets, four sergeants, four corporals, four musicians, eight artificers, and fifty-six privates, to be formed into five battalions: *Provided always*, that it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to retain, with their present grade, as many of the first lieutenants now in service as shall amount to the whole number of lieutenants required; but that, in proportion as vacancies happen therein, new appointments be made to the grade of second lieutenant until their number amount to twenty, and each regiment of infantry shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant, one sergeant-major, two teachers of music, and ten companies; each company to consist of one captain, one first and one second lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, four musicians, and sixty-four privates.

“SEC. 3. That there shall be one brigadier-general, with one aide-de-camp, who shall be taken from the captains or subalterns of the line; one adjutant and inspector of the army, to be taken from the line of field officers; one paymaster of the army, seven paymasters, and two assistants, to be attached to such districts as

the President of the United States shall direct, to be taken from the line of commissioned officers, who, in addition to their other duties, shall have charge of the clothing of the troops; three military agents and such number of assistant military agents as the President of the United States shall deem expedient, not exceeding one to each military post; which assistants shall be taken from the line; two surgeons; twenty-five surgeons' mates, to be attached to garrisons or posts and not to corps.

"SEC. 4. That the monthly pay of the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates be as follows, to-wit: To the brigadier-general two hundred and twenty-five dollars, which shall be his full and entire compensation, without a right to receive or demand any rations, forage, traveling expenses, or other perquisites or emoluments whatsoever, except such stationery as may be requisite for the use of his department; to the adjutant and inspector of the army thirty-eight dollars in addition to his pay in the line, and such stationery as shall be requisite in his department; to the paymaster of the army one hundred and twenty dollars, without any other emolument, except such stationery as may be requisite in his department, and the use of the public office now occupied by him; to the aide-de-camp, in addition to his pay in the line, thirty dollars; to each paymaster attached to districts thirty dollars, and each assistant to such paymaster ten dollars in addition to his pay in the line; to each military agent seventy-six dollars and no other emolument; to each assistant military agent eight dollars in addition to his pay in the line, except the assistant military agents at Pittsburgh and Niagara, who shall receive sixteen dollars each in addition to their pay in the line; to each colonel seventy-five dollars; to each lieutenant-colonel sixty dollars; to each major fifty dollars; to each surgeon forty-five dollars; to each surgeon's mate thirty dollars; to each adjutant ten dollars, in addition to his pay in the line; to each captain forty dollars; to each first lieutenant thirty dollars; to each second lieutenant twenty-five dollars; to each ensign twenty dollars; to each cadet ten dollars; to each sergeant-major nine dollars; to each sergeant eight dollars; to each corporal seven dollars; to each teacher of music eight dollars; to each musician six dollars; to each artificer ten dollars, and to each private five dollars.

"SEC. 5. That the commissioned officers aforesaid shall be en-

titled to receive for their daily subsistence the following number of rations of provisions: A colonel, six rations; a lieutenant-colonel, five rations; a major, four rations; a captain, three rations; a lieutenant, two rations; an ensign, two rations; a surgeon, three rations; a surgeon's mate, two rations; a cadet, two rations, or money in lieu thereof at the option of the said officers and cadets at the posts, respectively, where the rations shall become due; and if at such post supplies are not furnished by contract, then such allowance as shall be deemed equitable, having reference to former contracts and the position of the place in question; and each non-commissioned officer, musician, and private, one ration; to the commanding officers of each separate post, such additional number of rations as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, direct, having respect to the special circumstances of each post; to the women who may be allowed to any particular corps, not exceeding the proportion of four to a company, one ration each; and to every commissioned officer who shall keep one servant, not a soldier of the line, one additional ration.

"SEC. 6. That each ration shall consist of one pound and a quarter of beef, or three-quarters of a pound of pork, eighteen ounces of bread or flour, one gill of rum, whisky, or brandy, and at the rate of two quarts of salt, four quarts of vinegar, four pounds soap, and one pound and a half of candles to every hundred rations.

"SEC. 7. That the following officers shall, whenever forage is not furnished by the public, receive at the rate of the following sums per month in lieu thereof: Each colonel, twelve dollars; each lieutenant-colonel, eleven dollars; each major, ten dollars; each adjutant, six dollars; each surgeon, ten dollars; and each surgeon's mate, six dollars.

"SEC. 8. That every non-commissioned officer, musician, and private of the artillery and infantry shall receive annually the following articles of uniform clothing, to-wit: one hat, one coat, one vest, two pair of woolen and two pair of linen overalls, one coarse linen frock and trousers for fatigue clothing, four pair of shoes, four shirts, two pair of socks, two pair of short stockings, one blanket, and a stock and clasp, and one pair of half-gaiters; and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to cause to be furnished to the paymasters of the respective districts such surplus of

clothing as he may deem expedient, which clothing shall, under his direction, be furnished to the soldiers, when necessary, at the contract prices, and accounted for by them out of their arrears of monthly pay.

“SEC. 9. That the President of the United States cause to be arranged the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the several corps of troops now in the service of the United States in such manner as to form and complete, out of the same, the corps aforesaid; and cause the supernumerary officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates to be discharged from the service of the United States from and after the first day of April next, or as soon thereafter as circumstances may permit.

“SEC. 10. That the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the said corps shall be governed by the rules and articles of war which have been established by the United States, in Congress assembled, or by such rules and articles as may be hereafter, by law, established: *Provided, nevertheless,* that the sentence of general courts-martial, extending to the loss of life, the dismissal of a commissioned officer, or which shall respect the general officer, shall, with the whole proceedings of such cases, respectively, be laid before the President of the United States, who is hereby authorized to direct the same to be carried into execution, or otherwise, as he shall judge proper.

“SEC. 11. That the commissioned officers who shall be employed in the recruiting service to keep up by voluntary enlistment the corps as aforesaid, shall be entitled to receive for every effective able-bodied citizen of the United States, who shall be duly enlisted by him for the term of five years, and mustered, of at least five feet six inches high, and between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, the sum of two dollars: *Provided, nevertheless,* that this regulation, so far as respects the height and age of the recruit, shall not extend to musicians or to those soldiers who may enlist into the service. *And provided, also,* that no person under the age of twenty-one years shall be enlisted by any officer, or held in the service of the United States, without the consent of his parent, guardian, or master first had and obtained, if any he have; and if any officer shall enlist any person contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, for every such offense he shall forfeit and pay the amount of the bounty and clothing which the person so recruited

may have received from the public, to be deducted out of the pay and emoluments of such officer.

“SEC. 12. That there shall be allowed and paid to each effective able-bodied citizen, recruited as aforesaid, to serve for the term of five years, a bounty of twelve dollars; but the payment of six dollars of said bounty shall be deferred until he shall be mustered and have joined the corps in which he is to serve.

“SEC. 13. That the said corps shall be paid in such manner that the arrears shall at no time exceed two months, unless the circumstances of the case shall render it unavoidable.

“SEC. 14. That if any officer, non-commissioned officer, musician, or private in the corps composing the peace establishment shall be disabled by wounds or otherwise, while in the line of his duty in public service, he shall be placed on the list of invalids of the United States, at such rate of pay and under such regulations as may be directed by the President of the United States for the time being: *Provided, always*, that the compensation to be allowed for such wounds or disabilities, to a commissioned officer, shall not exceed for the rate of disability half the monthly pay of such officer at the time of his being disabled or wounded, and that no officer shall receive more than the half-pay of a lieutenant-colonel, and that the rate of compensation to non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates shall not exceed five dollars per month; *and, provided also*, that all inferior disabilities shall entitle the person so disabled to receive an allowance proportionate to the highest disability.

“SEC. 15. That if any commissioned officer in the military peace establishment of the United States shall, while in the service of the United States, die by reason of any wound received in actual service of the United States, and leave a widow, or if no widow, a child or children under sixteen years of age, such widow, or if no widow, such child or children shall be entitled to and receive half of the monthly pay to which the deceased was entitled at the time of his death, for and during the term of five years. But in case of the death or intermarriage of such widow before the expiration of the said term of five years, the half-pay for the remainder of the time shall go to the child or children of such deceased officer: *Provided, always*, that such half-pay shall cease on the decease of such child or children.

"SEC. 16. The paymaster shall perform the duties of his office agreeably to the direction of the President of the United States for the time being, and before he enters on the duties of the same shall give bonds, with good and sufficient sureties, in such sums as the President shall direct, for the faithful discharge of his said office, and shall take an oath to execute the duties thereof with fidelity; and it shall, moreover, be his duty to appoint from the line, with the approbation of the President of the United States, the several paymasters to districts and assistants prescribed by this act; and he is hereby authorized to require the said paymaster to districts and assistants to enter into bonds, with good and sufficient surety, for the faithful discharge of their respective duties.

"SEC. 17. That it shall be the duty of the military agents designated by this act to purchase, receive, and forward to their proper destination all military stores and other articles for the troops in their respective departments, and all goods and annuities for the Indians which they may be directed to purchase, or which shall be ordered into their care by the Department of War. They shall account with the Department of War annually for all the public property which may pass through their hands, and all the moneys which they may expend in the discharge of the duties of their offices respectively. Previous to their entering on the duties of their offices they shall give bonds, with sufficient sureties, in such sums as the President of the United States shall direct, for the faithful discharge of the trust reposed in them, and shall take an oath faithfully to perform the duties of their respective offices.

"SEC. 18. That if any non-commissioned officer, musician, or private shall desert the service of the United States, he shall, in addition to the penalties mentioned in the rules and articles of war, be liable to serve for and during such a period as shall, with the time he may have served previous to his desertion, amount to the full term of his enlistment; and such soldier shall and may be tried by a court-martial and punished, although the term of his enlistment may have elapsed previous to his being apprehended or tried.

"SEC. 19. That every person who shall procure or entice a soldier in the service of the United States to desert, or who shall purchase from any soldier his arms, uniform, clothing, or any part thereof and every captain or commanding officer of any ship or

vessel who shall enter on board such ship or vessel as one of his crew, knowing him to have deserted, or otherwise carry away any such soldier, or shall refuse to deliver him up to the order of his commanding officer, shall, upon legal conviction, be fined at the discretion of any court having cognizance of the same, in any sum not exceeding three hundred dollars, or be imprisoned any term not exceeding one year.

“SEC. 20. That every officer, non-commissioned officer, musician, or private shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, to-wit: ‘I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against their enemies or opposers, whomsoever; and that I will observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States, and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the rules and articles of war.’

“SEC. 21. That whenever a general court-martial shall be ordered the President of the United States may appoint some fit person to act as judge advocate, who shall be allowed, in addition to his other pay, one dollar and twenty-five cents for every day he shall be necessarily employed in the duties of the said court; and in cases where the President shall not have made such appointment, the brigadier-general or the president of the court may make the same.

“SEC. 22. That where any commissioned officer shall be obliged to incur any extra expense in traveling and sitting on general courts-martial, he shall be allowed a reasonable compensation for such extra expense actually incurred, not exceeding one dollar and twenty-five cents per day to such as shall be entitled to forage.

“SEC. 23. That no non-commissioned officer, musician, or private shall be arrested, or subject to arrest, or to be taken in execution for any debt under the sum of twenty dollars, contracted before enlistment, nor for any debt contracted after enlistment.

“SEC. 24. That whenever any officer or soldier shall be discharged from the service, except by way of punishment for any offense, he shall be allowed his pay and rations, or an equivalent in money, for such term of time as shall be sufficient for him to travel from the place of discharge to the place of his residence, computing at the rate of twenty miles to a day.

“SEC. 25. That to each commissioned officer who shall be deranged by virtue of this act there shall be allowed and paid, in addition to the pay and emoluments to which they will be entitled by law at the time of their discharge—to each officer whose term of service in any military corps of the United States shall not have exceeded three years, three months’ pay; to all other officers so deranged, one month’s pay of their grades, respectively, for each year of past service in the army of the United States, or in any regiment or corps now or formerly in the service thereof.

“SEC. 26. That the President of the United States is hereby authorized and empowered, when he shall deem it expedient, to organize and establish a corps of engineers, to consist of one engineer, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of a major; two assistant engineers, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of captains; two other assistant engineers, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of first lieutenants; two other assistant engineers, with the pay, rank, and emoluments of second lieutenants; and ten cadets, with the pay of sixteen dollars per month and two rations per day; and the President of the United States is, in like manner, authorized, when he shall deem it proper, to make such promotions in the said corps with a view to particular merit, and without regard to rank, so as not to exceed one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, four captains, four first lieutenants, four second lieutenants, and so as that the number of the whole corps shall, at no time, exceed twenty officers and cadets.

“SEC. 27. That the said corps, when so organized, shall be stationed at West Point, in the State of New York, and shall constitute a military academy; and the engineers, assistant engineers, and cadets of the said corps shall be subject, at all times, to do duty in such places and on such service as the President of the United States shall direct.

“SEC. 28. That the principal engineer, and in his absence the next in rank, shall have the superintendence of the said military academy, under the direction of the President of the United States; and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized, at the public expense, under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States, to procure the necessary books, implements, and apparatus for the use and benefit of the said institution.

“SEC. 29. That so much of any act or acts, now in force, as comes within the purview of this act, shall be and the same is hereby repealed; saving, nevertheless, such parts thereof as relate to the enlistments or term of service of any of the troops which, by this act, are continued on the present military establishment of the United States.”

CHAPTER VI.

COMMENTS UPON THE ACT CREATING THE ACADEMY—PROGRESS OF THE INSTITUTION—OUTBREAK OF THE WAR OF 1812—ENFORCED LEGISLATION PRODUCES THE LAW OF APRIL 29, 1812—THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE WEST POINT ACADEMY—REPORT OF GENERAL BERNARD AND COLONEL M'RAE—RECOMMENDATION BY JOHN C. CALHOUN TO ESTABLISH AN ADDITIONAL ACADEMY—OPPOSITION TO WEST POINT—THE EXCLUSIVE NATURE OF THE SCHOOL SET FORTH—ITS ARISTOCRATIC TENDENCIES—REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE UPON MEMORIALS—SYNOPSIS OF THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACADEMY—DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE CITIZEN-SOLDIERY.

A PERUSAL of the law in its full text, as given in conclusion of the immediately preceding chapter, will suggest one feature, at least, of particular interest. The establishment of an academy for the special purpose of imparting to American youth an opportunity to obtain a military education had been discussed for a number of years previously to the passage of the law just quoted, as will appear from the remarks upon the subject in the preceding pages. It was a measure of much importance, and occupied no middle ground. It was either a wise or an unwise measure, one calculated to do much good or to be

productive of much harm. The author has heretofore said that the prospect of establishing a special military school had met with opposition, though the extent of this latter does not fully appear in the early records. There were those, however, wise enough to foresee that such an institution, while possessing undoubted advantages in imparting military instruction, would be fraught with danger to a republican system of government.

The influence of Washington, Knox, McHenry, and other great soldiers of the Revolution, had been so potent in favor of the measure that the opposition to it had been muffled to a large extent, and finally, as we have seen, overcome in so far, at least, as to put the project upon a trial. It is safe to say that, at the time of the passage of the bill creating a fixed military school at West Point, the opposition to it among the actual legislators in both houses of Congress was, numerically speaking, much stronger than the sentiment in favor of it. But, standing in the light and warmth of the blessing brought by the struggle for freedom, the non-military people, as well as the soldiers who followed General Washington's standard through so many weary marches and hard fought battle-fields, had come to regard him with a kind of reverence, and to accept his opinions as almost possessed of infallibility.

The feature of the bill above quoted, to which attention is drawn at the beginning of the present chapter, is well calculated to illustrate the feeling against its expediency which existed at that time.

As has been remarked, the measure was important — nay, very important; but it will be observed that the whole subject of creating a military school for the education of American soldiers is disposed of in three short sections of the law before us.

Further than this the legislation appears not as a separate and openly announced fact, but as an appendix to a bill whose title conveys no intimation of its full scope. In the present legislative vocabulary, the three sections covering the matter of a military academy would probably be called *a rider* to the bill, and the idea of concealment and of unfair means would be suggested thereby. The creation of the school, even, is not positively arranged for. It is provisional in character, “the President of the United States being authorized and empowered, *when he shall deem it expedient*, to organize and establish a corps of engineers; * * * that the said corps, *when* so organized, shall be stationed at West Point, in the State of New York, and shall constitute a military academy,” etc.

Such distinctive military schools as existed at that period in Europe had been erected by well-defined ordinances, or, it may be said, by legislation. The entire plan was mapped out in detail, including their precise organization, rules, methods of teaching; in short, the whole system of their regular operation was distinctly and openly stated. Not so with their American imitator. Not even a teacher is provided for in the bill. The principal engineer is to have the superintendence of the Military Academy, under the direction of the President

of the United States, while the Secretary of War is authorized to purchase at the public expense, under the regulations directed by the President, necessary books, implements, and apparatus for the *use and benefit of the said institution*. No stipulation is made as to how cadets shall be appointed and entered; what shall be the term and course of their studies; nor their future, after they shall have received a degree. Considering the nature of the measure inaugurated by the last three sections but one of this law, the whole proceeding seems extraordinary, and only to be explained upon the theory that it barely passed as a sort of compromise between the contending opinions.

However, the basis of a military school was at length securely laid, and the future structure was to be reared by subsequent legislation. The work upon this began as early as the following year, when an act was approved (on the 28th of February, 1803) authorizing the President of the United States to appoint to the corps of engineers one teacher of the French language and one teacher of drawing.

For about five years after this but little was heard in Congress of the Military Academy. Officials had been appointed, and the work of imparting military education in America was supposed to be fairly under way. The events preceding the War of 1812 had begun to foreshadow the second struggle with Great Britain soon to follow, when public interest naturally began to center toward West Point. All resources in the emergency of

war must be made available, and the experiment of the Military Academy must not be overlooked nor neglected.

On the 18th of March, 1808, Thomas Jefferson, then President of the United States, transmitted a report of the progress and state of the Military Academy, under cover of a special message to Congress. Mr. Jefferson stated in this message as follows:

“The scale on which the Military Academy at West Point was originally established is become too limited to furnish the number of well-instructed subjects in the different branches of artillery and engineering which the public service calls for. The want of such characters is already sensibly felt, and will be increased with the enlargement of our plans of military preparations. The Chief Engineer having been instructed to consider the subject, and to propose an augmentation which might render the establishment commensurate with the present circumstances of our country, has made the report which I now transmit for the consideration of Congress.

“The idea suggested by him of removing the institution to this place is also worthy of attention. Besides the advantage of placing it under the immediate eye of the Government, it may render its benefits common to the Naval Department, and will furnish opportunities of selecting on better information the characters most qualified to fulfill the duties which the public service calls for.”

The report alluded to was made by the Chief Engineer, Colonel Jonathan Williams, and, as conveying the most reliable information now accessible upon the condition of the school six years after its regular establishment by act of Congress, the more interesting portions of the document are herewith given.

“This institution,” says the report, “was established at West Point in the year 1801, under the direction of a private citizen, and

was nothing more than a mathematical school for the few cadets that were then in service. It was soon found that the government of young military men was incompatible with the ordinary system of schools, and, consequently, this institution ran into disorder and the teacher into contempt.

“When the peace establishment was made the corps of engineers was created, and the twenty-seventh section enacts that the corps ‘shall be stationed at West Point, in the State of New York, and shall constitute a Military Academy, and the engineers, assistant engineers, and cadets shall be subject to do duty at such places and on such service as the President of the United States may direct.’ It was not probably foreseen that, although the headquarters of the corps might be at West Point, yet the duties of the individual officers necessarily spread them along our coast from one extremity of the United States to the other, and as the whole number of officers can be no more than sixteen, they could not in their dispersed state constitute a Military Academy. The incongruity of a stationary and errant existence in the same corps has been amply exemplified by experience. Indeed, it can never be supposed that engineers, as such, could be efficient elementary teachers; their capability consistent with other duties is confined to practical teaching by combining example with precept, and carrying the rudiments of the art into practical execution, in the same manner that other professional men generally have youth under their tuition after they have gone through every branch of elementary learning relating to their profession.

“A part only of the officers were appointed soon after the passage of the act, of whom the major, who was ex-officio the chief engineer, and two captains took charge of the Academy, the students of which were the cadets belonging to the regiment artillery. The major occasionally read lectures on fortifications, gave practical lessons in the field, and taught the use of instruments generally. The two captains taught mathematics, the one in the line of geometrical, the other in that of algebraical demonstrations.

* * * “It was soon discovered that mere mathematics would not make either an artillerist or an engineer, and a power was given by law to appoint a teacher of drawing and of the French language. * * * From that time to this, however, the Academy has progressed beyond what could have been expected

from its means, but now the first mathematical teacher has resigned and the second has for several years been employed as Surgeon-General of the United States in the Western country. * * * In short, the Military Academy as it now stands is like a foundling, barely existing among the mountains, and nurtured at a distance, out of sight, and almost unknown to its legitimate parents. The questions that have been frequently put to the subscriber by members of Congress evidently show that the little interest the institution has excited arises solely from its being unknown to those who ought to be, and doubtless would willingly become, its generous guardians and powerful protectors. Had it been so attached to the Government (its real and only parent) as to be always with it, always in sight, and always in the way of its fostering care, it would probably have flourished and have become an honorable and interesting appendage to the national family.

“The question recurs, What ought to be done? The subscriber would wish the answer to arise out of the nature of the case, and carry with it a demonstration of its being founded in the most pure, though zealous, regard for the public good. Actuated only by such motives, and without the stimulus of either ambition or interest, he begs leave to state, in the form of a proposition, what appear to him to be the natural and proper remedies.

“First. Let the Military Academy be placed under the direction of the President of the United States in all that does or can relate to it, anything contained in any former laws to the contrary notwithstanding.

“Second. Let an academical staff be created in manner following; and, as the regulations must necessarily be military, let the professors, when not of army rank, take that of their denominations (as relates to the Academy only) in the manner of brevets.”

Here follows an outline of an appropriate academic and professional staff, with branches to be taught at the Academy, and also a recommendation that certain additions be made to the corps of engineers. The report closes as follows :

“It will appear necessary to make, in the first instance, an appropriation for the proper buildings, apparatus, library, etc.; this being done (and it should be remembered that, being once well done, it will be but *one* expense, not subject to repetition), it is presumed the annual appropriation would be inconsiderable; it might indeed be so connected with the appropriation for the corps of engineers that all the surplusage of one would fall into the other, and the extension of the sum would not be felt.

“It might be well to make the plan upon such a scale as not only to take in the minor officers of the navy, but also any youths from any of the States who might wish for such an education, whether designed for the army or navy, or neither, and to let these be assessed to the value of their education, which might form a fund for extra or contingent expenses. On this plan it might be proper to suppress the ration system while the students are at the Academy, and oblige all but commissioned officers to board in commons, as in other universities. The citizen-youth, so adopted, should be required to sign the articles of war (for the time being), since it would be impossible, and improper if it were possible, to make any exceptions to the rules and regulations of the Academy. As these youths grow up and take their stations in society, they would naturally become militia officers, and in a few years, in the ordinary course of events, we should see a uniformity in our militia, resulting from a spirit of emulation, which the reputation of having received a military education would naturally excite, and the same duties which have often been considered a burden would become a pleasurable privilege. There is nothing more fascinating to youth than excellence in arms, and a little knowledge will create a desire to acquire more.

“That Congress may have as little trouble as possible, and to avoid a frequent recurrence of its authority on matters of course, it might, perhaps, be expedient to pass one short act, naming the additions to be made to the corps of engineers, but placing the direction of the Academy, external and internal, in the President of the United States, leaving the site, the buildings, the number and kind of professors, and all other matters connected with the institution, entirely to his judgment.”

No new legislation grew out of this report, nor did Congress consider the recommendation to remove the Academy to the city of Washington and place it under the direction, external and internal, of the President—a recommendation made by Colonel Williams, and tacitly indorsed by Mr. Jefferson. A perusal of the report will demonstrate the opposition to the Academy, and the struggle it was making in the year 1808 for a precarious existence. During this same year various measures were adopted by Congress to increase numerically our military force, as well as to add to its efficiency. Among these measures was the act of April 23, “making provision for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia of the United States;” the act of April 12, “to raise for a limited time an additional military force;” the act of December 18, 1807, “appropriating money for an additional number of gun-boats;” and of January 8, 1808, “to fortify the ports and harbors of the United States.” The period in which Colonel Williams’ report was submitted to Congressional consideration was one of activity in a military way, but the Academy at West Point failed to secure any substantial attention at that time. From the earliest effort to institute this special school, two chief objections had been urged against it. The first of these related to a doubt of the constitutionality of the measure; the second, to the perils arising from such an institution to a free government.

In his message of December, 1810, President Madison pays special attention to the school at West Point, and

urges a revision of the law under which it was established, "principally with a view to a more enlarged cultivation and diffusion of the advantages of such institutions by providing professorships for all the necessary branches of military institutions, and by the establishment of an additional academy at the seat of government or elsewhere." In the following year the President again called the attention of the slow-acting Congress to the subject of military academies. A few months later the war-cloud, which had been growing more and more threatening, actually burst, the American Congress having, upon the 18th of June, 1812, formally declared war to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories.

The event had been anticipated, and legislation looking to the raising of troops, and to placing the country upon an immediate war-footing, had been in progress for several months previous to the declaration of hostilities. In this time of military excitement, the Academy at West Point at last claimed the earnest attention of Congress, and the law of April 29, 1812, was passed. This act may be said to constitute the true charter of the institution now being considered. Previous legislation had been niggardly in character and compass. The "foundling among the mountains" had been dying of inanition. Congress had been importuned for more favorable and extended legislation by the early Presidents, and this had been withheld, until the child lay

at the very point of death. When, however, the shrill voice of war rang through the land, and the arming of men for the approaching conflict became the business of the day, every energy was spent in the development of the military resources of the country. The Academy at West Point was remote as a military resource, but no one knew at that early date just how long hostilities against America's hated foe and would-be oppressor were to last. At all events, the emergency justified an attempt to bring out whatever there was of good in the long-discussed project of a special school for the military training and education of officers for the army. Objections were brushed away. The country stood face to face with a traditional and most intensely hated enemy. The dogs of war were to be slipped, not again to be kenneled for an indefinite length of time. The drilled soldiers of a great military power—one whose every territorial accession had come through the mighty force of its ships, its cannon, and its conquering hosts of hired and coerced soldiery—were to be met upon fields still strewn with the remnants of the first struggle for freedom. The *American volunteer* was there. He was the refuge and hope of his country. But if there were really an amount of good preponderating sufficiently over the manifest danger of a fixed military establishment, then let it be brought out. Let air be breathed into the starveling at West Point; let nutriment be plentifully supplied to it; and let it be seen whether the command, "Let there be life," shall be responded to with the assurance that there is life.

The law above-mentioned was the expression of the determination to supply the movement with the conditions necessary to development. It is the sequel of the act of 1802, and fitness requires that it should also find record in the present volume. It is as follows :

“ Be it enacted, etc., That there be added to the corps of engineers two captains, two first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, with the usual pay and emoluments, according to their grades respectively, and one paymaster, to be taken from the subalterns, with the pay and emoluments of a regimental paymaster; and that there be attached to the said corps, either from the troops now in service or by new enlistments, as the President of the United States may direct, four sergeants, four corporals, one teacher of music, four musicians, nineteen artificers, and sixty-two men, which non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and men, together with the artificers and men already belonging to the corps of engineers, shall be formed into a company, to be styled a company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners, and be officered from the corps of engineers, according as the commanding officer of that corps may, with the approbation of the President of the United States, direct; and the said non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and men shall be allowed the same pay and emoluments as are allowed to the non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, and men in the regiment of artilleryists.

“SECTION 2. That the Military Academy shall consist of the corps of engineers and the following professors, in addition to the teachers of the French language and drawing already provided, viz.: One professor of natural and experimental philosophy, with the pay and emoluments of lieutenant-colonel, if not an officer of the corps, and, if taken from the corps, then so much in addition to his pay and emoluments as shall equal those of a lieutenant-colonel; one professor of mathematics, with the pay and emoluments of a major if not an officer of the corps, and, if taken from the corps, then so much in addition to his pay and emoluments as shall equal those of a major; one professor of the art of engineering in all its branches, with the pay and emoluments of a major if not an officer of the corps, and, if taken from the corps, then so

much in addition to his pay and emoluments as shall equal those of a major — each of the foregoing professors to have an assistant professor, which assistant professor shall be taken from the most prominent characters of the officers or cadets, and receive the pay and emoluments of captains, and no other pay or emoluments while performing these duties: *Provided*, that nothing herein contained shall entitle the academical staff, as such, to any command in the army separate from the Academy.

“SEC. 3. That the cadets heretofore appointed in the service of the United States, whether of artillery, cavalry, riflemen, or infantry, or that may in future be appointed as hereinafter provided, shall at no time exceed two hundred and fifty; that they may be attached at the discretion of the President of the United States as students to the Military Academy and be subject to the established regulations thereof; that they shall be arranged into companies of non-commissioned officers and privates, according to the directions of the commandant of engineers, and be officered from the said corps for the purposes of military instruction; that there shall be added to each company of cadets four musicians, and the said corps shall be trained and taught all the duties of a private, non-commissioned officer, and officer, be encamped at least three months of each year and taught all the duties incident to a regular camp; that the candidates for cadets be not under the age of fourteen nor above the age of twenty-one; that each cadet, previously to his appointment by the President of the United States, shall be well versed in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and that he shall sign articles, with the consent of his parent or guardian, by which he shall engage to serve five years unless sooner discharged, and all such cadets shall be entitled to and receive the pay and emoluments now allowed by law to cadets in the corps of engineers.

“SEC. 4. That when any cadet shall receive a regular degree from the academical staff, after going through all the classes, he shall be considered as among the candidates for a commission in any corps, according to the duties he may be judged competent to perform, and in case there shall not at the time be a vacancy in such corps he may be attached to it at the discretion of the President of the United States, by brevet of the lowest grade, as a supernumerary officer, with the usual pay and emoluments of such

grade until a vacancy shall happen : *Provided*, That there shall not be more than one supernumerary officer to any one company at the same time.

“SEC. 5. That the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars be, and the sum is hereby appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, for erecting buildings and for providing an apparatus, a library, and all necessary implements, and for such contingent expenses as may be necessary and proper in the judgment of the President of the United States for such an institution.

“SEC. 6. That so much of the 26th section of the act entitled ‘An Act fixing the military peace establishment,’ passed the sixteenth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and two, as confines the selection of the commander of the corps of engineers to the said corps, be, and the same is hereby repealed.”

Although the passage of the foregoing law failed to infuse vitality immediately into the school at West Point, a transformation in its affairs was at once effected. Full response to the stimulus was slow, however, as will appear from the following extract from a report of General Bernard and Colonel McRae, made to the Secretary of War in January, 1819. This report, it may be observed, was devoted to the advocacy of establishing a school of practice, as a supplementary appendage to the Academy itself, the latter to be an “elementary” school, and that recommended to be established one of “application.”

“The elementary school at West Point,” says the report, “has hitherto been very inferior as such, and altogether inadequate to the objects for which it was established. A project has been presented, however, calculated to place this school upon the footing of the most perfect of the kind which exists. As to a school of application, there is none. The degree of instruction given to the cadets at the school of West Point has heretofore been for the

most part limited to a general acquaintance with those branches of knowledge which are common to all the arms of an army, and which ought to have been extended and applied to artillery, fortification, and topography.

“The consequence has been that the officers of infantry, artillery, engineers, and of the topographical corps have had the same degree and kind of instruction; and the only real difference which existed between them on leaving the school consisted in the uniform of their respective corps or regiments. *If any have been so fortunate as to render themselves serviceable either in the artillery or engineers, the cause must be sought for in their own industry, and not in the education received by them at West Point, which was barely sufficient to excite a desire for military inquiries and of military pursuits.*”

The author has taken the liberty to italicise the concluding sentence of the above quotation as being in strange contrast with the high-sounding praises of the institution which had reverberated through the halls of Congress at every session since the establishment of the school.

President Madison himself had urged upon Congress not alone the propriety of enlarging and improving the Academy at West Point, but also the expediency of establishing others in different sections of the Union.

In the year 1819, the then Secretary of War, Hon. John C. Calhoun, in a communication addressed to the chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, strongly recommended an additional military academy “to be placed where it would mutually accommodate the Southern and Western portions of the country, which are the most remote from the present institution.”

Notwithstanding the apparently firm position which the Military Academy had now gained as a fixed national

institution, the sentiment of opposition to it continued to exist, and even to gather strength. An attempt was made in the House of Representatives, in February, 1821, to abolish the Academy. This purpose was sought to be accomplished under cover of a preliminary resolution of inquiry into the constitutionality of the laws under which the school existed, and of a subsequent resolution to discontinue the pay and rations of the cadets, and to discharge them from the Academy, and from the service of the United States.

As late as the year 1844, this opposition made a very formidable assault upon the establishment. The Legislatures of New Hampshire and Connecticut memorialized Congress in that year, praying for its abolition. A like attack was made by a State Military Convention, held at Albany, N. Y., which adopted and forwarded to Congress through its officers a series of strong resolutions. At the same time, certain citizens of Pomfret, Conn., forwarded a petition asking for the abolition of the Academy at West Point.

The resolutions of the New Hampshire Legislature contain the following strong statement, among others: "Every young man, unless he happen to be one of the select two hundred and fifty whom executive favor has placed in this public charity school, is utterly and forever excluded from holding any office of honor, trust, or emolument in the military service of our country."

The burden of all the complaints alluded to is summarized by the committee to which they were referred,

in these words: "The institution is aristocratic and anti-republican; it is unnecessary, expensive, and extravagant, and different in all its features from what was originally designed." The report of the House Military Committee, which was made by Representative Hamilton Fish, on May 15, 1844, strongly defends the Academy, and seeks to refute the allegations of the different memorialists.

These attacks constitute the last formidable movement looking toward the abolition of the institution. Under a law of Congress boards of visitors have been appointed at regular intervals, but, generally speaking, their reports have been favorable, and many of them flattering to the school. If objections have been made or alterations proposed, they have more particularly related to the system or to the discipline of the Academy. The idea involved in the creation of the institution has maintained its place in the popular opinion, and has successfully resisted every assault brought to bear upon it. This idea is subjected to two chief constructions: the one regarding a special education in any and all of the varied occupations of life as the prime essential of excellence—the *summum bonum* of all desire; and the other looking upon it more in the nature of a basis upon which an inherent talent or fitness may rear the future structure. The first of these represents the thing itself; the second, an auxiliary of the thing. The preponderating sentiment has been, and now is, in support of the first construction, one scarcely less pernicious in consequence than mis-



THE MILITARY ACADEMY AT WEST POINT.

1. Cadets' Mess Hall.

2. Fortifications on the Hudson

taken in conception. Within the healthful limits of the second are to be found safety and the road to high achievements and brilliancy of results.

Since the establishment of the institution up to a very recent period its friends have not been bashful in claiming such legislation, from time to time, as appeared to them essential to the success of the project. The legislation in its favor has been generous, no reasonable suggestion having been ignored nor proper demand refused.

It does not fall within the scope of the present volume to go into a description of the school at West Point, nor to detail the discipline, branches and course of study, etc. Those desiring such information will find it easily accessible. The present purpose, so far as it has to deal with the subject of military education in the United States, will be sufficiently subserved by adding to what has already been written in the preceding pages a mention of the principal acts of legislation in relation to the school, together with a synopsis of such existing law as may be of more particular interest to the reader.

The several acts of Congress bearing more or less directly upon the institution which have been passed subsequently to the act of April 29, 1812, are as follows:

Act of March 3, 1815, "Fixing the military peace establishment of the United States;" act of April 4, 1818, "Regulating the staff of the army;" act of March 2, 1821, "To reduce and fix the military peace establishment of the United States;" act of July 5, 1838, "To increase the present military establishment of the United States, and for other purposes;" act of July 20, 1840, "To provide for the support of the Military Academy for the year

eighteen hundred and forty;" act of August 23, 1842, "Respecting the organization of the army, and for other purposes;" act of March 1, 1843, "Making appropriations for the support of the army and of the Military Academy, etc., etc., for the fiscal year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and forty-four;" act of March 3, 1845, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred and forty-six;" act of May 15, 1846, "For the organization of a company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers;" act of August 8, 1846, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending on the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred and forty-seven;" act of February 19, 1849, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty;" act of September 16, 1850, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one;" act of September 28, 1850 making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one;" act of March 3, 1851, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two;" act of August 6, 1852, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, and for other purposes;" act of May 10, 1854, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five," act of March 3, 1855, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six;" act of April 23, 1856, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred and fifty-seven;" act of February 16, 1857, "Making appropriations for the support of the Military Academy for the year ending the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight;" act of March 3, 1857, "To increase the pay of the cadets at the West Point Academy;" act of June 12, 1858, "Making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred and

fifty-nine;" act of June 21, 1860, "Making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one," act of August 3, 1861, "Providing for the better organization of the military establishment;" act of August 6, 1861, "To promote the efficiency of the engineer and the topographical engineer corps, and for other purposes;" act of August 6, 1861, "To authorize an increase in the corps of engineers and topographical engineers;" act of July 2, 1862, "To prescribe an oath of office, and for other purposes;" act of March 3, 1863, "To promote the efficiency of the corps of engineers and of the ordnance department, and for other purposes;" act of July 2, 1864; act of June 8, 1866; act of June 16, 1866; act of July 13, 1866; act of February 28, 1867; act of March 16, 1868; act of February 21, 1870; act of July 15, 1870; act of February 28, 1873; act of March 3, 1873; act of March 3, 1875; act of August 7, 1876; act of June 11, 1878; act of June 18, 1878, act of June 23, 1879, etc.

A synopsis of the laws governing the Military Academy will furnish ample information as to such points as are of interest to the general reader. This synopsis is taken from the Revised Statutes of the United States, 1878:

"The United States Military Academy at West Point, in the State of New York, shall be constituted as follows: There shall be one superintendent; one commandant of cadets; one senior instructor in the tactics of artillery; one senior instructor in the tactics of cavalry; one senior instructor in the tactics of infantry; one professor and one assistant professor of civil and military engineering; one professor and one assistant professor of natural and experimental philosophy; one professor and one assistant professor of mathematics; one chaplain, who shall also be professor of history, geography, and ethics, and one assistant professor of the same; one professor and one assistant professor of chemistry, mineralogy, and geology; one professor and one assistant professor of drawing; one professor and one assistant professor of the French language; one professor and one assistant professor of the Spanish

language; one adjutant; one master of the sword, and one teacher of music.

“The superintendent and the commandant of cadets, while serving as such, shall have, respectively, the local rank of colonel and lieutenant-colonel of engineers.

“The superintendent, and in his absence the next in rank, shall have the immediate government and military command of the Academy, and shall be the commandant of the military post of West Point.

“The commandant of cadets shall have the immediate command of the battalion of cadets, and shall be instructor in the tactics of artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

“The superintendent and the commandant of cadets and the professors shall be appointed by the President. The assistant professors, acting assistant professors, and the adjutant shall be officers of the army, detailed and assigned to such duties by the Secretary of War, or cadets, assigned by the superintendent under the direction of the Secretary of War.

“The superintendent and commandant of cadets may be selected, and all other officers on duty at the Academy may be detailed from any arm of the service; but the academic staff, as such, shall not be entitled to any command in the army separate from the Academy.

“The corps of cadets shall consist of one from each Congressional district, one from each Territory, one from the District of Columbia, and ten from the United States at large. They shall be appointed by the President, and shall, with the exception of the ten cadets appointed at large, be actual residents of the Congressional or Territorial districts, or of the District of Columbia, respectively, from which they purport to be appointed.

“No person who has served in any capacity in the military or naval service of the so-called Confederate States, or of either of the States in insurrection during the late Rebellion, shall be appointed a cadet.

“Cadets shall be appointed one year in advance of the time of their admission to the Academy, except in cases where, by reason of death or other cause, a vacancy occurs which cannot be provided for by such appointment in advance; but no pay or other allowance shall be given to any appointee until he shall have been

regularly admitted, as herein provided; and all appointments shall be conditional until such provisions shall have been complied with.

“Appointees shall be admitted to the Academy only between the ages of seventeen and twenty-two years, except in the following case: Any person who has served honorably and faithfully not less than one year in either the volunteer or regular service of the United States, in the late war for the suppression of the Rebellion, and who possesses the other qualifications required by law, may be admitted between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four years.

“Appointees shall be examined under regulations to be prescribed from time to time by the Secretary of War, before they shall be admitted to the Academy, and shall be required to be well versed in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and to have a knowledge of the elements of English grammar, of descriptive geography, particularly that of the United States, and of the history of the United States.

“Each cadet shall, previous to his admission to the Academy, take and subscribe an oath or affirmation in the following terms:

“I, A. B., do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and bear true allegiance to the National Government; that I will maintain and defend the sovereignty of the United States, paramount to any and all allegiance, sovereignty or fealty I may owe to any State, county or country whatsoever, and that I will at all times obey the legal orders of my superior officers, and the rules and articles governing the armies of the United States.’

“And any cadet or candidate for admission who shall refuse to take this oath shall be dismissed from the service.

“Each cadet shall sign articles with the consent of his parents or guardians, if he be a minor, and if any he have, by which he shall engage to serve eight years, unless sooner discharged.

“The corps of cadets shall be arranged into companies, according to the directions of the superintendent, each of which shall be commanded by an officer of the army, for the purpose of military instruction. To each company shall be added four musicians. The corps shall be taught and trained in all the duties of a private soldier, non-commissioned officer, and officer, shall be encamped at least three months in each year, and shall be taught and trained in all the duties incident to a regular camp.

“Cadets shall be subject at all times to do duty in such places and on such service as the President may direct.

“The Secretary of War shall so arrange the course of studies of the Academy that the cadets shall not be required to pursue their studies on Sunday.

“No cadet who is reported as deficient in either conduct or studies, and recommended to be discharged from the Academy, shall, unless upon recommendation of the academic board, be returned or reappointed, or appointed to any place in the army, before his class shall have left the Academy and received their commissions.

“The superintendent of the Military Academy shall have power to convene general courts-martial for the trial of cadets, and to execute the sentence of such courts, except the sentences of suspension and dismissal, subject to the same limitations and conditions now existing as to other general courts-martial.

“There shall be appointed every year, in the following manner, a board of visitors to attend the annual examination of the Academy: Seven persons shall be appointed by the President, and two Senators and three members of the House of Representatives shall be designated as visitors, by the Vice-President, or President *pro tempore* of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively, at the session of Congress next preceding such examination.

“It shall be the duty of the board of visitors to inquire into the actual state of the discipline, instruction, police administration, fiscal affairs, and other concerns of the Academy. The visitors appointed by the President shall report thereon to the Secretary of War, for the information of Congress, at the commencement of the session next succeeding such examination, and the Senators and Representatives designated as visitors shall report to Congress, within twenty days after the meeting of the session next succeeding the time of their appointment, their action as such visitors, with their views and recommendations concerning the Academy.

No compensation shall be made to the members of said board beyond the payment of their expenses for board and lodging while at the Academy, and an allowance, not to exceed eight cents a mile, for traveling by the shortest mail route from their respective homes to the Academy and thence to their homes.

“Leave of absence may be granted by the superintendent, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War, to the professors, assistant professors, instructors, and other officers of the Academy, for the entire period of the suspension of the ordinary academic studies, without deduction from pay or allowances.

“The supervision and charge of the Academy shall be in the War Department, under such officer or officers as the Secretary of War may assign to that duty.

“The Secretary of the Senate shall furnish annually to the library of the Academy one copy of each document published during the preceding year by the Senate.

“The professors of the Military Academy at West Point are placed on the same footing, as to retirement from active service, as officers of the army.

“The superintendent of the Military Academy shall have the pay of a colonel, and the commandant of cadets shall have the pay of a lieutenant-colonel.

“The adjutant of the Military Academy shall have the pay of an adjutant of a cavalry regiment.

“Each of the professors of the Military Academy whose service at the Academy exceeds ten years shall have the pay and allowances of lieutenant-colonels; and the instructors of ordnance and science of gunnery and practical engineering shall have the pay and allowances of major; and hereafter there shall be allowed and paid to the said professors ten per centum of their current yearly pay for each and every term of five years' service in the army and at the Academy: *Provided*, That such addition shall in no case exceed forty per centum of said yearly pay; and said professors are hereby placed upon the same footing, as regards restrictions upon pay and retirement from active service, as officers of the army.

“Each assistant professor and each senior assistant instructor of cavalry, artillery, and infantry tactics (*and the instructor of practical military engineering*) shall receive the pay of a captain.

“The master of the sword at the Military Academy shall receive pay at the rate of fifteen hundred dollars a year, with fuel and quarters.

“Cadets of the Military Academy shall receive five hundred dollars a year and one ration a day.

“The librarian and assistant librarian at the Military Academy shall receive one hundred and twenty dollars a year additional pay.

“The non-commissioned officers in charge of mechanics and other labor at the Military Academy, the soldier acting as clerk in the adjutant’s office, and the four enlisted men in the philosophical and chemical departments and lithographic office, shall receive fifty dollars a year additional pay.”

The important legislation relating to the officers of the Academy, enacted since the publication of the foregoing *résumé*, may be more fully quoted as follows:

From “An act making appropriations for the Military Academy for the year ending June 30, 1879,” approved June 11, 1878:

* * * “SEC. 2. That appointments of civilians, except such as are regular graduates of the United States Military Academy who have been honorably discharged from the service, to be second lieutenants in any of the regiments of the army, shall be made in time of peace only when more vacancies exist in the army than will be required in the assignment of the next graduating class of cadets at the United States Military Academy: *Provided*, nothing herein shall prevent the appointment for a commission in the army of meritorious non-commissioned officers or private soldiers.

“SEC. 3. That from and after July first, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, only such number of the graduates of the United States Military Academy in any one year shall be entitled to appointments as second lieutenants in the army as are required to fill vacancies of that grade existing on the first day of July in each year, those entitled to appointment to said vacancies to be determined by the academic board on the basis of their standing in the graduating class. And hereafter no supernumerary officers shall be attached to any company or corps of the army, and all graduates of the Military Academy who are not appointed to the army under the provisions of this act shall be discharged upon the graduation of their class.

“SEC. 4. That the cadets at large at the Military Academy shall not hereafter exceed ten in all, and no new appointments at large shall be made until the number of such cadets heretofore appointed fall below ten. But this provision shall not be held to require the discharge of any cadet heretofore appointed.”

From "An act making provision for the support of the army for the year ending June 30, 1879," approved June 18, 1878:

"SEC. 3. That hereafter all vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant shall be filled by appointment from the graduates of the Military Academy, so long as any such remain in service unassigned, and any vacancies thereafter remaining shall be filled by promotion of meritorious non-commissioned officers of the army, recommended under the provisions of the next section of this act: *Provided*, That all vacancies remaining after exhausting the two classes named may be filled by appointments of persons in civil life.

"SEC. 4. That to insure the selection of proper candidates for promotion from the grade of non-commissioned officers, company and battery commanders will report to their regimental commanders such as, in their opinion, by education, conduct, and services, seem to merit advancement, and who have served not less than two years in the army; the reports to set forth a description of the candidate, his length of service as non-commissioned officer and as private soldier, his character as to fidelity and sobriety, his physical qualifications and mental abilities, the extent to which his talents have been cultivated, and his fitness generally to discharge the duties of a commissioned officer. If recommended on account of his meritorious services, the particular services referred to must be stated in detail. On receiving the reports of company or battery commanders, the regimental commander will forward the same to the department commanders, with such recommendation of non-commissioned regimental staff as he may deem worthy of promotion; and the departmental commander shall annually assemble a board to consist of five officers of as high rank as the convenience of the service will admit, to make a preliminary examination into the claims and qualifications of such non-commissioned officers. The board, constituted as above, shall submit a full statement in the case of each candidate examined, and on the said statements the department commander shall indorse his remarks and forward them to the Secretary of War by the first day of June in each year. The Chief of Engineers and of other staff corps may make similar recommendations of the non-commissioned officers of their respective commands to the Secretary of War, who shall convene a board of officers for like purpose."

From "An act making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending June 30, 1880," approved June 23, 1879:

"SEC. 5. That each member of the graduating classes of the Military Academy of one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine and one thousand eight hundred and eighty, after graduation may elect, with the assent of the Secretary of War, to receive the gross sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars, and mileage to his place of residence; and the acceptance of this gross sum shall render him ineligible to appointment in the army, except in the event of war, until two years after his graduation, and the amount required to defray the expenditure herein provided for shall be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated."

From the first two acts above quoted, it will be seen that in times of war and peace no vacancy in the grade of second lieutenant in the army can be filled by appointment from civil life until after the list of graduates from the Military Academy and of meritorious non-commissioned officers shall have been exhausted. The author states *in both war and peace*, because, although the first of the two acts prescribes the right of appointment of a civilian in time of peace after the graduated classes shall have been exhausted, yet the subsequent act is sweeping in character, and, being later in date, repeals by implication all anterior legislation in conflict with its provisions. From these examples of legislation the reader may begin to realize the tendency and power of an institution that has gradually fastened its hold upon the military resources of the country until it has become a piece of machinery of dangerous possibilities.

CHAPTER VII.

FINANCIAL ASPECT OF THE ACADEMY AT WEST POINT—EXPENDITURES FROM THE YEAR 1802 TO THE YEAR 1886—INTERESTING STATISTICS—POPULATION OF NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN STATES, IN 1810 AND 1860—THE NAMES, TOTAL NUMBER, AND STATES AND TERRITORIES OF RESIDENCE OF THE CADETS ADMITTED FROM 1802 TO 1861—THE HIGH-CLASS GRADUATES OF THE ACADEMY FROM 1802 TO 1861—THE SUPERINTENDENCY OF THE ACADEMY—WEST POINT A MILITARY DEPARTMENT—MISTAKES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

IT is the purpose of the author to close the history of the rise and growth of the military school at West Point with a statement of the expense of the institution to the Government, and with certain tabular statements designed to form a basis for future observations.

And first as to the financial feature of the establishment.

The ground embraced within the West Point reservation belongs to the United States Government. The tract is constituted of an area of 2,105 acres of land, as stated by Captain Boynton, in the work heretofore quoted from in the present volume. The English Government originally granted the land to Captain John Evans, who subsequently vacated it, when it reverted to

the grantor. The land embraced within the original grant was afterward conveyed by royal letters-patent to two different individuals, Charles Congreve and John Moore. The latter owner subsequently purchased the tract granted to the former, and thus became sole owner of the entire grant. Upon the death of Moore, the property descended by inheritance to his son, Stephen Moore, of Caswell County, N. C.

As the land had been occupied by the Government from the beginning of the Revolutionary War, Moore petitioned the Government, in the year 1790, to purchase it of him. The petition was referred by the House of Representatives to the Secretary of the Treasury for consideration. That officer—Alexander Hamilton—made a communication to the House, under date of June 3, 1790, in which he advised “the purchase of so much of the tract of land called West Point as shall be judged requisite for the purpose of such fortifications and garrisons as may be necessary for the defense of the same,” accompanying the recommendation with a quotation and indorsement of the opinions of General Knox as to the natural advantages of the locality for the defense of the Hudson River. These advantages have already been set forth in the preceding pages of this work.

Under an act of Congress approved July 5, 1790, the purchase of both patents held by Moore was effected in the following September, by the payment of the sum of \$11,085. A further tract of land was purchased by the Government from Oliver Gridlev, under act of Con-

gress, in May, 1824, for the sum of \$10,000. The Government was annoyed, for a number of years after the first effort to acquire sufficient land by purchase, by the claims of divers individuals, based upon various pretexts of personal right or ownership. A final survey was made, under direction of the Government, in the year 1839, and the boundaries of the Government property were then definitely settled.

By reference to the report of Secretary McHenry submitted to Congress under date of January 31, 1800, recommending a plan for the establishment of a Military Academy, which report has been quoted entire in a preceding chapter, the reader will be struck with the modest estimate of the expense of the establishment made by that worthy official. The total salaries of teachers in the two schools suggested by him—the Fundamental School and the School of Artillerists and Engineers—footed up to the insignificant total of \$10,489.20 annually, while the estimated cost of buildings amounted to \$38,846, upon the plan of one architect, and to \$80,000 upon the plan of another. Since that day the population of the United States has increased from six million to about fifty-two million people, an increase that may be approximately stated to be as one to eight and one-half.

It is no less instructive than interestingly suggestive to follow the bill of annual expense attached to the institution from its modest beginning to its present state of completeness and luxury. The following figures are taken from the annual appropriation bills of Congress,

and, while not critically accurate—no account having been taken of sums in cents—they are substantially correct, and can be relied upon for purposes of quotation.

The total appropriation of the United States Government upon account of the Military Academy from its creation by act of March 16, 1802, up to and inclusive of June 30, 1843, has been computed by Captain Edward C. Boynton, in his "History of West Point." This computation is made to cover amounts paid for the purchase of the lands; for the construction of roads, wharves, fences, water and gas-works; for the purchase of library, maps, instruments, philosophical and chemical apparatus, models in engineering and drawing; purchase of minerals; grading ground, etc., etc.; and for the pay and subsistence of officers, professors, teachers, and cadets; for fuel and stationery; transportation of material; stores; postage; expenses of boards of visitors; adjutant and quartermaster's clerks, and contingent and incidental expenses. The estimate embraces a period of forty-one years, or, as before said, from March 16, 1802, to June 30, 1843. The same items are covered in the subsequent annual appropriations as given below. The exhibit stands thus:

TABLE I.

Amounts appropriated annually for the Military Academy, from March 16, 1802, to June 30, 1886:

From 1802 to 1843 (a period of 41 years)\$	4,002,901	From 1847 to 1848 ..\$	124,906
From 1843 to 1845 ..	116,845	From 1848 to 1849 ..	143,472
From 1845 to 1846 ..	138,049	From 1849 to 1850 ..	171,294
From 1846 to 1847 ..	123,976	From 1850 to 1851 ..	202,535
		From 1851 to 1852 ..	130,528

From 1852 to 1853 ..\$	130,050	From 1871 to 1872 ..\$	316,269
From 1853 to 1854 ..	150,253	From 1872 to 1873 ..	327,100
From 1854 to 1855 ..	161,281	From 1873 to 1874 ..	332,562
From 1855 to 1856 ..	146,940	From 1874 to 1875 ..	349,765
From 1856 to 1857 ..	158,894	From 1875 to 1876 ..	354,740
From 1857 to 1858 ..	161,179	From 1876 to 1877 ..	292,365
From 1858 to 1859 ..	182,804	From 1877 to 1878 ..	287,166
From 1859 to 1860 ..	179,588	From 1878 to 1879 ..	290,632
From 1860 to 1861 ..	183,796	From 1879 to 1880 ..	320,309
From 1861 to 1862 ..	184,337	From 1880 to 1881 ..	323,834
From 1862 to 1863 ..	156,211	From 1881 to 1882 ..	323,328
From 1863 to 1864 ..	183,394	From 1882 to 1883 ..	335,296
From 1864 to 1865 ..	201,217	From 1883 to 1884 ..	289,687
From 1865 to 1866 ..	257,504	From 1884 to 1885 ..	314,263
From 1866 to 1867 ..	201,457	From 1885 to 1886 ..	309,921
From 1867 to 1868 ..	362,913		
From 1868 to 1869 ..	276,291	Total expense of	
From 1869 to 1870 ..	274,488	the Academy to June	
From 1870 to 1871 ..	314,869	30, 1886.....	\$13,789,199

It may be here remarked that in the appropriation bill for 1878 and 1879 the amount of the cadet salary was fixed at \$540 per year, at which figure it has since remained.

Thus it will appear that the total cost to the Government of the Academy at West Point, with its improvements, etc., amounts to nearly fourteen million dollars, including the appropriation for the fiscal year terminating on the 30th of June, 1886. The various items of expenditure, apart from the cost of the property and erections, or, in other words, the running expenses of the establishment, are fairly illustrated by the appropriation bill for the present year, the principal items of the latter being as follows:

For 8 professors, 4 assistant professors and instructors in various departments, including master of the sword. \$	47,425
Additional to adjutant.....	400
Treasurer	700
Pay of cadets.....	170,000
Pay of music-teacher.....	1,080
Pay of band.....	9,240
For current expenses, repairs, and improvements.....	11,000
For fuel and apparatus.....	13,000
For gas-pipes and fixtures, etc.....	900
Fuel for cadets' mess-hall, shops, and laundry.....	3,000
Postage and telegrams	300
Stationery	600
Transportation, etc.....	2,000
Printing	1,000
For salaries of 3 clerks	3,600
For department of instruction in mathematics.....	300
For department of instruction in civil and military engineering	600
For department of chemistry, mineralogy, and geology..	2,930
For department of modern languages	275
For department of history, geography, and ethics	300
For department of drawing.....	1,234
For department of law.....	250
For department of artillery, cavalry, and infantry tactics.	1,300
For department of ordnance and gunnery.....	300
For department of practical military engineering.....	1,200
For department of philosophy.....	2,850
For expenses of the board of visitors	3,000
For miscellaneous and incidental expenses.....	11,320
For assistant librarian.....	1,000
For increase of library.....	1,000
For furniture.....	200
For furniture for cadet hospital.....	100
For bedding for candidates.....	500
For contingencies for superintendent.....	1,000
For renewal of furniture.....	500
For buildings and grounds	500
For breast-high wall.....	500

For cadet barracks.....	5,000
For "pointing" cadet hospital.....	1,150
For "pointing" administration buildings.....	790
For "pointing" cadet barracks.....	300
For relining parapet cadet barracks.....	500
For expenditures on account of water-works.....	520
For additional bath-tubs for cadets.....	1,000
For barracks band.....	3,857
For addition to outbuilding.....	1,200
For erection of ice-cooler.....	300
Etc., etc.	

The author here introduces certain additional tables, which will be more particularly commented upon in the subsequent pages of this volume.

At the present point it may be remarked that the immediate object of Table II. is to illustrate, by means of authentic figures, the extent to which political influence filled the cadet vacancies of the army, from the year 1802 to that of 1861; while the purpose of Table III. is to place before the reader in a compact form the names of the high-class graduates who have issued from the Military Academy with a special indorsement of military qualification, as it may be said, from the West Point faculty. Upon glancing over the long list of names representing those who have carried off the honors of the institution, the reader will be surprised to observe how few of those of whom so much was expected have figured with any distinction in the military records of our country — nay, how few of them, in comparison with the whole number, have even become known, in connection with active military operations, to the general people.

TABLE II.

Statement showing the population of the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States of the Union, according to the census of 1810, and to that of 1860, the year preceding the outbreak of the Rebellion:

Slave States.	Population in		Free States.	Population in	
	1810	1860		1810	1860
Alabama		964,201	California		379,994
Arkansas		435,450	Colorado		34,277
Delaware	72,674	112,216	Connecticut ...	261,942	460,147
Florida		140,424	Illinois.....	12,282	1,711,951
Georgia	252,430	1,057,286	Indiana	24,520	1,350,428
Kentucky	406,511	1,155,684	Iowa		674,913
Louisiana	76,556	708,002	Kansas		107,206
Maryland	380,546	687,049	Maine	228,705	628,279
Mississippi.....	40,352	791,305	Massachusetts..	472,040	1,231,066
Missouri	20,845	1,182,012	Michigan	4,762	749,113
North Carolina..	555,500	992,622	Minnesota		172,023
South Carolina..	415,115	703,708	Nebraska		28,841
Tennessee	261,727	1,109,801	Nevada		6,857
Texas		604,215	New Hampshire	214,460	326,073
Virginia	974,600	1,596,318	New Jersey.....	245,562	672,035
			New York.....	959,049	3,880,735
			Ohio.....	230,760	2,339,511
			Oregon.....		52,465
			Pennsylvania...	810,091	2,906,215
			Rhode Island...	76,931	174,620
			Vermont.....	217,895	315,098
			Wisconsin.....		775,881
Total	3,456,856	12,240,293	Total.....	3,758,999	18,977,728

RECAPITULATION.

	In 1810.	In 1860.
Total population of slaveholding States.....	3,456,856	12,240,293
Total population of non-slaveholding States.....	3,758,999	18,977,728
Totals.....	7,215,855	31,218,021

TABLE III.

Statement of the names, total numbers, and States and Territories of residence, of the cadets admitted to the Military Academy at West Point, from its formal establishment, in the year 1802, to the beginning of the slaveholders' rebellion, in 1861.

NON-SLAVEHOLDING STATES, AS FOLLOWS :

Maine.....	101	Illinois	76
New Hampshire.....	78	Michigan	37
Vermont.....	101	Iowa	12
Massachusetts	227	Wisconsin.....	14
Rhode Island.....	41	California.....	7
Connecticut.....	101	Minnesota	5
New York.....	627	Oregon	2
New Jersey.....	98	Nebraska.....	1
Pennsylvania.....	413	Kansas.....	2
Ohio	232		
Indiana	103	Total	2,278

SLAVEHOLDING STATES, AS FOLLOWS :

Delaware.....	41	Kentucky	187
Maryland	176	Tennessee	171
Virginia.....	369	Missouri	61
North Carolina.....	181	Arkansas.....	15
South Carolina.....	155	Florida.....	19
Georgia.....	131	Texas.....	9
Alabama.....	84		
Mississippi	46		1,710
Louisiana.....	56	District of Columbia.....	109
		Total chargeable to slaveholding States.....	1,819

TERRITORIES, AS FOLLOWS :

New Mexico.....	3	Washington.....	2
Utah.....	3	Total	8
At large.....	307	Unknown	26

RECAPITULATION.

From non-slaveholding States.....	2,278	At large.....	307
From slaveholding States.....	1,710	Unknown.....	26
From Territories.....	8	Grand total.....	4,438
From Dist. of Columbia.....	109		

TABLE IV.

List of West Point graduates from the year 1802 to the year 1861, and names of cadets attached to the Army Register annually, in conformity with a later regulation for the government of the Military Academy, requiring the names of the most distinguished cadets, not exceeding five in each class, to be reported for this purpose at each annual examination.¹

1802.	1. Joseph G. Swift.	1808.	1. D. A. A. Buck.
	2. Simon M. Levy.		2. S. Babcock.
1803.	1. W. K. Armistead.		3. S. Thayer.
	2. H. B. Jackson.		4. S. B. Rathbone.
	3. John Livingston.		5. L. Valle.
1804.	1. Samuel Gates.	1809.	1. C. Van de Venter.
	2. H. M. Allen.		2. S. G. Conkling.
1805.	1. G. Bomford.		3. A. W. Magee.
	2. William McRee.		4. M. Haxtun.
	3. Joseph G. Totten.		5. A. Hall.
1806.	1. William Gates.	1811.	1. A. J. Williams.
	2. J. Heileman.		2. M. V. Boisaubin.
	3. P. V. Bouis.		3. A. Larrabee.
	4. A. Chouteau.		4. H. A. Hobart.
	5. A. Partridge.		5. T. Ketchum.
1807.	1. J. Post.	1812.	1. J. M. Wilcox.
	2. S. Clark.		2. A. Conant.
	3. J. Anderson.		3. L. L. Buck.
	4. S. Champlin.		4. A. R. Thompson.
	5. S. Noah.		5. J. R. Bell.

¹ For the material of this table the author is indebted to the valuable work of G. W. Cullum on the West Point graduates, and the no less valuable volume of Capt. E. C. Boynton on the history of that institution.

1813. 1. G. Trescot.
 1814. 1. G. W. Gardiner.
 2. C. S. Merchant.
 3. N. G. Dana.
 4. J. Munroe.
 5. J. J. Allanson.
 1815. 1. H. Middleton.
 2. W. F. Rigal.
 3. J. Simonson.
 4. J. Hills.
 5. S. Willard.
 1817. 1. A. L. Roumfort.
 2. J. M. Spencer.
 3. I. A. Adams.
 4. W. G. Graham.
 5. J. D. Graham.
 1818. 1. R. Delafield.
 2. A. Talcott.
 3. S. S. Smith.
 4. H. Webster.
 5. H. Brown.
 1819. 1. W. A. Eliason.
 2. F. A. Underhill.
 3. C. A. Ogden.
 4. E. D. Mansfield.
 5. H. W. Brewerton.
 1820. 1. S. Tuttle.
 2. A. J. Donelson.
 3. F. E. Sudler.
 4. W. H. Bell.
 5. W. C. De Hart.
 1821. 1. E. H. Courtenay.
 2. C. Burdine.
 3. J. Prescott.
 4. W. W. Wells.
 5. C. Dimmock.
 1822. 1. G. Dutton.

1822. 2. J. K. F. Mansfield.
 3. C. G. Smith.
 4. T. R. Ingalls.
 5. H. Bliss.
 1823. 1. A. Mordecai.
 2. G. S. Greene.
 3. G. C. Richards.
 4. R. Holmes.
 5. S. U. Southerland.
 1824. 1. D. H. Mahan.
 2. J. W. A. Smith.
 3. R. P. Parrott.
 4. R. E. Hazard.
 5. J. K. Findlay.

1825.—FIRST CLASS.¹

1. A. D. Bache. Penn.
 2. Peter McMartin. N. Y.
 3. A. H. Bowman. Penn.
 4. T. S. Brown. N. Y.
 5. D. S. Donelson. Tenn.

SECOND CLASS.

1. W. H. C. Bartlett. . . . Mo.
 2. Thos. S. Twiss. Vt.
 3. William Bryant. Va.
 4. Thos. J. Cram. N. H.
 5. Chas. G. Ridgely. . . . Del.

THIRD CLASS.

1. William Maynadier. . . D. C.
 2. L. J. Bibb. Ky.
 3. E. S. Sibley. Mich.
 4. P. B. Anderson. Tenn.
 5. John Childe. Mass.

¹ This part of the table to its close is from Captain Boynton's work.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. H. W. Mercer Va.
2. W. P. N. Fitzgerald . N. Y.
3. A. E. Church Conn.
4. W. B. Guion Miss.
5. D. M. Farrelly Penn.

1826.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. H. C. Bartlett . . . Mo.
2. Thos. S. Twiss Vt.
3. Wm. Bryant Va.
4. Thos. J. Cram N. H.
5. Chas. G. Ridgely . . . Del.

SECOND CLASS.

1. J. A. J. Bradford . . . Ky.
2. E. S. Sibley Mich.
3. Wm. Maynadier D. C.
4. John Childe Mass.
5. Edwin Schenck N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. P. N. Fitzgerald . N. Y.
2. H. W. Mercer Va.
3. A. E. Church Conn.
4. Walter B. Guion . . . Miss.
5. R. C. Tilghman Md.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. Chas. Mason N. Y.
2. Wm. H. Harford . . . Ga.
3. Robert E. Lee Va.
4. Wm. Boylan N. C.
5. Jas. Barnes Mass.

1827.—FIRST CLASS.

1. E. S. Sibley Mich.
2. John Childe Mass.
3. Wm. Maynadier D. C.
4. J. A. J. Bradford . . . Ky.
5. L. J. Bibb Ky.

SECOND CLASS.

1. A. E. Church Conn.
2. H. W. Mercer Va.
3. Robert E. Temple . . . Vt.
4. C. O. Collins N. Y.
5. R. C. Tilghman Md.

THIRD CLASS.

1. Chas. Mason N. Y.
2. Robert E. Lee Va.
3. C. P. Buckingham . . . Ohio.
4. W. H. Harford Ga.
5. Jas. Barnes Mass.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. A. J. Swift N. Y.
2. W. E. Basinger Ga.
3. W. S. Chandler D. C.
4. Thos. J. Lee D. C.
5. Francis Vinton R. I.

1828.—FIRST CLASS.

1. A. E. Church Conn.
2. R. C. Tilghman Md.
3. H. W. Mercer Va.
4. R. E. Temple Vt.
5. C. O. Collins N. Y.

SECOND CLASS.

1. Chas. Mason N. Y.
2. Robert E. Lee Va.
3. C. P. Buckingham . . . Ohio.
4. W. H. Harford Ga.
5. Jas. Barnes Mass.

THIRD CLASS.

1. A. J. Swift N. Y.
2. W. S. Chandler D. C.
3. Wm. N. Pendleton . . Va.
4. Wm. E. Basinger . . . Ga.
5. Francis Vinton R. I.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. Roswell Park.....N. Y.
2. Henry Clay.....Ky.
3. W. A. Norton.....N. Y.
4. R. A. Peyton.....Va.
5. Geo. H. Talcott.....N. Y.

1829.—FIRST CLASS.

1. Chas. Mason.....N. Y.
2. Robert E. Lee.....Va.
3. W. Harford.....Ga.
4. Jos. A. Smith.....Penn.
5. Jas. Barnes.....Mass.

SECOND CLASS.

1. A. J. Swift.....N. Y.
2. W. S. Chandler.....D. C.
3. Wm. N. Pendleton...Va.
4. Francis Vinton.....R. I.
5. Geo. W. Lawson....Tenn

THIRD CLASS.

1. Roswell Park.....N. Y.
2. Henry Clay.....Ky.
3. W. A. Norton.....N. Y.
4. Jas. Allen.....N. C.
5. R. H. Peyton.....Va.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. Benj. S. Ewell.....Va.
2. Robert P. Smith....Miss.
3. Jacob W. Bailey....R. I.
4. G. W. Ward.....Mass.
5. J. C. Vance.....Ohio.

1830.—FIRST CLASS.

1. A. J. Swift.....N. Y.
2. W. E. Basinger.....Ga.
3. W. S. Chandler.....D. C.
4. Francis Vinton.....R. I.
5. Wm. N. Pendleton...Va.

SECOND CLASS.

1. Roswell Park.....N. Y.
2. Jas. Allen.....N. C.
3. Henry Clay.....Ky.
4. R. H. Peyton.....Va.
5. W. A. Norton.....N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. Robert P. Smith....Miss.
2. Benj. S. Ewell.....Va.
3. Geo. A. Ward.....Mass.
4. J. W. Bailey.....R. I.
5. Lewis Howell.....Penn.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. F. A. Smith.....Mass.
2. J. H. Allen.....N. Y.
3. F. H. Smith.....Va.
4. D. B. Harris.....Va.
5. W. H. Sidell.....N. Y.

1831.—FIRST CLASS.

1. Roswell Park.....N. Y.
2. Henry Clay.....Ky.
3. Jas. Allen.....N. C.
4. H. E. Prentis.....Me.
5. Albert M. Lea.....Tenn.

SECOND CLASS.

1. Robert P. Smith....Miss.
2. Geo. W. Ward.....Mass.
3. J. W. Bailey.....R. I.
4. Benj. S. Ewell.....Va.
5. Geo. W. Cass.....Ohio.

THIRD CLASS.

1. Fred. A. Smith....Mass.
2. Wm. A. Sidell.....N. Y.
3. J. G. Barnard.....Mass.
4. Roswell W. Lee....Mass.
5. Rufus King.....N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. Wm. Smith.....N. Y.
2. H. Loughborough..Ky.
3. John F. Lee.....Va.
4. John Sanders.....Fla.
5. Curran Pope.....Ky.

1832.—FIRST CLASS.

1. G. W. Ward.....Mass.
2. Robert P. Smith....Miss.
3. Benj. S. Ewell.....Va.
4. G. W. Cass.....Ohio.
5. J. W. Bailey.....R. I.

SECOND CLASS.

1. J. G. Barnard.....Mass.
2. Fred. A. Smith....Mass.
3. W. H. Sidell.....N. Y.
4. G. W. Cullum.....Penn.
5. Rufus King.....N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. Wm. Smith.....N. Y.
2. H. Loughborough..Ky.
3. John Sanders.....Fla.
4. John F. Lee.....Va.
5. Jas. Duncan.....N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. G. M. Legate.....N. Y.
2. T. T. Gantt.....Va.
3. Chas. H. Bigelow...Mass.
4. C. J. Whiting.....Me.
5. Montgomery Blair..Ky.

1833.—FIRST CLASS.

1. F. A. Smith.....Mass.
2. J. G. Barnard.....Mass.
3. G. W. Cullum.....Penn.
4. Rufus King.....N. Y.
5. Francis H. Smith...Va.

SECOND CLASS.

1. William Smith.....N. Y.
2. John Sanders.....Fla.
3. R. T. P. Allen.....Md.
4. H. Loughborough...Ky.
5. W. T. Stockton.....Penn.

THIRD CLASS.

1. C. H. Bigelow.....Mass.
2. C. J. Whiting.....Me.
3. G. M. Legate.....N. Y.
4. J. H. Martindale...N. Y.
5. T. T. Gantt.....Va.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. J. L. Mason.....At large
2. D. Leadbeater.....Me.
3. Alexander Hamilton.N. Y.
4. B. Conkling.....N. Y.
5. J. R. Anderson.....Va.

1834.—FIRST CLASS.

1. Wm. D. Fraser.....N. Y.
2. John Sanders.....Fla.
3. H. Loughborough..Ky.
4. T. A. Morris.....Ind.
5. R. T. P. Allen.....Md.

SECOND CLASS.

1. C. J. Whiting.....Me.
2. J. H. Martindale...N. Y.
3. G. W. Morell.....N. Y.
4. C. M. Bigelow.....Mass.
5. G. M. Legate.....N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. J. L. Mason.....At large
2. D. Leadbeater.....Me.
3. M. C. Meigs.....Penn.
4. Alexander Hamilton.N. Y.
5. B. Conkling.....N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. J. W. Gunnison N. H.
2. H. W. Benham Conn.
3. E. W. Morgan Penn.
4. A. B. Dyer Mo.
5. John Bratt N. Y.

1835.—FIRST CLASS.

1. G. W. Morell N. Y.
2. C. H. Bigelow Mass.
3. J. H. Martindale N. Y.
4. C. J. Whiting Me.
5. G. M. Legate N. Y.

SECOND CLASS.

1. M. C. Meigs Penn.
2. Alexander Hamilton N. Y.
3. G. L. Walker Tenn.
4. J. L. Mason At large
5. F. A. Lewis Va.

THIRD CLASS.

1. E. W. Morgan Penn.
2. H. W. Benham Conn.
3. A. B. Dyer Mo.
4. J. W. Gunnison N. H.
5. John Bratt N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. W. H. Wright N. C.
2. A. H. Dearborn N. Y.
3. S. H. Campbell Vt.
4. P. G. T. Beauregard La.
5. J. T. Metcalfe Miss.

1836.—FIRST CLASS.

1. G. L. Welcker Tenn.
2. J. L. Mason At large
3. D. Leadbeater Me.
4. J. R. Anderson Va.
5. M. C. Meigs Penn.

SECOND CLASS.

1. H. W. Benham Conn.
2. E. W. Morgan Penn.
3. J. W. Gunnison N. H.
4. John Bratt N. Y.
5. W. W. Chapman Mass.

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. H. Wright N. C.
2. P. G. T. Beauregard La.
3. A. H. Dearborn N. Y.
4. S. H. Campbell Vt.
5. J. H. Trapier S. C.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. I. I. Stevens Mass.
2. H. J. Biddle Penn.
3. R. Q. Butler Va.
4. H. W. Halleck N. Y.
5. J. F. Gilmer N. C.

1837.—FIRST CLASS.

1. H. W. Benham Conn.
2. J. W. Gunnison N. H.
3. E. W. Morgan Penn.
4. John Bratt N. Y.
5. Braxton Bragg N. C.

SECOND CLASS.

1. W. H. Wright N. C.
2. P. G. T. Beauregard La.
3. A. H. Dearborn N. Y.
4. J. H. Trapier S. C.
5. J. T. Metcalf Miss.

THIRD CLASS.

1. I. I. Stevens Mass.
2. H. J. Biddle Penn.
3. R. Q. Butler Va.
4. J. F. Gilmer N. C.
5. H. W. Halleck N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. P. O. Herbert.....La.
2. W. P. Jones.....At large
3. B. P. Tilden.....Mass.
4. W. H. Churchill.....At large
5. Stewart Van Vliet..N. Y.

1838.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. H. Wright.....N. C.
2. P. G. T. Beauregard.La.
3. J. H. Trapier.....S. C.
4. S. H. Campbell.....Vt.
5. J. M. Scarritt.....Ill.

SECOND CLASS.

1. I. I. Stevens.....Mass.
2. R. Q. Butler.....Va.
3. H. W. Halleck.....N. Y.
4. J. F. Gilmer.....N. C.
5. H. L. Smith.....Me.

THIRD CLASS.

1. P. O. Hebert.....La.
2. W. P. Jones.....At large
3. C. P. Kingsbury.....N. C.
4. J. McNutt.....Ohio.
5. S. Wilcox.....N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. Z. B. Tower.....Mass.
2. T. J. Rodman.....Ind.
3. H. Wilson.....Penn.
4. J. Gorgas.....N. Y.
5. S. Stansbury.....Md.

1839.—FIRST CLASS.

1. I. I. Stevens.....Mass.
2. R. Q. Butler.....Va.
3. H. W. Halleck.....N. Y.
4. F. Gilmer.....N. C.
5. Henry L. Smith.....Me.

SECOND CLASS.

1. P. O. Hebert.....La.
2. W. P. Jones.....At large
3. John McNutt.....Ohio.
4. C. P. Kingsbury.....N. C.
5. Wm. Gilham.....Ind.

THIRD CLASS.

1. Z. B. Tower.....Mass.
2. H. G. Wright.....Conn.
3. M. Harrison.....At large
4. S. Stansbury.....Md.
5. J. Gorgas.....N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. H. L. Eustis.....Mass.
2. J. D. Kurtz.....D. C.
3. G. W. Rains.....Ala.
4. W. S. Rosecrans.....Ohio.
5. R. W. Johnson.....Va.

1840.—FIRST CLASS.

1. P. O. Hebert.....La.
2. C. P. Kingsbury.....N. C.
3. John McNutt.....Ohio.
4. Wm. P. Jones.....At large
5. Wm. Gilham.....Ind.

SECOND CLASS.

1. Z. B. Tower.....Mass.
2. H. G. Wright.....Conn.
3. M. Harrison.....At large
4. J. Gorgas.....N. Y.
5. S. Stansbury.....Md.

THIRD CLASS.

1. J. Newton.....Va.
2. H. L. Eustis.....Mass.
3. G. W. Rains.....Ala.
4. S. D. Kurtz.....D. C.
5. W. S. Rosecrans.....Ohio.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. Wm. B. Franklin Penn.
2. T. J. Brereton At large
3. W. F. Reynolds Ohio.
4. Joseph F. Reynolds . . Ind.
5. James A. Hardie At large

1841.—FIRST CLASS.

1. Z. B. Tower Mass.
2. H. G. Wright Conn.
3. M. Harrison At large
4. S. Stansbury Md.
5. A. W. Whipple Mass.

SECOND CLASS.

1. H. L. Eustis Mass.
2. John Newton Va.
3. J. D. Kurtz D. C.
4. G. W. Rains Ala.
5. W. S. Rosecrans Ohio.

THIRD CLASS.

1. T. J. Brereton At large
2. G. Deshon Conn.
3. W. B. Franklin Penn.
4. W. F. Reynolds Ohio.
5. Roswell S. Ripley . . . N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. W. G. Peck Conn.
2. J. H. Whittlesey . . . N. Y.
3. A. R. Eddy R. I.
4. S. Gill Ky.
5. H. B. Schroeder Md.

1842.—FIRST CLASS.

1. H. L. Eustis Mass.
2. J. Newton Va.
3. G. W. Rains Ala.
4. J. D. Kurtz D. C.
5. W. S. Rosecrans Ohio.

SECOND CLASS.

1. T. J. Brereton At large
2. W. B. Franklin Penn.
3. George Deshon Conn.
4. W. F. Reynolds Ohio.
5. R. S. Ripley N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. G. Peck Conn.
2. S. Gill Ky.
3. J. H. Whittlesey . . . N. Y.
4. D. M. Frost N. Y.
5. A. R. Eddy R. I.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. L. Hebert La.
2. W. H. C. Whiting . . . At large
3. Henry Coppee Ga.
4. E. B. Hunt N. Y.
5. W. F. Smith Vt.

1843.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. B. Franklin Penn.
2. J. Deshon Conn.
3. T. J. Brereton At large
4. J. H. Greland Penn.
5. W. F. Reynolds Ohio.

SECOND CLASS.

1. W. G. Peck Conn.
2. J. H. Whittlesey . . . N. Y.
3. F. J. Thomas Md.
4. Samuel Gill Ky.
5. D. M. Frost N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. H. C. Whiting . . . At large
2. L. Hebert La.
3. E. B. Hunt N. Y.
4. W. F. Smith Vt.
5. H. Coppee Ga.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. C. S. Stewart N. J.
2. C. E. Blunt At large
3. Geo. B. McClellan... Penn.
4. F. T. Bryan N. C.
5. J. L. Reno Penn.

1844.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. G. Peck Conn.
2. J. H. Whittlesey N. Y.
3. S. Gill Ky.
4. D. M. Frost N. Y.
5. A. R. Eddy R. I.

SECOND CLASS.

1. W. H. C. Whiting... At large
2. L. Hebert La.
3. E. B. Hunt N. Y.
4. W. F. Smith Vt.
5. J. H. Carlisle Me.

THIRD CLASS.

1. C. S. Stewart N. J.
2. C. E. Blunt At large
3. Geo. B. McClellan... Penn.
4. J. G. Foster N. H.
5. F. T. Bryan N. C.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. J. McAllister At large
2. J. C. Symmes Ohio.
3. D. T. Van Buren... N. Y.
4. D. Beltzhoover..... Miss.
5. J. Hamilton Ind.

1845.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. H. C. Whiting... At large
2. E. B. Hunt N. Y.
3. L. Hebert La.
4. W. F. Smith Vt.
5. T. J. Wood Ky.

SECOND CLASS.

1. C. S. Stewart N. J.
2. C. E. Blunt At large
3. S. G. Foster N. H.
4. Geo. B. McClellan... Penn.
5. Geo. H. Derby Mass.

THIRD CLASS.

1. J. C. Symmes Ohio.
2. J. Hamilton Ind.
3. J. McAllister At large
4. D. T. Van Buren ... N. Y.
5. J. J. Woods Ohio.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. W. P. Trowbridge... Mich.
2. A. J. Donelson Tenn.
3. N. Michler. Penn.
4. J. Holmes N. C.
5. W. H. Stevens N. Y.

1846.—FIRST CLASS.

1. C. S. Stewart N. Y.
2. Geo. B. McClellan... Pa.
3. C. E. Blunt At large
4. J. G. Foster N. H.
5. E. L. F. Hardcastle.. Md.

SECOND CLASS.

1. J. C. Symmes Ohio.
2. J. Hamilton Ind.
3. S. Chalfin Ill.
4. D. T. Van Buren... N. Y.
5. J. McAllister At large

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. P. Trowbridge... Mich.
2. W. H. Stevens N. Y.
3. A. J. Donelson Tenn.
4. N. Michler Penn.
5. R. S. Williamson... N. J.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. J. G. Parke.....Penn.
2. D. C. Bolles.....Ohio.
3. Q. A. Gilmore.....Ohio.
4. S. V. Benet.....Fla.
5. E. R. Platt.....Vt.

1847.—FIRST CLASS.

1. J. C. Symmes.....Ohio.
2. J. Hamilton.....Ind.
3. J. J. Woods.....Ohio.
4. J. McAllister.....At large
5. G. W. Hazzard.....Ind.

SECOND CLASS.

1. W. P. Trowbridge...Mich.
2. J. C. Duane.....N. Y.
3. R. S. Williamson....N. J.
4. W. H. Stevens.....N. Y.
5. A. J. Donelson.....Tenn.

THIRD CLASS.

1. J. G. Parke.....Penn.
2. Q. A. Gilmore.....Ohio.
3. S. V. Benet.....Fla.
4. D. C. Bolles.....Ohio.
5. T. J. Haines.... .N. H.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. F. E. Prime.....N. Y.
2. L. M. Walker.....At large
3. P. T. Wyman.....Mass.
4. S. Crispin.....Penn.
5. J. H. Wheelock.....Mass.

1848.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. P. Trowbridge...Mich.
2. A. J. Donelson.....Tenn.
3. J. C. Duane.....N. Y.
4. W. H. Stevens.....N. Y.
5. R. S. Williamson....N. J.

SECOND CLASS.

1. Q. A. Gilmore.....Ohio.
2. J. G. Parke.....Penn.
3. S. V. Benet.....Fla.
4. J. K. Duncan.....Ohio.
5. T. J. Haines.....N. H.

THIRD CLASS.

1. F. E. Prime.....N. Y.
2. G. K. Warren.....N. Y.
3. S. Crispin.....Penn.
4. P. T. Wyman.....Mass.
5. C. Grover.....Me.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. G. L. Andrews.....Mass.
2. G. T. Balch.....Ohio.
3. J. St. C. Morton....Penn.
4. A. Piper.....Penn.
5. W. T. Welcker.....Tenn.

1849.—FIRST CLASS.

1. Q. A. Gilmore.....Ohio.
2. J. G. Parke.....Penn.
3. S. V. Benet.....Fla.
4. T. J. Haines.....N. H.
5. J. K. Duncan.....Ohio.

SECOND CLASS.

1. G. K. Warren.....N. Y.
2. S. Crispin.....Penn.
3. F. E. Prime.....N. Y.
4. A. Bowen.....Tenn.
5. C. Grover.....Me.

THIRD CLASS.

1. G. L. Andrews....Mass.
2. J. St. C. Morton....Penn.
3. J. Thompson.....N. Y.
4. A. Piper.....Penn.
5. G. T. Balch.....Ohio.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. G. H. Mendell Penn.
2. G. B. Andrews N. C.
3. J. C. Ives Conn.
4. N. F. Alexander Tenn.
5. T. L. Casey At large

1850.—FIRST CLASS.

1. F. E. Prime N. Y.
2. G. K. Warren N. Y.
3. S. Crispin Penn.
4. C. Grover Me.
5. P. T. Wyman Mass.

SECOND CLASS.

1. G. L. Andrews Mass.
2. J. St. C. Morton Pa.
3. G. T. Balch Ohio.
4. W. T. Welcker Tenn.
5. J. Thompson N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. T. L. Casey At large
2. G. W. Rose N. Y.
3. N. F. Alexander Tenn.
4. J. C. Ives Conn.
5. J. N. Bonaparte Md.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. W. P. Craighill Va.
2. J. B. McPherson Ohio.
3. J. W. Sill Ohio.
4. F. J. Shunk At large
5. W. Jenkins At large

1851.—FIRST CLASS.

1. G. L. Andrews Mass.
2. J. St. C. Morton Penn.
3. G. T. Balch Ohio.
4. W. T. Welcker Tenn.
5. A. Piper Pa.

SECOND CLASS.

1. T. L. Casey At large
2. N. F. Alexander Tenn.
3. H. W. Slocum N. Y.
4. G. W. Rose N. Y.
5. J. C. Ives Conn.

THIRD CLASS.

1. J. B. McPherson Ohio.
2. W. R. Boggs Ga.
3. W. S. Smith Ohio.
4. W. P. Craighill Va.
5. F. J. Shunk At large

FOURTH CLASS.

1. O. O. Howard Me.
2. G. W. Custis Lee At large
3. H. L. Abbot Mass.
4. T. H. Ruger Wis.
5. T. J. Treadwell N. H.

1852.—FIRST CLASS.

1. T. L. Casey At large
2. N. F. Alexander Tenn.
3. G. H. Mendell Penn.
4. G. W. Rose N. Y.
5. J. C. Ives Conn.

SECOND CLASS.

1. Jas. B. McPherson Ohio.
2. W. R. Boggs Ga.
3. W. P. Craighill Va.
4. J. W. Sill Ohio.
5. W. S. Smith Ohio.

THIRD CLASS.

1. G. W. Custis Lee At large
2. T. H. Ruger Wis.
3. J. Pegram Va.
4. H. L. Abbot Mass.
5. T. J. Treadwell N. H.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. C. B. Comstock.....Mass.
2. G. H. Elliot.....Mass.
3. A. S. Webb.....N. Y.
4. J. V. D. Du Bois....N. Y.
5. J. R. Church.....Ga.

1853.—FIRST CLASS.

1. J. E. McPherson....Ohio.
2. W. P. Craighill.....Va.
3. J. W. Sill.....Ohio
4. W. R. Boggs.....Ga.
5. F. J. Shunk.....At large

SECOND CLASS.

- 1 G. W. Custis Lee....At large
2. H. L. Abbot.....Mass.
3. O. O. Howard.....Me.
4. T. H. Ruger.....Wis.
5. J. Pegram.....Va

THIRD CLASS.

1. C. B. ComstockMass.
2. G. H. ElliotMass.
3. Godfrey WeitzelOhio.
4. A. S. WebbN. Y.
5. F. L. VintonAt large

FOURTH CLASS.

1. G. W. Snyder.....N. Y.
2. D. C. HoustonN. Y.
3. M. D. McAllister ...Mich.
4. C. C. LeeN. C.
5. W. E. WebsterConn.

1854.—FIRST CLASS.

1. G. W. Custis Lee....At large
2. H. L. Abbot.....Mass.
3. T. H. Ruger.....Wis.
4. O. O. Howard.....Me.
5. T. J. Treadwell.....N. H.

SECOND CLASS.

1. C. B. Comstock.....Mass.
2. C. Van CampPenn.
3. Godfrey Weitzel....Ohio.
4. J. B. Wheeler.....N. C.
5. E. Gay.....N. H.

THIRD CLASS.

1. D. C. HoustonN. Y.
2. M. D. McAllister....Mich.
3. G. W. Snyder.....N. Y.
4. C. C. Lee.....N. C.
5. A. P. Porter.....Penn

FOURTH CLASS.

1. J. C. PalfreyMass.
2. G. C. Strong.....Mass.
3. R. K. Meade, Jr.....Va.
4. E. P. AlexanderGa.
5. J. L. Kirby Smith...At large

1855.—FIRST CLASS.

1. C. B. Comstock.....Mass.
2. Godfrey Weitzel....Ohio.
3. C. Van CampPenn.
4. G. H. Elliot.....Mass.
5. J. B. Wheeler.....N. C.

SECOND CLASS.

1. D. C. HoustonN. Y.
2. G. W. Snyder.....N. Y.
3. M. D. McAllister....Mich.
4. C. C. Lee.....N. C.
5. O. M. Poe.....Ohio.

THIRD CLASS.

1. J. C. Palfrey.....Mass.
2. R. K. Meade, Jr.....Va.
3. E. P. Alexander.....Ga.
4. J. L. Kirby Smith...At large
5. G. C. Strong.....Mass.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. J. H. Hallonquist....S. C.
2. W. C. Paine.....Mass.
3. J. S. Saunders.....At large
4. S. McKee.....Utah.
5. M. J. White.....Miss.

1856.—FIRST CLASS.

1. G. W. Snyder.....N. Y.
2. D. C. Houston.....N. Y.
3. M. D. McAllister....Mich.
4. C. C. Lee.....N. C.
5. H. V. De Hart.....At large

SECOND CLASS.

1. J. C. Palfrey.....Mass.
2. R. K. Meade, Jr.....Va.
3. G. C. Strong.....Mass.
4. E. P. Alexander.....Ga.
5. H. M. Robert.....Ohio.

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. C. Paine.....Mass.
2. J. H. Hallonquist....S. C.
3. W. H. Echols.....Ala.
4. W. H. Bell.....Penn.
5. M. J. White.....Miss.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. W. E. Merrill.....At large
2. C. B. Reese.....N. Y.
3. S. H. Lockett.....Ala.
4. R. F. Beckham.....Va.
5. O. G. Wagner.....Penn.

1857.—FIRST CLASS.

1. J. C. Palfrey.....Mass.
2. R. K. Meade, Jr.....Va.
3. E. P. Alexander.....Ga.
4. H. M. Robert.....Ohio.
5. G. C. Strong.....Mass.

SECOND CLASS.

1. W. C. Paine.....Mass.
2. M. J. White.....Miss.
3. J. Dixon.....Tenn.
4. W. H. Echols.....Ala.
5. R. H. Brewer.....Md.

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. E. Merrill.....At large
2. S. H. Lockett.....Ala.
3. C. R. Collins.....Penn.
4. O. G. Wagner.....Penn.
5. C. B. Reese.....N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. W. McFarland.....N. Y.
2. N. Bowen.....N. Y.
3. Horace Porter.....Penn.
4. J. A. Tardy, Jr.....N. Y.
5. J. M. Whittemore...Mass.

1858.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. C. Paine.....Mass.
2. M. J. White.....Miss.
3. J. Dixon.....Tenn.
4. W. H. Echols.....Ala.
5. J. S. Saunders.....At large

SECOND CLASS.

1. W. E. Merrill.....At large
2. S. H. Lockett.....Ala.
3. C. R. Collins.....Pa.
4. O. G. Wagner.....Pa.
5. C. B. Reese.....N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. W. McFarland.....N. Y.
2. J. A. Tardy.....N. Y.
3. Horace Porter.....Pa.
4. N. Bowen.....N. Y.
5. B. F. Sloan.....S. C.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. H. A. Du Pont.....At large
2. H. W. Kingsbury ...N. Y.
3. C. E. CrossMass.
4. L. G. Hoxton.....At large
5. O. E. Babcock.....Vt.

1859.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. E. Merrill.At large
2. S. H. Lockett.....Ala.
3. C. R. Collins.....Pa.
4. C. R. ReeseN. Y.
5. O. O. WagnerPa.

SECOND CLASS.

1. J. A. Tardy.....N. Y.
2. W. McFarlandN. Y.
3. N. Bowen.....N. Y.
4. C. Hook, Jr.....Ill.
5. Horace Porter.....Penn.

THIRD CLASS.

1. C. E. Cross.....Mass.
2. H. A. Du Pont.....At large
3. O. E. Babcock.....Vt.
4. H. W. Kingsbury....N. Y.
5. L. G. Hoxton.....At large

FOURTH CLASS.

1. A. H. Dutton.....Mass.
2. F. U. Farquhar.....Penn.
3. C. Derrick.....At large
4. P. H. O'Rorke.....N. Y.
5. A. Mordecai.....At large

1860.—FIRST CLASS.

1. W. McFarland.....N. Y.
2. J. A. Tardy.....N. Y.
3. Horace Porter.....Penn.
4. N. Bowen.....N. Y.
5. T. Edson.....Mass.

SECOND CLASS.

1. H. A. Du Pont.....At large
2. H. W. Kingsbury....Mass.
3. O. E. Babcock.....Vt.
4. A. Ames.....Me.
5. Emery Upton.....N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. P. H. O'Rorke.....N. Y.
2. A. H. Dutton.....Conn.
3. F. U. Farquhar.....Penn.
4. C. Derrick.....At large
5. D. W. Flagler.....N. Y.

FOURTH CLASS.

1. G. L. Gillespie.....Tenn.
2. R. S. Mackenzie....At large
3. W. A. Marye.....Cal.
4. H. S. Wetmore.....Ohio.
5. C. R. Suter.....At large

1861.—FIRST CLASS.

1. H. A. Du Pont.....At large
2. C. E. Cross.....Mass.
3. O. E. Babcock.....Vt.
4. H. W. Kingsbury....N. Y.
5. A. Ames.....Me.

SECOND CLASS.

1. P. H. O'Rorke.....N. Y.
2. F. U. Farquhar.....Penn.
3. A. H. Dutton.....Conn.
4. C. Derrick.....At large
5. D. W. Flagler.....N. Y.

THIRD CLASS.

1. C. R. Suter.....At large
2. G. Burroughs.....Mass.
3. G. L. Gillespie.....Tenn.
4. Jared A. Smith.....Me.
5. J. A. Kress.....Ind.

FOURTH CLASS.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. P. S. Michie.....Ohio. | 3. John R. Meigs.....At large |
| 2. J. D. Robb.....Ky. | 4. H. G. Townsend....N. Y. |
| 5. W. J. Twining.....Ind. | |

The foregoing sketch of West Point, in its double aspect of defensive post and military school, while not as exhaustive in special detail as the subject is susceptible of being made, will, nevertheless, furnish information sufficiently full and comprehensive for the purposes of the ordinary inquirer. The author has not touched upon the internal management of the school, its system of government, administration, discipline, curriculum of studies, etc., etc. These features of the institution, while not perfect in character and in some particulars wholly objectionable, are not designed for especial scrutiny in the present volume. There is one point, however, which may be touched upon in the following pages, and with the statement of which the author will pass for the present from the school at West Point to other relating topics.

By reference to the act of March 16, 1802, creating the Military Academy, it will be observed that section 28 of the said act prescribes that "the principal engineer, and in his absence the next in rank, shall have the superintendence of the said Academy." Under this provision the affairs of the Academy had been conducted by the officer designated up to the year 1866, when a modification was ordered. There had been fourteen superintendents, all of whom were of the engineer corps. Under this simpler method the best work of the institution was

accomplished, while the system itself more nearly represented the true character of the Academy as a mere school for the training of future soldiers.

In the year 1866, however, the unwise step was taken to remove the institution from the superintendency of the Chief Engineer, and to place the charge of the Academy in the War Department, under such officers as the Secretary of War might assign to the duty. The result that followed soon demonstrated the lessened efficiency of the school, consequent upon a sort of itinerant teaching, connected of necessity with the varied complexion of an officer wholly subject to political changes. Instead of retracing the false step, a still greater error was perpetrated. Under order of the President of the United States, Major-General J. M. Schofield assumed charge of the Academy as superintendent on September 1, 1876. This officer reports under date of November 8, 1877, in relation to the subject, as follows:

“The first duty which demanded my attention was a careful revision of the academic regulations, with a view to such improvements as might be possible in the system of discipline, course of instruction, and general administration of the institution.

“The revised regulations, having been submitted to the Secretary of War and by him to the President, were approved and adopted on the 28th of February, 1877. The most important feature of this revised system is the erection of the Military Academy and its accessories, constituting the post at West Point into a military department, under the command of a general officer and under the supervision and charge of the General-in-Chief of the army. This gives to this institution an organization corresponding to its character as one of the most important branches of the military establishment; makes it in form what it is designed to be

in substance, viz.: a model for the purpose of instruction of a separate military department, or of any army in the field; and makes the official head of the army responsible to the President and to the Secretary of War for the proper conduct of this as for the other branches of the military service," etc.

Now, these are the honest views of a professional soldier, formed, of course, from the standpoint of a military interest. The institution which was so graphically described by Colonel Williams, one of its first superintendents, as being "like a foundling, barely existing among the mountains, and nurtured at a distance, out of sight, and almost unknown to its legitimate parents," had, in the course of seventy-five years, passed through various stages of military incubation, and at length had blossomed out into an enormous tree, whose extended branches covered the wide area of an entire military department. The idea seemed ludicrous, though its tendency was full of danger to a Government with the declared policy of subordinating the military to the civil power.

Five years of this experiment brought such a pressure of hostile opinion to bear upon the Administration, that the following general order was promulgated:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, July 13, 1882.

"I. By direction of the President, the Military Department of West Point will be discontinued September 1, 1882.

"II. By direction of the President, sections 1 and 2 of article 1 of the general regulations for the United States Military Academy are hereby amended to read as follows:

"1. The General of the army, under the War Department, shall have supervision and charge of the United States Military

Academy. He will watch over its administration and discipline and the instruction of the corps of cadets, and will make reports thereof to the Secretary of War.

"2. The superintendent, and in his absence the next in rank, shall have the immediate government and military command of the Academy, and shall be commandant of the military post of West Point. The superintendent will render, through the Adjutant-General, to the General of the army, for submission to the Secretary of War, all required reports, returns, and estimates concerning the Academy.

"ROBERT T. LINCOLN, Secretary of War."

Comment upon this order will be reserved for another place. Having now completed a somewhat extended account of military education in the United States as it has been connected with West Point, the author will proceed to trace its further development in the direction of special naval education, which finally resulted in the establishment of the Naval Academy.

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF NAVAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES—
ORIGIN OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT—SEPARATION OF
THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS—FIRST SUGGESTION
OF A NAVAL SCHOOL BY SECRETARY M'HENRY—THE
FIRST ACTUAL PROVISION FOR NAVAL EDUCATION, JAN-
UARY 2, 1813—REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS
—GOVERNOR'S ISLAND SUGGESTED AS THE SITE FOR A
NAVAL SCHOOL—ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN LEGISLATION
BY A "RIDER" DEFEATED IN CONGRESS—A PASSING
GLANCE AT THE DEPARTMENT BARNACLE—EXPRESSIVE
LANGUAGE OF THE AMERICAN SAILOR—TABLE SHOWING
CONDITION OF NAVAL SCHOOLS IN 1833.

IT is not necessary to the present purpose to enter upon a consideration of the Naval Academy with the same detail of statement given to the institution at West Point in the preceding pages. The subject itself does not admit of this. The Academy at Annapolis hardly numbers half the years of the older school, and, from the nature of the two branches of the service, it must be considered of less importance. Apart from this consideration, the author has now to say that it is not his purpose to attack, in the following pages, the idea of preliminary training and preparatory education as a proper basis upon which to achieve expertness in the military calling,

but simply to arraign, in the strong terms that he believes the subject demands, the system upon which both institutions are founded, and which renders them, in his opinion, inimical to the best interests of republican government.

From the idea of a trained soldiery to that of a trained marine the transition was no less rapid than natural. Although the early records are very deficient in respect of the sentiment leading up to the institution of a formal naval school, there can be little doubt that the suggestion of an army school far back in the first years of the Revolution went hand in hand with that for the establishment of a naval academy. So closely related were the interests of the army and navy considered that their management was at first confided to a single principal official. On August 7, 1789, being only the sixth act passed by the Congress that assembled under the newly adopted Constitution, a law was approved entitled "An act to establish an executive department to be denominated the Department of War." The first section of this act reads as follows:

"Be it enacted, etc., That there shall be an executive department to be denominated the Department of War, and that there shall be a principal officer therein, to be called the Secretary for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the Constitution, relative to military commissions, or to the land or naval forces, ships, or warlike stores of the United States, or to such other matters respecting military or naval affairs as the President of the United States shall assign to the said department, or relative to the granting of lands to persons entitled thereto, for military services rendered to the United States, or relative to Indian affairs;

and furthermore, that the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said department in such manner as the President of the United States shall from time to time order or instruct," etc.

Under this act, vesting the functions of what subsequently became two separate departments in a single executive head, General Henry Knox, who had been in charge of the War Department since 1785, was appointed Secretary of War and of the Navy, which place he held until the year 1795, when he was succeeded by Timothy Pickering for about two years, and the latter by James McHenry for nearly four years. On April 30, 1798, Congress passed another law entitled "An act to establish an executive department to be denominated the Department of the Navy." Section 5 of this act repeals so much of the law of August 7, 1789, as vests any charge of naval matters in the Department of War. The two departments of War and of the Navy thus became distinct and separate in their functions and operations.

No official suggestion of a naval school appears until the submission of the communication of Secretary McHenry to Congress, bearing date of January 13, 1800. This paper appears in full in the preceding pages. By reference to the paper it will be observed that the Secretary recommends the establishment of four schools, viz.: The Fundamental School, the School of Engineers and Artillerists, the School of Cavalry and Infantry, and the School of the Navy. He recommends that the naval school be provided with a director, a professor of mathematics, a professor of geography and natural philosophy,

an architect, and a designing and drawing-master. Of the school itself he speaks as follows :

“The School of the Navy, to teach those appointed to, or destined for this service the application of the knowledge acquired in the Fundamental School in arithmetic, algebra, geometry, statics, and navigation. To this end, after having passed examination, they shall make voyages or cruises under skillful officers, for certain periods, during which time they ought to be exercised in the maneuvers and observations most useful in service, and to be instructed in whatever respects rigging of vessels of war, pilotage, and the management of cannon.”

In justice it should be here remarked that the able paper submitted by Secretary McHenry, and now quoted, has been credited to Alexander Hamilton, who was said to have prepared and recommended it in his capacity of Inspector-General of the Army under Washington, during the period when, prompted by hostile acts of the French Directory, the army was reorganized in view of the probable rupture with France.

This communication, as heretofore stated, was followed as a *sequitur* by the act of March 16, 1802, establishing the Military Academy at West Point, but no action whatever was taken looking in the direction of establishing a separate naval school nor of creating any naval professorships even in the Military Academy.

In the report of Colonel Jonathan Williams to President Jefferson upon the condition of West Point as it existed in the year 1808, which report has also been reproduced in this volume, the reader will perceive that, under the head of his third proposition for placing the

West Point school upon a better basis, Colonel Williams recommends that a general professorship of mathematics be established, and that to this branch should expressly belong the teaching of nautical astronomy, geography, and navigation. Nothing came of this recommendation, however, in the way of legislation.

Apart from the frequent suggestion of the necessity of a naval school, the subject seems to have slumbered until the second war with Great Britain was actually upon us. This, of course, was a period of excitement, when every effort was made to develop to the highest degree the military strength of the country, both upon the land and upon the sea. The Academy at West Point received its first real stimulus from the hands of the Government through the act of April 29, 1812, quoted in the preceding pages. Among the various laws made during the first seven months after the declaration of existing hostilities, there is an act that authorized a measure which must be considered the germ of the present naval school in its very earliest state of existence. The act referred to is that denominated "An act to increase the navy of the United States," approved January 2, 1813. Section 1 of the act authorizes the President to cause to be built and equipped four ships to rate not less than twenty-four guns, and six ships to rate forty-four guns each. Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act enumerate the complement of officers of all classes and of men which each of the said ships should carry, and in the enumeration of officers it is stated that there shall be one *schoolmaster*, to be

appointed by the *captain*. Section 5 of the law enacts that the pay of the schoolmaster shall be twenty-five dollars per month and two rations per day.

Though this provision, as above remarked, must be considered the very beginning, or rather the initial point of departure, of the movement which has since found development in the establishment of an exclusive naval school, it appears from the records that the idea embraced in the appointment of a regular "schoolmaster," who may be said to have been "abroad" both as regards his own person and the results upon his pupils, did not tend in the particular direction of a specific naval education.

In those days there were large numbers of boys attached to the navy as midshipmen, whose appointment rested upon mere executive favor. These boys, as a rule, had had but a very limited general education, and it was designed, by the appointment of regular schoolmasters, to supply this deficiency to some extent, particularly in the direction of mathematics and of languages.

Under the authority cited, the crude attempt at a school system was continued for a period of twenty-five years or more.

In the year following the passage of the act of January 2, 1813, Secretary William Jones, who held the naval portfolio under President Madison, proposed a step far in advance of that so recently taken. Under a resolution of the Senate, March 18, 1814, the Secretary of the Navy was directed to devise and digest a system for the better organization of the Department of the Navy of the

United States. In compliance with this direction, Secretary Jones submitted a lengthy communication upon the subject designated, under date of November 15, 1814. The report is an able one, and embodies the outline of an act "for the better organization of the Navy Department." In the report under consideration Secretary Jones takes occasion to make an additional recommendation in the following words:

"I would also respectfully suggest the expediency of providing by law for the establishment of a Naval Academy, with suitable professors, for the instruction of the officers of the navy in those branches of the mathematics and experimental philosophy, and in the science and practice of gunnery, theory of naval architecture, and art of mechanical drawing, which are necessary to the accomplishment of the naval officer."

This recommendation met with no responsive movement upon the part of Congress. The usefulness of the Military Academy itself at West Point was under process of being tested, and the time was not ripe for the inauguration of a twin institution.

Some eight years elapsed before any further action of an official character appears to have been taken. The question was the subject of much discussion in the interim, however, and especially in connection with the school at West Point. Under date of December 2, 1822, Smith Thompson, then Secretary of the Navy, submitted to President Monroe the "plan of a peace establishment for the navy and marine corps." This document was transmitted by the President under date of December 6, 1822, with a special message, to the House of Represen-

tatives, from which had emanated the request that it be prepared. The "plan" was also accompanied by a bill "to fix and render permanent the naval peace establishment of the United States," and at the conclusion of the report itself the Secretary uses the following words :

"Although, perhaps, not falling strictly within the scope of the resolution, yet the present affords a fit opportunity of respectfully suggesting the importance of establishing a naval academy for the instruction of our young officers in the sciences connected with their profession. As this is intended as a mere suggestion of a measure deserving consideration, I have not thought proper to present any plan for carrying it into effect. This may be done hereafter, should the measure meet with a favorable reception; nor is it deemed fit for me, at this time, to urge the many considerations which will readily occur to all liberal and enlightened minds in favor of such an institution."

This appeal in behalf of the movement fell upon ears as deaf as those receiving a similar recommendation eight years prior to that time. No action whatever was taken upon the matter by Congress.

The next official attempt to carry the project into execution was made by Samuel L. Southard, of New Jersey, who served as Secretary of the Navy from September 16, 1823, till March 9, 1829, and who represented his State in the United States Senate from 1833 to 1841, the year of his death, having, previously to entering the Cabinet, been elected to the same position, as well as to others of high distinction. This gentleman was the most earnest friend of the measure that had yet appeared in its interest.

As far as the author is aware, the history of the move-

ment to inaugurate a formal school in the United States for special naval education has not been written with documentary completeness; and partly with the view to place the subject in a position admitting of easy reference by those particularly interested in the details, the author has collected the scanty material relating to it, and without further apology to his readers reproduces it in full in the present place.

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives made December 15, 1823, Secretary Southard, under date of January 24, 1824, submitted "a plan for reorganizing the naval establishment." In recommending an increase in the number of vessels then in service, with an adequate number of officers, the Secretary refers to the matter of naval education in the following words:

"It is in vain to hope for a triumphant defense of our national interests and character, then, without we thoroughly train, educate, and discipline those who have to fight our battles. To insure such a defense beyond hazard, it is confidently believed that the nation will cheerfully meet the requisite expense. Connected with this point, it is not improper to suggest that the early education of most of our officers is very unequal to the character they have subsequently to sustain, and that an effectual remedy can be found only in the establishment of a naval school."

For the two highest rates of vessels which the Secretary recommends in his report, schoolmasters are to be provided with the pay of \$30 per month instead of \$25, as under the act of 1813. In support of this increase, the Secretary remarks: "Schoolmasters are proposed for the two highest rates of vessels, and, as we have yet no school

for the instruction of young officers, and as the duties of the chaplains, both as clergymen and teachers, demand purity of character, enlargement of mind, and scientific attainments, a higher salary (\$30 in lieu of \$25) would be useful to secure the services of those who are worthy of the station."

In his report on the "condition of the navy and marine corps," made the second session of the Eighteenth Congress, through the President, and dated November 1, 1824, Secretary Southard again brings up the subject of naval education as follows:

"Several laws seem necessary to render the establishment economical and efficient. Among them are those which were under consideration at the last session, for building ten sloops-of-war and reorganizing the navy. To these ought to be added a revision of the law for the better government of the navy, and the system of courts-martial, but especially some provision should be made for the education and instruction of the younger officers. We have now the light of experience on this point in the army, and its salutary effects are very manifest. Instruction is not less necessary to the navy than to the army. I refer to the views taken of some of these subjects in the reports made during the last session, and it will be my duty to develop them more fully in answer to a resolution of the Senate now before me."

No result having followed these appeals for legislation, Secretary Southard invoked the aid of President John Quincy Adams, who in his message to the first session of the Nineteenth Congress, in December, 1825, alluded to the subject in these words:

* * * "The rules and regulations by which it [the navy] is governed earnestly call for revision, and the want of a naval school of instruction, corresponding with the Military Academy at West

Point, for the formation of scientific and accomplished officers, is felt with daily increasing aggravation."

In his report dated December 2, 1825, and transmitted to Congress by the President, Secretary Southard, in commenting upon previous recommendations made by himself, is disposed to take a rather gloomy view of naval affairs. He remarks as follows:

"Without an organization of some kind — without a revision of our penal code, and of our rules and regulations — and without a naval school, tardy amendments may be made in the naval service and in its administration, but it is in vain to hope for speedy, useful, and very practical changes. * * * The experience of the present year has confirmed most strongly the views taken on all the subjects mentioned in the reports to which I refer you."

In making the open recommendation to establish and locate a naval school at Governor's Island, in the State of New York, a sum of \$10,000 was asked in order that it might be put into immediate operation. The Secretary says in connection therewith:

* * * "The younger officers [of the navy] are taken from the poor who have not the means of a good education, as well as the rich who have. They enter, from the nature of their duties, at so early an age that they cannot be accomplished nor even moderately accurate scholars. They are constantly employed on ship-board or in our navy-yards, where much advancement in learning cannot be expected. The better instructed or more intelligent an officer is, the more skillfully and precisely, and, of course, the more economically will he perform the duties assigned to him. Ignorance is always, skill is never, prodigal. The navy is also the bearer of our honor and fame to every foreign shore. The American naval officer is, in fact, the representative of his country in every port to which he goes, and by him is that country in a greater or less degree estimated." Etc.



THE NAVAL ACADEMY AT ANNAPOLIS.

1. Cadet Quarters. 2. Dress-Parade. 3. Physical and Chemical
Laboratories — Practice Fleet in Distance.

Considerable discussion of the subject followed this renewed effort to obtain favorable legislation in behalf of the measure now being considered. No other result attended it, however, as Congress again adjourned without adopting any law upon the subject.

At the meeting of the second session of the Nineteenth Congress, President John Quincy Adams, in his annual message dated December 5, 1826, again brings the matter before the body when speaking of the necessities of the navy and the expediency of its gradual increase. The reference, which is neither urgent nor emphatic, is made in the following words:

“In continuing to provide for the gradual increase of the navy, it may not be necessary or expedient to add for the present any more to the number of our ships; but should you deem it advisable to continue the yearly appropriation of half a million to the same objects, it may be profitably expended in providing a supply of timber to be seasoned, and other materials for future use, in the construction of docks, or in laying the foundations of a school for naval education, as to the wisdom of Congress either of those measures may appear to claim the preference.”

Again it appeared that Congress had no disposition to entertain the project of a school, so repeatedly urged by a few enthusiasts. By the act of March 3, 1827, the appropriation for a supply of good timber (live oak) was promptly made, as was provision also for certain dry docks, etc. Determined, however, that Congress should not again adjourn without the desired legislation in favor of an academy, Secretary Southard resolved upon the expedient adopted in the case of the Academy at West Point, when all effort to obtain separate legislation had

failed; that is, as will be remembered, to tie the legislation to some other bill, or, in more modern phraseology, to put it on as a "rider." Accordingly, when the act of March 3, 1827, entitled "An act for the gradual improvement of the navy of the United States," was presented, it embraced several sections relating to the establishment of an academy. These sections were as follow :

"SEC. 7. That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized to cause to be established a Naval Academy for the instruction of such midshipmen and other officers in the navy of the United States as may, from time to time, be attached thereto.

"SEC. 8. That the said Academy shall be governed by such rules and regulations as shall, from time to time, be prescribed under the direction of the President of the United States.

"SEC. 9. That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized to appoint for said Academy such professors, assistant professors, and teachers, as may, in his opinion, be necessary, who shall receive such pay and emoluments as are now received by similar professors, assistant professors, and teachers at the Military Academy.

"SEC. 10. That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby authorized to cause to be procured such books, implements, and apparatus, and to cause to be erected such buildings as may be necessary and proper for said school. And to cause to be purchased, if necessary, a quantity of land, not exceeding — acres, to include the site selected for the erection of said buildings, and to procure from the State in which the said land may lie the jurisdiction over the same.

"SEC. 11. That there shall be laid before Congress, at their next session, a list of the professors, assistant professors, and teachers appointed under this act, with the compensation allowed to each, the number of students admitted into the Academy, and the rules and regulations prescribed for its government."

When this bill was under consideration in the Senate, after having been reported from the committee of the

whole, Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, moved to amend by striking from the bill the sections above quoted. This motion was lost by a vote of 24 nays to 22 yeas. The blank was filled with the word "ten," when the bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time. Upon February 17, 1827, the bill came up in order, and was duly passed by the Senate, by a vote of 28 yeas and 18 nays, Senators Thomas H. Benton and John Branch, the latter of whom was made Secretary of the Navy two years later, voting against the bill, as they had previously voted to strike out the sections authorizing the Naval Academy. Senator Levi Woodbury, who became Secretary of the Navy in 1831, also voted against the bill upon its final passage.

The bill having been sent to the House of Representatives, it was returned from the latter body with three amendments, the last of which proposed to strike out the provisions for the establishment of a Naval Academy, which amendment was carried in the House by a vote of 86 yeas and 78 nays. The Senate concurred in this amendment by a vote of 22 yeas and 21 nays, Senators Thomas H. Benton, John Branch, Thomas Clayton, Mahlon Dickerson, William R. King, John Randolph, Martin Van Buren, and Levi Woodbury, among others, voting in the affirmative.

Thus was defeated, by a direct vote of Congress, the effort to establish a Government academy for the education of naval officers. It had long been talked of and recommended, as we have seen, but this was the first

opportunity that had been presented to Congress whereby the sentiment of its members might be ascertained through official expression. The friends of the measure, among whom was now the President, John Quincy Adams, were determined not to abandon the attempt to accomplish its success. Upon the assembling of the first session of the Twentieth Congress, in December, 1827, the President returned with increased warmth to the subject in his annual message, expressing himself in the following terms :

“ The establishment of a Naval Academy, furnishing the means of theoretic instruction to the youths who devote their lives to the service of their country upon the ocean, still solicits the sanction of the legislature. Practical seamanship and the art of navigation may be acquired upon the cruises of the squadrons which from time to time are dispatched to distant seas, but a competent knowledge even of the art of ship-building, the higher mathematics, and astronomy—the literature which can place our officers on a level of polished education with the officers of other maritime nations—the knowledge of the laws, municipal and national, which in their intercourse with foreign states and their governments are continually called into operation ; and, above all, that acquaintance with the principles of honor and justice, with the higher obligations of morals, and of general laws, human and divine, which constitute the great distinction between the warrior-patriot and the licensed robber and pirate—these can be systematically taught and eminently acquired only in a permanent school, stationed upon the shore and provided with the teachers, the instruments, and the books conversant with and adapted to the communication of the principles of these respective sciences to the youthful and inquiring mind.” Etc.

Notwithstanding this further recommendation of the President, followed by such arguments and influences as could be brought to bear by his Secretary of the Navy

and the friends of the measure in Congress, the matter received no official action, the body again adjourned without giving sanction to the strongly pressed Naval Academy, and Secretary Southard became silent for several years upon the subject.

There are certain state measures which seem to attach themselves to a particular department of the Government and to become, as it were, a part of the traditional policy of that department. These measures go with the office and have no binding relation to the officer. They are a sort of heirloom, handed down through the fitful uncertainties of official existence from the original owner to the latest incumbent. The Military Academy at West Point was one of these measures. Its conception originated in the particular department to which its activity belongs, and its final execution was accomplished, after several years of strong effort, purely through the influence of the War Department. The measure, as has been shown in the previous pages, was resisted with much obstinacy by Congress, but it was finally successful through the persistence of the executive.

The project for a Naval Academy was also one of the measures spoken of above. First officially suggested by McHenry, in his report of January 13, 1800, it was pressed upon the attention of Congress for nearly thirty years by various Administrations before the object was fairly accomplished. Treated with neglect, and twice defeated by direct vote of Congress, success was at length achieved only through the decisive action of one

of the Naval Secretaries, who, regardless of legislative action, took the responsibility of establishing the school upon his own authority, though this was shared, of course, by his colleagues and the President.

The operation of the influence of traditional policy and example pertaining to an executive department was curiously shown in the measure now occupying our attention. The Hon. John Branch, as United States Senator, was strongly opposed to the sections of the act of March 3, 1827, authorizing the establishment of a naval school. His vote is recorded with those who endeavored to strike from the bill those sections. He subsequently voted against the passage of the act after the Senate had refused to strike out the sections referred to. Still later he voted to agree with the House amendment to the bill, striking out the obnoxious sections, and finally his vote was recorded for the bill after the sections referred to had been expunged. With this record, as a Senator, against the establishment of a naval school, he was appointed two years later to be Secretary of the Navy, under President Jackson, that is to say, upon March 9, 1829. Under date of December 6, 1830, he made his annual report to the President, "showing the condition of the navy in the year 1830," which report was transmitted to Congress under cover of the Presidential message. After entering the atmosphere of the Naval Department, he underwent a metamorphosis of views strangely illustrative of the point herein suggested. The following quotation from the report referred to, when contrasted

with his course upon the naval-academic measure while in the Senate, will at least call forth "our special wonderment," even should it fail "to overcome us like a summer cloud":

"As a measure tending to give reputation and efficiency to the navy, the cultivation of the minds of those who are to compose its active members is a subject of great national interest. It is a fact which will not be questioned, that the early education of the officers of the navy is entirely unequal to the character they have subsequently to sustain.

"Few appointments under the Government involve a necessity for more general and scientific attainments. As officers of the navy, they are required to act as judges of the law and evidence on trials of their brother officers for offenses affecting the lives and characters of the accused; as commanders of ships, they should possess not only a practical acquaintance with seamanship, but an accurate knowledge of those branches of mathematics connected with the science of navigation, with astronomy and geography; and as commanders of fleets or squadrons, they must be well informed on all points of international law having reference to the rights of neutrals and belligerents, the often-recurring question of the rights of blockade, and other interdictions of intercourse between powers standing in this relation to each other; to possess an accurate acquaintance with the modern languages, to enable them to enter into discussions on points of difference which may arise with the representatives of foreign states speaking such foreign language; and it may often happen that the communications can only be made advantageously in the language of the party with whom the subject of dispute may exist. The sons of the wealthy may obtain these advantages from the bounty of their parents, but without the aid of public instruction how are the sons of the less affluent to become qualified to command in the naval service?

"It may be further remarked that while a school on the most liberal and comprehensive plan of instruction has been provided for the military talent of the country, and has been endowed with every attribute for the advancement of the education of the youth

who aspire to a share in the toils or honors of a military life, the only provision which has been authorized by law for the instruction of the midshipmen in the navy is to be found in the allowance of twenty-five dollars per month to the schoolmasters retained on board the larger vessels of war."

When we reflect upon the fact that the authorization for a naval school upon a basis similar to that of the Academy at West Point was only defeated by a single vote in the United States Senate, about three years before, and that that vote was given by *Senator* John Branch, the position of *Secretary* John Branch may appear rather anomalous to the ordinary reader. If, however, he should take the pains to survey the hull of the good ship in which the Department of the Navy floats and makes its interesting cruises, he could hardly fail to discover the old-time barnacle attached thereto, which had been making stereotyped reports upon divers matters, yea, for many a year. It is true that the argument to prove the necessity of instructing our naval officers in modern languages, in order that they might be enabled "to enter into discussions on points of difference which may arise with the representatives of *foreign* states speaking such *foreign* language," and especially, it may be added, if the foreigners persisted in speaking such *foreign* language, is at least original, if not strong, and new, if not convincing. In 1812, in 1846, in 1861, and for a few years succeeding those dates, American naval officers held pretty animated "discussions" with the representatives of foreign states. But it is believed that their "communications" were not made in the particular language of the party with whom

the "dispute" existed. It is somewhat to be feared, indeed, that many of our gallant tars, unused to schools and unlearned in languages, spoke with much abruptness through iron throats and in thunder-toned voices.

To the observer of today it would appear that this last argument, emanating from a naval authority as distinguished as Secretary Branch, must have operated to extinguish all further opposition, and that as a consequence the long-desired Naval Academy would have been established at once. To be sure, the Secretary was a lawyer by profession, and had never seen a ship until he took command of the American navy on the banks of the Potomac. But it is credibly recorded that he had seen the sea upon more than one occasion, and that, if he had never smelt powder, he had at least scented salt air. The truth must be stated, however, without evasion or attempt at palliation. Congress remained as obdurate as before; Secretary Branch's recommendation fell as unheeded as the strokes from the clock of time, and it must be confessed that there now exist just grounds for the belief that Congress had arrived at an appalling conclusion, viz.: that the public interest would be promoted if the barnacle before alluded to as the standard report-maker of the navy ashore, and whose name, as it appears by the register, was Root, were swept out with his chief from the Government marine-garden, Root and Branch, so to put it.

Four years again passed without further official attempt to establish the Academy. The expediency of the measure, however, was constantly discussed. It was

a sort of ghost that would not down. Under date of December 26, 1833, in response to a request from the House Naval Committee, Hon. Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Navy from 1831 to 1833, furnished the chairman the following table of information concerning the state of naval education at that date.

The naval schools, so-called, it may be here remarked, embraced simply the schools on board the larger ships, taught by schoolmasters employed under the law of January 2, 1813.

TABLE V.

Statement of the actual condition of the naval schools as at present organized, the number and character of the professors employed, of youths instructed, and the annual expenditure to maintain them.

<i>Number and Character of Professors.</i>	<i>Number of Youths Instructed.</i>	<i>Annual Ex- pense, Pay, etc.</i>	<i>Contingencies.</i>
BOSTON. One teacher of mathematics and languages.....	6 . . .	\$981.75	Small amount for books, instruments, and sta- tionery. Amount not given.
NEW YORK. One teacher of mathematics, one teacher of languages	15.....	{ 981.75 662,50	Quarters or rooms as furnished in receiving- ships.
NORFOLK. One teacher of mathematics and languages.....	31.....	981.75	
Total.....	52	\$3,607.75	

From this table it will appear that in the year 1833 there were instructed fifty-two youths at an expense of

\$3,607.75, being at the rate of \$69.38 per pupil annually. That was cheap education.

But these were naval schools in name only. They had no feature of an academy. They were not at all representative of the institution which, through its friends, had been pounding upon the doors of Congress for so long. They were the germs spoken of in preceding pages of the later establishment, whose advent, though prayed for, had not occurred as yet. The birth of the twin of the West Point Academy was destined to be "somewhat delayed."

CHAPTER IX.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, JAN. 3, 1834—ANOTHER FAILURE. TO SECURE LEGISLATION ESTABLISHING A NAVAL ACADEMY—MEMORIAL OF NAVAL OFFICERS IN 1836—SENATOR SOUTHARD'S BILL TO LOCATE A SCHOOL AT FORTRESS MONROE PASSES THE SENATE, BUT FAILS IN THE HOUSE—SECRETARY UPSHUR'S REPORT—BILL OF SECRETARY BAYARD, OF DELAWARE—REPORT IN CONNECTION THEREWITH—ANOTHER FAILURE TO OBTAIN LEGISLATION.

WITH the table given at the close of the last chapter, together with some relating documents, as a basis, Mr. Watmough, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, made a report to the House of Representatives, under date of January 3, 1834, upon the subject of naval schools, and accompanied it with a proposed bill, House Bill No. 127. This bill, however, as it would seem, was not designed to renew the attempt to establish a Naval Academy, but simply to improve the method of instruction then in actual operation. This report is interesting as illustrative of the state of the educational movement at the date of its writing. It is, therefore, given in full as follows :

“The Committee on Naval Affairs, to which the subject was referred, report: The Committee on Naval Affairs, taking into consideration the condition of the naval schools as at present

established at Boston, New York, and Norfolk, and their inadequacy to effect the object proposed, deem it a duty to present to the House the accompanying bill. It is presumed no one will question the vital importance of these institutions to the service, both as it respects the well-being of the junior officers and their future usefulness to their country.

“By the subjoined letter (A) from the Secretary of the Navy it will be found that there are 450 midshipmen in service. Of these about one-half are supposed to be at sea, one-fifth on duty at shore stations, and the remaining 135 are on leave, waiting orders, on furlough, or sick. Admitting that of the latter class 35 are sick, and this would seem to be a very large proportion, there still remain one hundred youths left entirely to their own guidance, freed from those restraints so essential to their period of life, and subject alone to the influences of their own ardent impulses. The consequences are in too many instances fatal. It is believed to be the duty, as it assuredly is within the competency of Congress, to arrest the evils resulting from this state of affairs. The appropriations called for in the bill, under the judicious management of the Secretary, will effect much. The third and fourth sections of the bill, which provide an increase of the pay of the two *respectable* grades of the service, the chaplains and schoolmasters, it is hoped to have the effect to enhance greatly the benefits to be derived from the appropriations, while in truth they do no more than the original intention of Congress in creating those grades by placing them on a footing consistent with their dignity and usefulness. Their present rate of pay is admitted on all hands to be entirely insufficient. A reference to the annexed letter of the Secretary, marked B, with its accompanying statement (A) shows the actual condition of the schools, the amount expended from the contingent fund, but under no law, and the limited number of youths who are enabled to avail themselves of what benefits do result. It is true the department has lately issued an order requiring all midshipmen not otherwise employed to repair to some one of these schools; but as the Government does not feel itself authorized to allow the traveling expenses incidental to such order, few will be able to avail themselves of its benefits. The fifth section of the bill is intended to obviate this difficulty. If, however, the whole number should repair, as required, it will only afford an additional and

paramount obligation for the passage of the bill. All which is most respectfully submitted."

The bill of the Naval Committee was read, *pro forma*, a first and second time, and then referred to the committee of the whole. This was the only reference it received, however, as it was never referred to again in Congress. It was buried beyond resurrection, the most diligent search having failed to unearth it at the present time. Whether this resulted as a consequence of Mr. Watmough's unfortunate use of language, which made him say that the chaplains and schoolmasters exclusively represented the "two respectable grades of the service," or of the indisposition of Congress to legislate further upon the subject of naval education, cannot now be determined.

The next effort in the order of events was made by an old friend of the project, the ex-Secretary of the Navy, Samuel L. Southard, who had been reelected in 1833 to represent the State of New Jersey in the United States Senate, and who in 1841 became the President of that body. The subject was brought up on a memorial of naval officers, which, as possessed of historical interest, is here given in full:

"Twenty-fourth Congress—First Session.

"Resolutions of a Meeting of Sundry Officers of the Navy to Obtain the Establishment of a Naval School, April 23, 1836. Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

"At a meeting of the commissioned and warrant officers of the United States ship Constitution, held on board, for the purpose of

concerting measures to effect the establishment of a Naval Academy, the following preamble and resolutions were unanimously agreed to.

“WHEREAS, Having ever felt the most ardent desire to prosecute successfully the profession to which we are devoted, to advance the interests of the navy, and to perpetuate the commercial prosperity of our common country, consigned in part to our safe keeping; and taught, by the experience of the past, that neither industry nor talent can spare the advantages offered by early education; earnestly desirous of the means of securing it, and deploring the inadequacy of the existing system to accomplish either the object of the Government or to meet our heartfelt wishes for professional instruction; and believing, as we do, that a respectful representation of the anxious hopes which the entire navy have ventured to indulge for so many years, and to the consummation of which they look with the deepest interest, will receive the consideration to which so excellent an object is entitled, and find, from liberal authorities, that indulgence which is ever acceded to generous aspirations and laudable exertions; we have, therefore,

“1. *Resolved*, That we deem education to be of peculiar importance to the sea officer; and that, amid the progressive improvements in the arts and sciences which distinguish the present age, the military marine would be most conspicuous, if guided in its advance by the lights of education.

“2. *Resolved*, That we look to the establishment of a naval school as the only means of imparting to the officers of the navy that elementary instruction and scientific knowledge which, at the present day, has become almost indispensable to the military seaman.

“3. *Resolved*, That, from the circumstances arising in part from professional causes, the ship’s schoolmasters can rarely, if ever, impart such elementary or scientific knowledge, or advance the education of the naval officer; and that were the office absolutely abolished (of so little utility it is) no evil would arise therefrom.

“4. *Resolved*, That, believing the expense incurred by Government, in providing ship’s schoolmasters and professors of mathematics, for the benefit of the junior officers of the navy (and from which little or no advantage is derived), would liberally sustain a

scientific institution, we should see with pleasure said funds directed to the establishment and support of a naval school.

"5. *Resolved*, That copies of the proceedings be furnished to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that he will lend his countenance and support to our undertaking.

"6. *Resolved*, That we will, severally and collectively, use our most strenuous exertions to effect an object so dear to us, and which promises to confer so much dignity upon the navy, so much honor on our beloved country.

"7. *Resolved*, That a committee of ten be appointed to take charge of the subject, and conduct it to its final disposition.

"8. *Resolved*, That the Secretary of the Navy be requested to lay a copy of the foregoing resolutions before the President of the United States, and that a copy of them be sent to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the Senate and in the House of Representatives.

J. B. MONTGOMERY, Lieut.
 F. ELLERY, Lieut.
 ISAAC BRINKERHOFF, Asst. Surg.
 EDWARD C. RUTLEDGE, Lieut.
 G. F. PEARSON, Lieut.
 JAMES FERGUSON, Master.
 THOS. THEO. SLOAN, Lieut. Mar.
 LEOVIN MYNN POWELL, Lieut.
 THOMAS I. BOYD, Surg.
 JAMES EVERETT, Chaplain.
 HENRY ETTING, Purser.
 JOS. L. C. HARDY,
 Lieut. U. S. Marine Corps.
 MONTGOMERY LEWIS,
 Passed Midshipman.
 J. W. REVERE, Passed Mids'n.
 CHAS. CRILLON BARTON,
 Passed Mids'n.
 JAS. B. LEWIS, Mids'n.
 R. LLOYD TILGHMAN, Mids'n.
 JOHN N. MAFFIT, Mids'n.
 GEO. T. SINCLAIR, Mids'n.

GEO. W. RANDOLPH, Midshipman.
 JOHN F. MERCER, Passed Mids'n.
 FRANCIS S. HAGGERTY, Mids'n.
 B. F. SHATTUK, Mids'n.
 E. E. ROGERS, Mids'n.
 STEPHEN D. TRENCHARD, Mids'n.
 A. HUBLEY JENKINS, Mids'n.
 W. T. MUSE, Passed Mids'n.
 JAS. F. DUNCAN, Passed Mids'n.
 FRED'K OAKES, JR., Passed Mids'n.
 W. C. NICHOLSON, Lieut.
 F. A. NEVILLE, Lieut.
 JAS. M. BERRIEN, Passed Mids'n.
 CHAS. STEEDMAN, Passed Mids'n.
 JAMES L. HENDERSON,
 Passed Mids'n.
 FRANCIS P. HOBAN, Mids'n.
 JAS. W. COOKE, Passed Mids'n.
 WM. RADFORD, Passed Mids'n.
 WM. RONCKERDORFF, Mids'n.
 ROBT. WOODWORTH, Asst. Surg.

"The undersigned officers of the United States ship *Vandalia* concur entirely in the above preamble and resolutions.

THOS. T. WEBB, Master Com.	FAYETTE MEYNARD, Mids'n.
E. T. Doughty, Lieut.	FRANCIS ALEXANDER, Mids'n.
ISAAC N. BROWN, Mids'n.	S. C. ROWAN, Acting Master.
THOS. W. CUMMING, Mids'n.	M. C. WALKINS, Mids'n.
EDWIN A. DRAKE, Mids'n.	WM. M. WALKER, Passed Mids'n.
WM. PLUMSTEAD, Surg.	WM. SMITH, Lieut.
R. N. STEMBEL, Mids'n.	C. A. HASSLER, Asst. Surg.
E. MUSSON, Mids'n.	JAS. BROOKS, Purser."

This memorial, having been presented to Congress, was referred to the appropriate committee for consideration. Of this committee ex-Secretary Southard was chairman. Under the proceedings of the Senate, dated May 14, 1836, the following record appears :

"Mr. Southard, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom certain resolutions adopted at a meeting of commissioned and warrant officers of the navy were referred, made a report, accompanied by a bill (No. 262) to establish a Naval Academy. Read and passed to a second reading."

From the proceedings of the Senate upon Thursday, June 30, we learn that the bill was read a second time and considered as in committee of the whole. The result of this consideration was that, upon the motion of Senator Southard himself, the bill was ordered to lie upon the table, and, like his predecessor's in the House (Mr. Watmough's), it was never heard of again. The bill was similar in features to that of 1827, which Mr. Southard had so earnestly endeavored to have passed while Secretary of the Navy.

Up to this date, then, naval education remained as

heretofore stated, being committed to the charge of teachers who maintained a sort of irregular school upon board of the receiving-ships. Under the act originally authorizing their appointment they were termed "school-masters," and their pay was fixed at \$25 per month. This pay was provided for out of the general contingency fund, no specific appropriation therefor being made in the general naval appropriation bills. In the act of March 3, 1835, entitled "An act to regulate the pay of the navy of the United States," the school-masters are specifically provided for in the pay-list, and, through the process of evolution, which pertains to things marine as well as to things terrestrial, the simple dominie became a professor of mathematics with an appropriated salary of \$1,200 per year "when attached to vessels for sea service or in a yard." By the same act the pay of midshipmen was fixed as follows: When attached to vessels for sea service, \$400 per year; when on other duty, \$350; and when on leave of absence or waiting orders, \$300 per year.

After the second failure of Mr. Southard, in 1836, to accomplish creative legislation for a Naval Academy, the friends of the measure remained quiescent until the appointment of the Hon. Abel P. Upshur to be Secretary of the Navy, the portfolio of which he held from September 13, 1841, until July 24, 1843, nearly two years.

Secretary Upshur, in his first report, under date of December 4, 1841, renewed the recommendations in favor of special naval education. In this document he says:

“The propriety of establishing naval schools has frequently been submitted to the consideration of Congress. I again respectfully bring it to your notice, as a subject of increasing interest to the navy. The use of steam vessels in war will render necessary a different order of scientific knowledge from that which has heretofore been required. If our navy should be increased by the addition of any considerable number of steam vessels, engineers will form an important class of naval officers. It will be necessary to assign to them an appropriate rank, and to subject them to all the laws of the service. Great care should be used in the selection of them, because a great deal will depend upon their skill and competency; hence, it is necessary that they should pass through a prescribed course of instruction, and that the Government should have the proof of their competency which an examination conducted under their own rules would afford. The important object can best be attained by the establishment of naval schools provided with all the necessary means of uniting practice with theory. The advantages which the army has derived from the Academy at West Point afford a sufficient proof that a similar institution for the navy would produce like results.

“In connection with this subject I would ask your attention to the situations of the professors of mathematics now employed in the service. This useful class of men have no permanent connection with the navy, but are called in only as their services are needed, and are not paid except when on actual duty. The consequence is that they cannot rely on this employment for their support, and are often reluctantly driven to other pursuits. It is to be presumed that men whose talents and attainments qualify them to be teachers in the navy are equally qualified to be teachers on land; and as this latter is the less precarious position, the *best* qualified will be apt to seek it. Hence, the department cannot rely with any assurance on being able to command suitable professors at all times when their services may be required. It is, I think, of great importance that some provision should be made upon this subject. I also recommend that a certain rank or position be given to the professors, which will relieve them of the necessity of messing and sleeping with their pupils. This close and constant association is well calculated to weaken the respect and influence which their relation to the young officer ought to

inspire, and which is absolutely necessary to give due effect to their instructions. I doubt whether their services upon the present system are worth the money which they cost, although they would be highly valuable under proper regulations." Etc.

In accordance with these recommendations, a bill was prepared by Secretary Upshur, authorizing the establishment of a naval school to be located at or near Fortress Monroe, which bill was passed by the Senate but failed in further progress, through lack of action in the House. It has been claimed that this inaction was the result of a want of time; but this, manifestly, was not the case, as other portions of the Secretary's report received full attention. In compliance with his suggestions, the act of August 31, 1842, was passed, enacting "That professors of mathematics in the navy of the United States shall be entitled to live and mess with the lieutenants of sea-going and receiving vessels, and shall receive such rations as lieutenants of the same ship or station shall receive;" and also the act authorizing the appointment of engineers and assistants in the navy on steam vessels.

The fact is that the bill authorizing the naval school could not pass the House because of the opposition thereto. In his report of one year later, however—December, 1842—Secretary Upshur returned to the subject of the school with much zeal. The report now referred to is one of the ablest in our navy records. It displays knowledge of the subject to which it is devoted, originality of thought, and presents few or no traces of the department barnacle, which, perhaps, by this time,

had been Root-ed out. As representing the condition of the navy at that period, as well as forming part of the history of naval education, now being studied, the report is worthy of being reproduced entire in these pages, did the space permit. The author must content himself, however, with a liberal quotation from this interesting document.

In speaking of the subject of needed reforms in this branch of the service, Secretary Upshur touches the matter of the *personnel* of the navy, embracing within it the question of a school, in the following manner :

“The *personnel* of the navy is a subject of much deeper interest, although it presents no greater difficulties. That abuses exist, and that the public eye is occasionally offended with displays of disreputable behavior, is not surprising. Such things might be expected in any body of men equally numerous ; they are seen every day in social circles on shore, without affixing to those circles any individual or even general reproach. The navy is as free from such scandals as any equal number of men in any order of society. It is matter of just surprise that it should be so. Withdrawn in a great degree, by the very nature of their pursuits, from the immediate influence of that public opinion which is the best corrective of manners, and with a most imperfect system of laws and regulations as a substitute for it, what is there but their own sense of propriety to prevent naval officers from falling into the worst excesses? For twenty years past the navy has received from the Government little more than a stepmother’s care. It was established without plan and has been conducted upon no principle fixed and regulated by law. Left to get along as well as it could, the wonder is that it retains even a remnant of the character which it won so gloriously during the last war.

“Reform in this particular must commence with the midshipmen. After a time these boys become men, and these midshipmen become lieutenants, and commanders, and captains. Hence it is of the utmost importance that none should be appointed who are not

duly qualified and suited in all respects to that peculiar service. And yet to this great and fundamental truth no attention has hitherto been paid. The department has been left free to appoint whom it pleased, and as many as it pleased, without any law whatever to guide or regulate the judgment. The only rule by which the Secretary can be governed is to appoint those who are, or seem to be, best recommended, and yet in half the cases the boy himself is as well known as those who certify in his favor. Hence the Secretary acts in the dark, and must of necessity be often in error. It is a notorious fact that wayward and incorrigible boys, whom parental authority cannot control, are often sent to the navy as a mere school of discipline, or to save them from the reproach to which their conduct exposes them on shore. It is not often that skillful officers or valuable men are made out of such material. The corrective which I propose is this :

“ 1. The naval establishment shall be fixed by law, ascertaining among other things the number of officers to be allowed in each grade. There must be a due proportion among the several grades or else it will be impossible that the different duties of the service can be properly discharged. In this respect the proviso of the appropriation bill of the last session of Congress, limiting the number of midshipmen to the number who were in service on the 1st of January, 1841, and of other officers to the number who were in service on the 1st of January, 1842, will, if persisted in, prove extremely unfortunate in its action. The *precise* proportion for the effective officering of a ship depends upon her class.

“ 2. There should be established proper naval schools on shore. Little or no attention has hitherto been paid to the proper education of naval officers. Through a long course of years the young midshipmen were left to educate themselves and one another, and it is creditable to them that they lost few opportunities of doing so. Suitable teachers are now provided for them, but their schools are kept in receiving-ships and cruising vessels in the midst of a thousand interruptions and impediments, which render the whole system of little or no value.

“ Under such circumstances the foundation of a solid and useful education can rarely be laid. This subject was brought to the attention of Congress at its last session, and a bill establishing a naval school passed the Senate.

"It was not acted upon by the House of Representatives for want of time. I again earnestly recommend it, convinced as I am that its effect upon the navy will be in the highest degree beneficial. If adopted, Congress will of course prescribe such rules and regulations in regard to it as may seem to them proper, but I respectfully suggest the following as the outline of the system :

"The school shall be established at such of the old military fortifications on the seaboard as may afford suitable accommodations and as may not be required by the War Department.

"The officers and teachers shall be supplied from those actually in the naval service, and all nautical instruments, boats for practice, etc., shall be furnished from the navy. This will save nearly the whole expense of the schools.

"Instruction in the schools shall be given to candidates for admission into the navy, and to midshipmen actually in the service.

"The admission of candidates shall be regulated by law, as is done in regard to the West Point Academy.

"No boy shall receive an acting appointment in the navy until he shall have passed a certain period of diligent study at a naval school, nor unless he shall produce the necessary certificates from his officers and instructors of his good conduct, capacity, physical ability, and general fitness.

"Among those who shall produce such certificates appointments shall be made, according to such rule as Congress shall prescribe.

"These precautions will afford a reasonable amount of assurance that no boy will be admitted into the navy without being qualified for and worthy of that station.

"But the watchful care of the Government over him should not stop here. He should receive, in the first instance, an acting appointment, as is now the practice, and not be entitled to a full appointment until he shall have seen at least one year's service at sea, and made suitable progress in the science and practical duties of the service. After receiving his full appointment, he should pass not less than five years in active service at sea before he should be entitled to examination for a warrant as 'Passed Midshipman.'

“That examination should be rigorous and thorough, and none should be entitled to it who could not produce the most satisfactory proofs of good conduct, attainments, capacity and general fitness. By this time the boy will have attained a period of life when the character is generally well developed, and in some degree fixed, so that the country will have good reason to trust him in the higher grades of the service. A corps of officers formed of such material would probably present few instances of misconduct or incapacity, and would reflect honor on the country, while rendering to it the most valuable services.

“This system could not fail to relieve the *personnel* of the navy, after a time, of all its present incumbrances, and would certainly tend to keep it in a healthy condition. But it would be too slow in its operation for the cure of existing evils. Probably there never was a similar institution in any country into which abuses have not crept, after so long a period as thirty years of profound peace and of consequent neglect. Governments and their peoples are too apt to overlook the military arm when there is no immediate need of its protection, forgetting the wise maxim that in peace we should prepare for war. Our navy has experienced its full share of those unfavorable influences, and the natural consequence is seen in the admitted fact that it contains some officers who do no credit to their commissions. Their number, however, is much smaller than might have been justly expected under the operation of so many discouraging and corrupting causes. Every nation finds it necessary, after particular intervals of peace, to revise and reform its military establishments, and the time has now arrived when such a corrective may be advantageously applied to the navy of the United States.

* * * * *

“If this system should be fully and faithfully carried out, I do not perceive that anything more will be necessary to insure to the navy competent and honorable officers. Hitherto it has been their great misfortune that, with fewer opportunities than others to educate themselves, the Government has done nothing to educate them. The cadet from West Point enters the army well founded in the principles of solid and useful learning and fully prepared to engage with advantage in any pursuit, whether of civil or military life. The candidate for the navy, on the contrary, is deemed well

enough qualified if he be able to read and write, to answer a few simple questions in geography and English grammar, and to solve plain problems in the elementary rules of arithmetic. Why should this difference be made? Important as a proper preparatory education may be to the army officer, it is even more important to the officer of the navy. Apart from the fact that he has few opportunities to improve himself, it is to be remembered that he is the most frequent representative of his country abroad, the standard by which foreign nations will be most apt to measure her moral and intellectual character. He is also frequently intrusted with the important and delicate negotiations involving the rights of our citizens and the peace and honor of our country. The function of the naval commander is much more useful, important and dignified than is generally supposed. To his skill and vigilance are intrusted at every hour of the day and night the safety of his ship and the lives of his crew. The honor of his country's flag, and, in a great degree, her harmonious relations in peace and her protection in war, are among the awful trusts with which he is clothed. Very few men can be found qualified in every respect for so high and imposing an office, and, unhappily, there are too few among those who now hold it who duly feel its importance and dignity. I humbly think that it is a high duty of Government to adopt every means calculated in any degree to elevate the standard of character in the naval commander and to fit him in knowledge, in professional skill, and in personal character, to discharge the high and solemn duties of his office.

“This can best be done by giving him a suitable preparatory education and by providing proper and ready means of removing him from the ranks of his profession whenever he may be found unworthy to occupy a place in them.” Etc.

Emanating from a source of such great intelligence and familiarity with the subject under consideration, the appeal of Secretary Upshur was worthy of serious and profound thought. This it undoubtedly received at the third session of the Twenty-seventh Congress, when the report was submitted by the President, John Tyler. Eloquent and strong as was the argument in support of

the proposed measure, no greater degree of success attended the effort than followed the previous attempts to obtain legislation for a Naval Academy.

But one more attempt was now to be made to persuade Congress to enact the desired legislation before the appearance of the Napoleon of the occasion, who, ignoring Congress and the law-makers, called the workmen to his aid, constructed the long-talked-of edifice over night, and quietly appeared at the next session of Congress asking a ratification of his act and intrusting the infant institution to the fostering care of the Government.

It is worth while to complete the history of the various efforts to found the Academy under direct legislation by quoting in full the report of Secretary Bayard, of Delaware, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, made at the second session of the Twenty-eighth Congress, under date of February 10, 1845, as also the accompanying outline of the draft of a bill providing for the establishment of a naval school.

Section 1 of the bill orders the establishment of a naval school, under direction of the Secretary of the Navy, on board of a vessel of the United States, in connection with Fort Norfolk, on Elizabeth River, in the State of Virginia, as a shore station. The same official to prescribe the course of study, and rules for its government and discipline; to employ professors and teachers, etc.

Section 2 prescribes the mode of appointing pupils, which mode differs from that at present in force.

Section 3 prescribes the sea service that each pupil

must have, after undergoing the primary tuition at the school, for eighteen months, and receiving an appointment as midshipman, and also the additional course of study at the school after his return.

Section 4 relates to the pay of officers, teachers, and pupils.

Section 5 abolishes the former system of teaching, and appropriates the pay of the professors under it to the new establishment.

The report of Senator Bayard is as follows:

“The bill in question proposes the establishment of a naval school, and for that purpose to employ a ship of the United States, in connection with Fort Norfolk, on Elizabeth River, in the State of Virginia. The object is not to form an expensive establishment in any respect resembling the Military Academy at West Point, but merely to employ the existing means of instruction belonging to the service in a more effectual manner, and in some measure to insure, on the part of those who are admitted into the navy, the desired attributes of physical and intellectual strength and of moral worth. If the plan is adopted, the present annual charge upon the naval establishment for the instruction of midshipmen will be sufficient for the support of the school, while the advantage gained in point of instruction will, in the opinion of the committee, be very great.

“In order properly to understand and appreciate the measure, it will be necessary to contrast it with the existing mode of admission into the navy, and of instruction subsequently received. Under the existing laws and regulations of the department, the appointment of midshipmen is made by the Secretary, without any check whatever upon the exercise of his discretion, and is the result, for the most part, of personal or political influence. The regulations require that the individual shall not be less than fourteen nor more than twenty years of age, and his first order is for sea service. The learning required is a slight knowledge of English grammar and of the elements of arithmetic and geography ; and these attain-

ments are not closely scrutinized. There is no provision for ascertaining either his physical condition or his mental or moral culture; but his fitness is presumed from the fact of his recommendation by some political or personal friend. Instances have occurred in which boys, who have been thought by their acquaintances to be good for nothing else, have yet been thought good enough for a service which, in its perils and its responsibilities, requires high qualities of physical and intellectual vigor, as well as moral worth. His scientific instruction commences at sea or in a foreign port, amidst the noise and distraction of a crowded ship, and the interruptions of the various calls of duty. Having been five years in the service, three of which must have been passed in active duty at sea, and having attained the age of twenty years, the midshipman may be examined for promotion. To prepare for this examination, he spends a few months at the naval asylum at Philadelphia, where a school has been established for that purpose.

“This meager course of instruction furnishes the sum of his attainments. Such are the provisions for the training of this important branch of officers—the future commanders of a service in which they are to bear with honor the flag of the nation, in peace and in war, at home and abroad, on the high seas and in the ports of foreign nations—the armed ambassadors of the country, who must be able to fight and to negotiate, and whose duties require that they should be familiar not only with naval tactics and the whole circle of nautical science, but with the principles of international law. The object of the bill under consideration is to provide, in some measure, a remedy for these defects.

“The materials of a ship may be collected, and the ship built, in a few months; but the training of an officer is the work of years, and must be commenced at an early period of life. The science and skill of the officer is part of the military wealth of the country; and if it be necessary and proper to provide a supply of timber and naval stores, to build ships, to cast cannon, to form depots of arms and munitions of war, it is not less so to train and support a sufficient number of competent officers.

“The Constitution of the United States has given to Congress, in express terms, the power ‘to provide and maintain a navy;’ and there is no longer any doubt in the popular mind or among statesmen as to the policy of using the power. The protection of the

commerce, and the preservation of the security and honor of the country depend upon it.

“Assuming that the present scale of the establishment, both in its *personnel* and its *material*, is such as is commensurate with the wants and dignity of the nation, it is obviously necessary, in order to maintain it, that some provision should be made for its periodical renovation. The *personnel* of the navy may be divided into the *officers* and *men*, the latter branch of which is recruited from the merchant service and from the school of apprentices.

“The officers may be divided into the civil and military branches of the service, and the military branch may be again divided into the commissioned and warrant officers. The commissioned officers of the military branch are the captains, commanders, and lieutenants. Of these there are 68 captains, 96 commanders, and 328 lieutenants. This class of commissioned officers is recruited from the midshipmen, who belong to the class of warrant officers. The proviso of the naval appropriation act of August 4, 1842, limits the number of midshipmen as a class, embracing the passed and other midshipmen, to 451; and there are at present 159 passed midshipmen, and 314 midshipmen, being an excess of twenty-two beyond the number limited by that act. The number of commissioned officers in the military branch (namely, of captains, commanders, and lieutenants) is 492, and the number of passed and other midshipmen 473,—making a totality of 965; which suffers, taking the experience of the last three years, an annual diminution in its different grades, from death, resignation, and dismissal, of about thirty. At the expiration, therefore, of another year, this totality will be reduced below the number limited by the proviso of the act of August 4, 1842. Admitting, then, that the scale prescribed by that act is the proper one for a peace establishment, it is time to provide for its maintenance by prescribing the mode in which the class of midshipmen shall be recruited and kept full.

“Whether the respective number of officers in each of these grades be wisely adjusted, is a question that depends upon the view which is taken of the wants of the service, and of the claims of the officers to promotion, which is the great incentive of the profession. It has been well observed by the British Commissioners, in their report of March, 1840, that ‘in a fluctuating and uncer-

tain establishment, the continued fear of reduction would operate to check the energies of those holding employment therein, as their anxieties might be more directed to their individual position than to a satisfactory discharge of their duties.'

"In relation to the matter of promotion, it may be remarked that the present junior commander on the register had been in service, at the time of his promotion, more than twenty-six years, of which period he had been for more than sixteen years a lieutenant, and that a midshipman now entering the service would not, under the present establishment in the regular order of promotion, probably attain the rank of commander under thirty years. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to assume that there will be no material change in the number of officers prescribed by that act. The annual appointments, then, necessary to be made in order to keep the different grades of these officers full, according to the scale of the present peace establishment, are, as has been stated, about thirty. There is no want of applicants for admission into the service, and an important point is to devise some mode of selection from among the numerous candidates which may secure the best moral and physical attributes.

"The bill proposes, for this purpose, to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to select, at stated periods of eighteen months, which have reference to the course of instruction, sixty individuals from the applicants, who shall form the class of candidates for admission into the navy. The individuals selected are not to be less than *thirteen* nor more than *fifteen* years of age, and are to be examined under regulations of the department as to their physical condition and moral cultivation. If found to be possessed of the requisite qualifications, they are then to be admitted into the naval school. At this school they are to be instructed in suitable studies for the period of eighteen months, and at the end of that time are to be examined by a board composed of the professors of the school and of competent officers appointed by the Secretary, and classed according to their respective merit. As yet they are only candidates for admission into the navy, and from this class thus instructed, the oldest of whom will not be more than *sixteen and a half years old*, and the youngest not less than *fourteen and a half years*, it is proposed, in the order of their merit, to appoint the number of midshipmen necessary to supply the wants of the ser-

vice. For the purpose of subsistence while attending the school, it is proposed to allow them one-half the pay of midshipmen waiting orders. After the appointment of the requisite number of midshipmen there will be no further occasion for the services of the rest of the class, and they will merely retire from the school to pursue such vocations in life as their parents or guardians may indicate, having derived the benefit of instruction for eighteen months in branches of knowledge which may be useful to them through life. Immediately on receiving his warrant the young midshipman is to be sent to sea, to be employed in active duty for the period of three years. On his arrival in the United States he is to return to the naval school and prosecute his studies for another period of eighteen months, at the expiration of which he will undergo an examination, when, if found qualified, he will rank as a passed midshipman, and may, when occasion offers, be promoted to the rank of a commissioned officer. It will be perceived that the change which is proposed in the existing regulations is in the mode of appointing midshipmen and in the method of their instruction — the object being in the first instance to insure, as far as can be done, the appointment of such only as are fit for the service, and, in the second instance, to provide a more enlarged course of study and instruction under more favorable circumstances than he now enjoys. The term of sea service required prior to examination for promotion is the same under both systems.

“It remains only to say a few words in relation to the organization of the school, its course of instruction, and the expense of the establishment.

“For its organization it will require the following officers, which the service will supply:

“*Captain or commander*, as superintendent.

“*Commander or lieutenant*, as instructor in naval tactics, seamanship, gunnery, etc.

“*Lieutenants*. Two or three lieutenants, as assistants to the instructor in naval tactics, seamanship, gunnery, etc.

“*Boatswain* for the school-ship, who will instruct in the use and conversion of ropes, rigging, and in the sailor’s art.

“*Gunner* for the school-ship, to instruct in the equipment of guns and fitting all things necessary to the gunner’s department on board ship.

"*Carpenter* for the school-ship, to instruct in the repair of masts, yards, rudders, and to construct models for illustration.

"For the civil establishment of the school :

"Two professors of mathematics.

"A teacher of French.

"A teacher of Spanish.

"A teacher of drawing.

"A professor of engineering or general knowledge and four assistants.

"The course of instruction would embrace, in the first eighteen months, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, plane and spherical trigonometry, surveying and navigation, nautical astronomy, analytical geometry, with the collateral studies of the French and Spanish languages, drawing, grammar, geography, and history, and an initiation to seamanship.

"The course of instruction for the last eighteen months, after three years' sea service and preparatory to examination for promotion, would embrace the following studies: Descriptive geometry, differential and integral calculus, mechanics, the theory and application of steam power, hydrographic optics, electricity and magnetism, astronomy, gunnery and pyrotechny, naval architecture, naval tactics, with the application of the principles of mechanical philosophy to the various operations of seamanship, moral science, international and military law.

"The expense of the establishment will be less than the amount now expended for the purpose of instruction. The amount now expended is something over thirty thousand dollars, as follows :

Twenty-two professors of mathematics, at \$1,200.....	\$26,400
Rations and contingent allowances.....	2,500
Three teachers of languages, at \$500.....	1,500
Total	<u>\$30,400</u>

"It is proposed to abolish all the professorships, except such as are necessary for and attached to the school, and to appropriate the sum now expended for them to the establishment and support of the school.

"The expenses of the school, as a charge on the naval establishment, would consist only of the pay of the candidates for admission and of the pay of the civil branch of the school, as follows:

Sixty candidates for admission, at \$150.....	\$ 9,000
Two professors of mathematics, at \$1,400	2,800
One teacher of French, at \$800.....	800
One teacher of Spanish, at \$800.....	800
One teacher of drawing, at \$800.....	800
One professor of engineering or general knowledge, at \$1,400.....	1,400
Four assistants, at \$800.....	3,200
Total	\$18,800

“The employment of the naval officers who will be attached to the school adds nothing to the expense of the establishment, since there is no addition made to the number of officers, and they would receive their pay whether so employed or not.

“Upon the whole, it is apparent that, using the means which are furnished by the ordinary peace establishments of the navy, the school can be established and supported without any additional expenditure, by abolishing the professorships in the service generally, and employing for its support the amount now expended in the present imperfect system of instruction.”

The scheme set forth in the foregoing report and the accompanying bill embraces, as will be perceived after a short consideration, some features of considerable merit. The project, however, under this last impulse, was destined to an issue no more successful than had attended all previous efforts to obtain direct Congressional legislation under which to create and organize a Naval Academy. It was pushed with considerable pertinacity by persons of high influence, but by a neglect to legislate, Congress tacitly refused to sanction the measure, which it was believed would now be finally remanded to the “tomb of all the Capulets.”

CHAPTER X.

A NEW VIEW OF THE NAVAL ACADEMY—SECRETARY BANCROFT SOLVES THE DIFFICULTY—AN EFFECTIVE METHOD TO OVERCOME OBSTINATE LEGISLATORS—DOCUMENTS IN THE CASE—THE FIRST SUPERINTENDENT, COMMANDER FRANKLIN BUCHANAN—OUTBREAK OF THE MEXICAN WAR—FIRST RECOGNITION OF THE ACADEMY BY CONGRESS—TABLE SHOWING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NAVAL ACADEMY FROM 1845 TO 1886—THE APPROPRIATION FOR 1886 IN DETAIL—TABLE SHOWING NUMBER OF CADETS ADMITTED FROM ITS ORGANIZATION—THE REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ACADEMY.

AFTER the failure of Senator Bayard's bill it became evident that no legislation under which an Academy might be established could be expected from Congress. The Administration had changed upon the 4th of March, and James K. Polk had assumed the duties of the Presidency. James Buchanan became his Secretary of State, William L. Marcy his Secretary of War, and George Bancroft his Secretary of the Navy.

The new Administration was cordially in favor of the Naval Academy, and the determination to create it was soon reached. The ground was reviewed and the statutes searched, but no provision of law could be found that, under any construction, might authorize its establishment.

The position was perplexing, but a method was suggested through which the Gordian knot might be cut. Neither provision of the Constitution nor any law of Congress expressly authorized the establishment of a Naval Academy; but did any Constitutional provision or Congressional enactment *expressly prohibit the establishment of a Naval Academy?* The suggestion was quaint, but there were, evidently, adhesive qualities in it. The distinction between a school and an academy was adroitly ignored, and the details were soon arranged. Mr. Bancroft, the Secretary of the Navy, under the general supervision of naval instruction which was devolved upon him by existing law, determined to remove the pupils to a fixed point upon the shore. With this purpose in view he solicited a transfer of Fort Severn, at Annapolis, to the Navy Department, by the Secretary of War. This request was complied with, and within six months of the failure of Senator Bayard to obtain Congressional sanction for the establishment of the Academy it became *un fait accompli*, through an artifice which, but for the intervention of an unexpected circumstance—the certainty of a war with Mexico—would probably have received the disapproval of Congress and an annulment of the procedure.

The reproduction of two documents, in this connection, will place the reader in full possession of the ultimate method by which the long-talked-of project was accomplished.

The first of these is the following letter from Secretary Bancroft to Commander Franklin Buchanan:

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 7, 1845.

“*Sir*: The Secretary of War, with the assent of the President, is prepared to transfer Fort Severn to the Navy Department, for the purpose of establishing there a school for midshipmen.

“In carrying this design into effect it is my desire to avoid all unnecessary expense, to create no places of easy service, no commands that are not strictly necessary, to incur no charge that may demand new annual appropriations, but, by a more wise application of moneys already appropriated and officers already authorized, to provide for the better education of the young officers of the navy. It is my design not to create new officers, but, by economy of administration, to give vigor of action to those who at present are available; not to invoke new legislation, but to execute more effectually existing laws. Placed by their profession in connection with the world, visiting in their career of service every climate and leading people, the officers of the American navy, if they gain but opportunity for scientific instruction, may make themselves as distinguished for culture as they have been for gallant conduct.

“To this end it is proposed to collect the midshipmen who from time to time are on shore and give them occupation during their stay on land, in the study of mathematics, nautical astronomy, theory of morals, international law, gunnery, use of steam, the Spanish and French languages, and other branches essential in the present day to the accomplishment of a naval officer.

“The effect of such an employment of the midshipmen cannot but be favorable to them and to the service. At present they are left, when waiting orders on shore, masters of their own motions, without steady occupation, young, and exulting in the relief from the restraint of discipline on shipboard.

“In collecting them at Annapolis for purpose of instruction, you will begin with the principle that a warrant in the navy, far from being an excuse for licentious freedom, is to be held a pledge for subordination, industry, and regularity—for sobriety and assiduous attention to duty. Far from consenting that the tone of the discipline and morality should be less than at the universities or colleges of our country, the President expects such supervision and management as shall make of them an exemplary body of which the country may be proud.

“To this end you have all the powers for discipline conferred

by the laws of the United States and the certainty that the department will recommend no one for promotion who is proved unworthy of it, from idleness or ill conduct or continuing ignorance, and who cannot bear the test of a rigid examination.

“For the purpose of instruction the departments can select from among twenty-two professors and three teachers of languages. This force, which is now almost wasted by the manner in which it is applied, may be concentrated in such a manner as to produce the most satisfactory results. Besides, the list of chaplains is so great that they cannot all be employed at sea, and the range of selection of teachers may be enlarged by taking from their number some who would prefer giving instruction at the school to serving afloat. The object of the department being to make the simplest and most effective arrangement for a school, you will be the highest officer in the establishment and will be intrusted with its government. It is my wish, if it be possible, to send no other naval officer to the school except such as may be able and willing to give instruction. Among the officers junior to yourself there are many whose acquisitions and tastes may lead them to desire such situations. For this end the department would cheerfully detach three or four of the lieutenants and passed midshipmen, who, while they would give instruction, would be ready to aid you in affairs of discipline and government.

“One great difficulty remains to be considered. At our colleges and at West Point young men are trained in a series of consecutive years. The laws of the United States do not sanction a preliminary school for the navy, they only provide for the instruction of officers who already are in the navy. The pupils of the naval school being, therefore, officers in the public service, will be liable at all times to be called from their studies and sent on public duty. Midshipmen, too, on their return from sea, at whatever season of the year, will be sent to the school. Under these circumstances you will be obliged to manage your classes in such a manner as will leave opportunity for those who arrive to be attached to classes suited to the stage of their progress in their studies. It will be difficult to manage a system of studies which will meet this emergency, but with the fixed resolve which you will bring to the work, and with perseverance, you will succeed.

“Having thus expressed to you some general views, I leave

you, with such assistance as you may require, to prepare and lay before this department for its approbation a plan for the organization of the naval school at Fort Severn, Annapolis.

"The posts to which you and those associated with you will be called, are intended to be posts of labor; but they will also be posts of the highest usefulness and consideration. To yourself, to whose diligence and care the organization of the school is intrusted, will belong in a good degree the responsibility of a wise arrangement. Do not be discouraged by the many inconveniences and difficulties which you will certainly encounter, and rely implicitly on this department as disposed to second and sustain you, under the law, in every effort to improve the character of the younger branch of the service.

"I am very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"GEORGE BANCROFT.

"COM'R FRANKLIN BUCHANAN,

"United States Navy, Washington."

The second of these documents is the following extract from the annual report of Secretary Bancroft, dated December 1, 1845, and transmitted by President Polk to the first session of the Twenty-ninth Congress:

"Congress, in its great desire to improve the navy, had permitted the department to employ professors and instructors at an annual cost of about twenty-eight thousand two hundred dollars; and it has been usual, besides the few employed at the receiving-ships and the naval asylum, to send professors with the midshipmen into every ocean and clime. But the ship is not friendly to study, and the office of professor rapidly degenerated into a sinecure; often not so much was done as the elder officers would cheerfully do for their juniors; the teachers on board of the receiving-ships gave little instruction, or none whatever, so that the expenditure was fruitless of great results. Many of the professors were able and willing; but the system was a bad one. The idea naturally suggested itself, of seizing the time when the midshipmen are on shore, and appropriating it to their culture. Instead of sending migratory professors to sea with each handful of midship-

men, the midshipmen themselves, in the intervals between sea duty, might be collected in a body, and devote their time to suitable instruction. For the pay of the instructors Congress has provided ; in looking out for a modest shelter for the pupils, I was encouraged to ask for Fort Severn, at Annapolis. The transfer was readily made by order of the Secretary of War, and a school was immediately organized, on an unostentatious and frugal plan. This institution, by giving some preliminary instruction to the midshipmen before their first cruise, by extending an affectionate but firm supervision over them as they return from sea, by providing for them suitable culture before they pass to a higher grade, by rejecting from the service all who fail in capacity or in good disposition to use their time well, will go far to renovate and improve the American navy.

“The plan pursued has been unpretending, but it is hoped will prove efficient. A few professors give more and better instruction than four and twenty at sea. No supernumerary officer has been ordered to Annapolis ; no idle man is attached to the establishment. Commander Buchanan, to whom the organization of the school was intrusted, has carried his instructions into effect with precision and sound judgment, and with a wise adaptation of simple and moderate means to a great and noble end. Let not Congress infer that new expenses are to be incurred. Less than the amount that has hitherto been at the disposal of the department for purposes of culture, will support the school, and repair and enlarge the quarters received from the hospitality of the army.”

Without anticipating the future unfolding of the subject, attention may be called to the closing sentences of the above extract. The change was introduced as a reform, educational and pecuniary. The former it certainly was ; but in the last sense, the pretense of saving is somewhat ridiculous, in face of the large outlays that soon occurred, and which have continued in increasing ratio up to the present time.

The foregoing record, however, completes the history

of the establishment of the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The Academy at West Point has a legitimate *raison d'être*. It cannot boast of parentage under a special and exclusive act of Congress; but nevertheless it has the warrant of legislative enactment prior to birth. The Academy at Annapolis has no such legitimate parentage. It is a sort of *filius nullius*, adopted by a kindly Government under pressure and the compulsion of circumstances. Stripped of certain objections hereafter to be stated, the Academy, under the fostering care of the Government, has become a useful institution.

It was created, however, without sanction of law, by an Administration that, departing from the fixed traditions of our Government, inaugurated a war of pure conquest against a neighboring and friendly country, for the purpose of adding additional slave territory to the United States. That the territory subsequently acquired did not become wholly slave territory was no fault of that and subsequent Democratic Administrations.

Once fairly located at Fort Severn, the school was placed under the charge of Commander Franklin Buchanan, who became its first superintendent, which position he occupied for a period of two years. The present generation has still some remembrance of this unfaithful servant. He belongs to a class of persons of whom this volume must contain some particular mention in the later pages. From a boy of fifteen, when he entered the American navy as a midshipman, up to the year 1861, he was supported, educated, and honored by

the Government of the United States. For all that he was he was indebted to that Government. The year 1861 found him a captain in the navy, and in less than seven weeks after a Republican had been inaugurated President of the United States he deserted the Government that had reared, fed, and educated him, using the education he had thus obtained against the very Government that had nurtured him. He superintended the fitting-out of the *Merrimac* and commanded her in the attack upon our fleet in Hampton Roads, through which attack so many true and loyal men lost their lives. He subsequently became a rear admiral in the Confederate service.

Apart from all comment upon the method of creation, however, and all stricture upon the organization, the fact remained that the simple school system authorized by the Government had been transferred into an academic system; a location had been selected, school buildings and appliances obtained; a superintendent appointed, with full faculties, etc. All this was done under the pretext that no alteration had been made other than to change the previous system of instruction, with the migratory professors and pupils, to a fixed establishment of precisely similar character upon the shore.

Within a year after the establishment of the Naval Academy the Mexican War was fully upon us. The circumstance was propitious for the new-born offspring, and it was made the most of by its friends. The first recognition of the establishment by Congress in the appropri-

ation bill was sufficient to secure it against subsequent danger. In the naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1847, this recognition was secured in the following language :

“SEC. 4. That of the money appropriated in this act for the pay of the navy, and contingent expenses enumerated, an amount not exceeding twenty-eight thousand and two hundred dollars may be expended, under direction of the Secretary of the Navy, for repairs, improvements, and instruction at Fort Severn, Annapolis, Maryland.”

In the bill of the following year the same amount was appropriated, for the same purpose, with the addition of the words : “ and for the purchase of land for the use of the naval school at that place, not exceeding twelve acres.”

From this time onward the offspring was fairly adopted as the nation's child, and under the paternal care it has gradually developed into vigorous maturity.

Under this portion of the author's subject it now remains only to exhibit the general expense account of the institution, and to present a summary of such legislation in connection with it as may be of interest to the reader.

In one respect, at least, the navy appropriation bills differ from those of the army. The latter appropriate separately for the Military Academy at West Point, and enumerate specifically the various items of expense—including amounts for teachers of all classes, for repairs, for workmen, etc.—and, likewise, the regular annual amounts for “ pay of the cadets.” The naval bills appro-

priate separately, also, for the Naval Academy, but the pay of the cadets is included in the general budget of navy pay, and therefore does not constitute a separate item. This circumstance renders it somewhat difficult to present the precise expense in detail without access to official documents. The purpose of the present volume hardly requires such detail.

The expense account of the Academy, therefore, stands as follows, tabulated by years:

TABLE VI.

Showing appropriations for the Naval Academy, from 1845 to 1886, less only the pay of the cadets.

<i>Years.</i>	<i>Purposes.</i>	<i>Amounts.</i>
1845 to 1846.	Teachers' salaries.....	\$ 28,200
1846 to 1847.	Repairs, improvements, and instruction.....	28,200
1847 to 1848.	Repairs, improvements, and instruction, and for the purchase of twelve acres of land.....	28,200
1848 to 1849.	Improvements and repairs.....	\$ 19,300
	Instruction.....	28,200
		47,500
1849 to 1850.	For support of Naval School.....	218,200
1850 to 1851.	For instruction.....	\$ 28,200
	For imp't and repair of buildings and grounds.....	28,200
		56,400
1851 to 1852.	Instruction.....	\$ 28,200
	Repairs and erections of buildings.....	26,700
		54,900
1852 to 1853.	Repairs and erections of buildings.....	\$ 28,000
	Quarters for professors and students.....	75,000
	Contingent fund.....	21,700
	Instruction.....	28,200
		152,900
1853 to 1854.	Imp't and repair of buildings and grounds, and support of Academy.....	\$ 46,059
	Purchase of land, extending walls, making new roads, wharf, building, and furnishing hospital, etc.....	38,000
		84,059

<i>Years.</i>	<i>Purposes.</i>	<i>Amounts.</i>
1854 to 1855.	Erection and repair of buildings, imp't and preservation of grounds, and contingencies. \$ 39,678 Barlow's Planetarium..... 2,000 Instruction..... 28,200	\$ 69,878
1855 to 1856.	Repairs of buildings, heating works, and support of Academy..... \$ 25,044 Sea-wall and roads..... 23,000	48,044
1856 to 1857.	Repairs, imp'ts, and support of Academy.....	39,595
1857 to 1858.	Repairs, imp'ts, and support of Academy.....	42,307
1858 to 1859.	Repairs, imp'ts, and support of Academy.....	45,671
1859 to 1860.	Repairs, imp'ts, and support of Academy.....	50,000
1860 to 1861.	Repairs, imp'ts, and support of Academy.....	57,096
1861 to 1862.	Repairs, imp'ts, and support of Academy.....	49,567
1862 to 1863.	Academy removed at breaking out of Rebellion to Newport, R. I. Such appropriation as was necessary for the year was covered by general appropriation, except the item for mileage of Board of Visitors.	1,000
1863 to 1864.	For expenses of watchmen and others, and contingencies of the Academy.....	24,881
1864 to 1865.	[In September, 1865, Academy removed back to Annapolis.] Expenses of professors, watchmen, and others, and contingencies of the Academy.....	101,831
1865 to 1866.	Contingencies of the Academy.....	115,620
1866 to 1867.	Mileage of visitors..... \$ 1,000 Pay of civil officers, professors, watchmen, and others, contingent expenses and repairs.... 198,429 Purchase of Government House and ground of the State of Maryland..... 25,000 Purchase of other grounds..... 25,000 Erection of buildings..... 100,000 Erection of machine shops..... 2,000 Erection of mural tablets and enlargement of chapel..... 7,000	358,429
1867 to 1868.	Pay of civil officers, professors, watchmen, and others, and contingent account..... \$283,913 Mileage of visitors..... 2,000	285,913
1868 to 1869.	Salaries and wages..... \$122,000 Contingent account..... 63,450 Repairs..... 10,000 Steam engineering dep't and laborers..... 5,000	200,450

<i>Years.</i>	<i>Purposes.</i>	<i>Amounts.</i>
1869 to 1870.	Salaries and wages.....	\$105,294
	Contingent account.....	61,450
	Repairs	8,680
	Steam engineering dep't.....	5,000
	Board of Visitors.....	2,000
		\$ 182,424
1870 to 1871.	For all purposes.....	190,340
1871 to 1872.	For all purposes.....	213,082
1872 to 1873.	For all purposes.....	199,457
1873 to 1874.	For all purposes.....	199,456
1874 to 1875.	For all purposes.....	176,300
1875 to 1876.	For all purposes.....	183,616
1876 to 1877.	For all purposes.....	197,095
1877 to 1878.	For all purposes.....	190,095
1878 to 1879.	For all purposes.....	184,278
1879 to 1880.	For all purposes.....	186,493
1880 to 1881.	For all purposes.....	211,143
1881 to 1882.	For all purposes.....	211,943
1882 to 1883.	For all purposes.....	188,979
1883 to 1884.	For all purposes.....	179,382
1884 to 1885.	For all purposes.....	90,663
1885 to 1886.	For all purposes.....	180,628
	Total general appropriations for Naval Academy..	\$5,954,355

For the purpose of affording an idea of the basis upon which the Naval Academy is at present organized, the following items of the last appropriation bill may be usefully given in this connection:

“For twelve professors and assistants of various branches and of languages, sword master and two assistants, boxing master and gymnast, assistant librarian, secretary of Academy, three clerks of the superintendent, one clerk of the commandant of cadets, one clerk of the paymaster, one dentist (salary \$1,600), one baker, one mechanic, one cook, one messenger of the superintendent, one armorer, one gunner’s mate, one quarter gunner, one cockswain, one seaman in department of seamanship, one attendant in department of astronomy, one attendant in department of physics and

chemistry, six attendants of recitation-rooms, one band-master, twenty-eight first-class musicians and seven second-class —

In all.....	\$53,559
Captain of the watch and watchmen.....	23,025
Mechanics and laborers.....	14,576
Employés in steam enginery department.....	7,668
Repairs.....	21,000
Fuel and lights	17,000
For books — increase of library.....	2,000
For stationery, maps, etc.....	2,000
For department of physics and chemistry.....	2,500
For miscellaneous (steam pipes and fitting, rent of building for Academy, freight, cartage, music, musical and astronomical instruments, uniform for band, telegrams, maintenance of teams, current expenses and repairs of all kinds, incidental labor and expenses not included under any other head).....	34,600
Materials for repairs, etc.....	1,800
Mileage, board of visitors, etc., etc.....	1,500

The foregoing list of items reads something like a modern "bank statement," but, as before intimated herein, it is not the purpose of the author to find fault with the expense account of either of the national academies. The quotation is made solely for the information of the general reader, who may not have ready access to the official documents.

The following table, exhibiting the whole number of cadets admitted to the Naval Academy for a period of forty years, has been compiled from official sources.

Among its other features of interest, it will be observed that during the first three years of the war, the admissions to the Academy were greater than during any equal period of its history, either before or since the Rebellion. This single circumstance speaks strongly for the patriotism of the youth of the North.

TABLE VII.

Statement showing the number of cadets admitted annually to the Naval Academy since its organization in 1845.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Number.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Number.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Number.</i>
1845	10	1860	96	1875	118
1846	22	1861	193	1876	119
1847	45	1862	196	1877	105
1848	48	1863	190	1878	66
1849	31	1864	150	1879	68
1850	52	1865	130	1880	67
1851	54	1866	147	1881	64
1852	44	1867	70	1882	59
1853	36	1868	49	1883	115
1854	72	1869	87	1884	93
1855	34	1870	101	1885	86
1856	73	1871	86		
1857	91	1872	109		
1858	58	1873	111		
1859	101	1874	114		
				Total pupils 3,560	

From the foregoing exhibits it will appear that there have been 3,560 cadets admitted to the Academy, up to and including the year 1885, while the expenditures for the same time have been \$5,034,355. To arrive at the true total of expense, however, it will be necessary, as heretofore stated, to add the pay of the 3,560 cadets who have been admitted into the institution.

A statement of the principal regulations of the Academy, taken from the Revised Statutes, may appropriately close this part of the author's subject:

"That hereafter there shall be no appointment of cadet midshipmen or cadet engineers at the Naval Academy; but in lieu thereof, naval cadets shall be appointed from each Congressional

district and at large, as now provided by law for cadet midshipmen (one for every member or delegate of the House of Representatives, one for the District of Columbia, and ten appointed annually at large, provided there shall not be at any time in the Academy more than ten at large), and all the undergraduates of the Naval Academy shall hereafter be designated and called naval cadets, and from those who successfully complete the six years' course, appointments shall hereafter be made as it is necessary to fill vacancies in the lower grades of the line and engineer corps of the navy, and of the marine corps; provided, that no greater number of appointments into these grades shall be made each year than shall equal the number of vacancies which has occurred in the same grades during the preceding year; such appointments to be made from the graduates of the year at the conclusion of their six years' course, in the order of merit, as determined by the Academic Board, the assignment to the various corps to be made by the Secretary of the Navy upon the recommendation of the Academic Board. But nothing herein contained shall reduce the number of appointments from such graduates below ten in each year, nor deprive of such appointment any graduate who may complete the six years' course during the year 1882. And if there be a surplus of graduates, those who do not receive appointments shall be given a certificate of graduation and honorable discharge, and one year's sea pay, as now provided by law for cadet midshipmen (\$1,000).

"That any cadet whose position in his class entitles him to be retained in the service may, upon his own application, be honorably discharged at the end of four years' course at the Naval Academy, with a proper certificate of graduation.

"That the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe a special course of study and training at home or abroad for any naval cadet.

"That the pay of naval cadets shall be five hundred dollars per year.

"All candidates for admission in the Academy shall be examined according to such regulations and at such stated times as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe. Candidates rejected at such examination shall not have the privilege of another examination for admission to the same class, unless recommended by the Board of Examiners.


“Candidates allowed for Congressional districts, for Territories, and for the District of Columbia, must be actual residents of the districts or Territories, respectively, from which they are nominated. And all candidates must, at the time of their examination for admission, be between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, and physically sound, well formed, and of robust constitution.

“The academic course shall be six years.

“All graduates of the Naval Academy who are assigned to the line of the navy, on the successful completion of their six years’ course, shall be commissioned ensigns in the navy.

“The course for cadet engineers shall be four years, including two years of service on naval steamers.

“Naval cadets charged with ‘hazing’ shall be court-martialed, and if found guilty by the court, they shall, upon its recommendation, be dismissed, and such cadet shall always be ineligible to reappointment.”



THE VOLUNTEER'S DEPARTURE.

PART II.

CONSIDERATION
OF THE
PRESENT MILITARY SYSTEM
OF THE
UNITED STATES.

THE PRESENT MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER XI.

THE OBJECTS OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL ACADEMIES—
THE OBLIGATIONS OF GRADUATES TO THE GENERAL GOV-
ERNMENT—TRIBUTE OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN TO THE
LOYAL SOLDIERS AND SAILORS—THE GRADUATED ARMY
OFFICERS AND NON-GRADUATES OF THE ACADEMY WHO
WENT INTO THE REBELLION—DESERTERS FROM THE
NAVY—GRADUATES OF THE NAVAL ACADEMY FROM 1845
TO 1860.

THE author has made the history of the national institutions at West Point and Annapolis somewhat fuller than the strict requirements of the present work demand, because it seemed to him that the literature of the subject—perhaps it were better to say its bibliography—warrants the detail. The volumes already existing upon these institutions, while possessed of merit, and especially that of Captain Boynton upon the History of West Point, are more particularly addressed to the professional soldier and sailor. It is hoped by the author of the present volume that his description of the two institutions may more nearly supply a want of the general

public for information upon a subject that is possessed of the highest interest to our people at large.

Having fully described the origin of the national academies, it falls within the plan of the author to inquire into their progress and to scrutinize their present adaptation to the requirements of the American Republic. It has long been the writer's belief that, as they were originally organized and as they now exist, they are not only unproductive of the results necessary to be obtained from such institutions, but that they contain many elements that might under certain circumstances prove dangerous to the best interests, and perhaps even to the long continued life of the Republic. The author is aware that he is treading upon delicate ground in opening a discussion as to the merit of these institutions. The proposition that disciplined soldiers are more efficient than those undisciplined, and that special education in the art and science of war creates more successful officers than the absence of such education, has come to be recognized as indisputable, while the fact that we have two institutions especially established for the purpose of imparting an expert military and naval education is accepted by the majority of people as a sort of sequence warranting a proposition and conclusion that may be briefly stated thus: Special military education is necessary to the making of the perfect soldier, and as our law has amply provided for imparting it, all of our soldiers are perfect. This species of logic is not very different in kind and not far removed in practical result from that once employed

in a distinguished legislative assembly to seat a member who was in political accord with a majority of the body, but who had been given a certificate of election in face of the most glaring violation of law. The committee reported that Mr. Smith's case admitted of a logical statement from which there was no escape: that Mr. Smith, the holder of the certificate of election, was either entitled to the seat, or he was not entitled to it; the contestant had declared that Smith was *not* entitled to it; therefore, according to the contestant himself, the seat belonged to Smith through sheer force of logic.

It is the purpose of the author to examine somewhat critically the institutions referred to, with the view to ascertain whether, as they have been and are now organized, they are free of objection, and whether they represent the system that should be adopted by a government like our own. In making such an examination the author can have no other purpose than that to contribute to the best interest of the country. His effort will be to discuss the questions connected with the subject of the usefulness of the academies in a temperate and wholly impartial manner. Having nothing of which to make personal complaint, and with a practical experience of the topics upon which he writes, his views should be unbiased. These views, be they valuable or not, will now be submitted to the people of the United States, to whom the whole subject is of incalculable importance.

As preliminary to the discussion purposed by the author, however, it seems desirable to make record of a

personal fact, as it may be termed, relating to those who have received a technical military or naval education from the hands of the Government. The fact belongs to the public record of our country, though an extreme magnanimity has prompted its concealment from the general people. Upon the very threshold of the present investigation the author is made to realize the great delicacy of his task. Frank and open statement, however, closely relates to the subject to be considered, and underlies the future of the Government. This fact is sufficient for the writer; and, though individuals having a personal interest in the concealment, or in a complete distortion of the truth, will, undoubtedly, in order to break the force of legitimate argument and conclusion, allege a purpose of the author to revive bitter memories and to foment sectional hatreds, he will continue to place his trust in the fairness of his countrymen, in whose service his best efforts have been employed during all his life.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, in 1861, the Academy at West Point had been established fifty-nine years, dating from its legal organization in 1802; while the Academy at Annapolis had been upon a working basis for sixteen years, dating from 1845, the year of its permanent location at Fort Severn. The fact is, however, as fully appears in the preceding pages, that a regular school for naval instruction had been maintained by the Government for a much longer period, and that most if not all of the higher naval officers in the service of the United States at the breaking out of civil warfare had

been educated by and at the expense of the Government. So far as the military officers are concerned, the venerable Winfield Scott represented one of the very few then in actual service who had not been educated at and graduated from the West Point Academy.

Upon entering the service of the Government, one and all alike took the oath of loyal support of that Government. Now, this Government was representative, not of any factional number of the States, but of the whole number of States and Territories comprising the American Union. Theoretically, the money which went to construct the edifices at West Point and at Annapolis, to equip them as academies of instruction, to pay teachers, to support pupils, etc., etc., was contributed by all of the States in a certain proportion. The fact is, however, that the Northern States of the Union, being greatly more populous and wealthy than the Southern States, so called, paid the expense of these institutions in that excess directly represented by the greater revenues of the General Government, based upon the mere fact of their increased population and wealth. Putting this palpable circumstance — which represents the greater obligation of the *alumni* to one section than to another — entirely aside, it appears that all of the military and naval officials who received their special education at West Point and Annapolis were indebted for that education and for their personal maintenance through varying periods — generally from their early youth up to the year spoken of — to all of the States of the American Union. They were

sworn by oath, and bound by every consideration of honor and principle, to the service of those States — not to one of them, nor yet to a dozen of them, but to one and all of them, representing the Government of the United States, whose bread they had eaten, whose money they had received, and from which they had obtained a technical or specific education in war that they had distinctly obligated themselves to use in defense of the Union of States constituting the Government.

This fact is thus strongly drawn because of the relevance it possesses to the inquiry concerning the full measure of usefulness of these national institutions. Within a few years past, exculpation for the attempt to break up the Union has assumed a somewhat new form. It is urged that the right of a State to secede from the Union was, to put it in its best form, but an unsettled question; that the people who attempted secession were sincere believers in their legal right to pursue that course; that, being honest in the conviction, they owed a paramount duty to their State governments, and that for these reasons it is not right that they should be held responsible for violating a principle that has never been established under any binding constitutional interpretation. It is not the present intention to enter into a discussion of questions growing out of this position, nor to inquire as to the extent of its justice, if any it have. The fact to be dealt with at this time is that, upon the inauguration of hostilities against the United States by a certain number of States composing the Union, there were a large number of

citizens who, after having pledged themselves solemnly to support the Government, after having obtained as a bounty from it a military education, after having received a maintenance for a varying number of years, were wholly without justification for the course pursued by them; these citizens not being at all covered by the defense above stated in behalf of the general doctrine of secession.

The individuals composing the army and navy of the United States—those of them, more particularly, who have received their education and maintenance from the Government—more nearly represent the Government, with a single exception (that of the judiciary), than any other individuals or class of people that compose it. They are *permanently attached* to it. This cannot be said of any other class of public servants in the whole Government service, except those belonging to its judicial branch. Presidents, Cabinet officers, Senators, members, foreign ministers, consuls, revenue officers, postmasters, clerks, and in short, the whole list of public employés, come and go; but the army and navy hold on forever. They are the only class, with the exception above noted, that are removed from direct responsibility and accountability to the people, at the polls. Changes of party do not affect them. They stand with the expounders of justice, as the representatives of a government that may change every official connected with it, except themselves, at short intervals of time.

Under this view of the case, their relation to the Gov-

ernment is peculiar, not to say extraordinary. An ex-civil officer of the Government has no connection with it other than that of a simple citizen, with the privileges and obligations pertaining to the character of a citizen. Whatever claim may be made that, under the theory of a supreme allegiance to a State, individuals were justified in following their States in the secession movement, no such claim can be made in behalf of those members of the army and navy who not only deserted the Government, but went into the ranks of those attempting to destroy it. No State sovereignty claim can extend its mitigating influence over them. They belong to the Government *per se*, and they had no personality that was not distinctly and emphatically absorbed by the Government.

If the issues submitted to the arbitrament of arms during the late civil conflict are really and finally settled by a sincere acquiescence in the supremacy of the National Government, certainly no good citizen will wish to revive the bitterness then engendered, nor even the remembrance of past events, except in so far as they possess an important bearing upon the future of the country and the interests of its people. The subject now touched upon, however, has present vitality in connection with the matter of our inquiry, viz.: the soundness of the system upon which our national military and naval education is based. That it is not sound, and that its defects are largely responsible for the conduct of those faithless officers who abandoned their country in its hour of peril, the

author believes to be susceptible of demonstration. The following quotation from the report of the Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War under President Lincoln, will serve to show how nearly fatal to the life of the Government was the conduct of the men upon whom the country should have been able to rely in any emergency. In this report, dated July 1, 1861, Secretary Cameron said :

* * * "The large disaffection at the present crisis of United States army officers has excited most profound astonishment, and naturally provokes inquiry as to its cause. But for this startling defection *the Rebellion never could have assumed formidable proportions*. The mere accident of birth in a particular section, or the influence of a belief in particular political theories, furnishes no satisfactory explanation of this remarkable fact. The majority of these officers solicited and obtained a military education at the hands of the Government—a mark of special favor conferred by the laws of Congress to only one in seventy thousand inhabitants. At the National Military Academy they were received and treated as the adopted children of the Republic. By the peculiar relations thus established, they virtually became bound, by more than ordinary obligations of honor, to remain faithful to their flag. The question may be asked, in view of the extraordinary treachery displayed, whether its promoting cause may not be traced to a radical defect in the system of education itself."

The following extract from the report of the Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, dated July 4, 1861, being germane to the same matter, may be appropriately quoted in this connection :

* * * "Since the 4th of March two hundred and fifty-nine officers of the navy have resigned their commissions or been dismissed from the service. This diminution of officers, at a time when the force was greatly enlarged, and when the whole naval

armament of the country was put in requisition, has compelled the department to send many of our public vessels to sea without a full complement of officers. To some extent this deficiency has been supplied by gentlemen formerly connected with the navy who had retired to civil pursuits in peaceable times, but who, in the spirit of true patriotism, came promptly forward in the hour of their country's peril, and made voluntary tender of their services to sustain the flag and the country. The department gladly availed itself of the tender thus patriotically made, and received these gentlemen into the service in the capacity of acting lieutenants. The alacrity with which they presented themselves for duty in any position the Government might assign them, when others, who had been the honored and trusted recipients of Government favors, were deserting the standard, was no less honorable to them than to the profession which they adorned, and the country which they loved."

These two quotations illustrate a pregnant fact in the history of the late war which shows conclusively that, had the recreant officers of the army and navy remained faithful to their solemn trusts, the sacrifices of human life which were made would not have been required, and that the limits of the Rebellion would scarcely have exceeded the proportions of a huge but badly organized mob.

In thus commenting upon the recreant members of both branches of the war service, the author takes particular pleasure in recording another fact, interesting in itself and important in its relation to the subject of military and naval education in our two national academies. This fact is represented by the circumstance that treason to the Government in the military and naval arms was confined to the *officers* whom the Government was specially educating for its defense. Justice to the faithful, as well as the relevancy of the fact to the present subject, requires its

full statement in this connection. The reader will pardon an extract in this place from the message of President Lincoln, read at the commencement of the first session of the Thirty-seventh Congress, and dated July 4, 1861, which states in the terse and graphic style of that great statesman and patriotic man the grateful fact now spoken of.

"It is worthy of note," said the lamented President, "that while in this, the Government's hour of trial, large numbers of those in the army and navy who have been favored with the offices have resigned and proved false to the hand which had pampered them, not one common soldier or common sailor is known to have deserted his flag.

"Great honor is due to those officers who remained true despite the example of their treacherous associates, but the greatest honor and the most important fact of all is the unanimous firmness of the common soldiers and common sailors. To the last man, so far as known, they have successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of those whose commands but an hour before they obeyed as absolute law. This is the patriotic instinct of a plain people. They understand without an argument that the destroying the Government which was made by Washington means no good to them."

What a glorious tribute to the American common soldier and sailor is this! And what an unanswerable demand lies within the mere statement of the fact for the inauguration and establishment of a system of national military education which shall at one and the same time save us from a repetition of such wholesale treachery as was witnessed in 1861, and give to our country the services of its patriotic citizens especially educated to serve in its defense.

If it be possible to define different degrees of a crime

as great as that of treason, those who, after having received a military or naval education from the Government, used it in an attempt to destroy that Government, were certainly guilty of the supreme infamy of the late Rebellion. The traitorous statesmen who had held high place under the Government might fulminate upon paper, with little other damage than that resulting from the destruction of writing-materials. It was the traitorous defenders of the Government that made the Rebellion practicable. Had they kept the faith of soldiers; had they been true to the obligations of honest men and citizens, there would have been no Rebellion, and the nation would not have been called upon to endure the sacrifices of blood and treasure which followed as a direct consequence of their treason.

It has been remarked in the first part of the present chapter that what the author terms a *personal fact* has been suppressed in the public records through extreme magnanimity. The official registers of the army and navy contain the names of the loyal and disloyal, with no distinguishing mark other than to note under the regular headings, *Resigned, Dropped, Dismissed*, etc., the names of those who infamously betrayed their trusts, the reader being left wholly without information as to why certain officers resigned, why certain others were dropped, and certain others were dismissed.

At the close of a civil war which determined the indissoluble character of the American Union and established the authority of the Government over States that

had resorted to armed rebellion upon an enormous scale, the nations of the world were astonished at the magnanimity of the conquerors to the conquered. Such a spectacle of charitable forgiveness as then occurred, whereby leaders who, by every law and usage of nations, had merited summary execution, were freely pardoned and restored to the full privileges of citizenship, was never before witnessed from the time that rebellion against governments first took the desperate chances of success or of certain death to the instigators. Men hobbling about the streets, mutilated in the defense of their country; noble-hearted women clad in vestments of deepest black and mourning the loss of husband, brother, relative, or friend; and orphaned children, from whom the protecting and supporting arm of the father had been cruelly wrenched, joined, one and all, in a sentiment of forgiveness, while the whole people gave fervent response to the words of the mighty chief of the Union host when exclaiming from the American Capitol, "Let us have peace!"

The course of forbearance and forgiveness pursued by the Government was supremely worthy of the people of the United States. It was grand; it was magnanimous; it was wise; it was far-seeing. It is but a few months ago that an unfortunate Canadian, smarting under the pain of undoubted wrong and Government oppression, inaugurated a feeble resistance to the lawful authority, whereby a mere handful of men lost their lives. It was a very small rebellion at best, and was based upon griev-

ances that the Government had refused or neglected to remedy, after repeated efforts had been made. When the leader, Riel, had been taken, no representation was sufficient to mitigate the sentence, and he was executed like a common felon upon the scaffold.

As these lines are being written an extraordinary scene is taking place in some of the States lately in rebellion. The corner-stone of a monument to the dead soldiers of the vanquished Confederacy has been laid with great pomp and amid wild enthusiasm by the executive head of the late Confederacy, Mr. Jefferson Davis. This unsuccessful chieftain has been permitted by the American people to live quietly in the enjoyment of his home and family, unharmed and unmolested. At this moment he is making addresses and emitting sentiments for which in any other country of the world he would be hanged with as little ceremony as possible. Impotent of harm himself, the general public cares little as to what he may say or do. But the painful warning of the case lies in the significant and earnest response of the people that are taking part in the ceremonies now being performed. Mr. Davis has assured the shouting crowds that the Southern cause is *not* lost, and the announcement has been received with noisy approval. The thoughtful people of the North, who, with wide-open arms, received their Southern brothers in a spirit of magnanimous reconciliation that has no parallel in history, understand the purport of this sentiment and are viewing these demonstrations with silent alarm. Some are being led to ques-

tion the wisdom of the magnanimity of the Government and the people of the North in attempting the reconstruction of the Southern States upon a basis of such great leniency.

However all this may be, one policy is plainly necessary. Let the extreme of kindness be preserved toward our brothers of the South. Let us continue to extend the hand of fellowship and national brotherhood. Let us blot out the animosities of the war and eradicate every trace of bitterness between the sections if the Southern people will consent to it. But for the sake of our national existence and the honor and manhood of our people let us never cease to stigmatize treason as a crime, and to laud patriotism and fidelity to our country as among the sublimest of virtues. These are foundation-stones upon which rests the perpetuity of the American Government. When weak sentimentality, under the form of mistaken magnanimity, shall fear to applaud the right lest the feelings of the wrong be wounded; when the record of the brave, the loyal, the true, shall be cast into the shade lest its exhibition may bring under light the wickedness of the unworthy, the disloyal, the treacherous, then may we well exclaim with the Roman Senator, "It is all over with the Republic," and mournfully await with folded hands the downfall of free governments and the expiration of the genius of liberty.

In December, 1863, the United States Senate adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary of the Navy to report to that body the names of all officers of the navy

and of the marine corps who left the service to engage in rebellion. In response to this resolution the Secretary furnished the desired information, which is repeated in the present volume. So far as the author's information extends, however, no such information relating to officers of the army has ever been drawn from the records of the departments and placed in a position of accessibility to the public. Believing that justice to the brave officers who remained faithful to their trust demands it, and that the policy of concealing, as far as possible, the names of the faithless has the germ of future evil in it, the author has caused to be prepared, though with considerable difficulty, a list of the army officers who deserted their country, either to ally themselves with its enemies or to remain passive spectators of its destruction. The list may not be critically accurate, though it is believed to be substantially correct.

The reader will observe that those whose names are followed by an abbreviation for a Northern State indicate men of the North who went into the service and pay of the enemy. Fortunately, these latter names are few in number.

TABLE VIII.

Exhibiting a list of army officers, graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, who left the service of the United States upon the inauguration of the Rebellion in 1861.

Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William H. T. Walker, Tenth Infantry, December 20, 1860.

Captain Robert P. Maclay, Eighth Infantry, December 31, 1860. (Penn.)

Second Lieutenant Francis A. Sharp, First Artillery, January 10, 1860. (Ind.)

Second Lieutenant John R. Church, First Cavalry, October 30, 1860.

Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston, Quartermaster-General, April 22, 1861.

Colonel Samuel Cooper, Adjutant-General, March 7, 1861.

Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Albert S. Johnston, Second Cavalry, May 3, 1861.

Colonel Robert E. Lee, First Cavalry, April 25, 1861.

Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Crittenden, of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, June 10, 1861.

Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Hardee, First Cavalry, January 31, 1861.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gabriel J. Rains, Fifth Infantry, July 31, 1861.

Major Richard B. Lee, Commissary of Subsistence, May 9, 1861.

Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John B. Grayson, Commissary of Subsistence, July 1, 1861.

Brevet Major William W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant-General, July 3, 1861.

Major and Brevet Colonel Benjamin Huger, Ordnance Department, April 22, 1861.

Major Theophilus H. Holmes, Eighth Infantry, April 22, 1861.

Major Robert S. Garnett, Ninth Infantry, April 30, 1861.

Major Earl Van Dorn, Second Cavalry, January 31, 1861.

Major and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Winder, Third Artillery, April 27, 1861.

Major Edmund K. Smith, Second Cavalry, April 6, 1861.

Major Richard C. Gatlin, Fifth Infantry, May 20, 1861.

Major Henry H. Sibley, First Dragoons, May 13, 1861.

Captain James A. J. Bradford, Ordnance Department, May 1, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Abraham C. Meyers, Assistant Quartermaster, January 23, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Major Henry C. Wayne, Assistant Quartermaster, December 31, 1860.

Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John B. Magruder, First Artillery, April 20, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Ruggles, Fifth Infantry, May 7, 1861. (Mass.)

Captain and Brevet Major Larkin Smith, Eighth Infantry, May 13, 1861.

Captain Thomas Jordon, Assistant Quartermaster, May 2, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Major James G. Martin, Assistant Quartermaster, June 14, 1861.

Captain Arnold Elzy, Second Artillery, April 25, 1861.

Captain Lucius B. Northrop, First Dragoons, January 8, 1861.

Captain Richard S. Ewell, First Dragoons, May 7, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Major John C. Pemberton, Fourth Artillery, April 29, 1861. (Penn.)

Captain William B. Blair, Commissary of Subsistence, May 14, 1861.

Captain John P. McCown, Fourth Artillery, May 17, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Major Edward Johnson, Sixth Infantry, June 10, 1861.

Captain Ruben P. Campbell, Second Dragoons, May 11, 1861.

Captain Lafayette McLaws, Seventh Infantry, March 23, 1861.

Captain William Steele, Second Dragoons, May 30, 1861. (N. Y.)

Captain and Brevet Major Peter G. T. Beauregard, Corps of Engineers, February 20, 1861.

Brevet Captain David R. Jones, Assistant Adjutant-General, February 15, 1861.

Captain Jeremy F. Gilmer, Corps of Engineers, June 29, 1861.

Captain Samuel Jones, First Artillery, April 27, 1861.

Captain Edmunds B. Halloway, Eighth Infantry, May 14, 1861.

Captain John M. Jones, Seventh Infantry, May 27, 1861.

Captain Richard H. Anderson, Second Dragoons, March 3, 1861.

Captain George E. Pickett, Ninth Infantry, June 25, 1861.

Captain William M. Gardner, Second Infantry, January 19, 1861.

Captain Barnard E. Bee, Tenth Infantry, March 3, 1861.

Captain Henry Heth, Tenth Infantry, April 25, 1861.

Captain Charles S. Winder, Ninth Infantry, April 1, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Major Samuel S. Anderson, Second Artillery, April 27, 1861.

Captain William N. R. Beall, First Cavalry, August 20, 1861.

Captain Richard B. Garnett, Sixth Infantry, May 17, 1861.

Captain Josiah Gorgas, Ordnance Department, April 3, 1861.
(Penn.)

Captain Eugene E. McKean, Assistant Quartermaster, April 25, 1861.

Captain James M. Hawes, Second Dragoons, May 9, 1861.

Captain George H. Steuart, First Cavalry, April 22, 1861.

Captain Nathan G. Evans, Second Cavalry, February 27, 1861.

Brevet Captain John Withers, Assistant Adjutant-General and First Lieutenant Fourth Infantry, March 1, 1861.

Captain Martin L. Smith, Corps of Topographical Engineers, April 1, 1861. (N. Y.)

Captain Alfred Cumming, Tenth Infantry, January 19, 1861.

Captain John A. Brown, Fourth Artillery, July 3, 1861.

Captain John Adams, First Dragoons, May 31, 1861.

Captain George W. Ley, Sixth Infantry, Aide-de-camp and ex-officio Lieutenant-Colonel, March 2, 1861.

Captain James McIntosh, First Cavalry, May 7, 1861.

Captain John W. Frazer, Ninth Infantry, March 15, 1861.

Captain Seth M. Barton, First Infantry, June 11, 1861.

Captain William L. Cabell, Assistant Quartermaster and First Lieutenant Seventh Infantry, April 20, 1861.

Captain William D. Smith, Second Dragoons, January 28, 1861.

Captain William H. C. Whiting, Corps of Engineers, February 20, 1861.

Captain Edward D. Blake, Eighth Infantry, June 11, 1861.

Captain Cadmus M. Wilcox, Seventh Infantry, June 8, 1861.

Captain Charles W. Field, Second Cavalry, May 30, 1861.

Captain Robert Ransom, First Cavalry, May 24, 1861.

Captain James E. B. Stuart, First Cavalry, May 14, 1861.

First Lieutenant William G. Gill, Fourth Artillery, February 4, 1861. (N. J.)

First Lieutenant Ambrose P. Hill, First Artillery, March 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant Armistead L. Long, Second Artillery, June 10, 1861.

First Lieutenant Caleb Huse, First Artillery, February 25, 1861. (Mass.)

First Lieutenant Thomas K. Jackson, Eighth Infantry, April 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant James L. Corley, Sixth Infantry, May 4, 1861.

First Lieutenant Robert Johnston, First Dragoons, April 25, 1861.

First Lieutenant Thomas G. Williams, First Infantry, March 15, 1861.

First Lieutenant John H. Forney, Tenth Infantry, January 23, 1861.

First Lieutenant Robert G. Cole, Eighth Infantry, January 28, 1861.

First Lieutenant Philip Stockton, First Cavalry, February 25, 1861. (N. J.)

First Lieutenant Thornton A. Washington, First Infantry, April 8, 1861.

First Lieutenant George B. Anderson, Second Dragoons, April 25, 1861.

First Lieutenant Samuel H. Reynolds, First Infantry, July 28, 1861.

First Lieutenant John T. Shaaff, Second Cavalry, February 22, 1861.

First Lieutenant George B. Cosby, Second Cavalry, May 10, 1861.

First Lieutenant Stephen D. Lee, Fourth Artillery, February 20, 1861.

First Lieutenant James L. White, Third Artillery, March 3, 1861.

First Lieutenant William R. Boggs, Ordnance Department, February 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant John Pegram, Second Dragoons, May 10, 1861.

First Lieutenant Henry H. Walker, Sixth Infantry, May 3, 1861.

First Lieutenant John B. Villepigue, Second Dragoons, March 31, 1861.

First Lieutenant Matthew L. Davis, Third Infantry, May 13, 1861.

First Lieutenant William D. Pendar, First Dragoons, March 21, 1861.

First Lieutenant John Mullins, Second Dragoons, April 24, 1861.

First Lieutenant Thomas M. Jones, Eighth Infantry, February 28, 1861.

First Lieutenant John B. Hood, Second Cavalry, April 16, 1861.

First Lieutenant Lucius L. Rich, Fifth Infantry, May 13, 1861.

First Lieutenant George W. C. Lee, Corps of Engineers, May 2, 1861.

First Lieutenant Laurence S. Baker, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, May 10, 1861.

First Lieutenant James A. Smith, Sixth Infantry, May 9, 1861.

First Lieutenant Hylan B. Lyon, Third Artillery, April 30, 1861.

First Lieutenant John T. Mercer, First Dragoons, April 26, 1861.

First Lieutenant John O. Long, Second Infantry, May 2, 1861.
(Ill.)

First Lieutenant James H. Hill, Tenth Infantry, May 1, 1861.
(Me.)

First Lieutenant Frank S. Armistead, Tenth Infantry, June 14, 1861.

First Lieutenant Lunsford L. Lomax, First Cavalry, April 25, 1861. (R. I.)

First Lieutenant Fitzhugh Lee, Second Cavalry, May 21, 1861.

First Lieutenant Manning M. Kimmel, Second Cavalry, August 14, 1861.

First Lieutenant George Jackson, Second Dragoons, June 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant Richard H. Brewer, First Dragoons, May 13, 1861.

First Lieutenant Arthur S. Cunningham, Tenth Infantry, June 25, 1861.

First Lieutenant Lafayette Peck, Eighth Infantry, August 23, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Richard V. Bonneau, Third Infantry, March 2, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Horace Randall, First Dragoons, February 27, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Frederick L. Childs, First Artillery, March 4, 1861. (Me.)

Second Lieutenant Robert C. Hill, Fifth Infantry, March 3, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Owen K. McLemore, Sixth Infantry, April 8, 1861.

Second Lieutenant James P. Major, Second Cavalry, March 21, 1861.

Second Lieutenant William H. Jackson, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, May 16, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Aurelius F. Cone, First Infantry, May 13, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Paul J. Quattlebaum, Ninth Infantry, June 29, 1861.

Second Lieutenant John S. Marmaduke, Seventh Infantry, April 17, 1861.

Second Lieutenant George W. Holt, Third Infantry, February 28, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Henry C. McNeill, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, May 12, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Robert H. Anderson, Ninth Infantry, May 17, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Thomas J. Berry, Second Dragoons, January 28, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Oliver H. Fish, First Cavalry, May 1, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Samuel W. Ferguson, First Dragoons, March 1, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Richard K. Meade, Jr., Corps of Engineers, May 1, 1861.

Second Lieutenant George A. Cunningham, Second Cavalry, February 27, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Edward P. Alexander, Corps of Engineers, May 1, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Byron M. Thomas, Fifth Infantry, April 6, 1861.

Second Lieutenant James H. Hallonquist, Fourth Artillery, January 1, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Solomon Williams, Second Dragoons, May 3, 1861.

Second Lieutenant William G. Robinson, Second Infantry, May 17, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Andrew Jackson, Jr., First Cavalry, May 7, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, April 22, 1861.

Second Lieutenant John R. B. Burtwell, First Cavalry, March 21, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Frank Huger, Tenth Infantry, May 21, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Edward D. B. Riley, Fourth Infantry, June 13, 1861.

Second Lieutenant John S. Saunders, Ordnance Department, April 22, 1861

Second Lieutenant Stephen D. Ramseur, Fourth Artillery, April 6, 1861

Second Lieutenant Moses H. Wright, Ordnance Department, May 30, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant William P. Smith, Corps of Topographical Engineers, April 27, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Moses J. White, Ordnance Department, February 7, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Joseph Dixon, Corps of Topographical Engineers, June 28, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant William H. Echols, Corps of Topographical Engineers, March 21, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Charles R. Collins, Corps of Topographical Engineers, June 10, 1861. (Penn.)

Brevet Second Lieutenant Samuel H. Lockett, Corps of Engineers, February 1, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Robert F. Beckham, Corps of Topographical Engineers, May 3, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Benjamin F. Sloan, Jr., Second Dragoons, March 2, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Wade H. Gibbes, Second Cavalry, January 1, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Harold Borland, Fifth Infantry, March 31, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Mathais W. Henry, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, August 19, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant George O. Watts, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, August 10, 1861.

Paymaster Lloyd J. Beall, April 22, 1861.

Paymaster Robert H. Chilton, April 29, 1861.

Paymaster Thomas G. Rhett, April 1, 1861.

Paymaster James Longstreet, June 1, 1861.

DECLINED.

By Major William W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant-General, the appointment of Assistant Adjutant-General, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, to date from May 11, 1861.

DROPPED.

Captain Alexander W. Reynolds, Assistant Quartermaster, October 4, 1861.

Captain Franklin Gardner, Tenth Infantry, May 7, 1861. (N. Y.)

Captain Henry B. Davidson, First Dragoons, July 30, 1861.

First Lieutenant James Deshler, Tenth Infantry, July 15, 1861.

DISMISSED.

Captain Carter L. Stevenson, Fifth Infantry, June 25, 1861.

Captain Dabney H. Maury, Assistant Adjutant-General, June 25, 1861.

Captain Charles H. Tyler, Second Dragoons, June 6, 1861.

Captain Beverly H. Robertson, Second Dragoons, August 8, 1861.

First Lieutenant Joseph C. Ives, Corps of Topographical Engineers, December 26, 1861. (N. Y.)

Second Lieutenant Nathaniel R. Chambliss, Third Artillery, May 25, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Olin F. Rice, Sixth Infantry, June 6, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Charles E. Patterson, Fourth Infantry, June 6, 1861. (Ind.)

Second Lieutenant Charles C. Campbell, First Cavalry, June 6, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant John M. Kerr, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, July 13, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Llewellyn G. Hoxton, Ordnance Department, May 23, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Clarence Derrick, of the Corps of Engineers, July 16, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant Frank A. Reynolds, Second Dragoons, July 16, 1861.

First Lieutenant Walter H. Stevens, Corps of Engineers, May 2, 1861.

First Lieutenant Charles H. Rundell, Fourth Infantry, June 6, 1861. (N. Y.)

TABLE IX.

Exhibiting a list of army officers, non-graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, who left the service of the United States upon the inauguration of the Rebellion in 1861.

RESIGNED.

Captain John Donovan, Tenth Infantry, December, 29, 1860.

Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, First Dragoons, May 13, 1861.

Colonel Matthew M. Payne, Second Artillery, July 23, 1861.

Colonel William W. Loring, of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, May 13, 1861.

Brevet Major George Deas, Assistant Adjutant-General, February 25, 1861.

Captain Henry Little, Seventh Infantry, May 7, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Major Joseph Selden, Eighth Infantry, April 27, 1861.

Captain Andrew J. Lindsay, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, May 5, 1861.

Captain John G. Walker, Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, July 31, 1861.

Captain Thomas Claiborne, Jr., Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, May 14, 1861.

Captain and Brevet Major Lewis A. Armistead, Sixth Infantry, May 26, 1861.

Captain William D. De Saussure, First Cavalry, March 1, 1861.

Captain James J. Archer, Ninth Infantry, May 14, 1861.

Captain William R. Bradfute, Second Cavalry, March 21, 1861.

Captain William S. Walker, First Cavalry, May 1, 1861.

Captain Crawford Fletcher, Ninth Infantry, March 1, 1861.

Captain Francis C. Armstrong, Second Dragoons, August 13, 1861.

First Lieutenant Anderson Merchant, Second Artillery, May 2, 1861.

First Lieutenant Julius A. De Lagnel, Second Artillery, May 17, 1861.

First Lieutenant Caleb Smith, Second Infantry, May 3, 1861.

First Lieutenant Walter H. Jenifer, Second Cavalry, April 30, 1861.

First Lieutenant Henry B. Kelly, Tenth Infantry, February 27, 1861.

First Lieutenant George W. Carr, Ninth Infantry, February 20, 1861.

First Lieutenant Alfred Iverson, Jr., First Cavalry, March 21, 1861.

First Lieutenant Lawrence W. O'Bannon, Third Infantry, March 31, 1861

First Lieutenant Edward F. Bagley, Fourth Artillery, March 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant Alexander E. Steen, Third Infantry May 10, 1861.

First Lieutenant Walter Jones, First Infantry, May 10, 1861.

First Lieutenant Edwin J. Harvie, Ninth Infantry, March 13, 1861.

First Lieutenant George S. James, Fourth Artillery, February 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant Charles D. Anderson, Fourth Artillery, April 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant Aaron B. Hardcastle, Sixth Infantry, May 7, 1861.

First Lieutenant Richard H. Riddick, First Cavalry, May 9, 1861.

First Lieutenant Thomas B. Edelin, Seventh Infantry, May 30, 1861.

First Lieutenant John G. Taylor, Eighth Infantry, June 7, 1861.

First Lieutenant William Kearny, Tenth Infantry, June 1, 1861.

First Lieutenant John R. Cooke, Eighth Infantry, May 30, 1861.

First Lieutenant Joseph F. Minter, Second Cavalry, March 31, 1861.

First Lieutenant John R. Waddy, Fourth Artillery, July 26, 1861.

First Lieutenant Charles W. Phifer, Second Cavalry, April 1, 1861.

- First Lieutenant Edward Ingraham, First Cavalry, May 2, 1861.
 First Lieutenant Nathaniel Wickliffe, Ninth Infantry, May 17, 1861.
 First Lieutenant William O. Williams, Second Cavalry, June 10, 1861.
 First Lieutenant William H. Brown, Eleventh Infantry, October 23, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant William Butler, Second Artillery, February 1, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant St. Clair Dearing, Second Artillery, February 7, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant Arthur Shaaff, Fourth Infantry, July 10, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant William F. Lee, Second Infantry, April 30, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant Joseph P. Jones, Second Artillery, January 28, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant Alexander M. Haskell, First Infantry, May 1, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant Francis Mallory, Fourth Infantry, July 10, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant James K. McCall, Fourth Infantry, April 25, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant William E. Burnett, First Infantry, July 17, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant James Howard, Third Artillery, April 3, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant Gabriel H. Hill, Third Artillery, April 29, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant James H. Holman, First Infantry, April 17, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant Samuel M. Cooper, First Artillery, April 5, 1861.
 Second Lieutenant Alexander B. Montgomery, Fourth Artillery, March 3, 1861.
 Surgeon Samuel P. Moore, February 25, 1861.
 Surgeon David C. De Leon, February 19, 1861.
 Surgeon Thomas C. Madison, August 17, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Charles H. Smith, April 25, 1861.

- Assistant Surgeon John M. Haden, April 25, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Thomas H. Williams, June 1, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Edward W. Johns, April 22, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon William W. Anderson, April 20, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Elisha P. Langworthy, April 30, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Aquila T. Ridgely, June 23, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Andrew J. Foard, April 1, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Richard Potts, May 7, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Robert L. Brodie, May 7, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Nathaniel S. Crowell, May 17, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon John J. Gaenslen, August 17, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Asa Wall, May 11, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Charles Brewer, May 7, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Edward N. Covey, June 1, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon William A. Carswell, March 25, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon James H. Berrien, March 17, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon Archibald M. Fauntleroy, May 9, 1861.
 Paymaster Henry Hill, June 14, 1861.
 Paymaster Sackfield Maclin, March 1, 1861.
 Paymaster Abraham B. Ragan, June 30, 1861.
 Military Storekeeper John M. Galt, Ordnance Department,
 February 28, 1861.
 Military Storekeeper Briscoe G. Baldwin, Jr., Ordnance
 Department, April 22, 1861.
 Military Storekeeper Theodore Lewis, Ordnance Department,
 February 18, 1861.
 Military Storekeeper Frederick C. Humphreys, Ordnance
 Department, May 22, 1861.

DROPPED.

- Captain Robert R. Garland, Seventh Infantry, May 23, 1861.
 Assistant Surgeon James C. Herndon, November 27, 1861.

DISMISSED.

- Brigadier and Brevet Major-General David E. Twiggs, March
 1, 1861.
 Captain John McNab, Tenth Infantry, July 1, 1861.
 First Lieutenant James E. Slaughter, First Artillery, May 14,
 1861.

First Lieutenant Andrew Jackson, Third Infantry, June 6, 1861.

First Lieutenant John Thomas Goode, Fourth Artillery, July 3, 1861.

Second Lieutenant Edward Dillon, Sixth Infantry, June 25, 1861.

Second Lieutenant William W. McCreery, Fourth Artillery, June 3, 1861.

Brevet Second Lieutenant James P. Parker, Fourth Infantry, July 16, 1861.

Assistant Surgeon Lafayette Guild, July 1, 1861.

Assistant Surgeon David P. Ramseur, August 17, 1861.

Paymaster Albert J. Smith, June 20, 1861.

In presenting a list of naval officers who also deserted the standard of their country, the author avails himself of the entire report of the Secretary of the Navy, heretofore referred to. The details relating to each individual are fuller than it has been possible to obtain in connection with the deserting army officers, but it is deficient in an important particular, viz.: that it does not designate the graduates of the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The author has attempted to supply the deficiency by giving as complete a list as he has been able to obtain of the graduates of the Academy, from the year 1845 to the year 1860 inclusive.

A comparison of the list of graduates of the Naval Academy during the years indicated with the list of deserters to the Confederate service, as given by Secretary Welles, will show whether the deserting officer entered the United States navy through the Academy, or by prior appointment as midshipman. Unfortunately, the names of a number of individuals appear in the list of

graduates from the Naval Academy and also in that of deserters from the naval service.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy is as follows :

“REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

“*Transmitting, in answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 21st of December, 1863, a list of officers of the navy and of the marine corps who, between the first day of December, 1860, and the first day of December, 1863, left the service, with the grade and rank of each.* January 5, 1864. Read, referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and ordered to be printed.

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, December 29, 1863.

“*Sir:* The resolution of the Senate, dated the 21st instant, which directs ‘that the Secretary of the Navy be requested to report to the Senate the names of all officers of the navy and of the marine corps who, between the first day of December, 1860, and the first day of December, 1863, left the service, either by resignation or desertion, stating which, to engage in the rebellion against the Government of the United States, giving the grade or rank, and also designating such (if any) as have been formally dismissed by the President,’ has been received, and I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement embodying the information called for.

“It will be observed that the names of all officers who have left the service between the periods referred to, for whatever cause, are embraced in the list submitted. Those marked as being in the ‘rebel navy’ are ascertained to have entered that service from a copy of the ‘register of the commissioned and warrant officers of the navy of the Confederate States, to January 1, 1863,’ published at Richmond, Virginia, and now in the possession of the department.

“Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

“GIDEON WELLES,

“Secretary of the Navy.

“HON. H. HAMLIN,

“Vice-President of the United States, and President of the Senate.”

TABLE X.

List of all Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps who left the Service between December 1, 1860, and December 1, 1863, by resignation, dismissal, or desertion, to engage in the Rebellion against the Government, or otherwise.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Lawrence Rousseau....	Captain....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thomas M. Newell....	Captain....	Resigned...	At the South.
Isaac Mayo.....	Captain....	Dismissed..	Died day of dismissal.
French Forest.....	Captain ...	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Josiah Tattnal.....	Captain....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Hugh N. Page.....	Captain....	Resigned...	At the South.
Harrison H. Cocke....	Captain....	Resigned...	At the South.
Victor M. Randolph....	Captain....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Franklin Buchanan....	Captain....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
George N. Hollins....	Captain....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Duncan N. Ingraham..	Captain....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
George A. Magruder...	Captain....	Dismissed..	Residing in Canada.
Samuel Barron.....	Captain....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
William F. Lynch.....	Captain....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Isaac S. Sterrett.....	Captain....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Joseph Meyers.....	Commander	Resigned...	At the South.
William Green.....	Commander	Resigned...	At the South.
Edward B. Boutwell....	Commander	Dismissed..	Residing in Washington.
Sidney Smith Lee.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
William C. Whittle....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Robert D. Thorburn....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John Manning.....	Commander	Resigned...	At the South.
Robert G. Robb.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
William W. Hunter....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Murray Mason.....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Ebenezer Farrand.....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Charles H. McBlair....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Archibald B. Fairfax ...	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
William McBlair.....	Commander	Dismissed..	Joined rebel navy; since dead
Richard L. Page.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Frederick Chatard....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Arthur Sinclair.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Chas. H. A. H. Kennedy	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Thomas W. Brent.....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John K. Mitchell.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Matthew F. Maury.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Raphael Semmes.....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Edward L. Handy.....	Commander	Dismissed..	At the South.
William Chandler.....	Commander	Dismissed..	By court-martial.
John R. Tucker.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Thomas J. Page.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
George Minor.....	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Robert F. Pinckney...	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thomas R. Rootes.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Henry J. Hartstene...	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James L. Henderson...	Commander	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
William T. Muse.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Thomas T. Hunter.....	Commander	Dismissed..	In rebel service.
Charles F. McIntosh...	Commander	Dismissed..	Joined rebel service; killed at New Orleans.
George H. Preble.....	Commander	Dismissed..	Neglect of duty; since rein-
James W. Cooke.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	In rebel navy. [stated.
Chas. F. M. Spotswood.	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
J. J. B. Walbach.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	Whereabouts not known.
William L. Maury.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Francis B. Renshaw...	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James H. North.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Robert B. Pegram.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Richard L. Tilghman...	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	Did not go south.
Charles Hunter.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	Sentence of court-martial.
George T. Sinclair.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Carter B. Poindexter...	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
James B. Lewis.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	At the South.
Henry H. Lewis.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
George W. Harrison...	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James D. Johnston.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James N. Maffit.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Washington Gwathmey.	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
William A. Wayne.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	Joined rebel navy; since dead
Peter U. Murphy.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Isaac N. Brown.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
John J. Guthrie.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Joseph N. Barney.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
S. Chase Barney.....	Lieutenant.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Thomas B. Huger.....	Lieutenant.	Resigned...	Joined rebel navy; since killed

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
John Rutlege	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Catesby ap R. Jones	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Silas Bent	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
Van R. Morgan	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
John S. Taylor	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	Joined rebel army; since dead
E. Lloyd Winder	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
John H. Parker	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Joel S. Kennard	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
John Wilkinson	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
W. Winder Pollock	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
Charles M. Morris	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Chas. M. Fauntleroy	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Wm. B. Fitzgerald	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	Joined rebel navy; since died.
Alphonse Barbot	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	By sentence of court-martial; in rebel navy.
John S. Maury	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Charles W. Hays	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Henry K. Stevens	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	Joined rebel navy; since killed
Reginald Fairfax	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	Joined rebel navy; since dead
William A. Webb	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Maurice Simons	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	At the South.
Charles C. Semmes	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Julian Meyers	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy. [unknown.
Robert M. McArann	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	For misconduct; whereabouts
Alex. F. Warley	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
John W. Bennett	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Jonathan H. Carter	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Augustus McLaughlin	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
William H. Parker	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
J. Pembroke Jones	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
William L. Powell	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel army.
William H. Murdaugh	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
John M. Brooke	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy. [Navy.
Joseph D. Danels	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	Acting Lieutenant U. S.
John Kell	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Alex. M. De Bree	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy. [unknown.
Edward A. Selden	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	For misconduct; whereabouts
James H. Rochelle	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Robert D. Minor	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
N. H. Van Zandt	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
David P. McCorkle	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
William Sharp	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
James J. Waddell	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Joseph Fry	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Robert Selden	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	Did not go south.
George H. Bier	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Charles P. McGary	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Hunter Davidson	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Dulany A. Forest	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	Joined rebel navy; since dead
Robert R. Carter	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
John R. Hamilton	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Oscar F. Johnston	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Beverly Kennon	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
John Taylor Wood	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
John R. Eggleston	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Robert T. Chapman	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Wm. P. A. Campbell	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Joseph D. Blake	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Wm. T. Glassell	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Benj. P. Loyall	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Wm. H. Ward	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
J. W. Dunnington	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
F. E. Shepherd	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Thos. P. Pelot	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy. [unknown.]
A. J. McCartney	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	For misconduct; whereabouts
William G. Dozier	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
William L. Bradford	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Phillip Porcher	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy. [unknown.]
George E. Law	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	For misconduct; whereabouts
H. H. Dalton	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
George S. Shryock	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Thomas K. Porter	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel army.
J. W. Alexander	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
John M. Stribling	Lieutenant .	Resigned . . .	Joined rebel navy; since dead
Charles J. Graves	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Walter R. Butt	Lieutenant .	Dismissed . .	In rebel navy.
Wm. E. Evans	Master	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Thos. B. Mills	Master	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Wm. A. Kerr	Master	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Wm. C. Whittle	Master	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
John Pearson	Master	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
H. A. F. Young	Master	Resigned . . .	At the South.
John Grimball	Midshipman	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Wilburn B. Hall	Midshipman	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Chas. W. Read	Midshipman	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Edmund G. Read	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Thomas L. Dornin	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
James L. Hoole	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Francis L. Hoge	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Samuel W. Averett.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
James L. Tayloe	Midshipman	Dismissed..	At the South.
S. W. Hackett	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown
Geo. A. Borchert.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Thos. L. Harrison	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Henry B. Claiborne ...	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Hillary Cenas.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
A. D. Wharton.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Charles H. Rogers	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Edward H. Clark	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Robert C. Hopkins.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Wm. L. Marsh.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Charles H. Potter.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Wm. Hammett	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Morrow W. Lowry.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Allen K. Kelton.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Charles H. Ballance....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Charles W. Reynolds...	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
C. C. Clements.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Charles T. Pond	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Charles B. Goodkin ...	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Henry W. Sprole.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Thos. G. Welles.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Henry C. Townsend....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Frederick Sturtevant ...	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
C. P. Hone.....	Midshipman	Resigned...	Not at the South.
E. F. J. Warren.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Francis D. Campbell ...	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Wm. Johnston.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Richard F. James.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
R. H. Bushnell	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Smith Egbert.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Robert J. Sperry.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
George A. Crall.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Henry D. Wyman.....	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Henry D. Fuller	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Thomas Williams	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
James P. Wygum	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
William E. Lathey	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Joseph K. Kelsoe	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
F. H. Bolenius	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Francis D. Foote	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
William J. Schroeder	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
James K. Goodhue	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
James P. Hale	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
William B. Murray	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Charles McJ. Engle	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
William A. McKown	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Thaddeus P. Anderson	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Buchanan Beale	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Richard L. Ross	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Thomas S. Flood	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Francis W. Perkins	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Stephen D. Adams	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
John McK. Duncan	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
F. M. Keith	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
William B. McMichael	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
P. McL. Washebaugh	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
John F. Fisher	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Alfred W. Baylies	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Charles J. Blake	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Erastus M. Parker	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Mitchell M. Jamar	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
John C. Orner	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Charles J. Buchan	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Lawrence Mallory	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Charles T. Jewett	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Stephen D. Field	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
John Dunscomb	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Frederick L. Lincoln	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
John T. Tinker	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Franklin Kneass	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
George W. Lewis	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Henry H. Wilson	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Robert S. Ryers	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Charles H. Sedgwick	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Hobart Berrien, Jr.	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
C. Preston	Midshipman	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
Robert C. Fonte	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned..	In rebel navy.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
R. H. Bacot	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John T. Walker	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. W. Wilkinson	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Ochran C. Howard	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Robert Flournoy	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Napoleon J. Smith	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Sardine G. Stone	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Francis M. Robey	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John R. Price	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. F. Robinson	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Jas. G. Baldwin	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Isaac C. Holcombe	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Hugh L. Hill	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Robert Payne	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Jas. A. Meriwether	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Raphael Moses	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Horatio G. McClintock	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. E. Pinckney	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Barron Carter	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thos. M. Berrien	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
David Moodey	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. Van Comstock	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John H. Comstock	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. W. Carnes	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
M. P. Goodwyn	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John H. Ingraham	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Dabney M. Scales	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thos. G. Garrett	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John M. Reber	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Joseph D. Wilson	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John F. Holden	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. A. Hicks	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. P. Lee	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Not at the South.
A. G. Hudgins	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
H. H. Dougherty	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
W. R. Dalton	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
George D. Bryan	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Giles F. Appleton	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Chas. H. Daniels	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	U. S. marine corps.
Jas. W. Ahl	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
John C. Fortune	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Silas S. Willett	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Temporary service U. S. N.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
William W. Young.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
John A. Hopkins.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
James A. Peters.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Benj. Heath, Jr.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Louis E. Fagan.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Edward P. Guthrie.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
James A. Dick.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Robert E. Carmody.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. H. Hivling.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
H. H. Marmaduke.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Edward S. Buggles.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
David A. Telfair.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel army.
Wm. C. Osterloh.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. L. Ames.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
John S. Livingston.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Le R. H. Washington ..	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Henry S. H. Williams ..	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Lucius E. Heath.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. B. Cushing.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Lieutenant, U. S. navy.
Cassius Meyer.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James E. Fiske.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James M. Morgan.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Edward J. McDermott..	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thos. L. Moore.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
George A. Howard.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. P. Mason.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Henry C. Holt.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Mortimer M. Benton...	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Daniel Trigg.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Francis T. Chew.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Joseph P. Claybrook...	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Andrew P. Beirne.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. C. Hutter.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Robert A. Camm.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Richard S. Floyd.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Daniel Carroll.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. C. Jackson.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. W. Read.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Joseph M. Gardner.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Chas. F. Sevier.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Aug. O. Wright.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel army.
Theo. Sturdivant.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Ivey Foreman	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Alex. M. Mason	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Algernon S. Worth.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
H. B. Littlepage	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James M. Stafford.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Henry S. Cooke.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Henry C. McDaniel....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
James M. Pearson	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. J. Carroll	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wyndham R. Mayo	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Onis A. Browne	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Henry L. Vaughan.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Gale W. Sparks	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. D. Goode	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
James C. Long.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Joseph B. Peyton	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Julien M. Spencer.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Charles K. King	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Jefferson Phelps	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. M. Pipkin	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Gustavus English	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. J. Craig.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Chas. L. Schultz	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Alfred F. Brady.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. A. Duer.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Thos. L. Morris.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
E. Buckmaster.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
C. H. Brantingham.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Thos. R. Brookes	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
George F. Hyam.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Franklin S. Cantrell....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Daniel W. Davies	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
John C. Doughty	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. D. Groves.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Henry F. Struse	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. A. Doliver	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Robert W. Alexander ..	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
James B. Baker.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. Robinson	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned ..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. H. Smith.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned..	Whereabouts unknown.
Junius D. Crabb	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned ..	Whereabouts unknown.
Francis O. Blake.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Wm. H. Dunn.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. H. Webb.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Alfred S. Newlin.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
George H. Laughton ...	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Peter V. Bussing	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
George J. Richardson ..	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. A. Hess.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Amariah H. Hicks	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Edward D. Breed	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Samuel C. Buckingham.	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Norris P. Stockwell ...	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Arnold H. Dohrman....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. H. Mott.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Henry W. Golden.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Peter V. Hasker.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Joseph L. Bay	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Edward Rodman.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Henry O. Proctor.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Lewis M. Albright	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Walter S. Johns	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Edward P. Nillis.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
George H. Chapman ...	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Samuel R. Whitall ...	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Arthur P. Selby.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Edgar A. De Camp.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Francis D. Campbell...	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
F. Y. Commager.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Chas. H. Poor, Jr.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
John A. Hopkins	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. R. Hunter.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Jas. E. Whitwell.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Julius M. Beemer.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
John C. Connor.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Edwin S. Fowle.....	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
F. H. Freeman	Ac'g Mid'n.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
George Blacknall	Surgeon....	Resigned...	Died at the South.
James Cornick.....	Surgeon....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. F. Patton.....	Surgeon....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
W. A. W. Spotswood...	Surgeon....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Lewis W. Minor.....	Surgeon....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Wm. F. McClenahan...	Surgeon....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Daniel S. Green.....	Surgeon....	Resigned...	In rebel navy.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
John T. Mason.....	Surgeon....	Resigned...	At the South.
William B. Sinclair....	Surgeon....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Richard W. Jeffrey....	Surgeon....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Thomas B. Steele.....	Surgeon....	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
James F. Harrison....	Surgeon....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
William D. Harrison...	Surgeon....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
William J. Hay.....	Surgeon....	Resigned...	Not at the South.
William M. Page.....	Surgeon....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Randolph F. Mason....	Surgeon....	Dismissed..	At the South.
Charles F. Fahs.....	Surgeon....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Morris B. Beck.....	P.Ass't Sur.	Resigned...	At the South.
J. W. B. Greenhow....	P.Ass't Sur.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
D. B. Philips.....	P.Ass't Sur.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
John Ward.....	P.Ass't Sur.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
William F. Carrington..	P.Ass't Sur.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Charles H. Williamson .	P.Ass't Sur.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Arthur M. Lynah.....	P.Ass't Sur.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
William E. Wysham....	P.Ass't Sur.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Daniel B. Conrad.....	P.Ass't Sur.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Francis L. Galt.....	P.Ass't Sur.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
H. W. M. Washington .	P.Ass't Sur.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
H. L. Sheldon.....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Did not go south.
A. S. Garnett.....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
J. W. Sanford, Jr....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Charles Lowndes, Jr...	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Charles E. Lining.....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thomas J. Charlton....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
M. P. Christian.....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Robert J. Freeman....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Bennett W. Green.....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Joseph D. Grafton....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
James E. Lindsay.....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
James W. Herty.....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
O. S. Iglehart.....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
F. Van Bibber.....	Ass't Surg'n	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
John Homans.....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Charles Carter.....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Charles O. Carpenter..	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Not at the South.
R. E. Van Geison.....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Not at the South.
Alexander Hutchins...	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Not at the South.
James H. Mears.....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Not at the South.
William F. Terry.....	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned...	Not at the South.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Thomas H. Whitney . . .	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned . . .	Not at the South.
J. Otis Burt	Ass't Surg'n	Resigned . . .	Not at the South.
John De Bree	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Thomas B. Nalle	Paymaster .	Resigned . . .	At the South.
L. Warrington	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	Not at the South.
Thomas R. Ware	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
James A. Semple	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Richard T. Allison	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
John Johnson	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
W. W. J. Kelly	Paymaster .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
R. F. Gallaher	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	Not at the South.
James K. Harwood	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
George R. Ritchie	Paymaster .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Henry Meyers	Paymaster .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Felix Senac	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
John W. Nixon	Paymaster .	Resigned . . .	In rebel navy.
Miles H. Morris	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	At the South.
George W. Clark	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	In rebel army.
Granville T. Pierce	Paymaster .	Dismissed . . .	Not at the South.
Benjamin F. Camp	As't Paym'r.	Resigned . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
Charles W. Thomas	Chaplain . .	Resigned . . .	At the South.
James A. Coleman	Chaplain . .	Resigned . . .	Not at the South.
Alexander W. Lawrence	Prof. Math'cs	Dismissed . . .	At the South.
Thomas J. Robinson . . .	Prof. Math'cs	Dismissed . . .	At the South.
Fred. G. Hesse	Prof. Math'cs	Resigned . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
William P. Williamson .	Chief Eng'r.	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Samuel Archbold	Chief Eng'r.	Resigned . . .	Not at the South.
Michael Quinn	Chief Eng'r.	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
James H. Warner	Chief Eng'r.	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
N. P. Patterson	Chief Eng'r.	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
Thomas A. Jackson	Chief Eng'r.	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Robert H. Long	Chief Eng'r.	Resigned . . .	Not at the South.
William C. Wheeler	Chief Eng'r.	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
T. B. C. Stump	1st As't Eng'r	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
Edward W. Manning	1st As't Eng'r	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Henry A. Ramsay	1st As't Eng'r	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
Richard C. Potts	1st As't Eng'r	Dismissed . . .	Not at the South.
Virginus Freeman	1st As't Eng'r	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
George W. City	1st As't Eng'r	Dismissed . . .	In rebel navy.
William P. De Sanno	1st As't Eng'r	Dismissed . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
George W. Alexander	1st As't Eng'r	Resigned . . .	Whereabouts unknown.
James M. Adams	1st As't Eng'r	Resigned . . .	Temporary service U. S. N.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Charles Schroeder.....	1st As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Philip L. Mars.....	1st As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Edward Mars.....	1st As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Marshal P. Jordan.....	2d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Charles H. Levy.....	2d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Wm. Frick, Jr.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Jas. S. Wright.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
John W. Tynan.....	2d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Elijah Laws.....	2d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Loudon Campbell.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thos. J. Griffin.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
R. A. Copeland.....	2d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
C. A. Chipley.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
A. B. Campbell.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
W. A. R. Latimer.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Temporary service U. S. N.
E. S. Boynton.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Newton Champion.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Not at the South.
George W. Thorne.....	2d As't En.	Resigned...	Not at the South.
W. S. Thompson.....	3d As't En.	Deserted...	In rebel navy.
E. L. Dick.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. H. Glading.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
F. A. R. George.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
James Plunkett.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
H. X. Wright.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
E. C. Patten.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
W. N. Miller.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
G. W. Tennent.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
W. C. Starr.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Benj. Herring.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
Henry Fagan.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
John T. Tucker.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
L. L. Olmstead.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Chas. W. Jordan.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
W. H. Fuller.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Sebastian Crolius.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
George W. W. Dove....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
E. R. Arnold.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. M. Habershaw...	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
W. W. Shipman.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
T. S. Smith.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Joseph Mercer.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
G. W. Wilkinson.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
John E. Cooper.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
H. R. Lawrence.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
R. F. Hatfield.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Thos. Petterick.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
E. S. Hutchinson.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
T. M. Mitchell.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Edward Curtis.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
C. J. Cooper.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Chas. B. Dahlgren....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Temporary service U. S. N.
C. S. Hunt.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
John Stell.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Noah W. Moffett.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Isaac J. Griffiths.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
R. E. Halsey.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Peter C. Riley.....	3d As't En.	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
B. J. McGurran.....	3d As't En.	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. Smith.....	Boatswain..	Deserted..	At the South.
John Dunderdale.....	Boatswain..	Deserted..	At the South.
Chas. H. Hasker.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
James M. Miller.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Henry P. Grace.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. Winchester.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
George Dean.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	Did not go South.
A. J. Robinson.....	Boatswain..	Deserted..	Whereabouts unknown.
Joseph Shankland.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Nelson Goodrich.....	Boatswain..	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
C. H. Hatfield.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
J. C. Myers.....	Boatswain..	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
John Owins.....	Gunner....	Deserted...	At the South.
Charles B. Oliver.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	In rebel navy.
John A. Lovett.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Charles Moran.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
L. K. Ellis.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Temporary service U. S. N
Herman Peters.....	Gunner....	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Otis H. Gilmore.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. Summers.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Benj. Roberts.....	Gunner....	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. Wade.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
G. H. Brooks.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Wm. Yates.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
John Duncan.....	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unnnown.
George A. Parkhurst...	Gunner....	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Samuel Cross	Gunner	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
Charles A. Stephenson .	Gunner	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
Charles Seymour.....	Gunner	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
Charles De Bevoise	Gunner	Resigned...	Temporary service U. S. N.
Charles L. Duncan	Gunner	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
William Knight.....	Carpenter ..	Resigned...	At the South.
James Meads	Carpenter ..	Deserted ...	At the South.
Henry G. Thomas	Carpenter ..	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
John T. Rustic.....	Carpenter ..	Deserted ...	In rebel navy.
Lewis Holmes	Carpenter ..	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
Robert M. Bain	Carpenter ..	Dismissed ..	In rebel navy.
Edward Williams	Carpenter ..	Dismissed ..	In rebel navy.
D. M. W. Nash	Carpenter ..	Resigned ..	Whereabouts unknown.
John H. Conly.....	Carpenter .	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
J. B. Hoover	Carpenter ..	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
James Kinneer	Carpenter ..	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
G. M. Doughty	Carpenter ..	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Washington Duckett ...	Carpenter ..	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
Jacob M. Dallas	Carpenter ..	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
John Shannon	Carpenter ..	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
William Bennett	Sail-maker .	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
George D. Blackford ..	Sail-maker .	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
William M. Mahoney...	Sail-maker .	Dismissed ..	At the South.
S. H. Boutwell.....	Sail-maker .	Dismissed ..	Whereabouts unknown.
S. V. Turner	Sail-maker .	Resigned...	In rebel navy.
Thomas Mellen	Sail-maker .	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown.
George H. Wrightman .	Sail-maker .	Resigned...	Whereabouts unknown

MARINE CORPS.

Henry B. Tyler.....	Major	Dismissed ..	At the South.
George H. Terrett	Major	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Jabez C. Rich.....	Captain	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Algernon S. Taylor	Captain	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Robert Tansill.....	Captain	Dismissed ..	At the South.
John D. Simms	Captain	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Israel Green	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed ..	At the South.
J. R. H. Tatnall	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Adam N. Baker.....	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Charles A. Henderson .	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Henry B. Tyler.....	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed ..	At the South.
Julius E. Meiere	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed ..	At the South.

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>How left the service.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Geo. P. Turner	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed..	At the South.
Thos. S. Wilson	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed..	At the South.
Alex. W. Stark	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed..	At the South.
Jacob Read	1st Lieuten't	Resigned..	At the South.
Andrew J. Hays	1st Lieuten't	Resigned..	At the South.
Geo. Holmes	1st Lieuten't	Resigned..	At the South.
S. H. Matthews	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Robert Kidd	1st Lieuten't	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Geo. W. Cummins	2d Lieuten't	Dismissed..	Whereabouts unknown.
Calvin L. Sayers	2d Lieuten't	Resigned..	At the South.
Henry L. Ingraham	2d Lieuten't	Resigned..	At the South.
Becket K. Howell	2d Lieuten't	Resigned..	At the South.
J. H. Rathbone	2d Lieuten't	Resigned..	Not at the South.
Oscar B. Grant	2d Lieuten't	Resigned..	Not at the South.
J. M. Reber	2d Lieuten't	Dismissed..	Not at the South.
D. M. Sells	2d Lieuten't	Resigned..	Not at the South.

TABLE XI.

Exhibiting names of the graduates of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, from the year 1845 to the year 1860, inclusive, as far as it has been possible to obtain them.

YEAR 1845.

Chandler, Ralph; Hamilton, J. R.; Hays, William B.; Hodge, George R.; Houston, Thomas T.; McGunnede, Wilson.

YEAR 1846.

Braine, Daniel L.; Breese, Kidder R.; Breese, Samuel L.; Broadhead, Edgar; Carnes, Edwin O.; Foster, James P.; Gherardi, Bancroft; Gray, Edwin F.; Johnson, Philip C., Jr.; Johnson, Oscar F.; Kennon, Beverly, Jr.; Kimberly, Lewis; Morris, George U.; Parker, James, Jr.; Rainey, John D.; Smith, Charles B.; Sproston, John G.; Watters, John.

YEAR 1847.

Belknap, George E.; Benham, A. E. K.; Blake, Joseph D.; Bowen, Richard T.; Brose, Frederick F.; Campbell, William P. A.; Chapman, Robert T.; Cornwell, John J.; Cummings, Andrew B.; Eggleston, John R.; Flusser, Charles W.; Tyffe, Joseph P.; Gwin, William; Hand, B. E.; Harmony, D. B.; Irwin, John; Lovell, William S.; Maxwell, James G.; Mygat, J. P. K.; Newman, L. H.; Oakley, E. H.; Stillwell, James; Thoburn, Charles E.; Totten, Washington; Williams, E. P.; Wilson, Henry; Wood, John S.

YEAR 1848.

Abbott, Trevett; Baker, F. H.; Bruce, James; Erben, Henry, Jr.; Fitz Hugh, William E.; Garland, Hudson M.; Gillis, James H.; Glassell, William T.; Greene, Charles H.; Greer, James A.; Hileman, Julius G.; Hester, Isaac W.; Johnston, John E.; Livingstone, De Grasse; McCann, William P.; Owen, Elias K.; Pendergrast, Austin; Skerritt, Joseph S.; Spedden, Edward T.; Weaver, Aaron W.

YEAR 1849.

Adams, Henry A., Jr.; Brown, George; Chever, William H; Cushman, Charles H.; Dunnington, John W.; Hawley, Charles E.; Loyall, Benjamin P.; May, Robert L.; McCrea, Edward P.; Morrison, George F.; Pelot, Thomas P.; Sheppard, Francis E.; Shirk, James W.; Stanton, Oscar M.; Stockton, Edward C.; Taylor, Bushrod B.; Taylor, Jesse, Jr.; Thomas, Calvin F.; Ward, William H.

YEAR 1850.

Armstrong, Æneas; Babcock, Chas. A.; Bacon, Geo.; Beardsley, L. A.; Bord, Robert, Jr.; Bradford, Wm. L.; Campbell, Marshall C.; Carpenter, Chas. C.; Chaplain, Jas. C.; Dana, Wm. H.; Dozier, Wm. G.; Izard, Allen C.; Kirkland, W. A.; McCartney, A. J.; Meade, Richard W., Jr.; Mitchell, John G.; Peck, Chas. F.; Potter, Edward E.; Ramsay, Francis M.; Walker, J. G.

YEAR 1851.

Barnes, J. S.; Blodgett, George M.; Buchanan, Thomas McK.; Cain, John, Jr.; Crossman, A. F.; Dalton, H. H.; Fitch, Le Roy; Graham, R. W. M.; Hopkins Alfred; Law, George E.; Lea, Edward;

Lull, E. P.; Matthews, E. O.; Miller, Joseph N.; Norton, Charles S.; Perkins, George H.; Porcher, Philip; Selfridge, T. O.; Sicard, Montgomery; Stribbling, J. M.; Todd, J. M.

YEAR 1852.

Allen, Weld. N.; Bigelow, George A.; Bradford, R. F.; Bunce, F. M.; Cooke, A. P.; Evans, W. E.; Gove, G. D.; Green, N.; Hatfield, C.; McDougall, C. J.; Merchant, Clark; Miller, S. W.; Mills, T. B.; Mosely, J. C.; Porter, T. K.; Prichett, J. M.; Seely, H. B.; Shyrock, G. S.; Wallace, R. R.

YEAR 1853.

Alexander, J. W.; Blake, T. B.; Eastman, T. H.; Graves, C. J.; Harris, J. W.; Kelly, J. W.; McNair, F. V.; Pythian, R. L.; Terry, Edward; Todd, H. D.; Wilson, Byron; Yates, A. R.

YEAR 1854.

Bishop, Joshua; Blue, H. M.; Dewey, George, Farquhar, N. H.; Franklin, C. L.; Furber, E. G.; Grimbball, John; Howell, J. A.; Howison, H. L.; Judson, C. O.; Kautz, Albert; Kerr, W. A.; May, L. C.; McCook, R. S.; Prentiss, Roderick; Reed, A. V.; Schoonmaker, C. M.; Spencer, T. S.; Stores, G. S.; Swazey, C. H.; White, G. B.; Whittle, W. C., Jr.

YEAR 1855.

Averitt, S. W.; Borchert, George; Butt, W. R.; Cenas, Hillary; Clayburn, H. B.; Greene, S. D.; Hackett, S. H.; Hall, W. B.; Cane, T. F.; McKenzie, A. S.; Read, E. G.; Remy, G. C.; Taylor, J. L.; Walker, E. A.; Wiltse, G. C.

YEAR 1856.

Ames, S. D.; Barton, W. H.; Brown, F. S.; Casey, Silas; Davenport, F. O.; Darnin, T. L.; Gillet, S. P.; Harrison, T. L.; Hoge, F. L.; Hoole, J. L.; Mahan, A. T.; Manley, H. D.; Marvin, J. D.; McCarty, S. A.; McNair, A. R.; O'Kane, James; Paddock, S. B.; Philip, J. W.; Read, C. W.; Robeson, H. B.; Schley, W. S.; Stuyvesant, M. S.; Swann, T. L.; Watson, J. C.; Wharton, A. D.; Whitehead, William.

YEAR 1857.

Bache, G. W.; Backus, Sylvanus; Bowen, T. C.; Cromwell, B. J.; Dexter, A.; Duer, R. K.; Graham, J. D.; Hayward, G. W.; Higginson, F. J.; Kempff, Lewis; McFarland, John; McGlensey, J. F.; McKay, C. E.; Mullen, H. E.; Phœnix, Lloyd; Picking, H. F.; Robertson, J. P.; Rodgers, Frederick; Rowland, J. H.; Ryan, G. P.; Sampson, W. T.; Snell, A. T.; Steece, T.; Stewart, W. F.; Tallman, H. C.; Thomas, N. W.; Tyson, H. B.; Weidman, J.

YEAR 1858.

Blake, E. C. V.; Blake, H. J.; Bradley, J. B.; Brower, E. T.; Caruthers, J. K.; Cotton, C. S.; Day, B. F.; Forest, M.; Huntington, C. L.; Kellog, E. N.; Lambson, R. H.; Mitchell, A. N.; Nicholls, S. W.; Preston, S. W.; Read, J. J.; Smith, F. R.; Sumner, G. W.; Terry, S. W.; Wimple, D. D.; Zimmerman, C. W.

YEAR 1859.

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CHAPTER XII.

CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING TO GOVERNMENT—MONARCHIES AND DEMOCRACIES OF THE PAST—CLASS-DISTINCTION—ASIATIC CIVILIZATION—BLUE-BLOOD AND RED-BLOOD—THE ARISTOCRACIES OF THE GREEKS, ROMANS, SPANIARDS AND ITALIANS—THE FANTASTIC CASTE OF INDIA—SLAVERY THE LEGITIMATE OFFSPRING OF ARISTOCRACY—ANCIENT REPUBLICS DESTROYED BY CASTE AND SLAVERY—THE PATRICIANS AND PLEBEIANS OF ROME—THE REPUBLICS OF ITALY BUILT UPON TITLES OF NOBILITY.

BY reason of habit and general constitution man cannot live alone; while, as a consequence of his mental and moral characteristics, it is very difficult for him to live with his fellow man. This statement of fact is no less embarrassing than true. The hermitical mode of life has been somewhat extensively tried during the history of the human kind, and especially by religious enthusiasts. But it has never been productive of any very satisfactory results in individual cases; while, as a measure applicable to the whole human race, it must be considered altogether impracticable, if not impossible.

The necessity of living in companionship has given rise to a problem that has baffled the wisdom of all the ages. How to live together in obedience to the better instincts of humanity and to repress the selfishness, avarice, ambition, injustice of the fallen nature, has

remained an open question down to our own time. A general answer has been easily found in the single word *government*, but unfortunately this word is susceptible of as many interpretations as were the equivocal utterances of the Grecian oracles. Not that there are so many plans of government from which to choose. Political scientists, excluding the primitive forms, as the patriarchal and the tribal, as well as the more modern ecclesiastical, have reduced all forms of government to three elementary types: the monarchy, the aristocracy, and the democracy. The ancients resolved all possible forms of matter into the four elements: fire, earth, air, and water. Out of these four units was supposed to be constructed everything which we see, feel, and hear in the material world upon which we live, and in the enormous space, with its solar, planetary, and stellar bodies, which surrounds us. The modern scientist, with an accuracy that can admit of no doubt, has more intelligently determined the elements of which the universe is composed; and, although they are more numerous than the four simple elements of the ancients, they are, nevertheless, very few. But, while the myriad forms of matter which surround us are resolvable into a very few elementary bodies, there is no such range of governmental construction, so to speak, belonging to the elementary molecules from which the science of government has been evolved. Chemistry shows us that two elementary bodies may unite and harmoniously form a third, wholly differing from either of the constituents. But the metamorphoses of the governmental units

are exceedingly limited in character, very fragile, and, as the chemists might say, very unstable. The monarchical and the aristocratic elements are susceptible of a certain kind of union; but the true democratic type is wholly uncombinable with either of the others—that is to say, within the sense of the general usage of the terms.

Hence the problem presented has not related to multiplicity of forms or plans of government, but has always covered the simple question, Which one of the possible forms shall come out of a given conflict between men? Down to the time of the Greek Republics the governments of the world had been founded upon the rule of the many by the few. For at least three thousand years before the Dorian migration into Greece there was no exception to that order of things; and no men arose in all that time with sufficient power to call in question the divine rights of kings and of aristocratic rulers. Upon the basis of conflict between the few and the many the whole battle has been fought, and is still being fought in our own time. It is a simple question of individual ambition against the prerogatives, rights, and interests of mankind in general. When that eminent usurper, Julius Cæsar, was offered a crown upon the Lupercal by a fellow patriot and companion-in-arms, of whom it may be said—if history is to be credited and the pleasantry may be excused—that he had not a crown to his name, the donee declined the proffer in a spirit of effusive self-sacrifice; and much the same thing happened at a later day in England. Cæsar rejected a crown, but made himself an emperor in every-

thing save the name; while the English tyrant Gloster, with a protestive denial of ambition upon his lips, literally cleaved his way to a throne.

Until the establishment of the American Republic individual ambition had generally, if not always, succeeded in overcoming the rights of the masses; but the course of kingly destiny has run in rough places, nevertheless. If the people have had their questions, so have the monarchs, and if the masses have been compelled to fight for their rights, the rulers have been forced to battle for their places.

The vital question that has afflicted all monarchs is that relating to the use of other men in the preservation of the individual privileges of the former. Nature has made us all so nearly equal in the purely physical sense that a single man, or a limited coterie of men, can only usurp dominion at the expense of the greater number through virtue of superior force. How to use that force and at the same time to control it, has been the single problem of monarchy and all forms of centralized government. If a man fight as a business from which he receives pay and a livelihood, he will look upon his profession from a business standpoint, and will sell his services in the best market. If the factor of mere pay be eliminated from the question, the man must fight in behalf of principle and self-interest, in which case he ceases at once to be the stolid machine which kingly interest requires. The principle involved in this proposition was well illustrated in the case of the Southern slaves at the breaking-

out of the Civil War. When it became expedient to put arms into their hands in order that they might fight for the Union, the necessity of investing them soon or late with the privilege of the ballot became apparent at once. The American soldier does not fight for pay. He fights for a government in which he has a personal interest and of which he is an integral element.

The monarchical government, then, is certainly menaced, not alone by other governments seeking its downfall, but also by the dangerous instruments of its own power, which, seeking self-interest in the most promising direction, may find it convenient at any moment to turn upon their own masters.

Democracies, too, have their perils. Where are the Republics of Greece, that for five hundred years pretended to assert the rule of the masses? Where the Republic of Rome, that for another five hundred years was professedly based upon the legend, *Vox populi, vox Dei*? Where the Dutch and Italian Republics, that made spasmodic efforts in behalf of popular rule? Fallen! all fallen into a common grave with the empires of Cyrus and Alexander, of Charlemagne and Napoleon.

The Republics of Greece, in the days of their early purity, possessed elements that, if preserved, and combined with others that would have come to them through lapse of time and experience, such as federation of all the states into a single governmental unit, and the cultivation of a high type of morality, should have made them as imperishable as the pyramids. The personal training of the Greek

citizens, and especially those of Sparta, developed a powerful physique with traits of high courage, extreme endurance, and—for that era—great love of country. Every citizen of the republic was a soldier, and every soldier was a citizen. Reared under the law that death must be accepted in preference to defeat, cowardice was wholly unknown to him; and Homer's representation of the willingness of Achilles to give up his own life after having revenged the slaying of Patroclus by the killing of Hector, undoubtedly paints a national trait of early Greek character, conveyed though it be through the art of fiction and inspiring verse.

But, unfortunately for the progress of the world, the germs of Greek destruction were evolved out of the conquest of Greece from the native tribes. From that conquest slavery emerged to curse, and ultimately to assist in the downfall of the republics that had shed such brilliant light upon the ancient world. At the battle of Marathon, the glory of which has been sung by poets and perpetuated by writers and orators alike, where 10,000 Greeks defeated and put to rout an army of 110,000 Persians, a part of those engaged upon the Greek side were slaves, though not considered soldiers, many of whom fell upon the field of battle.

With the conquest of other states, the number of slaves increased in the Greek Republics. Luxury and the accumulation of wealth gradually caused a relaxation of the abstemious, frugal, active life which gave to the ancient Greek his splendid physical development, and

made him the equal upon the battle-field of half a dozen of the spiritless, hopeless soldiers of the Eastern despotisms. With the progress of the Greeks in the acquisition of power, the increase of wealth, the cultivation of learning, the refinements of an indolent life, the growth of aristocratic and class distinctions, the weakening influence of inter-state conflicts, resulting from narrow policy and corrupting ambition, the people lost by degrees the strong Hellenic personality, until, when the world stood within a century and a half of the birth of Christ, Greece was ready to become a province of that mighty power which had arisen in the west, into whose strong keeping the supremacy of the world was soon to pass. The historic land became the Roman province Achia, and, though it still was Greece,

“’T was living Greece no more.”

Standing face to face with their mournful humiliation, well might the degenerate Hellenes have exclaimed, “Oh ! for the iron money of Lycurgus ! oh, for a return to the severe simplicity of the fathers.”

Among the pure weaknesses of human nature, there is one that has had much to do with shaping the destinies of governments and of peoples all along the rugged pathway of human struggles. The remarkable trait of character which prompts the majority of men and women to make the effort to be thought better, to appear wiser than and superior to others in all respects, is here referred to. No disquisition upon morals is meditated, but the fact is simply stated because of its bearing upon the sub-

ject under immediate treatment. This simple desire to appear in the light of a superior possesses all degrees of intensity, and is underlaid by the differing motives of personal vanity, love of power and dominion, and the yearning for money, luxury, and ease. Pure intellectual aspiration rests upon an entirely different plane, and breathes a wholly different atmosphere. It is the noblest of all ambitions, but unfortunately it is not the most common.

The superiority above alluded to, and aimed at in every age, is made to be constituted of two elements—a transmitted and an acquired quality or virtue—and the distinctions which are now to be considered are all founded upon one of these two constituent elements. Since the beginning of man, so far as we have any knowledge of his history, individuals have arrogated preferment over their fellows, and the practical result of this has been the creation of class-distinctions, with all their momentous consequences. It is worth while, then, to consider the topic, in view of its intimate relationship with the subject of government. It is a curious sentiment, and has had more to do with the fate of nations than armies and implements of war.

Monarchies and aristocracies only represent class-distinction in different degrees, founded upon extrinsic circumstances. Democracies in the pure sense can only exist in the absence of every distinction save that based upon intrinsic worth and merit.

Down to the time of the establishment of the Greek

Republics all governments of which we have any knowledge were founded on, or were indissolubly interwoven with, the idea of class-distinction. In the early Asiatic civilizations kings and rulers were clothed with almost divine attributes, while the ordinary people ran through classes until a status was reached so low as to render mere contact with it polluting to the superior being. It is interesting to note the different qualities which have conferred the personal or class preëminence now being considered in different ages and among different peoples. The first of all these qualities, that which bore the stamp of the king metal, gold, upon it, was *blood*, and this ennobling fluid gave a greater or less degree of preëminence, according as it was blue or red in color. In ancient Spain—that enchanting land of chivalry and rapturous sentiment—the favoring quality had no relation to the church, to commerce, nor to the learned professions, but descended directly from fearless warriors and mighty conquerors into the veins of grandees, hidalgos, and high-born señoritas. The hidalgo had red blood, and therefore was less noble than the grandee, whose vital fluid was of the purest blue. The former alone was privileged to be called *Don*—a title equivalent to *Sir*, as used in the English peerage.

But noble blood was not the exclusive gift of warriors and conquerors among all nations. In India it descended from Brahma, the creator, by whom caste or class-distinctions were established. In the despotisms of Asia it came from a long line of rulers. When aristocracy

began to rear itself as one of the most important agencies destined to overthrow the Greek Republics, the privileged class claimed their attributes as an inheritance from gods, demi-gods, and celestial heroes. Others had a nobility of old citizens, and Sparta one of pure conquest; while both of these, as well as others of the Greek states, more notably Thebes, had an aristocracy of wealth. The earlier Romans founded their claims upon primitive ownership of the soil, but at a later period a pure aristocracy of wealth was created. In some of the Italian Republics the aristocracy was founded upon wealth obtained through commerce. In other nations, as in England at present, the sovereign could ennoble.

The subject is interesting, and the time spent in considering it more in detail will not be thrown away.

One of the most fantastic inventions ever devised, involving the idea of class-distinction, has existed from time immemorial in certain parts of India, and notably in Hindostan. It was called *caste* by the Portuguese traders who first noticed it in their voyages, and this word has been adopted pretty generally by other nations as representative of the idea of class-distinction. The laws of caste among the Hindoos were voluminous and minute. Under these laws society was divided into several classes, at the head of which stood the brahmin or priest, followed by the warriors and rulers, the agriculturists and traders, the laborers and servants, and lastly the pariahs, or lowest of society, who were so utterly vile and degrading that their mere shadow falling upon a better man

would pollute him. The priest or brahmin who would eat with or even touch certain kinds of food consumed by an inferior caste would be excluded from the society of other brahmins as a polluted man, and the same penalty would attach to the brahmin who would allow the presence of an inferior within a certain distance while eating. So rigid was the distinction of class under the Hindoo code that an inferior was at times struck dead for having accidentally touched a superior. This grotesque system still exists.

The foregoing example of human weakness, arrogance, and love of power is here referred to as an illustration of the tyranny of class-distinction in connection with the religious sentiment. The history of paganism through the early ages furnishes additional examples, though differing in degree of priestly preëminence and domination.

As a constituent of monarchical rule through every period of the world's history down to our own times, the reader is familiar with every phase of class-distinction, from the sacredness of the king, who can do no wrong, through the revolting array of nobles and aristocrats, whose assumptions of superiority, built upon wealth or the accident of birth, are an offense to him whose nature and cultivation have made a man of the truest type and character. With a consideration of this sort of royal machinery the true American does not care to occupy himself, except upon the principle by which we hope to illuminate the future through means of the dying embers

of the past. The republican is more deeply interested in searching for the rocks upon which former efforts at popular government have been stranded. Among the destructive agents of past attempts at free government authentic history shows the evil now being considered—that of class-distinction—to be the most potent and irresistible.

From the absolute lordship of the oriental nations to the ideas of equality upon which the Greek Republics were founded there was a very long step, extending in a direction leading to the interest of the common people. It has been remarked by an able writer that with the birth of the Greek commonwealths “the political and intellectual life of the world began.” The truth of this remark is indisputable, and there seems no historical subject of such vast interest and importance to the political economist and philosopher of the present era as the narrative covering the rise and fall of the Greek states, which extends through a period of over nine hundred years. For a time they furnished a faint illustration of democracy, and they might have afforded to the philosophers of the time a mental vision, through the intervening space of twenty-five hundred years, of the creation of an enormous republic and a powerful nation, denominated by one of the greatest of its sons “a government of the people, for the people, and by the people.”

Perfection in all things human must be the result of growth. There is nothing with which man has to do that has not grown from the crude conception, and there

are not many things which have already passed the stage of possible future growth. The establishment of the Greek commonwealths was evolved out of the long struggle of the masses with their rulers, and practically it constituted the end of the divinely-appointed sovereigns of the Eastern nations, and foreshadowed the coming recognition of the grand principle teaching the brotherhood of man. The results to mankind flowing from the life of those states were wonderful indeed, but it was not in the nature of things that perfection should be reached within the fleeting span of one thousand years. The agent of certain destruction went hand-in-hand with the spirit of progress. A sentiment arose for the rule of the people, but the word *people* embraced a most illiberal, vicious, and destructive distinction which, after the lapse of twenty-five centuries, nearly wrecked the life of the greatest Republic ever existing.

It would be interesting to know with certainty when, and under what circumstances, man first became a slave to his fellow-man. But the institution of slavery antedates all authentic history, and its beginning probably runs back to the earliest intercourse between man and man. It may be asserted that class-distinction is the chief warrant for slavery, when not taking into consideration the practice among barbarous and semi-civilized nations in every age of making slaves of their captives in war. Slavery was common to almost all nations when the Greek Republics began their wonderful career; and the Hellenes, aspiring to lead the way toward the rule of

the people, acquiesced in the theory of human slavery and adopted it in practice. The practice was bad in principle, but it was the theory that chiefly opened the chasm into which Grecian democracy was finally precipitated.

Perhaps with the increase of wealth and the indulgence of luxury, which the possession of wealth so pressingly invites, much the same growth of caste would have occurred among the Greeks without the actual existence of slavery. As every thoughtful person must admit, however, the system of a compulsory personal service is as blighting to the faculties of the mind as it is to the energies of the body; and this observation holds good of every form of slavery, whether that practiced by the Greeks, or the incomparably baser system practiced within our own enlightened age. Though the end might have been the same, it is most evident that a true republic recognizing the principles of slavery was as much of a paradox one thousand years before Christ as it was eighteen hundred years after his death. It was therefore as certain that the Greek attempt at democracy should fail in the absence of a broad recognition of the rights of man, as it was inevitable that the American Republic could only continue to exist through the abolition of an accursed form of slavery which had been fastened upon it at the birth as the last boon of expiring despotism and wickedness.

As the Grecian states grew in power, in territorial acquisition, in public and private wealth, in luxury,

refinement, and intellectual life, the leaven of class-distinction, always present, became more and more active. In Athens there existed a nobility of old citizens, which gradually gave way to a pure aristocracy of wealth. The struggles for supremacy of this aristocracy with those of the other republics form one of the most striking portions of Greek history. Every student is familiar with the long series of domestic wars, growing out of the debasement of the Hellenic character, that ultimately resulted in the subjugation of the Greek states by mighty Rome, which latter, for some five hundred years, also enacted the rôle of a republic, under the interpretation of that day.

The Romans began the experiment of democratic government upon a foundation as inadequate to the maintenance of a lasting structure as that laid by their Greek predecessors. The right of property in man was a recognized principle of the democracy of the Romans. This fact alone proves conclusively that the people had no broader idea of a pure democracy than had the signers of 1776 when declaring "that all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," in face of the contradictory circumstance that human slavery was a recognized institution in the free government they were about to create.

The privileged class of Rome — the *patres*, or patricians — came into existence at a very early period in the history of the republic. They were so privileged that

they managed to hold all the offices, to control the religion of the State, and to obtain exclusive enjoyment of the common lands of the nation. The *populus*, or common people, had no right except that to labor for a bare support. The patricians, claiming descent from the founders, perverted the original land concessions into an absolute right, termed *jus quiritium* by the Latin law.

With the lapse of time the distinction in society became sharply drawn, under the terms *patrician* and *plebeian*. The latter class, however, increasing in number faster than the former, began to wring concessions in their own favor by agitation, and even by violence. First, marriage among them was legalized; then followed the right to hold petty offices, then to enjoy more important ones. The right to enter the military was won, then the enjoyment of the privileges of civil jurisdiction, and still later a right to participate in religious rites and ceremonies. Agitation between the classes continued, the Agrarian and Licinian laws became the excuse for frequent conflicts, and finally, after the lapse of nearly five hundred years from the founding of the city, the strife between the patricians and plebeians terminated with the abolition of all distinction between them.

Then was the time for the establishment of a pure republic, but the vision was overshadowed by the growing lines of the coming empire. A curious and instructive anomaly presented itself. The plebeian class, who for more than four centuries and a half had been battling against the aristocrats for the extension of common rights

to all men, at last, having obtained those rights for themselves and having grown rich in the course of industrial pursuits, became part composers of the nobility under the empire. The descendants of former plebeians were transformed into violent partisans of class-distinction. Boasting of their ancestors, they claimed the *jus imaginum*, or right of having the images of those ancestors, which constituted a prerogative similar to the possession of a coat-of-arms at a later period. As the empire grew in years, letters patent of nobility were granted, conveying the right to a shield blazoned with a coat-of-arms. The division of classes became quite simple. There were but the noble and the ignoble, the rich and the poor. It is very evident that at that period of the Roman Republic the popular mind was not sufficiently enlarged to comprehend the true nature of a democratic government.

The later republics of Italy present this vicious tendency to class-arrogance in a light still stronger than that by which we view the course of the preceding attempts to establish republican governments. The Venetian commonwealths were the most arbitrary of aristocracies, with the common people excluded. The aristocracy grew upon wealth accumulated purely through the operations of trade, and a subsequent nobility was erected entirely composed of those descended from the early *officeholders*. In Florence the nobility was abolished, but another was subsequently established composed of former commoners. No more oligarchical rule can be found in history than that of Florentine democracy. Under the theory that an

aristocracy is composed of the wisest, best, and most cultured as well as the most wealthy persons of the state, the unfortunate commoner stood a worse chance than his predecessor, the plebeian of Rome, or his contemporary, the *roturier* of France.

In summarizing the results of all past attempts at the establishment of republican governments, it may justly be said that in not one instance does it appear that the very essence of democracy was understood or sought to be reached by the projectors and subsequent administrators of the various governments; that is to say, that they were totally ignorant of the extent to which their professions should carry them, and that they had not even approached the vital principle of the true republic—the absolute political and civil equality of men, and the non-existence of any class-distinctions save those legitimately pertaining to mental and moral worth and preëminence.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE LESSON OF CLASS-DISTINCTION — FORMER CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY IN THE SLAVE STATES — THE PARIAS OF THE SOUTH, AND THE "POOR WHITE TRASH" — THE REBELLION A LOGICAL AND INEVITABLE CONCLUSION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARISTOCRACY BASED UPON SLAVERY — ARISTOCRATIC TENDENCIES OF OUR PRESENT MILITARY SYSTEM — OPPORTUNITIES OF CÆSARISM OFFERED BY THE WAR — THE WEST POINT ACADEMY NOT TO BE CREDITED WITH UNSELFISH PATRIOTISM OR RARE MILITARY ABILITIES — GRANT AND LEE.

THERE will probably be none among the author's readers to dispute the justice of the remarks contained in the latter part of the preceding chapter, founded as they are upon the well-established truth of historical relation. There may be a few, however, who, while pursuing them, may wonder what relevancy the matter of caste or class-distinction can have to the subject of the present volume.

The facts set forth have been so grouped as to illustrate under strong light a lesson which it would be well for our people to heed and to study most carefully. Theoretically a republican form of government signifies absolute equality, political and civil, of every one of its law-abiding citizens. The history of the republics of the past

vouches for the correctness of the theory in its practical application, and forcibly emphasizes the fact that, as soon as the actual practice is made to conflict with the theory, the government has begun its departure from the true ideal of democracy. The author does not believe it to be going too far to assert that every republic of past times has found its destroyer in the growth and establishment of class-distinction among its people. Complicating causes of downfall there have been which would apparently contradict this assertion, but it is believed that after stripping each individual case of indirect and extraneous influences the actual agent of destruction will be found to be the one indicated.

If this is a fact—and there seems no escape from the admission that it is—there can be no such thing as over-estimating its importance by the American people. As heretofore intimated, a recognition of the right to hold property in man, by his fellow-man, whether the skin of the enslaved individual be white, black, red, yellow, or of any other color, is a veritable foundation-stone of class-distinction.

The author has attempted to trace in detail, in another work, the causes and enveloping conditions of the great Rebellion, and reference to that work is recommended for a full exposition of his views. In this place it may be briefly said that the original moral perversion of our Southern fellow-citizen, which ultimately led to the attempt to secede from the Union, was engrafted upon and found its legitimate development in the system of

human slavery practiced among them. Class-distinction became the prominent feature of their political and social organizations. The unfortunate negroes, like the pariahs of Hindostan, were utterly vile and polluting from the social standpoint, while the poor class of whites were so completely crushed in aspiration, reared in such ignorance, and smitten with such poverty, as to lead to their general designation as "poor white trash." Except in the cities and towns, where the operations of trade and general industry permitted an intermediate stratum of society, there were in strictness no middle classes of people. The practical division of the whites was into the upper and lower classes. The upper rode the lower with boots and spur, and the under dog mounted the "nigger" whip in hand. As the great product of the South brought large wealth to the land-owners the feeling of caste continued to grow. Families began to reach back for titles of gentility to their ancestors. Some could get no farther than the early dignitaries of the provinces, but many could trace a line of direct descent from a noble stock of Great Britain. The upper classes came to believe in their "good blood;" they despised tradespeople and cultivated a sort of mixed chivalry, compounded of the ferocity of the feudal system and the frothy "highfalutin" of the more modern Castilian. The author would not willingly exaggerate the follies of the Southern people as then constituted, and much less misrepresent them, but impartiality could say no less, though strict justice might require the saying of much more.

But with the feeling of aristocracy existing in the South for a score of years before the actual outbreak of hostilities between the sections, it was impossible that there should exist any sentiment of true democracy among the Southern people, or any desire to remain linked with the common horde of the North, who had no ancestry, the great bulk of whom had no personal wealth, and none of whom had any refinement or courtly manners. Consequently, when the South lost control of the General Government in 1861, the time had arrived when people so diverse in feeling should separate, and more emphatically had the time arrived when the aristocracy of the sunny South should have a government representative of them, and not of a nation of trades-people like those of the Northern States. The real purpose of the attempted separation was obscured and perverted by the Southern leaders, but the inexorable logic of the premises leads to the certain conclusion that that purpose was to erect a new government in consonance with the sentiments of those who were the leaders and directors of the Southern people. That those sentiments did not run abreast of the declaration by Lincoln for a government for the people, of the people, and by the people, admits of no argument whatever. It certainly was to be a government recognizing class-distinction, and no subsequent *coup d'état* would have been necessary to confirm the traditional title of "good blood" by legislative enactment. No Southern republic was possible under the existing situation. The bane of republics had done its

work, and, whether they knew it themselves or did not, the monarchy was the inevitable end of successful separation.

Now, if we correctly interpret the utterances of ancient history upon the subject of republican government, and, coming down to our own time and our own government, if we do not thrust behind us the broad facts of the late Southern folly, we shall see how inimical to the continuance of the Republic is the sentiment underlying the feeling of caste in a nation. But do the people of the North need such a reminder? It is the opinion of the author that they do. There are certain premonitions of impending danger that a people ought always to heed, as the ship-master does the barometric changes indicative of the coming storm. As yet there may be no concealed sighing for titles, and service, and all the trumpery that the *régime* brings among our wealthy classes, but there are certain preliminary indications of a growth certainly destined to imperil the integrity of the body politic. Enormous concentration of wealth in individual and corporate hands offers opportunities of potential influence, seductive to the possessors and menacing to the healthful interests of those unfavored with it. Every man should be entitled to the possession and enjoyment of wealth legitimately acquired, but he should never pervert it to the oppression of others, nor to deprive them of their just rights. We live in a land where *majorities* rule; and *the rich are always in a minority*. This should never be forgotten by our people.

The author has no purpose, however, to be led out of

the proper line of argument leading to the discussion of the subject-matter of the present volume. The previous remarks upon the subject of caste or class-distinction have been adduced in order to show that the existence of this evil is fatal to the well-being and even to the continued life of a republic. This being successfully established, it will be easily admitted that everything tending to the development of the feeling of class-exclusion should be repressed, as a national policy, the only one under which the Republic can hope to live. Does the system under which the Academies at West Point and Annapolis exist fall within the strict line of scrutiny as to its character in this respect?

In an official capacity the writer has been compelled to observe both of these institutions for a number of years, and the system upon which they are founded, in its practical operation, has formed the subject of his careful study. His conviction of the faultiness of the system, as applied to the republican form of government, as well as its absolute danger, has been strengthened, year by year, as his observation and study have extended. It is proposed to examine the principal objections to the system at the present time.

The charge of promoting a spirit of aristocracy among the army officials has been alleged against the institution at West Point for over fifty years. Within the first half century of its existence most determined attempts were made to abolish it solely upon the ground of this principal allegation. The friends of the institution, however,

have succeeded in so perverting the nature of the real objections, as to readily defeat all attempts against it. To illustrate the manner in which the vital point of the charge of aristocratic tendency has been covered from the view of the people at large, a quotation is here introduced from a report made by Chief of Engineers Joseph G. Totten to the Hon. William L. Marcy, Secretary of War, under date of November 1, 1845, and by the latter official transmitted under cover of his own report to Congress. It may be premised that Colonel Totten was himself a graduate at West Point, and, therefore, performed a grateful duty in defending his *alma mater*. He was a very competent officer, a loyal soldier, and a true republican in thought and action. Insincerity is not to be alleged against him. He judged the institution from the standpoint of his own high character, and, being blinded himself to the defects of the institution, he assisted in blinding his fellow-citizens also. It is curious to remark how the sharp edge of a perfectly just accusation was turned, and has remained turned, by sophistry of the thinnest texture. Colonel Totten says in the report alluded to :

“A few general statements will comprise all that I deem it important to present now in reference to certain accusations against the management and tendencies of the institution.

“A very common charge is that the Military Academy is *aristocratical in its constitution*.

“In relation to this erroneous allegation, I offer the following tabular statement, exhibiting the condition in life of the cadets who were in the school in the last four years, including 1845 :

	1842	1843	1844	1845
Parents are or were farmers or planters.....	59	61	61	68
Parents are or were mechanics.....	14	12	15	22
Fathers are or were lawyers or judges.....	27	25	30	35
Parents are or were merchants.....	18	15	23	27
Parents are or were boarding-house or hotel-keepers.....	5	2	4	3
Fathers are or were physicians.....	12	15	15	13
Fathers are or were of the army, navy, or marine corps.....	14	16	16	13
Fathers are or were clergymen.....	4	6	6	6
Fathers are or were in the civil employment of the General or State Government.....	5	15	16	9
Miscellaneous: as bank officials, editors, professors, engi- neers, masters of vessels, etc.....	15	11	15	23
Occupation not stated: <i>those having mothers only, or no</i> <i>parents</i>	48	34	23	17
Total.....	221	212	224	236
Of these numbers, there are without fathers living.....	26	57	44	48
Of these numbers, without either father or mother.....	22	16	18	15
Total orphans.....	48	73	62	63
Of these numbers, the parents are stated to be in moderate circumstances.....	156	150	164
Of these numbers, the parents are stated to be in reduced cir- cumstances.....	182	26	37	36
Of these numbers, the parents are stated to be in indigent cir- cumstances.....	6	8
Of these numbers the parents are stated to be independent in life.....	39	18	19	16
Total.....	221	212	224	216

“It will be seen from this table that the sons of the wealthy and independent in life compose but a very small proportion of the young men at the Academy. It is now well understood throughout the country that the nominations for cadet appointments are made by the members of the House of Representatives, and the

above statement clearly demonstrates, as was to be expected, that this privilege has been exercised in a praiseworthy and impartial manner. In truth, that it gives a helping hand to so many of the poorer youths of our country, and qualifies them for the performance, in the ablest manner, of the highest duties of patriotism.

“It has been objected to the institution that its graduates monopolize the appointments in the army, thereby entirely depriving persons educated elsewhere and engaged in the civil pursuits of life of the privilege of receiving any military commission. This objection is the result of mistaken views as to the manner of making appointments into our army. The Military Academy forms now, and has from the time of its foundation formed, a part of the army, and all who are to be commissioned in the service, instead of being appointed at once to the higher grade of second lieutenant, receive a cadet appointment, and serve for four years as *warrant officers* in a grade between that of first sergeant and that of second lieutenant, and bearing the same relation to the army that the midshipman does to the navy. That is to say, the first military office into which the citizen enters is not that of lieutenant, but that of cadet—just as the first appointment into the navy is that of midshipman, and not that of lieutenant. While the well-being of the army demands such a course, its small number permits that all be thus instructed; and the grade of cadet is, under our present organization, as much one of the steps in the military ladder as any other grade. On the occasion of the enlargement of the military force, this source would not supply the requisite number of officers, and then, no doubt, many appointments would have to be made from private life. But then these appointments would be made, not to lieutenantcies alone, but to all grades, even the highest; and if a principle drawn from the necessity were now urged as a reason for appointing to the grade of lieutenant, it would be found equally applicable to appointments in any other grade, so that it might with equal justice be considered as a hardship that a citizen cannot under the present organization be made at once a captain, major, or colonel, etc., as that he cannot be made a lieutenant. In several of the military services of Europe the same grade of cadet introduces, even in the line, the youthful aspirant to the sequence of military promotion.

“The young men who are appointed cadets, or *warrant officers*,

are nominated, as has been mentioned, by the members of the House of Representatives, and are selected by them from among the sons of men living in their respective districts, and engaged in the various pursuits and professions of the country. It would seem, therefore, that the charge of monopoly is in every sense an unmeaning one. Do young men when they receive appointments as cadets so entirely change their relations to the country as to lose all claim to citizenship? Are they not as much citizens of the country as the young men of two-and-twenty who claim to be appointed lieutenants immediately from the civil pursuits of life? Is not the nation more certain of securing competent officers — officers qualified to perform, and devoted to, their duties — by subjecting each one for a number of years to the severe ordeal which the Military Academy affords? While in the lowest grade, the cadets are required to devote all their energies to the acquisition of such a knowledge of their profession as will raise them to that standard of acquirement which much experience has shown it wise and proper to exact of those upon whom the higher military appointments are to be conferred. This standard, which varies for different arms of service, is not considered too high. In truth, the proficiency which it requires is essential to qualify the young officer for the efficient performance of the various duties of his station. Much of the information necessary to form a good officer, being of a peculiar nature, can only be acquired in connection with a military establishment. The question then arises, how and at what time can this indispensable knowledge be imparted in the best and most economical manner? Ought the plan to be that now pursued, of selecting a number of young men each year, at the age when the mind is plastic and capable of rapid improvement, and sending them to an establishment especially fitted for instruction, there diligently to study and to serve for a number of years in a low grade and with small compensation; or, as suggested, should gentlemen of more advanced age be appointed to the higher grade of lieutenant, and sent with better compensation at once to the various military posts of the country to receive the requisite instruction? The plan now followed has many advantages over the last, both in point of economy and efficiency.

“An impression prevails with some that the number of cadets at the Academy is too large, that it might be somewhat reduced

and then furnish a sufficient number of scientific officers for the army as now organized. This subject was so fully discussed in my last report, to which I beg leave to again refer, that it is not deemed necessary to repeat the many facts and statements then fully set forth. It may be simply mentioned that the graduates of each year very little exceed in number the vacancies accruing annually in the army by deaths, resignations, and other casualties, and that the brevet lieutenants accruing to the service from this small excess are constantly and advantageously employed, either with their companies, on the coast survey, or on other detached duties. Many of the higher grades of officers are necessarily separated from their companies at all times, as assistant adjutants-general, assistant commissaries, assistant quartermasters; on the recruiting service; as aides-de-camp; on the coast survey; as assistant professors and instructors at West Point, and on other special services, making a total at the present time of eighty-eight, exclusive of the officers who are acting as adjutants of the different regiments, who are sick, who are on leaves of absence, or detached by other casualties. The legitimate duties of all these officers must be performed by others, and the brevet lieutenants furnish the means of supplying in part their places in their respective companies. They are thus called upon to do the duties appertaining to higher ranks in the army—sometimes one, two, or even three grades above their own.

“In this connection I will also remark that we ought not to lose sight of the fundamental principle which should always govern our peace establishment, namely, that of a skeleton force, small, but capable of sudden augmentation, in order that a much larger force may be speedily organized and brought to a state of efficiency in times of emergency with the least possible delay. On a sudden increase of the army, the present companies might be doubled; at least, some of the non-commissioned officers could be withdrawn to mix with the companies of the new regiments, a portion of the officers of experience would be promoted to the same regiments, to the regimental staff, and to the general staff of the army; thus securing to the country in a very brief period a large and well disciplined army.” Etc., etc.

A careful consideration of the attempted refutation of charges against the West Point Academy, as set

forth in the foregoing report of Colonel Totten, will be sufficiently convincing, not only that the arguments upon which the refutation is based are deceptive and valueless, but, also, that the real charge against the institution—that of its aristocratic tendency—is wholly evaded in this attempted defense.

In the preparation of a table of statistics such as accompanies the report of Colonel Totten, it might be easy enough to ascertain with entire accuracy the professions or callings of the parents of the students at the Academy during any period of years, but when the worthy chief, in his ready zeal to defend the institution against all assault, attempts to classify the parents themselves into those “in moderate circumstances,” “those in *reduced* circumstances,” “those in *indigent* circumstances,” “those independent in life” (this latter class constituting a very small ratio of the whole number), the reader can hardly help being struck by the conviction that the author of the defense has gone altogether too far for material which, under the most favorable interpretation, can have but slight bearing on the case, and which, in any event, must be wholly untrustworthy and uncertain in character. When it comes to considering how many parents each student has, or whether he be a half or a whole orphan, in connection with its bearing upon the aristocratic tendencies of the institution, it is difficult to repress the smile evoked by the utter absurdity of the proposition.

But the main point in the matter is that the reply is a

complete evasion of the charge of an aristocratic tendency, so long alleged as an objection to the institution at West Point as well as to its sister institution at Annapolis. The whole question at issue is perverted, and the facts adduced have no bearing whatever upon the case. Over a quarter of a century subsequent to the date of Colonel Totten's report, "the aristocratical tendency" of the students at West Point among themselves was, it is true, most painfully manifested in the exhibition of a class-feeling that led to the persecution of cadets whose parents, while, perhaps, in "indigent circumstances," had also the misfortune—a criminal and wholly disqualifying one, in the minds of the West Point persecutors—to possess a colored skin. Apart from this exhibition of narrow-minded tyranny, confined, it is to be hoped, to a few, the author is not aware that there exists, or that there has existed, or that it has been generally charged that there exists, a feeling of caste-distinction among the students themselves of our national academies.

The charge goes wholly beyond that, and assumes a much more pernicious character, because it affects the national interest. In broad terms, then, it may be said that *the tendency of our present military and naval system of education is to create a body of men in a republican country, the very nature of the circumstances under which the body is created and maintained implying the same feature of class-distinction, or of aristocracy, that distinguishes the similar bodies of men in purely aristocratic or monarchical countries.*

Upon the very threshold of the argument which the author is now briefly to make, he draws emphatic attention to the fact that his allegations as above set forth lie against the *system* and not against *individuals* who have received or may receive their military or naval education at either of the institutions now under discussion. The country has had many illustrations of able and patriotic soldiers and sailors, offsprings of both institutions. The renowned soldier who led the Union armies to victory was a graduate of West Point, as were also his great marshals, Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, and others. These brave men were not only patriotic and extraordinarily skilled in their profession, but they were, and those of them yet left with us still are, utterly destitute of any taint savoring of the odor that clings around an aristocracy. The author will be pardoned for going still farther, to say that our own generation is not fully appreciative of the pure character of the men referred to. Full justice to their names will only come at a later period in history, and this is said in no derogation of the gratitude and discernment of the loyal citizens of the present day who have done so much in recognition of their heroes. But there are some survivors of the great conflict who know that the opportunity to attempt the rôle of a Cæsar or of a Napoleon was presented to more than one of the great generals to whom the life of the Republic is due. That there was absolutely no tinge of personal ambition at the expense of country among the really great leaders, implies not only love of country, but deep love of republican institutions.

All honor to the men who saved us, not only from a Southern monarchy, but likewise from a *Northern dictatorship*.

Having said this much in laudation of some of the *alumni* of West Point, it is not to be admitted for a moment that the institution is to be wholly credited with either the creation of their rare military abilities or their utter freedom from aristocratic tendency and yearnings, as manifested by their simple love of country and pure devotion to the forms of a true republic. The mere *personnel* of these soldiers argues nothing in favor of the system at West Point. It must never be overlooked in the consideration of such a question that a majority of the Southern leaders, who so nearly succeeded in grasping victory for their cause, were graduates of the same institution at West Point. The statistics are not at hand to prove the fact that a greater portion of the Southern leaders were graduated from this institution than were the same proportion of Northern leaders, but there cannot be much room for doubt upon the point. The able captain of the Southern Rebellion, measured by the test of class-standing, more nearly represented West Point than did his great adversary Ulysses S. Grant. A reference to Table IV., upon page 246, will disclose the fact that while the one stood near the head of his classes, the other did not reach sufficiently near the foot of his own to get his name upon the table. This circumstance proves more than would, at first view, appear.

Comparison between the two great captains of the

war in the aspect of military skill would serve no useful purpose, but the leading facts of their public career afford most profitable material for reflection. The Northerner—born in humble circumstances; reared to a life of hard toil and self-dependence; schooled in the simple virtues of the poor—wholly failed to distinguish himself in the curriculum of studies at the Academy, and, indeed, barely passed the final examination. When the time came, however, for an application of the crucial test, found in practical demonstration, lo! the dull pupil was transformed into a military genius never surpassed, if indeed ever equaled, in the whole annals of war. But further than this, his early home education and training had permanently instilled into his mind and heart the value and love of republican institutions, and when the dread crisis came, requiring all citizens of the country to decide as to their fealty, party friends and considerations were thrust aside by the simple-hearted patriot, and the whole power of his superb genius was thrown to the support of the Government of the people. The Southerner—born in a line of ancestry carefully preserved and boasted of; descended from families that with each succeeding generation approached nearer and nearer the atmosphere in which republican feeling withers and the flower of caste reaches perfection; reared in affluence; supplied with every requisite to make life a brilliant success; a child of the Government; a sworn defender of the whole country—met that crisis in an entirely different manner. He was as true to the teachings of his early education as was

his great antagonist. The latter was the growth of honest republicanism; the former the scion of an incipient aristocracy. Having no faith in the theory upon which republics are built, he held no sympathy for the Republic in practice, and when the menaced country called aloud in the agony of its great peril, "Help me, Cassius, or I sink," he coldly opened the flood-gates of revolution, and with his own hand poured down the waters of destruction upon its head.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PRESENT MILITARY SYSTEM INIMICAL TO REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS—LIFE-SERVICE IN THE ARMY AND NAVY—COMPARISON WITH THE JUDICIAL SERVICE OF THE GOVERNMENT—COURTS-MARTIAL AND COURTS-JUDICIAL—DOES THE CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZE CONGRESS TO CREATE A CONTINUOUS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT?—THE MILITARY PRACTICALLY BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE—THE PRESENT SYSTEM WHOLLY UN-AMERICAN—THE TERRIBLE LESSON OF THE REBELLION—DANGERS OF CONFINING MILITARY KNOWLEDGE TO A COMPARATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF CITIZENS.

IN the preceding chapter the author has stated that the charge against the national academies of a tendency to foster the growth of the aristocratic sentiment has no bearing upon discriminations of class among the pupils themselves. The evil of the system in that direction lies in the erection of a body of men into an organization that, by reason of the principle upon which it is constituted, is directly opposed to the theories upon which republics are founded and upon which alone they can exist. A pupil entering those academies understands that he is tendered a life-occupation, with the privilege of relinquishing it should he desire to do so, but with no power vested in the Government to deprive him of it so long as his conduct is at all passable.

An interesting discussion involving the matter just touched upon occurred in the United States Senate during the first session of the Forty-ninth Congress. This discussion arose upon a bill to restore to the naval register the names of certain pupils who, by the act of 1882, had been discharged from the Naval Academy. This act, it may be briefly explained, was passed in view of the fact of an annual surplus of graduates from the Academy in excess of the vacancies occurring in the service each year, whereby a number of the graduates were left without places to which they could be assigned. The legislation enacted in 1882 to meet this difficulty provided that only the first ten in class-standing at the annual examinations should be assigned to places, while the others who had also successfully passed the examinations might receive a diploma and a sum of money—about one thousand dollars—in lieu of an assignment. A number of the class of that year who failed to get into the naval service by reason of this legislation subsequently petitioned Congress to place their names upon the naval register, claiming that they had entered the Academy with the understanding, warranted by uninterrupted usage, that they were to be permanently received into the naval service of the United States. It was upon the consideration of a bill granting the request of the petitioners that the discussion above alluded to took place.

The discussion seemed to indicate the pretty unanimous opinion that Congress has the power to legislate upon the subject of admission to the naval service—and

by logical sequence to the army also—through the national academies, but no expression was made upon the equally vital point of abbreviating the career of an officer who has already entered into one or the other service. For the information of the reader it may be stated before leaving the point that the bill to reinstate the applicants failed to pass the Senate.

But, returning to the matter of terminating the career of an official already in the service, it will be suggested at once that he is amenable to the laws covering proper conduct, and that in violating them a ready means is afforded of removing him from the service. Were this means a radical preventive of ill-conduct and a certain sluice-gate whereby offensive and unworthy persons might always be discharged, the fact would not even then reach to the point which the author wishes to raise, viz.: that the pupil upon entering the United States service, either as one of the highest ten or of any other number, understands that upon compliance with the imposed requisites he is to enjoy a life-service only to be terminated by himself. This point is dwelt upon because of the bearing it has in a moral sense upon the question under discussion.

While the means spoken of above may appear wholly sufficient to purge the military or naval service of unworthy material, the remedy is not to be accepted in a too radical sense. Ordinary bad conduct in the army or navy is not dealt with by the judicial arm of the Government, but jurisdiction is remitted to the service itself to which the official belongs. His case is considered and adjudicated

by means of courts-martial, which are a very different thing from civil courts of justice, although justice is sought to be reached by them. Courts-martial and courts-judicial should be in spirit and essence one and the same thing, but with no disrespect to the military or naval service it may be said that there is a difference in both spirit and essence largely growing out of the changed relations of the individual under the service of strict discipline which the military and naval necessity imposes. Thus, a sentinel found sleeping at his post on duty would, under martial law, be condemned to death, though the civil law would prescribe no such penalty for a policeman found sleeping upon his beat. Conversely, a man found intoxicated in civil life would be sent to a lock-up, while a soldier or sailor might become intoxicated with impunity, etc.

All of this aside, however, the broad fact to be borne in mind is that the individual entering the service of the United States, in its army or navy branch, as an officer, practically has a life-occupation under the Government secured to him. There is but one other branch of the National Government of which this can be said—the judicial branch. With this single exception every individual, from the President down to the most unimportant clerk, is directly or indirectly within accountability to the electors of the country. Some further exception to this sweeping rule has been sought to be created of late years through the establishment of the Civil Service.

There are well-defined distinctions, however, existing

between the military and the judicial servants of the Government which make the former, in the respect in which we are now viewing the case, altogether superior to the latter, theoretically considered the higher branch of the Government, as, in matters belonging to its jurisdiction, it has the last decision over Congress and the executive. By section 1 of article III. of the Constitution it is provided that "the judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior," but the same instrument, while authorizing the Congress "to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," has nowhere expressly said that the officers of the military and naval branch shall only hold during good behavior. The power to make such a regulation is, of course, delegated to Congress, but it does not appear that this body has ever specifically laid down the rules which the Constitution establishes in the case of the judges. Under the codes of the War and Naval Departments members of both services are amenable to trial for offenses against the codes, but under the most favorable aspect there is a very wide distinction between the specific enunciation of a rule in the fundamental law itself and the delegation of power to make rules in general to some other authority by the same document. The source of appointing power is the same for officers of the army and navy as it is for judges of the Supreme and inferior courts, and they are all supposed to be amenable to the same authority.

Why, then, is it specifically provided in the Constitution itself that the judiciary shall only hold during good behavior, while the instrument remains silent upon the office tenure of the only other permanent branch of the Government—the army and navy of the country?

This is no place to go into the discussion of a question which must be raised soon or late, as it appears to the author. This question is whether section 12 of article I. of the Constitution, giving to Congress the power “to raise and support armies,” though “no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years,” really furnishes at all a warrant for a regular and continuous military establishment in the sense of a standing army as it is now understood. This authority follows immediately the section conferring upon Congress the authority “to declare war,” etc., and immediately precedes in subject-separation the provision authorizing Congress “to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, repel invasions,” etc.

As above intimated, however, the discussion of such a question is entirely foreign to the author's present purpose. The point to be made clear at this moment is the practical difference between the office tenure of the two permanent branches of the Government—the judiciary and the army and navy. The difference constituted by positive declaration in case of the former, and the entire absence of any such declaration in case of the latter, is a very practical one when followed into the ramifications of

actual application or operation. This point of difference will be readily grasped by any reflecting mind and need not be dwelt upon nor be followed to its rational conclusion.

There is still another distinction, however, inherent to the nature of the two bodies of individuals. The military profession—embracing within the general term of *military* both the army and navy—is an exclusive one in a sense that its members constitute a distinct entity in the community. The knowledge of this body, theoretical, and especially *practical*, is confined to the body. The members of the profession are clothed in uniforms radically differing from the garb of a simple citizen; they live apart from the general community and under their own laws and regulations; they are legally invested with weapons and a power over the lives of other men; and they constitute that force which is potent to defend or destroy a nation. They are the embodiment of the *imperium in imperio*. Being thus a body apart from the general constituents of the community, amenable only to their own authorities and their own internal regulations, they pass out of the scrutiny of civil society. Should one of the members of the body commit an offense subjecting him to the penalties prescribed by the military, not the civil, authority, he is tried by a military and not by a civil court. To the constitution, rules of procedure, prerogatives, etc., of such a court the general public are, as a rule, entire strangers. It may be said, in a general sense, that the whole proceeding, from the court-martial to the con-

sideration and disposal of the sentence by the War or Navy Department, is as far removed from the scrutiny and knowledge of the people at large as though it had taken place in the heart of Africa.

A man occupying the position of a judicial officer of the Government moves within the immediate circle of civil society. He is subject to its constant scrutiny both in his official and personal character. His profession is not technical in the military interpretation. Should a judicial officer offend in a personal or a moral sense, the eyes of the multitude are upon him, and the people are quick to demand that he be brought to a proper account. Should he be incompetent in a legal sense, or corrupt in the administration of his office, there are thousands of men about him, learned in the profession and fully competent to detect incapability or dishonesty. The American people, as a rule, are a nation of lawyers from force of general education and forms of life. Should a judicial officer place himself within the pale of investigation, his trial becomes a matter of national concern: it is conducted, so to speak, before the people themselves, who thus become in a certain sense the last judges of the matter.

From this lengthened statement it must appear that a judicial officer has a greatly less certain tenure of official life than has a member of the especially favored class of American citizens whose names make up the official rosters of the American army and navy.

In all that essentially constitutes such a relation, these

MAJ. GEN. E. V. SUMNER.

MAJ. GEN. J. B. F. WOOL.



GEN. U. S. GRANT



MAJ. GEN. LEW WALLACE.



MAJ. GEN. JEFF C. DAVIS.



FAMOUS MILITARY LEADERS

latter are a highly privileged class. During early youth they are endowed with a most liberal education at the public expense, and upon the completion of their academic course they are placed at the beginning of an official career involving a life-tenure which, through the mere casualties of nature, carries them through progressive stages of higher honor and greater emolument until finally they are retired from active service at a certain age to enjoy the rest of life upon a fixed salary from the Government. No change of political parties affects them. They are wholly beyond the reach of the sovereign people. Presidents, senators, representatives in Congress, and, through these, Cabinet officers, foreign ministers and consuls, department officials spread over the entire country, and, in brief, the whole *personnel* of the General and State Governments, are called at fixed intervals to the bar of the whole people; judgment is pronounced upon them as public servants; the policy for the next stated term of official investiture is marked out; individuals are assigned to the various places of trust, and the common people go back to the duties of their daily life.

Now this formula is the very essence of a popular government, and just to the extent that it is departed from does the government fail in the perfect ideal of the true republic. Of late years there has been a strong tendency among some of the public men of our country to extend the privileged, or, as it may be said, the life-tenure class of officeholders. This tendency grows, as the author believes, from the too common disposition to look to the

monarchical forms of government for models upon which to perfect republican institutions. The idea seems absurd. One of the contemplated innovations consists of creating a diplomatic and consular corps with a life-tenure of office, as is the practice of all European monarchies, as it also is of the Republic of France. Such a practice would be pernicious alike to the theory upon which our Government is founded and to the healthful results of its practical operations considered from a standpoint of our foreign relations, as well as in the peril of the mere example. To call into being a life-class of this description would be to create a body of men who, far removed from the scrutiny of their fellow-citizens, and possessing a security of office-tenure, would become as indolent, presumptive, inefficient, and aristocratic as are the generality of the monarchical foreign representatives. As much as, and even more than any other class of American officeholders, our foreign ministers and consuls need the stimulus to action and fidelity which periodical accountability to the people alone can give. Under our present system, it may be remarked that the United States has a more efficient foreign corps, in the general make-up, than any other country.

Hence, instead of extending the privileged classes, it should be our effort to confine their number to the very minimum compatible with the necessity of administration.

But to resume the consideration of the army and navy class with which we have to do in the present volume, the foregoing facts and arguments may be now cited in cor-

roboration of the charge so frequently made against the system of national academies, that it is aristocratic in its tendencies. Why should it not be? The case rests upon a basis as fixed and unvarying as a mathematical problem, which simply requires a statement of the factors in order to produce the inevitable result. The young men of these national institutions are prepared for their career by an education which, in the points of liberality and general application, can be secured at but few of the collegiate institutions of America. With this education they are started upon a career promising much honor and great glory, and which, as frequently stated, practically covers a life-tenure irrespective of any civil or political authority whatever. Further than this, they are the defenders of the Government—the firm rock upon which the nation rests. Why should not such conditions result, especially in the absence of the strength of mind, possessed by a Grant, a Sherman, a Sheridan, and by many others, in the gradual growth of a feeling of superiority over the commoner conditions of men? Let the advocates of the system say what they will, this is the legitimate, and it is the practical effect. The American army or navy officer, if worthy in private character, has a ready *entrée* into every grade of society at home and abroad. It makes no difference if in his school days he belonged to the class whose parents were in “indigent circumstances,” as described by the worthy Colonel Totten, his reception into any society whatever is assured by the honorable class-position which he occupies. Therefore, notwith-

standing the exceptions which may be freely adduced to the contrary, the tendency to the creation and growth of the caste or aristocratic feeling exists as a veritable and incontrovertible fact, and it may be said in general terms that it was through the feeling of aristocracy engendered in Southern people as a part of their domestic system, added to by the education and tendencies of the West Point system, that such men as Lee and his *confrères* found it so easy to glide from the defense of their country into an open war upon its life. The tendency, then, is there; the circumstances warrant it, and it requires strong republicanism to resist it.

The army and navy are, numerically, so infinitesimal, as compared with the fifty odd million common people, that the military power is wholly swallowed up, so far as any dangerous possibility is concerned. In the present disposition of things, the evil is wholly theoretical, not practical. But, unquestionably, the system of a privileged class, holding a life-tenure of office, is foreign to the constitution and best interests of a republic.

In view of these statements, the question may be asked, whether the author would favor a political tenure for army officers, and whether he would advocate the abolition of our schools of military and naval instruction at West Point and Annapolis.

In reply to the first question of such a nature, he would answer no, most emphatically, and he would go farther than this, and assert his belief that there is already too much of a political character in the system

for the promotion of the healthfulness of the system itself. The author intends to offer some remarks upon this point in the ensuing chapter, in further objection to the system of the academies, and hence he defers other comment upon it in this place.

As to whether he would advocate the abolition of the system of a trained soldiery, his negative would be equally emphatic. Hamilton said that "war, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice." It is to be presumed that no intelligent person in this age will be disposed to take issue with a statement which the experience of every decade more strongly confirms. But, while none could go farther than does the author in advocacy of preliminary education and training as a means to produce an efficient soldiery, yet he does not believe that the present system under which military education is imparted by the national institutions is the system best adapted to the needs of the American Republic. Upon the contrary, he believes it to be restrictive, inadequate to the end of its creation, and wholly un-American in nature.

It is restrictive, because it confines the benefits of education and the possibilities of distinction to a relatively few individuals, whose selection for this favored position is made upon a basis about as unfair as anything could be.

It is inadequate to the end of its creation by reason of the inopportune method of selecting the individuals.

The author will endeavor to illustrate this feature of the case in a stronger light in the ensuing chapter.

Lastly, it is un-American in almost every sense. All other positions of honor and emolument, under our system of government, are open to the competition of every individual, upon the basis of merit. There is no hindrance to any citizen in the effort to reach the highest offices of the Republic, if he can demonstrate in the right way that he has a special fitness for the position he aspires to. The author now more particularly refers to young men starting in life, though the statement is general in application. As a candidate for West Point or Annapolis, however, all questions of the personality of the applicant are out of consideration: literally, he may be said to be "in the hands of his friends." The author will not further anticipate, in this place, the remarks he designs to make in the following chapter.

But the system is most decidedly un-American in this: that it confines a knowledge of the military art to a comparatively few persons, and the legitimate effects of this are bad in every respect. To constitute a small body of men the sole military experts of a nation is to invest them with a tremendous power for evil, should they, in the course of human weakness, ever see fit to use it. Is there a necessity for emphasizing the truth of such a statement to a people who, within a quarter of a century past, have had a practical demonstration of it applied to their own case? When, at the breaking-out of the Rebellion, so many of our official army and navy staff,

whom the nation had been so carefully educating in the art of war, turned their expert knowledge and training against the Government, what would have been the result if the absconders had succeeded in taking away from their allegiance the faithful men who, in remaining loyal to their country, covered themselves with never-dying fame? This band of officers, who were not drawn from their allegiance to pure republicanism by the allurements of class-distinction, was denominated the *pis aller* of the Republic—its last hope. Under the unwise system of our national academies, whereby their graduates were established as the bulwark of the Government, and the volunteer soldier was crushed in every aspiration and every attempt, that band of loyalists from West Point and Annapolis largely deserved the designation. Had our Government adopted a more liberal and a more general system of expert education, the fate of the nation would not have hung as it did upon the mere thread of accident.

It has been reserved to the present paragraph to say that in no sense is the system more un-American than in the circumstance of its foreign origin. Military schools are of modern date, and the idea of such an institution in America was borrowed entirely from European example in the last century, and most particularly was it borrowed from France, the military record and career of which nation, from the year 1792 until the fall of the great Napoleon in the year 1815, need no illustration from the hand of the author of the present volume.

CHAPTER XV.

THE METHOD OF APPOINTMENT TO WEST POINT AND ANNAPOLIS—ITS POLITICAL CHARACTER AND USE AS POLITICAL PATRONAGE—A FORTUNATE SELECTION TO WEST POINT OR ANNAPOLIS, UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM, A MERE ACCIDENT—STATISTICS OF POPULATION, IN THEIR POLITICAL BEARING UPON CADET APPOINTMENTS—CONSTITUTION OF THE ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR—ANIMUS OF THE DESERTING OFFICERS—THE HIGH-CLASS GRADUATES OF WEST POINT—MANY GRADUATES, BUT FEW SOLDIERS—INDIVIDUAL RECORDS—STATISTICAL RÉSUMÉ OF THE RESULTS OF THE ACADEMY—THE GREAT NAMES OF THE CIVIL CONFLICT UPON BOTH SIDES THOSE OF LOW CLASSMEN—THE DANGERS OF A SMALL MILITARY CLASS—NECESSITY OF BROADENING THE MILITARY SYSTEM.

THE worthy Colonel Totten, in the report made to the Secretary of War in the year 1845, in refutation of certain allegations that had pretty constantly been charged against the West Point institution, a portion of which report is quoted in a preceding chapter of this volume, adduces with a good deal of display the method of cadet appointment as one of the great merits of the system. "The young men," says he, "who are appointed cadets or warrant officers are nominated, as has been

mentioned, by the members of the House of Representatives, and are selected by them from among the sons of men living in their respective districts, and engaged in the various pursuits and professions of the country," etc.

Now, this method of appointment, which Colonel Totten commends as direct evidence that there is no *monopolizing* tendency connected with the system, and as indirect evidence, it would seem, of the fortunate mode of cadet appointment, forms, in the opinion of the author, a very strong objection to the national system, as applied to the Academies of West Point and Annapolis alike. It is objected to by the author for at least three reasons: First, the system is *political* in character, and as such it is wholly unfair; second, the method pursued is inadequate to produce the best results of such institutions (that is to say, that the system fails to give the best material for the development of high military talent); and third, it is not the most conducive to the safety of republican government.

Under the system of appointment pursued for many years past, each member of the House of Representatives nominates a candidate for admission to each academy, and the President of the United States possesses the privilege to nominate ten persons as candidates at large. It will hardly be claimed that this method of appointment is other than a purely political one. Like any other political appointment, it is a part of the patronage of those to whom it is conceded, and, without making any personal arraignment, it may be alleged that this has been the

practical application of the method. The boy with an influential father or family connections has pretty generally received the nomination regardless of the question of fitness for the career of a soldier or sailor. This may be stated without impugning the motives of the Congressman or President making an appointment to any greater degree than attaches to the appointment of a postmaster, or of any other Government employé. The hard facts of the American political system are too well fixed and widely recognized to warrant any delicacy in the discussion of the system itself. It is not within the scope of the present volume to consider the question whether the system is wholly bad, as claimed by some, wholly good, as claimed by others, or a mixture of good and bad, as claimed by others still. The fact involved is what we desire to reach in the present case, and it is a fact not to be gainsaid, that the present method of appointing cadets to our national academies is political in theory and in practice.

So well recognized is the truth of this statement, that of late years there have been some instances of Congressmen establishing a rule for their own districts, under which they have nominated the candidate who has succeeded in passing the best examination before a constituted board, irrespective of his political connections or family influence. This plan is certainly better than that under which the Representative allows himself to select his candidate indiscriminately and in accordance with his own ideas of expediency, but it still fails to reach with certainty the class of youth which it should be the policy

of the system of appointment to obtain for our army and navy. Neither has the plan been adopted generally, and if the author is not mistaken in his information, the method alluded to is not only not gaining ground, but is rather upon the decline.

It is fortunate for the good name of our people that the actual nominations have been made generally under the legitimate license of our purely political system, and that the instance presented some years ago, of a Congressman who endeavored to enforce payment of a stipulated sum of money agreed upon as the price of his appointing power, stands alone in its shameless iniquity.

The political character of the appointing system is illustrated under a different phase by an anecdote of the late General Judson Kilpatrick, related by the Comte de Paris in his valuable "History of the Civil War of America." Kilpatrick, when a youth of eighteen, desired to enter West Point, but, having no political friends to secure the nomination for him, made an agreement with a candidate for the House of Representatives from his district in New Jersey, by which he was to stump the district for the candidate, who, in case of being elected, was to nominate Kilpatrick to West Point. Young as he was, Kilpatrick rendered effective service in the campaign and was rewarded with the appointment.

This same anecdote, if true, is instructive in another sense. The youth, without prompting from family or relations, had formed for himself the determination to become a soldier, thus evincing natural predisposition for

the career. His subsequent record in the War of the Rebellion as a brave and brilliant commander, though he had no high-class standing at West Point, is strongly confirmatory of one of the points made by the author in the present chapter in reference to a selection of military pupils based upon inherent aptitude, to the exclusion of selection by political favoritism.

It has been stated by many great military authorities that no degree of scholastic education and training can make a distinguished soldier of a man who has not the inherent qualifications of a soldier. The same statement has been made more than once in the present volume. Evidently, then, the calling of a military life requires a qualification that can never be reached, except as an accident, through a selection made under political methods. This objection is so potent of itself that it should have caused the abandonment of the system of appointment long ago. But there is a twin-evil connected with this phase of the matter that is, perhaps, as pernicious to the healthy results of the system as is that just dwelt upon.

This may be explained as follows: The cadet appointment being entirely a result of party politics, as has been shown, the political predominance of each class of cadets will very accurately correspond with the political predominance of each House of Representatives under which they receive appointments. The one is but the shadow of the other. This state of affairs, in the practical aspect, was well illustrated in the very institutions now being treated of at the outbreak of the Southern Rebellion.

If the reader will turn to page 244 of the present volume and consider carefully the tabular statement there presented, marked II., he will be able to make several interesting deductions, all of which it will not be necessary to refer to in the present connection, but that which the author desires to comment upon for the purpose now in view is to be considered in connection with the tabular statement to be found on page 245, marked III. The first of these tables, as will be seen, furnishes a numerical comparison of the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States of the Union, compiled from the censuses of 1810 and 1860, the latter being the year preceding the outbreak of the Rebellion. The second table presents a substantially complete statement of the total number of cadets admitted to West Point, with the States from which they were appointed, from the year 1802, when the institution was formally established, to the beginning of the Rebellion, in 1861.

Referring to table II., it will be perceived that the total population of the slaveholding States in the year 1860 was 12,240,293. The table will show that the total population of the non-slaveholding States in the same year (1860) was 18,977,728, or 6,737,435 (roughly stated, nearly one-fourth) more than the population of the Southern States. Table III. will show that during the life of the Military Academy up to the period named, viz., the outbreak of the Rebellion, there had been admitted a total of 4,438 cadets; that of this number there were appointed from the non-slaveholding States 2,278; and from the slaveholding States, 2,126,

including those from the District of Columbia and those appointed by the executive, no account being made of those appointed from the Territories, eight in number, nor of the twenty-six whose States of residence are marked unknown in the table. The main point of the present illustrations being to show not only the numbers of those appointed from the Southern States, who, having been appointed by Southern Democrats, were necessarily of Democratic politics also, but likewise the number of those appointed from the non-slaveholding States Democratic in politics, the author has deemed it fair to include in the number of Southern appointments the total quota of appointments at large, for the obvious reason that for a greater portion of the whole period the Democratic party administered the Government, and that during the entire period from 1802 to 1861 the influence of the South controlled the Government in all its operations.

Upon the basis above stated, without taking fractions into account, the Southern States had sent to the Military Academy one cadet for every 5,757 of their entire population, while the Northern States had sent only one cadet for every 8,330 of their whole population. If it be objected, however, that it would be unjust to charge all of the appointments at large to the Southern States, the showing would still be largely in favor of the latter. Excluding these appointments, there would still be left to the debit of those States 1,819 cadet appointments, which, without computing the fraction, would make one

appointment to every 6,729 of the population, as against one to every 8,330 from the Northern States.

It is not pretended that these estimates are critically accurate, because the same ratio of discrepancy of population between the two sections has not precisely existed through each year of the half century between 1810 and 1860. Thus in 1810 the population of the Northern States only exceeded that of the Southern States by some 302,043 inhabitants, while in 1860 the population of the former exceeded that of the latter by some 6,737,435 inhabitants. While, therefore, the estimate is faulty in this respect, yet the statement illustrates with sufficient accuracy the points which the author is endeavoring to bring out in this connection. The first of these points is the political nature of the cadet appointment, which under our present system—and the same is true of that of the past, when the nomination came direct from the executive—makes the majority of the appointments to West Point and Annapolis to follow the political character of the appointing authority. The second point is the long preponderance of the Southern over the Northern States of the Union, the apprehended interruption to which preponderance in 1860 furnished the South a pretext for revolution, and the sons that she had sent to West Point and Annapolis the opportunity to turn the knowledge received from the Government against it.

The foregoing illustration of the political character of the cadet-appointment to West Point and to Annapolis brings into bold relief, as the author believes, the per-

nicious nature of the appointing system. Nearly one-half of the entire admissions to West Point for nearly sixty years was composed of representatives of the South and of the Democratic party, loyal to the leading principle upon which that party was constructed, viz.: the legitimacy of slavery. Upon the election of a Republican President, the Southern leaders persisted in construing the significance of that election as an attack upon the institution of slavery with a deep-settled purpose to abolish it. The army at that time was crowded with Southern representatives, who, forgetting country, went into what was openly declared to be, by its Southern projectors, a *political* war. Had there always been a non-political system of appointment to West Point and Annapolis, there would have existed a higher tone and a broader scope of mind among the army and navy officials, which would have saved the country from the terrible disasters that befell it during the struggle lasting from 1861 to 1865.

Bad as was and is the appointment system, however, there were men that had received their military or naval education under it who, when the question of sustaining the creeds of a party or the fancied rights of a section at the expense of their united country was presented to them, rose to the full altitude of patriotism and proved themselves to be happy accidents under an unfortunate system. Lucky, indeed, was it for the perpetuity of the Republic that such men as Grant, and Sherman, and Sheridan, and many others—accidents of the system—were not only born soldiers, but that they were broad

enough of mind and republican enough of principle to rise above party and its associations, and to cast their strength to the support of country and of freedom.

A writer in *The Nation*, in the number for March 29, 1866, denies the hostility of West Point, at the outbreak of the Rebellion, which has been constantly charged upon it. He remarks that "the graduates failed to comprehend the political situation. Almost everywhere in it (the army) were still current the same ideas about the sacredness of slavery, the same cant about the evils of agitation, the same classification of secessionists and anti-slavery men as alike disunionists," etc. The writer is entirely correct as to the general currency in the army of the idea of the sacredness of slavery, but it is hardly possible that any believer in the sacredness of slavery failed to comprehend the political situation. It would have been far better for the country and for the noble volunteer soldiery who were called in to settle the question at issue between the sections had the army ignored the political situation entirely and held itself in readiness to obey the higher, nobler call of country.

But there was a curious anomaly about this matter of the politics of the army which furnishes the author the unusual opportunity to attack the system of cadet-appointment from both sides of the same question. The side which views the appointee as a mere political favorite owing his position to partisanship has just been considered and condemned because of its tendency to fill the army with mere politicians to the exclusion of genuine

soldiers. The author now desires to indulge in an apparent paradox and to reprobate the system of appointment *because there is no politics in the army and navy.*

It is one of the prime duties of all citizens of the Republic to become thoroughly conversant with every question of a political nature affecting the well-being of their country, as upon an intelligent knowledge of all public subjects depends the value of a man in the discharge of the prerogatives of citizenship. It is one of the most potent objections to a life-tenure of office in a republic that it tends to withdraw the interest of the individual vested with the tenure from all questions connected with the politico-economic affairs of his government. His own position in life is assured to him without further effort upon his part, and, the stimulus of personal benefit which so strongly promotes human activity being withdrawn from the direction of public affairs, he is apt to become indifferent to obligations of the first importance to his country. As the army or naval officer once fairly in the service of the Government possesses the consciousness, as heretofore stated, that even within very broad limits he is wholly beyond the reach of individual politicians and political parties, it might be inferred as a natural consequence that he would soon or late lose his interest in everything connected with state affairs which has no bearing direct or indirect upon the narrow circle of which he is a constituent. Do we find that the actual fact bears out the inference in practical operation? A writer in *The Nation* for March 15, 1866, in commenting upon the army

as a class, says "they are not well-informed, nor liberal-minded;" thus reaching farther than the limit of the inference just suggested. The same writer asserts that "many clergymen are bred at this school for soldiers" (West Point). Apart, however, from all this, the author believes it to be a fact that as a class the American army and naval officers take but little interest in the political affairs of their country; that but few of them have any intimate knowledge of the great issues dividing the chief parties, as that of the currency, of the tariff, of our external and internal commercial relations, etc.; that they seldom exercise the privilege of the elective franchise; and that many of them, especially the naval officers, who spend so large a part of their lives in foreign waters, never vote at all.

Now all of this is wrong, assuming the statement to be true as above made. No individual, nor group or class of individuals, not disqualified under the laws, should be withdrawn from the weight of responsibility which the functions of citizenship entail. Citizenship under a government that is administered by the whole people, and not by the select few, carries with it obligations as well as privileges. The latter of these should never be renounced, the former never evaded.

In view of this statement the question may be asked, how are these different positions to be reconciled; how does it happen that politics was supreme in the army and navy in 1861, while the charge is made and sustained at the same time that the system under which

the officers of those bodies are created has the effect to withdraw them from all interest in political affairs, and therefore is detrimental to the best interests of the country? The reply to such a query is not difficult to find. The question of slavery was political in character beyond doubt, but it was vastly more than that. It was a subject that entwined itself with the domestic and social relations of the people among whom it existed; it was the foundation-stone upon which their class-aspirations were built. It is not necessary to repeat the statements made in preceding pages which relate to the subject of slavery in its caste or class aspects. It is safe to say that the army and navy officers who defaulted in their trust in the year 1861 had no basis whatever upon which to found a strictly political excuse for their action. They cared nothing for other questions of government, and as an abstract issue of national policy they cared as little for the institution of slavery. Their whole interest in the latter was centered in another aspect of the subject much farther-reaching in consequences than its extension in a purely political direction, covering effects relating only to the national economy. Such of them as were graduates of West Point or Annapolis had primarily received the appointment to those institutions through the machinery of party politics, but once having entered the service they became as oblivious to the questions of party in detail as those who follow them under the same system to a life-tenure under the Government.

Hence, it may be said that the system of appointment

is to be condemned because it involves the simple question of politics for admission into the national academies; and it is further to be condemned because, when once the officer is made, the system, in its extension, strongly tends to strip him of his value as a simple citizen and elector of the Republic. But can a system be devised that may obviate this political defect? The author believes that one can be, and in the subsequent pages he will have some suggestions to offer upon this important subject.

Thus much for the first or political objection which the author has to make against the national system of appointment to the Military and Naval Academies. The second of the objections presented relates to its inadequacy in the production of the best results to the nation. A late writer, in reiterating a well-established truth, has forcibly said that "education can develop ability, but never take the place of it. It may make a soldier, but it cannot make a general." Now, then, what shall be said of a system of general-making—for that is what all military systems should aim at—which wholly ignores the first principle upon which military education should be based, viz.: the selection of the material which, under the developing influence of education, may be molded into a standard of usual or, perhaps, of exceptional excellence? No pretense can be made that the present and past systems of appointment to these academies have any reference whatever to the requisite qualification which should precede all others in the selection of

young men to be developed into officers, and who shall be competent to lead to victory that most invincible of all soldiers—*the American volunteer!* Under the operation of our exclusively political system of appointment, those young men are presented as candidates for entry into the academies who are able, through the influence of friends, to obtain nominations from the Congressmen of the districts in which they live, or from the President of the United States direct. That is the essence of the whole matter. All must admit it to be a very imperfect method in this progressive age.

This reasoning, which may be considered only *a priori* in character, is amply vindicated by the results of the *ex post facto* experience. No more forcible testimony could be appealed to than the record of the institution now under chief scrutiny. With a view of interrogating that record, the author has presented the table upon page 246, marked IV., which gives the individual position of every graduate of the four highest classes, from the year 1802 to the year 1861 inclusive. If any young man with sufficient education to pass a very ordinary examination in the rudimentary English branches may be educated into a successful soldier after a prescribed course of study in mathematics, engineering, and the other branches forming part of the curriculum at West Point, then, manifestly, the graduates with the highest class-standing should be those who would become most distinguished in the practical exercise of the military profession.

The table presented by the author will not only afford

much interesting information to the general reader, but will yield, also, much matter for careful reflection. The point which it is now the purpose to draw out is that which illustrates the results of the attempt to make soldiers by the process of mere education.

In the first place, let the reader, through the various works,¹ biographical and others, that may serve to show the subsequent career of each graduate of the highest class-standing, as given in the table, follow the history of the whole number. One of the first surprises which must attend such an operation will embrace the reflection that the institution, in all the years of its work, has made, comparatively speaking, an infinitesimal number of *soldiers*. It has sent from its halls professors and teachers by the score; it has furnished to the country lawyers and preachers, bank presidents, officers of insurance companies, engineers (for public and private works) in abundance, etc., etc.; but there is not a prominent university in the country of which the same cannot be said. What we expect of a military school is that it shall make expert military men.

Though an investigation, such as suggested, into the subsequent history of all the graduates whose names are given in the table, would occupy too much space for the scope of the present volume, a brief mention of the heads of the first classes will sufficiently subserve the author's present purpose. The table, as will be noticed, begins

¹One of the best of these is the work of G. W. Cullum, heretofore mentioned in these pages.

with the year 1802, and the first graduate of the institution presents so favorable an opportunity in his history and relations for illustrating the author's subject, in more than one of its branches, that he is unwilling that it should be lost. This graduate of the institution was General Joseph G. Swift, who received the honor of being its first *alumnus* in October, 1802. General, then Lieutenant, Swift entered the engineer corps, of course, as pretty much all of his successors have tried to do, and, excepting the period of his service as superintendent of the Academy, his time was chiefly spent in engineer work, principally about New York City. Though he possessed an experience of ten years as a military officer when the War of 1812 came into the country, General Swift, the West Pointer, made no distinguishing mark as an officer in the field, though as an engineer his service was highly honorable. Fortunately for the country General Joseph Swift had a brother, John Swift, who, during that war, without a West Point education, had been made a brigadier-general of New York volunteers. The volunteer General rendered most brilliant service to the country as an officer in the field, and after a successful campaign in Upper Canada, during which he succeeded in cutting off an important picket of the British, he lost his life upon the field of battle. The case of these two brothers is instructive, even after this lapse of time. The regular West Point officer, who evidently had no inspiration for a successful military career, passed his life in a service for which he would have been as well

fitted by special education received from an appropriate civil institution, while his brother, a simple volunteer, undoubtedly possessed that inherent something, heretofore referred to in preceding pages, which made him a brilliant soldier without the aid of the conventional academic education. This strong contrast between the college-made soldier and the soldier fashioned by the hand of nature has been witnessed in the history of our country many times since.

The subject is of a public character, and a warrant for considering the *personnel* of the table is thereby afforded us, freed from the reserve belonging to private life and acts. Let us scrutinize it, then, and endeavor to learn whatever good lesson it may teach.

General Joseph G. Swift, the first graduate of the institution, in 1802, as has been said, was an accomplished engineer and teacher of mathematics. Apart from work of this kind, he appears to have had but one experience in actual battle, in 1812, and it is certain that he made no distinctive mark as a military leader. In 1818 he resigned from the army to accept civil appointments.

Samuel Gates, of the class of 1804, resigned from the army in less than eighteen months, and has left no military record.

G. Bomford, of the class of 1805, invented the "Columbiad," thereby advancing the military interest, though he made no special mark as a military leader.

William Gates, of the class of 1806, rendered long and honorable military service.

The head of the class of 1807 saw service in 1812 and was "disbanded" in 1815.

The head man of 1808 served in the War of 1812 and resigned in 1815 to become a lawyer in the City of Washington.

The first graduate of 1809 was in the War of 1812, but resigned from the army in 1816.

The head of the class of 1811 was killed in battle the following year.

The head of the class of 1812 met a frightful death at the hands of the Indians.

The head of the class of 1813 left the service in six years without special military record.

The head in 1814 saw honorable military service and was killed in 1835.

The head in 1815 left the service the following year without military record.

The head in 1817 had no special military history.

The head graduate of 1818 saw some military service.

The leader of 1819 was an engineer officer, and spent his life at different army posts.

The honor graduate of 1820 saw engineer service and left no distinctive military record.

The head classman of 1821 was a teacher until 1834, when he left the army to become a teacher in civil life.

The head man of 1822 had a simple engineer record, and did not go to the Mexican War.

The honor graduate of 1823 saw service only as an engineer and professor, and when his country needed his

services to aid in suppressing the Rebellion he quietly resigned from the army, in 1861, after having received the support of the Government for nearly forty years.

The head of the graduating class of 1825 resigned from the army within a period of four years, and though subsequently achieving distinction in civil life as an engineer and chief of the coast survey, he is without any military record.

The honor graduate of 1826 became a teacher of mathematics and has left no military record.

The head of the class of 1827 served in the Mexican War, as well as in the first part of the War of the Rebellion, resigning from the service in 1864. He reached the brevet rank of colonel.

The honor graduate of 1828 spent his life as a professor of mathematics, and became the author of several books on geometry. He had no military record.

The cadet who heads the class of 1829, of which Robert E. Lee was second, resigned from the engineer corps in two years after graduating; he then became a lawyer, and, subsequently, an editor. He has no military record.

The graduate who carried off the honors of the year 1830 was the son of the first *alumnus* of the Military Academy. His acquirements as an engineer gave him an honorable record in the planning and construction of military works. His only military experience was at the siege of Vera Cruz, where his engineering services were

of a valuable nature. Apart from this, he has left no military record.

The head of the graduating class of 1831 resigned from the service within two years after graduation. He then studied divinity, entered the ministry, and became a distinguished clergyman, devoting his life to the church. He had no military record.

The head classman of 1832 was in one engagement of the Florida War. He resigned from the army within four years after graduation to engage in mercantile pursuits. He is without military record.

The head of the class of 1833 spent his life as an engineer and as an instructor. He saw no service in the Mexican War, which occurred during his period, and, dying before the outbreak of the Rebellion, he has left no military record. It may be remarked, *en passant*, that Francis H. Smith, who graduated No. 50 in the same class, devoted the education bestowed upon him to the attempted destruction of the Union.

The honor graduate of 1834 spent the most of his career in the engineer service, though he saw some service in Mexico, where he received a brevet rank.

The head man of 1835 resigned from the service in two years, but reëntered the army during the Rebellion, and rendered honorable service.

The honor graduate of 1836 saw no military service proper, though his career covered the period of the Mexican War. His services were rendered in an engineering capacity.

H. W. Benham, the laureate of 1837, forms the first example in the list of a highly distinguished soldier. The record shows that there was no mistake of a vocation for this pupil. He has no history as an engineer officer kept stationed by the influence of friends in the "society places." His career was purely military, while his record in the Mexican War and in the War of the Rebellion, during which latter he rose to the rank of brevet major-general of the Union army, was most honorable to him as an accomplished soldier.

The head of the class of 1838 affords another instance of the engineer officer. His career extended to the beginning of the Mexican War. He has left no military record.

The head man of 1839, I. I. Stevens, presents another cheering example of a prize in the cadet lottery. He distinguished himself to such an extent in Mexico that General Scott pronounced him to be "the most promising officer of his age;" and this, it may be remarked, was said at the moment Ulysses S. Grant was also serving as a young officer in Scott's army. Between the close of the Mexican War and the outbreak of the Rebellion, Stevens rendered many public services. During the War of Secession he threw the whole weight of his superior military talent and fine education to the support of his imperiled country, for which he gave up his life upon the field of battle. He rose to the rank of major-general.

The head man of 1840 chills the hope beginning to grow from the example of Stevens. This honor graduate

passed the next five years of his life as an engineer and assistant professor at West Point. He then resigned from the army, but was reappointed toward the close of hostilities in Mexico, though he saw some service during the final scenes. He again resigned and became a planter in Louisiana, his native State, of which he subsequently became governor. At the outbreak of the Rebellion he turned his education against his country, and with his fellow-rebels sought to destroy it.

The first graduate of 1841, Zebulon B. Tower, again furnishes an agreeable exception to the *régime* of the dilettant engineer officer. He served with honor in Mexico and rendered distinguished service during the War of the Rebellion, in which he won the rank of major-general.

The head of the class of 1842 became a professor of engineering in Harvard University. At the outbreak of the Rebellion, however, he entered the Union army and won the rank of brigadier-general.

The list is further illuminated by the career of the head graduate of 1843, W. B. Franklin, who distinguished himself in Mexico and achieved high rank in the War of the Rebellion.

The head man of 1844 has no distinctive military record. He was an engineer officer in the Frémont expedition and a professor of mathematics at West Point.

The honor graduate of 1845 deserted his country in its hour of peril. He was in temporary command during Terry's successful assault on Fort Fisher; he was

wounded in the fight, and subsequently died in a Union hospital.

The head man of 1846 has left a good military record.

The honor graduate of 1847 resigned from the army after the firing upon Fort Sumter, just when his country needed his services.

The honor man of 1848 resigned from the army in 1856 and has left no military record.

The head of the class of 1849 presents another example of the oasis in the desert. The gallant and valuable services of General Q. A. Gilmore during the Rebellion are well known. He richly merited the rank of major-general, which he won.

The first graduate of 1850, F. E. Prime, won distinction during the War of the Rebellion.

The leader of 1851, G. L. Andrews, demonstrated his military ability throughout the Rebellion. His services were most valuable and won for him the rank of brevet major-general of volunteers.

The honor man of 1852, T. L. Casey, also rendered good service during the Rebellion and won a brevet rank.

The class of 1853 is headed by the ever-to-be-lamented James B. McPherson, who combined fine scholarship with an inborn military genius, and thus was constituted an ideal soldier. He died all too soon for his own glory and for his country's good. With no academic training whatever, McPherson would still have been a great soldier.

The head of the class of 1854 gave his class-standing,

which was all he had of the soldier, to the service of the Southern Confederacy.

From this point to the year 1861, embracing seven graduating classes, there is presented an unbroken line of soldiers who proved themselves not only true to their country, but—in varying degrees—capable military men. There is no quasi-civilian in the list constituted of the names of C. B. Comstock, G. W. Snyder (killed at Manassas), J. C. Palfrey, W. C. Paine (disabled in 1863), W. E. Merrill, W. McFarland, and H. A. Du Pont.

With the foregoing list of names and the data accompanying it, the reader will be able to draw his own deductions. The list prior to the year 1825—when the table of Captain Boynton begins—has less interest in illustration of the present subject than has that portion of it covering the subsequent period. Some of the graduates of the Academy between the years 1802 and 1824 saw actual service either in the War of 1812 or in subordinate conflicts with the Indians; some few saw service in Mexico, and a very few remained attached to the army up to the close of the Rebellion, as, for example, Jos. G. Totten, H. W. Brewerton, and G. S. Greene. Many of them resigned from the army either immediately upon graduation or at varying periods afterward. A large number spent their lives in engineer service, or in teaching at West Point. Many others, availing themselves of the Government education, became engineers or teachers of mathematics in civil life; others became practicing lawyers; a few studied medicine and became practicing physi-

cians; one at least (A. Mordecai, class of 1823) lived upon the Government for more than forty years, and then deserted it upon the approach of the dread crisis of 1861. What will most strike the reader upon a review of the whole list between the years mentioned is the fact that it does not contain the name of a single individual who has left a distinctive record stamping him with the qualities of a great military leader. Many of them saw honorable service in the field, and others in the departments of teaching or in garrison duty to which they were assigned; but the same can be said of volunteer soldiers who served by their side and had never seen West Point or any other military school. One of the graduates—G. Bomford—served in the army honorably, and invented the Columbiad; another—R. P. Parrott, class of 1824—remained in the service for twelve years, when he resigned and became judge of a civil court, and afterward proprietor of a foundry, when he invented the Parrott gun. The author has no wish to detract from the merit of any of the individuals under consideration. Their service, such as it was, may have been honorable, but the present purpose is to weigh the school at West Point, not as the *alma mater* of professors, engineers, lawyers, doctors, or even of inventors of guns, but as the kind mother of distinctive military men superior in arms and in fame to those who never enjoyed the advantages of a scholastic military education.

The list embraced within the years 1825 and 1861 has more interest for the reader in connection with the present

subject than that which precedes it, for the chief reason that the period embraces two wars in the history of our country, the latter of which was of such proportions as to afford scope for the full display of the military talent and genius of the West Point *alumni* who participated in it. The statistics herein given in connection with the head classmen of the Academy between the years above mentioned will demonstrate that of the whole number given — some thirty-seven in all — about thirty-three per cent. never saw a battle ; nearly fifty per cent. have left no military record ; three of the number went into the Rebellion ; a little over fifty per cent. had military records of varying degrees of importance and excellence, while only a little more than one-fifth of the number rose to the standard of the great soldier. In making this latter statement the author must again say that he has no intention to detract from the well-earned credit of those who served their country well, but the present demand is for facts with which to elucidate an important problem, and it is well known that among the head classmen of the Military Academy such men as Stevens, McPherson, and the others already mentioned, have no duplicates in the history of the school.

The author is aware that the showing of the facts is strong in character, but the figures render it invulnerable to attack. These cannot be changed, though the attempt will be made by ultra-scholastics to explain away their significance. It may be claimed that class-standing at West Point does not strictly represent actual scholarship,

but that it also embraces points of college discipline. Such a reply can only be valid to a very limited degree, as even the fossiliferous system of West Point can scarcely be so absurd as to place a pupil at the head of his class upon a record for turning down his bedspread with prescribed regularity.

The foregoing facts in connection with class-standing at the Military Academy are openly affirmative in character. They may be strongly supplemented by a negative evidence equally confirmatory of the point raised by the author. Where are the names of the soldiers upon both sides who won a merited title to high military genius during the late civil conflict? Why do they not appear upon this honor roll of West Point? Why is there no place upon it for the names of Grant, No. 21 in class; Sherman, No. 6; Sheridan, "glorious Phil," No. 34; Pope, Hancock, Anderson, McDowell, Heintzelman, Hooker, Hunter, Lyon, Reno, George H. Thomas, Sturgis, Burnside, and others upon the Union side; and of Joseph E. Johnston, No. 13; A. S. Johnston; "Stonewall" Jackson, No. 17; Magruder; Van Dorn, Jubal Early, Longstreet, J. E. B. Stuart, Ewell, the saintly Bishop Polk, and the commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces, Jefferson Davis, on the rebel side? The author scarcely needs to attempt an answer to such questions.

The testimony given, then, by the published records of West Point must be held to be conclusive as to the inadequacy of the appointing system by which pupils are

admitted to our national academies. These pupils, expected to become accomplished soldiers and sailors, are picked up, so to express it, at random, without any regard to the question of fitness or aptitude. The pupil himself is generally a passive agent in the matter. The father of the boy settles the question of profession in the large majority of cases. Of one son he resolves to "make" a lawyer, of another a doctor, of a third a minister of the gospel, of a fourth a distinguished soldier, and of a fifth a brilliant naval officer. In the last two cases the faculties at West Point and Annapolis undertake to give the finishing strokes in the "making" process. There is some statistical law under which certain events, as the commission of crime, accidents by fire, storm, shipwreck, etc., are numerically predicted for a given period of time, and it is just possible that under a similar law there will always be a certain proportion of army and naval cadets, out of a given number of appointees, whose aptitude for their chosen profession may be justified by the subsequent record. But as a practical rule for the safety and well-being of this progressive nation, the author ventures to suggest that it possesses some elements of grotesqueness bordering upon absurdity. The whole subject is one of great seriousness to the people of the United States, and no effort should be spared looking to the grand end of selecting, under an enlightened and effective system, the most available material for the soldiers and sailors of our country—the men who are to become its defenders against nations which cultivate the art and

science of war as a specialty. The idea of sustaining national military academies for the making of lawyers, priests, clergymen, professors of mathematics, editors, school-teachers, surveyors, or any other calling except that of the military art, had better be abandoned as soon as possible. If it be necessary to the progress of the nation that the Government should provide for education in the professions mentioned, let a grand polytechnic institution be created, which may meet the necessity, but let it be distinct and wholly separate from the national military academies.

The third and last objection to the system of military education, as now conducted, which the author desires to raise in the present connection, is that relating to its expediency as viewed from the standpoint of national security. There seems to be no cause for any present apprehension that danger to republican institutions exists from the army and navy of the United States, though the war of the Rebellion pretty strongly illustrated certain possibilities when danger from such a source was least expected. But the objection now urged may be entirely based upon the general principle of the case. It is a well-established fact that it is dangerous to the safety of any government to have a knowledge of the military art confined to a comparatively small number of people, as the latter would possess the power, even should they never entertain the inclination, to control, or, to put it more broadly, to conquer the rest of the community. Now, does not our present system directly

lead to the creation of a comparatively small military class exclusively vested with a knowledge of the art of war? Most certainly it does, and the potent influence of this small class has been, and is now, supreme in every relation belonging to it. The class of which the author speaks is especially powerful in two respects: first, its members possess the life-tenure of office, and, therefore, enjoy a special privilege, upon which aristocracies are legitimately built; and second, they enjoy an exclusive knowledge of the profession of arms. All knowledge is power, and a knowledge of arms is supreme in the affairs of nations. An enthusiastic playwright has declared the pen to be mightier than the sword, but the author's observation leads him to believe the declaration to be more poetic than practical. A vigorous cavalry charge has seemed to him much more convincing than the work of many pens, even though of steel themselves.


It would be strange, perhaps, if such elements as those just named should go unappreciated or unused even in a republican country, and it appears most certain that they have not in the case under consideration. As the repository of our military knowledge and resources, the Government habitually looks to its army and navy class in all matters pertaining to those branches of administration, and, briefly stated, the result of our system has been to constitute both the army and navy the closest corporations in the country. The entrance to a recognized career in either one or the other service lies only through the picket lines of West Point or Annapolis.

All knowledge not obtained there is spurious, and all soldiers and sailors not made there are considered mere pretenders. These are strong words, but nevertheless true, as all must concede who are familiar with the facts of the situation. Until the occurrence of a most notable circumstance of quite recent date, the corporations named have been supreme in the management of the military policy of the country: they have controlled the whole organization of military affairs, and they have regulated all the appointments of the army and naval services. They have arrogated to the graduates of the national academies the appellation of *regular* officers in opposition to volunteer officers, who by contrast have become *irregular*, and, as a consequence, pretenders in the profession of arms. Hence, from the earliest operation of our present system the regular officer has climbed over the head of the volunteer officer, without regard to real ability or qualification, in all promotions for which the two classes were competitors.

The author will set forth this phase of the question at much greater length in subsequent chapters of the present volume. He has called attention to it in the present place because of its strong exemplification of the evils of the national system from the standpoint from which the subject is now being viewed. *Military knowledge should be more generalized and legitimized in the United States.* The system is much too narrow for the best interests of our great country.

It is not meant by this that the Government should

resort to a measure which constitutes the life of monarchies and aristocracies, viz.: the creation of a large standing army, which would be a standing menace to the liberties of the people. The author refers not to armies, but to a general diffusion of advanced military knowledge among the greatest possible number of people. He means to take an expert knowledge of the military art and science away from the keeping of a small privileged class and to entrust it to the people of the Republic. This can be done, without doubt, and when it is done the nation will never again be placed in the position of peril which so nearly extinguished its life when men whom it trusted proved faithless to their obligations.



THREE TYPICAL VOLUNTEER GENERALS.

1. General John Stark and his Green Mountain Boys. 2. General Logan in the Rain before Donelson. 3. General Terry at Fort Fisher.

PART III.

A DEMAND FOR JUSTICE.

A DEMAND FOR JUSTICE.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE COLONISTS AS SOLDIERS—THE INDIAN CONFLICTS—
BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER AT LEXINGTON—
THE RIGHT ARM OF THE COUNTRY FROM BUNKER HILL
TO APPOMATTOX—THE AMERICAN PLAN OF ARMY ORGAN-
IZATION—UNJUST TREATMENT OF THE VOLUNTEER—
QUALITIES THAT FORM THE SOLDIER IN BATTLE—DISCI-
PLINE UPON DRESS-PARADE AND UNDER FIRE--PERSONAL
BRAVERY A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE VOLUNTEER—THE
HEROES OF THE REVOLUTION—GENERAL KNOX'S EFFORTS
TO DIFFUSE MILITARY KNOWLEDGE AND TRAINING—THE
WAR OF 1812 AND ITS VOLUNTEERS—THE WAR WITH
MEXICO—THE GREAT CIVIL STRIFE.

THE introductory chapter of the present volume has been devoted to a general consideration of the American citizen-soldier. It is the present purpose to take up the thread of this interesting subject and carry it to a further conclusion.

Under the colonial condition, we had no original military system. The incident struggles of pioneer life, with an enemy of civilization ever alert and always blood-thirsty and unmerciful, had accustomed the colonists to

the use of arms in the defense of person, family, and home. To that extent they were soldiers; or it may better be said that they had certain qualifications which rendered the transition from the life of a civilian to the career of a soldier much less difficult than under the ordinary circumstances. They were possessed of watchfulness, energy of action, and quickness in the adoption of expedients. They had become familiar with danger, and fearless in meeting it. They were trained to the use of arms, and practice had made them unerring marksmen. Unused to luxury in any form, and for the most part reared with habits of frugality and hardy toil, they were models of physical development and robust manhood. All of these qualifications were invaluable to the formation of a soldier. But they lacked the discipline which enters so largely into the composition of an efficient soldier. When the war between England and France was in progress the American colonists were presented with their first real opportunity to learn the attributes of a soldier under a state of organized warfare. The English officers that led the American forces were men of military education and experience, even though unaccustomed to the Indian modes of hostility, as in the case of Braddock, who paid the penalty of deficiency with his life. But from these officers and their veteran troops the colonists learned lessons, and reaped an experience which made ultimate success possible in the Revolution which was so quickly to follow the struggle between the two European powers named. With the close of the "Seven Years' War" in

1763, the French lost their colonial possessions in America; and in 1775, twelve years later, the first armed conflict between England and her own colonists took place at Lexington—an event which was marked by two circumstances of the most profound consequence to mankind in general. The first of these was *the birth of the American volunteer*; the second, the beginning of a labor destined to terminate with the advent of a new nation, the cherished offspring from the womb of the suffering ages. Elder brother and younger sister, the volunteer has stood as a bulwark of protection to his beautiful charge upon all the bloody fields that have menaced her destiny, from Bunker Hill to Appomattox Court-house. So long as the strong arm of the American citizen-soldier is extended in protection of the American Republic, it will endure as a blessing to all races of men; but when that protecting arm falls, the American Union must fall with it.

The governments of the Old World owe their continuance to standing armies, raised and maintained by regular pay or by stern compulsion. The United States possesses no standing army in the popular sense of that designation. Its policy and traditions, in fact the very essence of the nation's existence, repudiate any such contrivance. The theory of the national defense rests upon what the French call *cadres*, mere skeleton organizations, of diminutive proportions, which in time of peace are sufficient to man the coast defenses, and to protect the people from that inveterate enemy of civilization and progress, the Indian of the frontiers, and which in time of war serves as the

nucleus about which the enormous armies that the country is capable of putting into the field may form themselves into fighting legions.

Practically considered, then, the nation has no army in time of peace, though, when the clarion voice of war resounds through the land, the country throughout its vast extent becomes, if necessary, one bristling camp of fighting men. This is a most interesting circumstance, and one that has challenged the attention of men of all nations and of all creeds. It is a circumstance quite unique in character, and forms at least one exception to the oft-quoted words of the wise man, "There is nothing new under the sun." It is so new that it has no precise parallel in all history: it belongs to the genius of the American Republic; and it is possible only to a government founded upon a basis substantially identical with that upon which our free institutions so securely rest.

Singularly enough, while the capital fact of our national life and well-being is well known to, and thoroughly appreciated by, all other nations, there are many of our own people who remain so far blinded to its ultimate importance as to be quite insensible to the practical necessities involved in it. A military school for the education of a comparatively limited number of military officers has been established and in active operation, as we have seen in the previous pages, for a period of more than four-score years. A certain number of men, to constitute, with their officers, what is called "the army of the United States," but who, in fact, constitute a sort of

national police force, are mustered into the service and pay of the Government as often as it may be necessary to preserve the numerical requisites of the body spoken of. This is well enough as the initial or departing point of our military school, but the point is too small for great extension. Thirty or forty thousand soldiers are quite sufficient for the needs of the country in a state of peace and international quietude, but the absurdity of relying upon such a number of educated and well-disciplined troops to represent the military power of sixty million people in a condition of war need scarcely be dwelt upon. From the period of the Declaration of Independence, when the colonies numbered little if any more than three million inhabitants, down to the close of the recent Civil War, the volunteer soldiers have constituted the prime military power of the Government. More than that, they must continue in occupancy of that position until the liberties of the people are unfortunately sunk under the iron heel of a standing army.

The plain fact that the author has taken so much pains to emphasize in more than one place is insusceptible of controversy or denial; and yet, with the experience of a war occurring about once in an average of every twenty-seven and one-half years, including that of the Revolution—there having been four wars (exclusive of the Indian struggles and the hostilities with the Barbary pirates) in one hundred and ten years—the governing power has not advanced the national military scheme a single step beyond the scope embraced within the insuffi-

cient ground covered by the academies at West Point and Annapolis. With the fact, heretofore stated, plainly before us, that the volunteer force of the country constitutes its real defensive dependence, together with the lessons furnished by the invariable first failures of heroic, but raw, undisciplined levies of troops, which come to us from almost every battle-field, it seems remarkable that, in all this experience of a people progressive to an almost unparalleled degree, there should have been but little or no effort to advance in a direction running so closely abreast of the national welfare, and even of the national existence. Surprising as the circumstance really is, however, it seems surpassed in mysterious incomprehensibility by another fact, as open and undeniable as the first, which is, that the volunteer, who is and always has been the acknowledged defense of the country, should be the subject of an unfair treatment and an unwise as well as an unjust discrimination well calculated to destroy the very feature of the American Government which has so surprised the modern world—the volunteer system of the great Republic.

Let us consider the branch of the subject covered by these two points.

All military men know that among the many requisites of an efficient soldiery there are at least two qualifications absolutely indispensable. These are, first, a discipline amounting to a blind obedience to the commands of the officer; and, second, such a disregard of an enemy's fire as will enable the soldier to perform his duties and to pre-

serve his discipline as unconcernedly and as absolutely as though the enemy's guns were simply exploding harmless powder and as though his swords and bayonets were made of wood. These two qualifications, so to call them, are worth vastly more than personal bravery alone upon the battle-field. To a large extent they are acquired qualities, for while the idea of discipline may be conveyed by military schools as well as the mechanical act of moving in bodies according to set rules, true discipline in its ideal perfection can only be acquired in the action of battle. And as for the second of the qualifications spoken of, as well or better might it be attempted to teach a man how to go to sea without the penalty of sea-sickness in the first experiences, as to instruct him in a school how to stand an enemy's fire. Immunity from the first of these can only be secured from the roll of a ship as it breasts the crested wave, and indifference to the second can only be acquired amid the roar of artillery and the serpent-like hiss of the death-dealing small arms. The two qualities in the effective soldier go hand-in-hand; they are united in him as firmly as were the Siamese twins by their bond of living structure.

A closer analysis will develop the facts more clearly.

A justly admired poet has embraced an important and far-reaching truth in the following lines, which have become the subject of almost daily quotation :

Vice is a monster of such frightful mien,
As to be hated needs but to be seen ;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

In the present place there is no disquisition to be made upon the subject of vice, but the fact expressed in the foregoing lines admirably illustrates the effect of usage in its general operation upon mankind. Men become accustomed to facing danger in myriad shapes and forms. Nor does the circumstance of their doing so always imply bravery of the individual. Familiarity with a certain form of danger acquaints the observer with its nature, enabling him to know its real attributes and to calmly appreciate its real effects. Some men go to sea, for example, and learn to be impassive amid the wild raging of the elements, while they would fly before a simple but unfamiliar danger upon land. Others go down into coal mines whose passages and chambers are full of explosive gases, with the nature of which the miners become so familiar as never to lose their presence of mind in case of an accidental explosion, being constantly ready to throw themselves, as quickly as the flash of the gas itself, flat upon the ground, where the atmospheric air invariably settles, in which they may be safe from harm until the gas in the upper stratum has been consumed. But put such men upon the ocean, with the danger of shipwreck staring them in the face, and they might blanch with fear, or be unable to stand for trembling, at the threatening of a death far less terrible and less painful than that they have so many times faced with indifference in the bowels of the earth.

In these and all other cases illustrating the same point the apparent paradox presented is to be explained wholly

upon the ground of usage, and upon that knowledge of or familiarity with a thing which usage alone can give.

Here, then, is one of the elemental attributes of all soldiers, whether in the line or in the rank and file, which no academy can teach nor oral precept convey, but which can only be learned in the noisy school held upon the battle-ground.

It has been said that discipline goes hand-in-hand with the quality just considered, for it must be self-evident that without the indifference to the enemy's missiles heretofore mentioned there could be no effective discipline upon the battle-field.

To march, to wheel, to move singly and in column, and to go through the manual of arms at the word of command upon a dress-parade, when under the view of fair women and admiring fellow-citizens, is one thing; and to perform these same marches and evolutions in front of batteries belching fire and brimstone and iron shells, is quite another thing. Under stern familiarity with that particular form of danger which attends a cannon when, like a volcano, it may be said to be in eruption, the soldier learns to realize its full proportions and to be as indifferent to it as the men who learn to play with venomous reptiles are with another form of danger. The soldier comes to understand after sufficient experience that, terrible as appears the blazing fire from line after line of artillery and rifles, the number of chances of his escape from being hit by the enemy's balls and bullets is largely in excess of the chances that he takes of being

struck by them. With the feeling that he is not walking deliberately up to certain death, and with a firm confidence in the wisdom and competency of his officers, as well as reliance that his comrades will maintain the discipline that should move them in a solid body, elbow to elbow, in advancing line, he becomes a soldier such as those who have won all the great battles of the world have been.

Let it not be understood from this commentary that the author eliminates the quality of personal bravery in the contestants upon a battle-field from the question of the results of the contest, leaving it to be decided purely upon the circumstances of more or less perfect discipline and greater or less recklessness as to danger. The previous pages have dwelt upon the peculiar quality which renders the American volunteer soldier such a tremendous power upon the field of battle—the quality of rare personal courage backed by and resting upon the noble inspiration of patriotism and love of freedom. There is a wide difference between recklessness of life and the pure courage which so ennobles its possessor. Many of the most despicable characters of history have been reckless of life, while all true worth implies courage of high degree. The instance of a gifted military officer who fell at an early day of the late war in one of the border States will not soon be forgotten. He was placed in the trying position attached to those who engaged in a struggle with former friends and neighbors to save the border States from being drawn into the whirlpool of secession—a position which brought them into a deadly

personal antagonism with the maddened advocates of rebellion. The gallant officer referred to saved the State of Missouri from secession by a noble exhibition of courage which terminated in his death upon a hard-fought field. Every possible means of persuasion, coercion, and threat failed to swerve him from his high sense of duty; and as a last effort to dispose of him he was subjected to the mortification of a personal challenge and the taunt of cowardice because he was too brave to uselessly throw away a life of inestimable value to his country. His was a courage of an order before which mere recklessness of life shrinks to the background as an ignoble blight upon fair character. It was the courage of patriotism, of principle, of holy self-sacrifice; it was the courage of the volunteer soldier of America, reflected by one of its most accomplished military officers.

Hence, while recklessness upon the field does not of a necessity imply the attribute of true courage, neither does the absence of it imply cowardice. In many of the battles of the late war, whole regiments of the bravest troops frequently broke before the fire of the enemy and fled as though panic-stricken, who were afterwards formed into line and moved upon the foe in unflinching constancy, until victory perched upon the Union standard. As a rule, panics upon the battle-field are not the result of personal fear or cowardice, strange as such a statement may seem. Generally they result from a sudden shock or from a loss of confidence that their fellow-troops will stand and act together. So long as a soldier feels that his comrades

will move firmly at his side—so long as the feeling of reliant companionship can be maintained, just so long will a soldier of good *morale* remain firmly at his post until the tide of battle turns either for or against him. But let a break suddenly occur, and even among the bravest troops the tendency is almost irresistible to fly before a danger augmented by an imagination which has with the quickness of the hurricane broken from the safe moorings of unimpassioned reason.

In this circumstance is strongly reflected the value of discipline to troops upon the field. A proper discipline not only teaches them *how* to move and stand together, but it also inspires them with the confidence that they *will* stand and move together. That feeling is a prerequisite to success upon the field. The soldier knows that the efforts of a few are unavailing against a multitude, and if he be really brave he will not care to throw away his life in a hopeless struggle. But give him the confidence that he is sustained to the extent of rendering combined effort, more or less productive of some good result, and he will present an entirely different aspect in the grim play of battle. If he can have an absolute confidence that his comrades are firmly held to strict discipline under the officers, he will possess the very strongest incentive to observe the same discipline himself.

To the practical soldier who has borne the labor and faced the dangers of many hard-fought fields the foregoing observations, so evident in character, may appear to be wholly superfluous. But, hoping to claim the attention of

many readers who, while having little or no practical knowledge of military affairs, are nevertheless potent to affect legislation, the author has deemed it best to illustrate the subject upon which he writes in a plain and homely manner.

Enough has been said to demonstrate the indispensable value to the soldier of the qualities treated of, be he officer or private. Mere personal bravery in a body of troops without discipline counts for little against an enemy thoroughly under the control of a vigorous and enlightened discipline. This fact alone explains the reverses which the American troops so frequently met in the first periods of the Revolution, of the War of 1812, and to some extent of the Southern Rebellion. When hostilities began between the colonists and the British troops in 1775, the revolting provinces possessed no semblance of a regular army. A crude militia organization existed, as well as bodies called regulars, and there were soldiers, too, who had served in the Seven Years' War against France; but, practically speaking, the army which was to achieve the independence of the colonies was yet to be formed. It would be useless to go into a detail in the present volume of those weary first years of the Revolution, when the raw, undisciplined, illy armed, poorly clothed, and insufficiently fed troops of the struggling colonies were pitted against the veterans of a nation with which the art and practice of war was a fixed profession. Nearly always beaten and driven from position to position, and from place to place, by a foe superior in all that belongs to the

mere trade of war, the suffering volunteers of the Revolution, never daunted by hardships, never dejected by hopelessness, never driven from their purpose to achieve independence by defeat in battle, followed the lead of the glorious Washington, and in every encounter reflected those distinguished attributes of the American soldier which, with the acquisition of discipline and a more extended experience, enabled them to crush the veteran legions of the British oppressor upon the glorious and most memorable field of Yorktown.

After the American Government had begun life upon its own account, the guiding spirit of its destiny endeavored to create a military organization which, while free from the dangerous tendencies of a standing army, would, nevertheless, obviate, in case of foreign war, the utter lack of military preparation with which the colonists began the struggle for independence. Foremost among those who gave earnest attention to the subject were Washington, Knox, Hamilton, and others. As a result of their efforts in this direction the scheme for the effective organization of the militia, as given in full in the previous pages, was presented to Congress as the basis of a law by General Henry Knox, then Secretary of War. As before observed, this scheme was supposed to embody the views of Washington upon the necessities of the case in general, if not in detail. As has also been related, Congress virtually refused to adopt the scheme so ably prepared by General Knox, and, emasculating it of all effectiveness, adopted in lieu of the original plan the harmless and, it

may be said also, the absurd militia law approved May 8, 1792. After the many struggles and vicissitudes heretofore detailed in these pages, the legislation necessary for the successful establishment of the Academy at West Point was enacted. This plan, as has been remarked, was also one of the favored projects of Washington, though the law providing for the effective establishment of the Academy was not passed until after his death. The two projects were intended to go hand-in-hand: the militia bill to provide for the general military education of the whole people, and the Academy to furnish a sufficient number of educated officers to lead our armies. The plan in its entirety was broad and comprehensive in scope, and, had there been earnest action in the direction of following the spirit of both the proposed measures, important results would undoubtedly have followed in the next war with which our people were to be afflicted. At the beginning of the present century, however, there was a strong sympathy among the Americans for the French upon account of the long-existing hostility between the latter people and the English, whom the Americans detested as late enemies upon the field and as the destroyers of relatives, friends, and homes. The sympathy spoken of was more active and fervent because of the material aid lent to the colonists by the French in the latter period of the Revolution. The sympathy partook of the disposition to imitate the customs and institutions of France. The first military school in the latter country had been created by Louis XV., about the year 1751,

at Vincennes, though it was afterward removed to the Champs de Mars, Paris, where it still remains. The pupils, who were all young noblemen, numbered about five hundred. Subsequently other schools were established, that in which Napoleon I. received his education being located at Brienne. This wonderful military genius, fully comprehending the advantages of an expert education, founded another school at Fontainebleau in 1802, which, however, was subsequently removed to St. Cyr. The sympathy of the Americans with the French, notwithstanding the events that so nearly drove them to a hostile collision at this very period, as well as the military enthusiasm which the great Frenchman created everywhere, was undoubtedly somewhat instrumental in the passage of the law of March 16, 1802, which gave life to the Academy at West Point. But there was no French model under the militia law of General Knox. Conscription and actual service was the French precedent in that direction. Congressional action gave birth to the twin military measures—the Academy and the militia bills. One of these died after a lingering struggle for existence, and the other survived through a precarious contest with adverse circumstances.

After a peace of less than thirty years, following the Revolution, the United States was forced into the War of 1812. It was a war that should have been avoided, and it seems safe to say that it would have been honorably avoided had the Administration been vested in the people of the North. The grievances which led to the war were

mutual without doubt, and the existence of a spirit of reason, backed by the desire to render justice animating the heads of the belligerent nations, would have saved an armed conflict, with the consequent loss of life and property.

But the war came, and, as upon the previous occasion, the American volunteer was quickly upon the field. Entire lack of military preparation and training was productive, in the first period of the war, of pretty constant reverses to the American arms. The conflict was unpopular in the North, however, and it never became national in any sense. Until the wanton outrage upon the city and public buildings of Washington was perpetrated there was no general enthusiasm in the sections. By that base act of vandalism, the British furnished all the incentive to national union that afterward existed. But the quotas of troops were furnished for periods far too short to admit of the attainment of a discipline among the soldiers which would have rendered them invincible upon every battle-field. Had an efficient militia training been adopted and practically followed after the Revolution, backed by the proper coöperation of all the States, there can be no doubt whatever that Canada in its entirety would have been attached to the American Union as the grand result of the War of 1812. But the conditions were against it. The war was not popular, and troops were begrudgingly furnished by a portion of the States. At the outbreak of hostilities, the militia were raw and undisciplined, and by the time they acquired the practical

training which would have made the invasion of Canada by a sufficient force an inevitable success, the star of the great Napoleon had set, and England, being thereby released from her contest upon the Continent, was enabled to furnish a sufficient force to effectually protect her American provinces. The might-have-been of the case was soon realized by our people. Notwithstanding the lessons of the conflict, the return of peace was followed by no effort to devise a feasible method through which the weakness of an untrained militia might be obviated to the greatest extent compatible with the unwarlike purposes and character of the United States. The injunction, "In time of peace prepare for war," was overlooked or disregarded by a people who desired and expected to be at peace with all the world.

In just thirty-one years more this desire and expectation were again disappointed. The restless statesmen of the South, always upon the alert to protect the "domestic institution" upon which their social structure rested, and firmly determined to possess and administer in the interests of a section the control of the General Government, easily found a pretext for a war with our feeble neighbor upon the southern line of the United States. The inevitable result of such a war, in the acquisition of territory destined to increase the political power of the Southern States, needed no gift of prophecy to clearly foresee.

The Mexican War, forced upon the country under the then existing Administration, like that of 1812, was unpopular in the North. The peace-desiring inhabitants

of the country could see no cause nor common justification for it. There was no issue between the contending governments that could not and should not have been settled by peaceful methods, and in a manner honorable and satisfactory to both parties. But the war was rudely thrust upon the country, and the demonstrated consequence of it was to vastly increase the political power of the Southern States of the Union. To the War of the Revolution—the only general war in which the country, up to the present period, should have been engaged—the Northern States of the Union, as then formed, contributed, in round numbers, three-fourths of all the troops raised by the colonies. To the War of 1812 and the Mexican War of 1846, the Northern States, in each case, contributed only about one-half the number of troops sent by the Southern States.

At the inauguration of the Mexican War, the regular army, including the marines, numbered 27,500 men, and these, being first put into the field, having had the advantage of military training, were successful against the enemy in all of the earliest battles of the contest, beginning with Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. When the volunteers went to the field, the same bravery and patriotic determination to uphold the flag of their country was witnessed, but, also, though to a greatly less degree, the same necessity for military training that had emphasized itself during the early period of the previous wars became a record of all their first experiences in battle. This necessity, however, was less apparent because of the fact

that nearly one-fourth of the troops sent to the war (the whole number being estimated at 101,000) consisted of trained men.

As a result of this war upon our future military establishment, the bill establishing the Naval Academy at Annapolis can alone be pointed to. The militia law of 1792 remained upon the statute-book, and at the conclusion of hostilities with our unfortunate neighbor our people laid themselves down to a dream of uninterrupted peace.

Alas, for the uncertainty of human hope! The treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed upon February 2, 1848, and in a few months over thirteen years from the date of that event the United States entered upon the most terrific struggle of modern history—a struggle which involved the question of the continued life or the speedy death of the Nation. Without other preparation than that derived from the handful of regular troops constituting the army of the United States, and from the militia organizations developed by and maintained under the general laws of the various States, the country was called to a war in which not thousands, as before, but millions of men were to become the actors. Our brothers of the South had again beaten the long-roll, and summoned the loyalists of the North to a conflict of huge proportions, and destined to be attended with the most mighty results. The American volunteer, after his short sleep, was again hurried to the field of battle, this time, however, to find himself arrayed, not against a foreign foe,



THE BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA. "A LITTLE MORE GRAPE, CAPTAIN BRAGG."

but face to face, bayonet to bayonet, with his brother, by whose side he had fought the haughty Briton, and by the aid of whose valiant arm the stars and stripes had floated in triumph over the capital of Mexico.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE GREAT VOLUNTEERS OF THE REVOLUTION—GENERAL WASHINGTON—GEN. NATHANIEL GREENE AND HIS ARMY OF UNTRAINED VOLUNTEERS—COMPARISON OF GREENE'S UNFORESHADOWING YOUTH WITH THAT OF NAPOLEON THE GREAT—WASHINGTON'S YOUTH—A GLANCE AT THE FORESHADOWINGS OF GEN. GRANT—BURGOYNE AND THE VOLUNTEERS WHO OPPOSED HIM—JOHN STARK AND HIS GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS—ALEXANDER HAMILTON, HENRY KNOX, "MAD ANTHONY WAYNE," ISRAEL PUTNAM, ETHAN ALLEN, FRANCIS MARION, THOMAS SUMTER, NATHAN HALE, AND OTHER GREAT VOLUNTEERS—THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS OF THE REVOLUTION—GEN. CHARLES LEE AND HIS INGLORIOUS CAREER UNDER WASHINGTON—THE CASE OF GEN. CONWAY—NAPOLEONISM—THE BIRTH OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERY.

THE brief recapitulation of, and running commentary upon, the several wars in which the United States has been engaged, contained in the closing half of the last chapter, have been presented with the specific purpose to give strong emphasis to the statement previously made, and to which, it would seem, no exception can justly be taken, viz.: that it has always been the volunteer of America and not the regular soldier who has constituted its true military power.

Arrived at this point of the subject, it is now the author's purpose, as a preliminary to the review of the injustice of our Government and people to the volunteer system, which is to be presented in the subsequent pages of this volume, to glance rapidly at the men who, through the perils of war, have rendered possible the present growth and commercial as also intellectual greatness of the United States.

As remarked in the preceding chapter, the American colonies had no general army when the crisis of war with the mother country, a nation of venerable war tradition and power, was sprung upon them. Neither had they officers educated in special military institutions nor those bred to the art of war under long-experienced and celebrated military chiefs. The central figure of the struggle for independence, General George Washington, whom more than one people have pronounced to be "first in war," was himself first among the volunteers of America. He was wholly without the preliminary military education which is now regarded as indispensable to the making of a successful officer. Educated as a simple land surveyor, Washington had no military experience beyond a connection with the Virginia militia, until commissioned as lieutenant-colonel of six companies of one hundred men each, with a part of which he set out against the French on the Ohio. At the battle of the Monongahela, where Braddock was defeated and lost his life, he was volunteer aide to that General, who, however, as the result so fatally proved, was inferior to his young aide as a military

officer. With this slender amount of military experience, reinforced by the position of colonel of the Virginia forces, including the militia and the colonial regulars in the contests with the hostile Indians, Washington was called by the Second Continental Congress, of which he was a member, to be commander-in-chief of the American army in the impending war with the mother country. All readers of American history in detail are familiar with the striking character of Washington from a military point of view. Considering the material at his command and the circumstances under which he conducted the war, as well as the conditions by which he was hampered and bound down, it is doubtful that he has been surpassed as a military commander in all of the annals of war. No amount of preliminary technical education could have made a greater general of the hero of Trenton, Princeton, and Yorktown. His genius was natural, and bloomed into the perfection attained under the developing influence of actual warfare.

Thus much of the great volunteer General who led the hope of the blow for Independence. What may be said of the other striking characters of that momentous struggle?

Probably no officer of the Revolutionary army enjoyed the confidence and personal esteem of Washington to the full extent that did Major-General Nathaniel Greene; and no single officer rendered more effective service in the accomplishment of the final triumph, with the exception of the commander-in-chief himself. Greene's father was a blacksmith by trade and a preacher in the

Society of Friends, and the future soldier therefore was brought up in a creed a prime article of which is the condemnation of war and of all violent measures in the relations between nations and between private individuals. His book education during childhood and youth was of the most rudimentary character. He first worked upon a farm, then in a mill, and finally learned the trade of the blacksmith, at which he worked for a considerable time. These facts are mentioned more particularly to illustrate the wonderful expansiveness of true genius, which, no matter what the surrounding obstacles, or with what strength and persistency the effort is made by mistaken relatives and friends to give it a different direction, will as certainly attain its legitimate development as is the air we breathe to permeate all space about the planet which it envelops.

Beginning the study of law, the storm-cloud of the Revolution broke over the country and called into life and active growth the latent military genius of the patriotic youth of the resisting colonies. From the nature of the influences under which Greene was reared, he was wholly without military training. Under the driving force of an irresistible genius he broke from the peaceful traditions of family and friends, to join a company belonging to his State militia. The threat of expulsion from the Society, which was afterwards unhesitatingly executed, failed to restrain to the least extent the steed which, having once gotten the bit into his mouth, had dashed off for a race with the wind. Rapidly developing his ability, he was

made a brigadier-general of the Rhode Island militia, three regiments of which he led to Cambridge, Massachusetts, after the battle of Lexington. So striking was their discipline in contrast with the raw troops in general, that Greene at once fell under the eye of Washington, and was instantly taken at his full worth by the penetrating judgment of his chief. From this time he developed with great rapidity. He was appointed to be brigadier-general in the Continental army in June, 1775, and in fifteen months afterward he was made a major-general. At the battle of Trenton he rendered brilliant service. Being in command of the left wing of the army, by a magnificent effort he captured the British artillery and completely cut off the enemy's retreat to Princeton. At Brandywine, by a rapid march and a dogged stand, he undoubtedly saved the whole Continental army from total ruin. He displayed conspicuous ability at Germantown, Monmouth, and in a retreat from Rhode Island. At Springfield, Massachusetts, he successfully opposed the advance of five thousand British troops, ably officered, with only two brigades and a small body of militia at his disposal. He was placed in command of the army during Washington's temporary absence in 1780. Appointed to succeed General Gates in the latter year, his military record in the South was strikingly brilliant. The enemy had beaten Gates at Camden, South Carolina, and was reveling under the prestige of victory. He was well provided with clothing, food, and arms. The people of the South were depressed and impoverished. Greene immediately dis-

played the attributes of a great military genius. He reorganized and strengthened his small command. With a portion of his army under Morgan, the battle of the Cowpens was fought and won by the hitherto despondent Americans. During the ensuing several months Greene executed a series of movements which are held by celebrated strategists of our own time to rank high among the most noted campaigns of the great generals. His army was small, badly clothed, badly fed, and badly armed, but with it Greene succeeded in keeping Cornwallis upon the constant move. He compelled the British army to evacuate Georgia and all parts of the Carolinas except the towns of Savannah and Charleston, and, as the termination of his remarkable strategic movements, he drove Cornwallis, with his army, into the peninsula of Virginia, where Washington pounced upon him and administered the *coup de grace* to the British arms at Yorktown.

The case of General Nathaniel Greene is one of the most striking and at the same time one of the most instructive in the annals of military history. Without any enlarged English education, except such as he acquired through his own tutorship after being grown; with no military tendencies about his family and social surroundings to give his mind a bent in that direction; with no friend or teacher to inflame his young imagination with tales of war and "hair-breadth 'scapes by flood and field;" without apparent aspiration for other than the arts of peace—under the magic touchstone of opportunity his military genius blazed out with the suddenness of the

full-faced sun as it quickly emerges from behind a fugitive cloud. Nor can it be successfully maintained that his genius was only relative to the times and circumstances of his activity. His opponent in the South, Lord Cornwallis, was by far the ablest officer sent by England to America during the Colonial Revolution. Highly educated at Eton and Cambridge, he was a captain in the British army at the age of twenty, at which age Greene had only begun the study of law in his native village. He was an aide-de-camp in the German campaign of 1761, and upon the breaking-out of hostilities in the American colonies he was commissioned as major-general. His army scarcely contained a raw recruit, being composed almost entirely of English veterans. Greene's army, like himself, were volunteers, and fought under the most discouraging conditions and circumstances. Further than all this, Greene's campaign in the South, which was the beginning of the successful end of the Revolution, is admitted by military experts, in the present advanced state of the art and science of war, to challenge comparison with the most distinguished military campaigns of ancient and modern times.

Hence, it must appear to the most ardent advocate of a preliminary military education as a prerequisite of all military greatness, that Greene's case suggests embarrassing perplexities to the sweeping theories of the scholastics. Within the narrow scope of his education there had not been embraced even the outlines of mathematical instruction, though through the spur of ambition he ac-

quired some knowledge of Latin and of mathematics in the moments of rest from his work, and by the friendly light of the blazing forge. But he was as unlearned in engineering as in the modern languages, and he knew no more of the elements of military science than he did of the ordinary routine of military drill and tactics. With simple patriotism he entered the service of his country, and in less than eighteen months thereafter he had proved himself an accomplished military leader. Considered in all of its bearings, his case must be held to afford remarkable negative proof against the common belief that high military talent and successful leadership can only be the product of a set course of instruction by a military academy.

In one of its aspects the case of General Greene furnishes an exception to those of great military men. Many of these, if not the most of them, indeed, have furnished, before the youth of the individual has been completed, some glimpse at least of the orbit in which the genius was destined to play. The wild storm seldom breaks over the face of the peaceful ocean without giving the experienced mariner some indications of its approach, and it is not often that genius suddenly asserts itself in a particular direction without furnishing to a close observer some intimations in connection with its certain unfolding.

Whatever view we may take of the general effect upon the world of the career of the great Napoleon, it must be conceded by all that he ranks among the first military geniuses of recorded history. His genius, how-

ever, unlike Greene's, did not flash unheralded over the field of military glory. While the merest child, his favorite plaything was a small brass cannon, weighing about thirty pounds, which was long preserved as a relic of the great captain in his native island of Corsica. While most children of the age at which he then was are engaged with toys and innocent play as the routine of their daily life, Napoleon loved to sit upon his father's knee and listen to stories of the engagements between the French and Corsicans, as related by his parent, who was a distinguished soldier of the Corsican army. The incident of the snow fort is no less generally known than well attested. While at school in Brienne, in the winter of 1784, there occurred an unusually heavy fall of snow. Napoleon, being then but fifteen years old, divided his schoolmates into two parties, and, having erected a fortification of snow, with regular bastions and the usual military essentials, placed one of the parties within the fortification to defend it, and the other in front to attack it, while he constituted himself commander-in-chief of both forces. The sham fight raged for nearly three weeks, and became so realistic that many of the boys were seriously hurt, when the authorities of the school were obliged to put a stop to Napoleon's first campaign. The whole period of the future soldier's youth and pupilage is filled with anecdotes illustrating in the most unmistakable manner the military bent of his extraordinary genius.

Much the same preliminary notice of the coming event was furnished during the youth of the immortal

Washington. His elder brother, Lawrence, had served as captain in one of the English campaigns in the West Indies, and upon his return poured into the ever-willing ears of his child-brother, George, the most glowing narratives of battle and glory. Speaking of this portion of Washington's life, Irving in his charming history of the Father of his Country says that "all of his amusements took a military turn. He made soldiers of his school-mates; they had their mimic parades, reviews, and sham-fights. A boy named William Bustle was sometimes his competitor, but George was commander-in-chief of Hobby's school." Upon leaving school, so strong was the young man's bent in the direction of a military life, that, with the consent of his family, arrangements were made for his entry into the navy. At the last moment, when his trunk was already on board the vessel in which he was to sail, and he himself was upon the point of embarkation, the fond mother relented, and withdrew her consent, and the ever-dutiful son gave up his most cherished wish.

The very slender knowledge of military affairs possessed by Washington up to the moment that he was called into active service has already been stated at the commencement of the present chapter. Though so wholly untaught in military science, his judgment and many of the rare qualities which shone so resplendently during the dreary campaigns of the patriots of the Revolution were fully announced during the fatal march of Braddock against the French and Indians, at which time

the youthful Washington, as has been said, was a volunteer aide upon the General's staff. Of Braddock himself, Irving says that he "was a veteran in service and had been upwards of forty years in the guards, that school of exact discipline and technical punctillos." Notwithstanding this great disparity between the educated veteran officer and the stripling aide, Washington gave him advice which, had it been followed, would in all probability have given an entirely different result to the expedition. Of this Irving further remarks that "Braddock could not carry out Washington's advice in detail. His military education was in the way: bigoted to the regular and elaborate tactics of Europe, he could not stoop to the make-shift expedients of a new country where every difficulty is encountered and mastered in a rough-and-ready style. In consequence of adhering to technical rules and military forms, General Braddock had consumed a month in marching little more than one hundred miles." Upon this same point Washington himself subsequently wrote: "I found that instead of pushing on with vigor, without regarding a little rough road, they were halting to level every mole-hill, and to erect bridges over every brook, by which means we were four days in getting twelve miles." These illustrations of the youth and early military experiences of one whose military glory will never fade from the history of battle-fields serve to picture faithfully the expansive direction of his brilliant genius.

Turning for a moment to the example of our more

modern military marvel—the revered captain of the Union struggle—though we cannot find in the scant material of his early life, as furnished by his biographers, direct evidence of his future bent, we can, nevertheless, in the qualities of quick judgment, stern decision, and unyielding determination, which one and all accord to mark his very earliest character, discern the peculiar attributes which so inseparably belong to the great soldier. Modest almost to a fault, as was Ulysses Grant, it is not improbable that the very traits of character which would indelibly mark the line of his future greatness were left by him entirely unmentioned to his various biographers. There exists, however, a paragraph in his “Personal Memoirs,” which, unconsciously to himself, who believed he had no military taste, perhaps most fully illustrates the latent spirit concealed in one who was destined to write his name upon the scroll of the world’s great soldiers. The paragraph alluded to is inscribed in the simple style of the author of the “Memoirs,” and is as follows:

“During my first five years’ encampment, General Scott visited West Point, and reviewed the cadets. With his commanding figure, his quite colossal size, and showy uniform, I thought him the finest specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. I could never resemble him in appearance, but I believe I did have a presentiment, for a moment, that some day I should occupy his place on review, although I had no intention then of remaining in the army.”¹

What a charmingly modest confession is contained in those simple words, and how fully does the confession

¹Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. I., page 41.

itself mark the latent inspiration of that wonderful genius, who belongs not alone to his own generation, but to all future time!

To return from a digression which, the author hopes, may not be deemed profitless, let us continue the brief survey of the more prominent figures of the Revolution with which the present chapter is engaged.

The surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga was one of the decisive events of the war, as has been elsewhere intimated in the present pages. That victory not only revived the drooping hopes of the patriots, but it also furnished the ultimate inducement which decided the French Government to enter into an alliance with the colonies. The surrender took place after the battle of Saratoga, but the result had been rendered inevitable before the occurrence of that battle. The actors in the events connected with Burgoyne's campaign are possessed of a peculiar interest.

Burgoyne himself was an educated and experienced officer of the British army. Creasy ("Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World") says of him that "he had gained celebrity by some bold and dashing exploits in Portugal during the last war; he was personally as brave an officer as ever headed British troops; he had considerable skill as a tactician, and his general intellectual abilities and acquirements were of a high order. He had several able and experienced men under him, among whom were Major-General Phillips and Brigadier-General Frazer." Of his troops the same author says that "seven thousand

veteran troops were sent out from England, with a corps of artillery abundantly supplied, and led by select and experienced officers." To these was added an auxiliary force of over two thousand Canadians, with a large number of Indians. The object of the expedition was to crush out all opposition in Northern New York, from the lakes southward, and by the possession of the line down the Hudson River to cut the New England States, which were considered the only effective enemies, entirely apart from the other colonies. Burgoyne himself started down Lake Champlain and took Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga, but, that no force might be left in his rear, Colonel St. Leger was sent to take Fort Oswego, after which he was to rejoin Burgoyne. The whole plan miscarried. St. Leger was defeated at the battle of Oriskany by the American volunteers under the brave General Herkimer, who lost his life, though the British force was driven down the St. Lawrence, away from the main army. In moving down Lake George, detachments sent out by Burgoyne in quest of stores were met and utterly defeated by the gallant General John Stark and his Green Mountain boys. Burgoyne was utterly broken by these reverses before reaching the Hudson River, and his troops were appalled by the constantly swelling numbers of the Americans. Burke, in the "Annual Register for 1777," quoted by Creasy, in speaking of the growing force of the American volunteers, says that "an army was poured forth by the woods, mountains, and marshes, which in this part were thickly sown with plantations and

villages. The Americans recalled their courage, and, when their regular army seemed to be entirely wasted, the spirit of the country produced a much greater and more formidable force.' ”

Major-General Philip Schuyler had been in command of the Northern Department, but General Horatio Gates, who had been scheming to succeed him, obtained the object of his desires just in time to carry off the credit of the crushing victory over Burgoyne. No impartial student of the events of that time can fail to award the honor of preparing everything for the final victory to General Schuyler.

General Horatio Gates was born in England, and at an early age he entered the British army and soon acquired the rank of major. He was subsequently stationed at Halifax, and still later accompanied Braddock's expedition and was severely wounded. Retiring from the army, he purchased an estate in Virginia, where the Revolutionary outbreak found him. Entering the service of the patriot army, he was assigned to the Northern Department, where he made an almost fatal blunder in withdrawing the entire American force from Crown Point. For this he was generally censured, and Schuyler was appointed to succeed him. When the latter had prepared the trap which was to capture Burgoyne and his army, Gates, through intrigue, superseded him at the opportune moment to reap the whole prestige for himself. Elated by the success of the achievement, Gates and his friends of the "Conway Cabal" fomented a scheme by


which Washington was to be displaced and Gates made commander-in-chief of the army. The scheme failed, as all know, and Gates subsequently proved his military incompetency through the crushing defeat by Cornwallis at Camden, South Carolina. This defeat is considered to have been the most disastrous suffered by the colonists during the entire war, and it terminated the military career of an officer whose military education and service in the British army should have made him a most valuable acquisition to the Americans.

Brigadier-General Nicholas Herkimer, who so gallantly defeated Colonel St. Leger at the battle of Oriskany, and thus administered the first blow leading to the final defeat of Burgoyne, was reared in civil life. During the hostilities with the French and their Indian allies he entered the militia and commanded at Fort Herkimer in 1758. Upon the outbreak of the Revolution he again entered the New York militia, and was made brigadier-general, terminating his service with the sacrifice of a valuable life. For the important services he rendered to the country, Congress voted him a monument.

General Philip Schuyler, the real hero of the Burgoyne surrender, was also a civilian. The French and Indian war gave him his first entrance to the State militia, while the outbreak of the Revolution furnished the second. He was soon made a major-general, and rendered the most signal service as a volunteer officer. After he had been so unjustly treated by the Gates clique, instead of playing the part of the sulk, General Schuyler

magnanimously offered to serve his country in any private capacity whatever. He had not the military aspiration of Gates, the regular officer, but, actuated by the patriotism of pure principle, he was willing to sink personal renown under the good of the country.

That glorious representative of the volunteer soldiery of America, Major-General John Stark, was reared upon a farm and followed the plow until he was twenty-four years of age. His first military experience was acquired through service in a militia company during the French and Indian war. As a simple lieutenant he gained much credit by conducting a retreat after all the superior officers had been killed or wounded. The first gun of the Revolution found him ready to enter the ranks of the volunteers. He distinguished himself at Bunker Hill, commanded the vanguard at Trenton, and should have been promoted for his gallant service at Princeton, though he was not. Nettled at the injury done him, he returned to his farm, but when again called upon to the defense against Burgoyne, he quickly raised a force of Green Mountain men and administered the second blow, through which the British General was destined so soon to fall. He took part in the first battle of Saratoga, and continued to render valuable service to the patriot cause until the close of hostilities. He was a man of no book education, but he bore as true a heart as ever beat in soldier's breast. He knew nothing of mathematics, nor of engineering, nor of the art of war as taught in the schools but he knew a red-coat veteran upon sight, and gener-



· VOLUNTEER HEROES OF THE REVOLUTION.

1. Greene. 2. Wayne. 3. Putnam. 4. Washington. 5. Stark.
6. Knox. 7. Hamilton.

ally it was a very unpropitious day for the said veteran when "Mollie" Stark's husband got his eye upon him. This great volunteer General of the Revolution was a soldier by pure inspiration and natural character, and no amount of scholastic education would have made him a more successful officer than he became through the sheer force of natural genius developed and matured by rough experience upon the field of battle.

A consideration of the gallant soldiers who fought first for the independence of the nation, subsequently for its honor, and lately for its preservation, is a pleasure of fascinating interest. In a volume limited to the compass of the present, however, it is impossible to extend the subject to the proportions that every American, proud of his country and his people, would naturally wish. In furtherance of the immediate objects of his task, it is only permitted to the author that he throw the light first here, then there, in order that in succession it may fall upon the bold points of our historic coast-line, so that they may more fully serve as guiding objects in the navigation of the future. A brief summary, then, of a few others of the strong men of the Revolutionary struggle must suffice for the present purpose.

Alexander Hamilton, who, in wealth of natural intellect, breadth of mental power, enlargement of culture, and versatility of genius, was one of the greatest of public men of this country, was also one of its most able and distinguished volunteer soldiers. He began life in a counting-house, and the education which he subsequently received,

first in a private school in New Jersey, and afterward at King's College, was purely of a civil character, covering only the ordinary branches of an English education. Upon the bursting of the war-cloud, young Hamilton began the assiduous study of military tactics, and in 1776 he was made a captain of artillery. He rendered gallant and important service at Long Island, White Plains, Monmouth, Princeton, Trenton, and Yorktown. He served upon Washington's staff with distinction, and in 1798, when the French Directory by repeated acts of hostility caused the reorganization of the army in anticipation of war between France and the new Republic in America, Hamilton was appointed Inspector-General, with the rank of major-general, and second only to Washington. In the following year, when the country was called to universal lamentation for the death of the revered Father of his Country, so highly was Hamilton's military ability considered that he was named to succeed the great soldier as commander of the American army. It was after the surrender of Cornwallis that Hamilton commenced the study of law, which he began to practice in 1783. With his most eminent qualities as a jurist and statesman, as well as with the services rendered to his country in a civil capacity, the student of American history is wholly familiar. In a military aspect his character was as remarkable as that of General Nathaniel Greene. Up to the very outbreak of the hostilities neither the one nor the other had any military knowledge, theoretical or practical, and yet both became under practical training most important military

officers, each largely contributing to the ultimate triumph of the colonial arms.

The case of General Henry Knox has already been touched in the previous pages in connection with his scheme for the general training of the militia. At present it need only be said that at the outstart in life Knox possessed the elements of a common-school education only. His only military knowledge prior to experience in actual warfare was derived from connection with a local artillery company. He was a volunteer aide at the battle of Bunker Hill, and attracted the notice of Washington by his skill as an artillerist. In 1776 he was made a brigadier-general, and commanded the main artillery throughout the war. He distinguished himself in all of the chief battles of the Revolution, only suffering in prestige once, which was at Germantown, when, by too closely following established military maxims, a portion of the unfavorable result was attributed to him. In all else, his reputation as a splendid officer is unchallenged. His subsequent brilliant service to the country as Secretary of War, with charge of the navy, need not here be commented upon. It is the striking case of Henry Knox—the civilian who, without preliminary military knowledge or education, became one of the most competent and trusted generals of the Revolution—that is here considered.

Still another brilliant figure of the war is General Anthony Wayne—"Mad Anthony," as his enthusiastic troops called him in admiration of his dashing bravery and startling rapidity of movement and execution.

Wayne served with great distinction and *éclat* throughout the war, and was one of the most trusted of Washington's officers and advisers. What reader of his brilliant storming of Stony Point, on the Hudson, can fail to be thrilled by his gallant achievement at that place. And yet Anthony Wayne, like so many of his fellow-generals, possessed no preliminary education of a military character. Until 1774 he followed the occupation of a farmer, conjoining with it the business of a land surveyor. After the smoke of Lexington had blown away, and the dead of Bunker Hill had been laid to an eternal rest, Wayne raised a regiment (in September, 1775), and in something more than a year his capability and soldierly knowledge caused him to be made a brigadier-general. His example shines from the pages of our history as that of another great soldier developed from inherent genius, amid the thunders of battle and the clash of arms.

Other figures of the struggle whose services were of the most indispensable value in the achievement of the glorious end pass rapidly before us in connection with the present topic. Who can forget that Warren, who fell at Bunker Hill, was a civilian educated as a physician, and that his military knowledge and rank were acquired during the threatening crisis of war. Who, that General Daniel Morgan, whose record as a dashing soldier in so many conflicts can never be dimmed by time, was an illiterate boy upon his father's farm until the age of seventeen, when he became a wagoner in the Braddock expedition, and thus acquired a practical military knowledge in the field? Who,

that General Benjamin Lincoln, another luminous example of superior military capacity, and with Morgan one of the heroes of the Southern campaign under Greene which finally drove Cornwallis to his fate at Yorktown, was a farmer at the outbreak of the Revolution? Who, that General Israel Putnam, famous for his military achievements, was plowing in his field when the news of the battle of Lexington reached him, and that, unyoking his horses and leaving his plow standing in the furrow, he rode off to Boston; that he returned to raise a regiment; and that, after a brilliant service in the field, he further displayed his military sagacity in the selection of West Point as the site of a strategic fortification? Who, that the renowned soldier and partisan fighter, General Ethan Allen, was one of the proprietors of an iron furnace, with but little English education and no military knowledge or experience until the reverberation of the guns at Lexington caused him to bound into the saddle and subsequently to become a brilliant leader in the struggle for freedom? Who, that General Francis Marion, "the swamp-fox" of the South, was in his youth a seaman and in subsequent life a farmer, who left his plow to fight the Indians, thereby gaining the only military knowledge and experience that he possessed as the preliminaries of the great part he enacted as a partisan leader in the battle-fields of the Southern section? Who, that his celebrated colleague, General Thomas Sumter, was originally a farmer, who had seen some practical service as a volunteer in the Braddock expedition and in fighting the Cherokee

Indians? Or what American can ever forget that Nathan Hale, the volunteer, whose rare qualities caused his selection for a service no less important than hazardous, and who, in dying upon a British gibbet, expressed the regret that he had "only one life to give to his country," was an unpretending school-teacher with no military knowledge nor previous experience in military affairs?

The author has reserved for a closing notice another of the prominent generals of the Revolution, though it is much to be regretted that with the mention of his name the voice of eulogy must be hushed. Major-General Charles Lee was born in England and entered the English army at an early age, and he received such military education as the foremost military power of Europe then bestowed upon those entering its service. Sent by his government to America in 1754, he was with Braddock at the battle of the Monongahela, and was subsequently wounded in an attempt upon Ticonderoga. Next sent to Portugal, under Burgoyne, he won considerable distinction. A few years later he became a major-general in the service of the King of Poland, but, not being satisfied, after roaming over Europe, he returned to England, when he was made a lieutenant-colonel and placed upon half-pay. Disappointed that he did not receive expected promotion, he espoused the American side of the controversy with the mother country, undoubtedly with an ulterior purpose, considering his selfish character. After some further lapse of time he came to America and purchased land in Virginia. After the battles of Lexington and

Bunker Hill, Congress, at the instance of his friends, made him a major-general, when he at once resigned his commission in the English and entered the American army. Possessed of fine military ability, and brave as he was able, his first efforts in behalf of the Americans were very successful; but it was not long before his personal ambition began the destruction of his usefulness. In pursuit of his own purposes, he disregarded the repeated injunctions of Washington, and, being taken prisoner, his disobedience of orders prevented the colonists from reaping a well-earned victory at Monmouth. He was tried by court-martial and sentenced to suspension from his command for a year. Prior to these occurrences Lee had been engaged in a conspiracy with General Thomas Conway and others to cause General Washington to be superseded by the utterly incompetent Horatio Gates. Conway, though Irish by birth, was educated for the army in France, and received from that government a decoration and the rank of captain. Coming to America, he was made a major-general in 1777, and was at Brandywine and Germantown. He was at the head of the league to displace Washington, which was known as the "Conway Cabal." In the eyes of these educated military men Washington was nothing but a *volunteer* officer, wholly unfitted for his exalted position. Who can doubt, considering the character of these conspirators, that, had their scheme been successful, the Revolution would have terminated in defeat; or, in the possible event of success, that a form of government entirely different from the

present form would have arisen from the ashes of the extinguished colonies?

Lee, Conway, Gates, were educated military officers, and they were soldiers by profession. The readiness with which they shifted their obligations proved them to be mere soldiers of fortune, and that their swords would serve the cause which would yield to them the greatest consideration. They possessed no elements of the glorious *volunteer soldier*, who, with no consideration of profession or trade to inflame ambition and to create a thirst for personal gain, fights for principle, for truth, for honor, for family, for country, and who, when his cause is won, doffs his military garb, lays away the sword and gun, and mingles with his fellow-citizens in the peaceful pursuits of industrial life. It is not possible for a Napoleon to be made from the material of the American volunteer. The Napoleon must be a soldier by profession in a country wherein the army is omnipotent, and he must spring, not from the ranks composed of men of whom Captain Nathan Hale was a fair representative, but from those of which Charles Lee and Thomas Conway were legitimate offspring.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE WAR OF 1812—THE VOLUNTEER UPON THE SEA—THE WONDERFUL ACHIEVEMENTS OF PAUL JONES—THE VICTORY OF THE CONSTELLATION OVER THE L'INSURGENTE—THE AMERICAN SAILOR ISAAC HULL—VICTORY OF THE "OLD IRONSIDES" OVER THE GUERRIÈRE—REMARKABLE CAPTURES BY COMMODORE PORTER WITH THE ESSEX—THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF DECATUR—THE THRILLING EXPLOITS OF CAPTAIN ISAAC JONES—BRILLIANT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN NAVY.

WITHIN less than a generation from the close of the Revolutionary contest, the American volunteer was again called to arms for the War of 1812. This war, as has been remarked elsewhere in the present pages, should not have taken place. It was a useless, profitless, not to say causeless, contest. Wrong existed, undoubtedly, but it was such wrong as two intelligent nations could easily have removed without an appeal to arms. But the war came, and the volunteer again sprang to the defense of his country.

The emergency found us precisely where we had been at the beginning of the struggle for independence, with strong latent military power, but with undisciplined troops and no organized system for the arming, moving, and maintenance of a large army. As it requires from one

and a half to two years of active field experience to bring to a condition of full effectiveness raw levies of troops, the first results of the conflicts with the British veterans were generally adverse to the American side. The contest, however, was destined to be comparatively brief, though the loss of life and the destruction of property which ensued could illy be afforded by the young Republic. The circumstances under which the war was fought by both parties render their consideration in connection with the more immediate purposes of the present volume particularly favorable to the author's object. These conspired to make the contest naval in character to a great extent—that is to say, the most marked successes of the war upon the American side, and those probably which contributed more largely than the successes upon land to bring it to a speedier termination, were gained upon the water. This fact lies directly within the lines upon which the author's subject is being treated.

At the commencement of the war, the Academy at West Point had been fairly established for a decade of years, and some of the graduates of the institution participated in the several campaigns. With the exception of the old plan of instruction by special school-teachers, already detailed fully in the preceding pages, there was no academic system of naval education until the year 1845, at which time the Academy at Annapolis was regularly established, as has been heretofore seen. The bearings of this fact upon the author's subject will pres-

ently form an interesting topic of investigation and discourse.

As regards our ancient antagonist, it may be remarked that the insular position of England necessarily made of her a maritime nation from a very early period. Her merchant marine has constantly kept abreast of the progress in naval construction, and in some respects it may be justly alleged that she has led that progress. The formation of her navy dates back to the time of Alfred the Great, who began its regular construction under the necessities involved in the defense of the country against Danish invaders as well as against pirates. This monarch has been called the first English admiral, because he was the first English sovereign that commanded his own fleet in battle. From the time of Alfred to that of Henry VIII., the condition of the navy fluctuated through different grades of efficiency. When the latter monarch came to the throne, he began its reorganization and establishment upon a basis from which it grew to be the most powerful, all things considered, of that time. It was under the splendid reign of his daughter Elizabeth that the English fleet defeated the world-renowned Spanish Armada, that remarkable naval force, which comprised one hundred and fifty ships, three thousand cannon, and twenty thousand men.

Though, to read the account of the English navy, as it existed under the corrupt reign of Charles II., as given by Macaulay in his history of England, one could well imagine that he was perusing an American campaign

article inveighing against bloated contractors and dishonest government officials, yet, undoubtedly, since that memorable period in Elizabeth's reign England has steadily improved and increased her maritime resources in accordance with the general development of the nation. She has claimed that the sails of her merchant marine "whiten every sea," while the proud "wooden walls" inspired respectful awe in every would-be foe until the battle between the *Monitor* and *Merrimac*, in Hampton Roads, incontinently threw them down with a suddenness of effect strongly resembling the result of the angel's blast before the gates of Jericho.

When the War of 1812 was fought, however, the age of steam and of iron ships had not yet arrived, and England proclaimed herself then, as now, to be "mistress of the seas."

The American colonists were navigators to a certain extent, from the earliest settlements upon the Atlantic seaboard. This circumstance arose from the necessities of trade amongst them, and, in order to protect their craft, as well as the settlements, from the incursions of freebooters and hostile Indians, their little vessels were variously armed. Nothing like a navy existed, however, up to the year 1775. As soon as it was possible to make any move in the matter, Congress took steps, after the battle of Lexington, toward the formation and organization of a naval force. Twenty cruisers had been built by the close of the year 1775. The first ensign displayed by an American man-of-war was hoisted by the remarkable

John Paul Jones on board his ship, the *Alfred*. Upon his first cruise he captured no less than sixteen prizes belonging to the British merchant service. The feats of this plucky seaman in the *Bon Homme Richard* never pall in interest by repetition in the American ear. Small and insufficient as was considered the American navy during the Revolution, it nevertheless swept the seas of British merchant ships, and even made descents upon the coasts of the British isles. The number of prizes captured during the first year of the Revolution was 342, and during the second year 467.

By the close of the year 1798, in view of the probable war with France, the Republic had gotten twenty-three men-of-war upon the water, the invincible character of this little navy with its brave seamen being well reflected in the brilliant engagement between the *Constellation* and the French frigate *L'Insurgente*, which resulted in the capture of the latter by the American ship.

At the beginning of the War of 1812, our navy consisted of about seventeen efficient vessels, eight of these being frigates. With this small force upon the water, our brave seamen proposed to meet a foe whose boast it was that "Britannia rules the wave." With powerful and numerous ships, manned by educated officers and by veteran seamen, well disciplined through long service and experience, the haughty Britons declared that they would soon sweep "the little bits of striped bunting" of the Yankees from the seas.

After the surrender of Detroit, at the very commence-

ment of the war, and the subsequent reverses to the American arms along the Canadian border, the country was cast into the deepest gloom. Thoughtful men of all parties now realized the extreme folly of plunging the new Republic, wholly unprepared with disciplined troops and munitions of war, into a conflict with a nation like Great Britain, engaged though she was in a war in Europe—a nation as unscrupulous as powerful, since she made no concealment of a purpose to let loose upon the Americans a savage foe who neither knew nor cared for the rules and amenities of civilized warfare. If, within the first three months from the declaration of war, the United States could have receded with honor from her position, there can be no doubt that public sentiment in that direction was sufficiently strong to have compelled the Government to do so. In this condition of despondency and crimation, a light of hope suddenly flashed from the waters of the ocean, and the thunders of battle announced that the American navy had been heard from. The *Constitution*, commanded by Captain Isaac Hull, encountered in her cruise the *Guerrière*, one of the best and finest frigates of the British navy. The English commander immediately prepared to bag his game. The Yankee captain maneuvered skillfully for position, and for some time received the British fire without returning it. Broadside after broadside was poured into the American ship, and still the brave Hull made no response. But when the opportune moment arrived the fire from the American became terrific. For fifteen minutes Hull

poured his broadsides into the enemy, with hardly a moment's intermission in the dreadful roar of his guns. At the end of that time, he had swept away the enemy's mizzen-mast and got his opponent under a raking fire. This was poured into the *Guerrière* for fifteen minutes longer, when, with his masts and every spar gone, his decks wet with blood, and his vessel so near sinking that a few more shots would have carried it down, the astonished Briton surrendered to an enemy whose fine seamanship and courage were a portentous revelation.

The news of this unexpected victory created the wildest enthusiasm throughout the country. Among the European nations, by which the English ships and sailors had been considered invincible, the surprise was unbounded, and the American naval power came to be considered the phenomenon of maritime warfare. But the exhibition of this gigantic power was not destined to rest for full vindication upon a single showing in battle. A series of the most remarkable exploits in naval contests continually sent the exciting thrill of victory through the American pulse, and as continually electrified the British foe and the fighting nations of the Old World.

The *Essex*, under Commodore Porter, fell in with the fleet of a frigate. Keeping at a safe distance until night, the dashing seaman rushed in and captured a brig with one hundred and fifty men aboard, subsequently receiving a handsome ransom for the ship after paroling the men on oath not to serve again during the war. In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy the Commodore

regretted that he had not had a sloop with him, as he would have been able in that event to "surround" and capture the whole fleet.

Running across the British sloop-of-war *Alert*, the commander of the latter, who was out in search of "bits of striped bunting," sent a broadside into the *Essex*. Porter took the British vessel in a very short engagement, capturing over five hundred prisoners with it.

Following close upon these events came the record of a splendid achievement by Commodore Decatur. Being in command of the *President*, Decatur fell in, off the Western Islands, with the British frigate *Macedonian*, carrying forty-nine guns and three hundred men. Being a vessel of the largest class, and manned by a veteran crew, her commander expected to make short work of the American. The sea was rough, and the Briton had the advantage of a position to the windward. The superiority of the American gunnery in this action was an additional source of surprise. The guns were served with remarkable effect, while the rapidity of their blaze induced the enemy to believe at one time that the American was on fire. The fight, owing to the roughness of the sea, took place at long range, and at the end of two hours the Briton surrendered, after he had suffered a loss of one hundred and twenty-four men killed and wounded, and when his ship's masts had been shot away and the hull riddled with shot. The American ship suffered so little from the enemy's fire that she was not compelled to go to port, while she only lost five seamen in



VICTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION ("OLD IRONSIDES") OVER THE GUERRIERE.

the action. The *Macedonian* was subsequently repaired, and added to the American fleet.

The tremendous sensation caused by this affair was still unabated when the news of the exploit of Captain Isaac Jones was received to rekindle the general rejoicing. Jones was in command of the sloop-of-war *Wasp*, which had suffered considerably in her rigging during bad weather, and, before he had had time to repair damage, he fell in with the British brig *Frolic*, of twenty-two guns, conveying a fleet of merchant ships. Though the sea was exceedingly rough, and the *Wasp* not in her best fighting trim, Captain Jones prepared for action. The gunnery of the Americans, in this as in the previous case, was remarkable. The Briton fired invariably as his vessel rose from the water, and thus the damage he inflicted was largely expended upon the masts and rigging of the American. Captain Jones, upon the contrary, fired as his vessel sank and thus poured his shot into the enemy's hull. When the American finally got alongside of the *Frolic* to board her it was found that there were no British seamen left on deck to pull down the flag. The engagement lasted forty-three minutes, and was one of the bloodiest upon record, considering the number of men engaged. The brilliancy of this exploit could not be dimmed by the circumstance that the *Wasp* and her prize were both taken upon the same day by a British seventy-four.

Within six months from the declaration of war between the United States and Great Britain the boast of

the latter to the sovereignty of the seas had not only been disputed, but entirely disproved, by a nation not yet counting three decades of an autonomous existence. The powers of Europe, which had long accepted the naval pretension of England, could not understand it, and the English people themselves were as much befogged in an attempted explanation as were all others. Between the months of June and November, comprising the first five months of hostilities, some two hundred and fifty vessels were captured by the American volunteer navy, and over three thousand prisoners were taken. Of the vessels taken nearly sixty were armed, with a total armament of nearly six hundred of the best guns made at that time. In order to ascertain the causes of the unexpected results of the encounters between the American and British vessels, the English Government raised committees of investigation, with a hope of solving the secret of the extraordinary skill of the American seamen in the tactical management of their ships and in the destructive character of their gunnery. The result of the investigations, in the language of a writer of that day, was a recommendation to the Navy Board "to put their heroes again to school that they might learn to cope with this new, this subtle and most extraordinary enemy." The most inexplicable part of it all was that this remarkable enemy, so difficult to comprehend, possessed no naval schools. During the war of the Revolution England had come to understand thoroughly the problem of the volunteer soldiery of America. Through the brilliant

campaigns of Washington, campaigns not less brilliant under defeat than when accompanied with victory; through the campaign against Burgoyne, when Schuyler and his brave men obstructed the advance, and Stark with his glorious Green Mountain volunteers completely crippled the expedition by the blow at Bennington; and through the campaign of Greene in the South, which resulted in driving Cornwallis to his doom at Yorktown, the English Government had learned the remarkable characteristics of the force with which it had been contending. Its soldiers had frequently seen the American army, with which a battle had just been fought, reduced to a mere handful of half-starved men—men who, as Washington said, “literally served in the field, since most of them had no tents to cover them,”¹ and who were so driven by lack of proper supplies that the great General at one time declared they would have “to starve, to dissolve, or to disperse in quest of food.”² But the same English soldiers had seen this handful of men so augmented or swelled in numbers during a single night or day that they were able to achieve a victory at the very time their enemies were congratulating themselves upon the ease with which they would be able to capture the whole force. The English subjugators found that in the rebellious land every man was a soldier when occasion demanded, and during many a sad experience they had seen that every tree, every nook, and every rock concealed a foe with deadly missile.

¹History of the United States, Doyle. 2 Ibid.

But all this had been upon *terra firma*, and not upon the sea or lakes, the navigation of which involves suitable vessels, with the knowledge of their sailing and management, and the fighting of a battle upon the water requiring ordnance and technical knowledge as well as practical experience, in order that it may be effectively served from the ever-changing position of a ship upon the water. The problem was wholly different from that of thirty years before. There could be but one explanation of the case entertained by the arrogant Englishman—the disasters to the British ships were the result of accident, and it was impossible that they should be repeated. Systematic naval education and veteran discipline would obviate it all, and the Yankee sailors would soon be swept from the waters.

This prediction was not destined to be realized. The English vessels in squadron ravaged the Atlantic coast, and in the burning of defenseless towns committed acts of vandalism for which the English may yet suffer through the precedent then established. One of the most flagrant of these acts was the destruction of the National Capital, with the wanton burning of the Government archives. But all of this destruction was accomplished by fleets of vessels, the enemy never daring to risk an equal naval engagement. When our brave seamen had an opportunity to meet the enemy's vessels upon anything approaching fair conditions, the result was almost always in our favor.

The third naval triumph of the Americans took place in the capture of the British frigate *Java* off the coast of Salvador. This vessel was armed with forty-nine guns and

manned by a crew of four hundred men. The *Constitution* — “Old Ironsides” — commanded by Bainbridge, again covered herself, as well as the officers and crew, with imperishable fame. After this the *Hornet*, commanded by Captain Lawrence, ever to be remembered in American annals by his dying order upon a subsequent occasion — “Don't give up the ship!” — captured the English brig *Resolution*, of ten guns, and with nearly \$25,000 on board. Continuing his cruise Captain Lawrence ran across the *Peacock*, a large British man-of-war superior to the *Hornet* in force. Lawrence took his opponent in about fifteen minutes after the action began, killing the captain, and killing or wounding the greater portion of the crew. The *Enterprise*, commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, made a prize of the British man-of-war *Boxer*. The gallant Porter cleared the South Atlantic and South Pacific of British merchant ships while cruising in the *Essex*, and was denounced by the English Government in consequence thereof as a pirate. It required the combined attack of two of the best English ships to finally capture Porter and to destroy his gallant vessel. During the year 1814, our naval triumphs upon the ocean reached a splendid culmination, and furnished a fitting supplement to the brilliant victories of the American seamen upon the Northern lakes. During the year named the American sloop *Peacock*, Captain Warrington, captured the *Epervier*, with a large amount of money on board. The *Wasp*, under Captain Blakely, having taken seven merchantmen, captured the English ship *Reindeer* after a gallant action of

about twenty minutes, during which more than half of the British crew were killed and wounded. The *Wasp* in continuing her cruise met and sank the British man-of-war *Avon*, captured several merchantmen, but never returned to port, her fate and that of her gallant commander and crew being a mystery to the present day. As a close to the list of victories by our infant navy in the year 1814, the *Constitution*, under Captain Stewart, captured two of the enemy's ships sailing in consort—the frigate *Cyane* of thirty-four guns, and the sloop-of-war *Levant*, of eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades; while the *Hornet*, under Captain Biddle, captured the British man-of-war *Penguin*, of eighteen guns and a twelve-pound carronade.

The foregoing commentary upon the remarkable victories upon the sea won by a young nation from the first naval power of the world is confined in its narrative to the achievements of what is called the “regular” navy. But, as is well known, the achievements of these were supplemented by the important service rendered by the *volunteer navy*, composed of daring spirits who, under authority of letters-of-marque, struck the enemy, through his commerce, upon every sea and in almost every port. The exploits of these skillful navigators and brave men carried consternation to the foe, and added increased renown to the naval power of the United States.

In disregard of chronological order it has been reserved by the author as a closing comment upon the glories of our sailor army of the War of 1812 to mention the victories upon those inland seas of America, the

lakes upon our northern frontier. Of these victories two were of especial importance to the American cause, because of the decisiveness of their character and results—those of the fleet under Perry and of the combined land and naval forces at Plattsburgh.

At an earlier date Captain Chauncey had rendered infinite service to the land forces in various engagements upon the shores of Lake Erie, but with the progress of the war the British naval force had become so greatly increased that the necessity to meet it upon something like equal terms became very apparent. The work of preparing a fleet was intrusted to Captain Perry, who succeeded by dint of great enterprise in getting it in a state of readiness during the first week of August, 1813. He at once began a search for the enemy, and upon the morning of September 10 the American and British fleets met upon the broad waters of Lake Erie to test the question of naval superiority. The previous victories of the Americans upon the ocean had been gained in contests between single ships, and now a test of the ability of our seamen to conduct a contest in fleet was to be decided. The surprising result of that test is well known to every American. The British fleet, commanded by an officer who had won distinction at Trafalgar, and greatly superior to the American fleet in size of vessels and number of guns, was beaten by the American commander and his gallant men, who captured every vessel of the enemy's fleet—such a result having been until then unknown in naval warfare.

The victory at Plattsburgh gave a crowning glory to the achievements of our naval forces. Sir George Prevost, commanding the British fleet, conceived the renewal of the strategic movement attempted during the Revolution by Burgoyne, whereby the line of the Hudson River might be seized and held as the base of hostile operations against the sections of the country lying upon either side of it. The termination of the war with Napoleon in March, 1814, which resulted in sending the wonderful French General to the Island of Elba, enabled the English Government to dispatch strong reinforcements against the Americans. The Army of the Garonne, which had won such distinction under Wellington, was transferred to Canada, and, in order to enable Sir George Prevost to successfully carry out the important campaign in contemplation, some fourteen thousand of these troops were assigned to his command. The garrison of Plattsburgh was first to be reduced. On the 3d of September the British land forces began the investment of the town of Plattsburgh, and, though annoyed and retarded by the American troops, the English took possession of it, while our own small force retreated to the works located upon the opposite bank of the Saranac River, just at the point where it empties into Lake Champlain. The fleet which the English brought to cooperate with their land force consisted of the frigate *Confiance*, with thirty-nine guns, twenty-seven of which were twenty-four-pounders; the brig *Linnet*, of sixteen guns; the sloops *Chub* and *Finch*,

each carrying eleven guns; and thirteen galleys, five of which carried two guns and the others one.¹

The fortifications, commanded by the gallant General Macomb, were garrisoned by a force of regular troops not exceeding 1,500 in number; but this force, when news of the attack was fairly confirmed, was gradually augmented to a surprising degree by the flocking in of the militia from New York and Vermont, and of the mysterious and omnipresent volunteer, who came with his rifle and provisions, prepared to give Prevost the reception which Burgoyne had received some thirty-seven years before.

The American fleet, which was commanded by Commodore Macdonough, had also to a large extent been improvised by that brave and capable officer. One of the vessels of his fleet had been constructed with such rapidity that, only eighteen days before it was taken into action, the timber of which it was built had been growing in the tree upon the shores of the lake.² The fleet, however, was inferior to that of the British, the guns of the latter numbering ninety-five, while those of the American numbered eighty-six, and the number of the seamen of the British amounting to upward of one thousand, while that of the American fleet only comprised about eight hundred.

Under this state of things the action for the reduction of the forts was begun by Sir George Prevost with his land forces, while the two fleets engaged each other upon

¹ History of the War of 1812, Brackenridge. ² *Ibid.*

the lake. The whole importance of the contest centered in the battle between the rival fleets, as without the supremacy of the lake the campaign of Prevost must fail to attain the desired result. During the progress of the naval conflict three separate attempts were made by the troops of Prevost to cross the river in order to storm the American works, each attempt being defeated with loss to the enemy. One of these attempts consisted of the effort to cross by a ford some three miles above the works. This ford, however, was defended by a body of militia and volunteers posted in the adjoining wood, who poured such a deadly fire into the storming detachment that it retreated in the greatest disorder, with a loss of one-half its numbers.

The course of the action between the fleets soon shifted the brunt of battle upon the two principal ships of the contending parties—the American ship *Saratoga* and the British frigate *Confiance*. Two circumstances strongly operated in favor of the enemy: first, the superior weight of his guns; and second, the mistake of the commander of the American ship *Eagle*, who, in shifting his vessel from the prescribed line of action, exposed the *Saratoga* to a strong fire from the enemy. Both of the contending vessels suffered fearfully, the battery of each upon the starboard side having been wholly dismantled and rendered unserviceable. In this emergency, the whole result of the conflict depended upon the execution of a movement considered to be one of the most difficult in the range of ship-management. This movement con-

sisted of the attempt to wind the vessel around so as to bring the port side, with its battery of guns, to bear upon the enemy. The *Confiance* made the attempt to accomplish the movement, with the most determined persistence, but wholly failed of success. The *Saratoga* executed the movement with such celerity that in a very short time she was enabled to pour her port-broadsides into the *Confiance* with such terrible effect that the latter soon struck her flag to the gallant American, and within thirty minutes afterward every vessel of the British fleet surrendered.

This gallant naval action—gallant upon both sides—was one of the most destructive, considering the number of ships and men engaged, upon record. When the battle was over, the vessels composing both squadrons lay almost helplessly upon the water. Masts there were none, and not a sailcloth was to be seen in either fleet. The hull of the *Saratoga* was pierced by fifty-five round shot, while the *Confiance* was riddled with one hundred and five shot-holes. The total loss on the American fleet was about fifty killed and some sixty wounded. The enemy lost eighty-five in killed and over one hundred wounded. But one of the most surprising results of the contest consisted of the fact that the number of prisoners captured by the Americans, some eight hundred and fifty in the total, exceeded the whole number of officers and men in the American fleet.

This remarkable conflict at and before Plattsburgh was as decisive in character as was the battle of Saratoga,

fought by Burgoyne in 1776. In the total defeat and capture of the British fleet on Lake Champlain, Prevost bitterly realized the failure of his whole scheme of invasion. It then became with him no longer a question of hoped-for victory, but the result of the naval conflict had rendered it a question how to get out of the position that he occupied, in order that his army might be saved from capture or utter annihilation. His own force had attained its numerical maximum with the commencement of the offensive operations, and it had been decreasing through casualties and desertions with frightful rapidity. Not so, however, with the Americans. Being quite unadvised of the intended movement, the latter were wholly unprepared for it. The force at the place, as before said, did not exceed fifteen hundred troops, while the works were in no condition to withstand an assault in force. But from the hour that the intention of the enemy became apparent, the American army began to grow with mushroom-like rapidity. Sir George Prevost beheld it swelling, like the incoming tide, with every leaping wave. He was amazed at the sight which presented itself to his anxious view. "Who are these men, and whence do they come?" was the question that he so feverishly put to his friends. Some of them were able to afford the desired information, as they had had some previous experience with the stern citizen-soldier of the United States. The volunteers confronted Prevost like a wall of granite; they hung upon his rear, and swarmed upon his flanks until his position became perilous in the extreme. In this emer-

gency, with his navy swept out of existence by a foe whom his skilled officers and crews affected to despise, and his army hourly decreased by the sharpshooters of the forest, he pursued the only course left to him. Keeping up a show of maintaining the offensive during the day, when night drew its friendly shadows over both armies, and left the spectral hulks upon the fair bosom of the lake as ghostly relics of the strifes of men, the British army took to hasty flight, abandoning sick and wounded to their late antagonists, and leaving great quantities of arms and provisions to fall into their hands. But they were not permitted to escape as easily as Prevost had hoped. With the quickness of the panther the Americans were upon them, and before the British army had reached a position of security, at least one thousand of its fleeing soldiers had been picked off or captured by the pursuing avengers.

Both land and marine forces participated in the glories of the day. To our naval fame the result was particularly favorable. It was the second time during the existing war that the sailors of the United States had confronted the veteran navy of Great Britain in a contest between squadrons, and it was also the second time that American seamanship and valor had humbled the pride of Albion in such a test of superiority. September 10, 1813, and September 11, 1814—the first being the date of Perry's victory on Lake Erie, and the second that of Macdonough on Lake Champlain—mark two of the most brilliant events in the history of our country.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE LOGIC OF THE NAVAL SUPERIORITY OF THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER SAILOR — THE NAVAL HEROES OF 1812, AND OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL CONFLICT — THE LAND VOLUNTEERS OF 1812 — PROMINENT VOLUNTEER OFFICERS, WITH A SKETCH OF THEIR PREVIOUS HISTORY — THE GALLANTRY OF THE VOLUNTEER SOLDIER RECOGNIZED BY CONGRESS — THE MEXICAN WAR — ITS INJUSTICE AND UNPOPULARITY AT THE NORTH — THE VOLUNTEER OF THE MEXICAN WAR — UNTRAINED, BUT INVINCIBLE — THE VOLUNTEER SOLDIERS WINFIELD SCOTT AND ZACHARY TAYLOR — THE REMARKABLE CAREER OF JOHN E. WOOL.

THE repetition of well-known facts in American history so fully detailed in the preceding chapter has not been indulged in by the author with any view to present these facts in a more striking shape or more interesting form than may be found in the standard text-books of the schools, or in the more voluminous works for greater minuteness of instruction. The circumstances related by the author possess in themselves an absorbing interest for every true American. The author's purpose lies within the scope of two reasons: first, as has already been intimated, up to the period of the War of 1812 no effort whatever had been made to establish a distinct educational system for naval instruction, in consequence of which such

seamanship and naval talent and ability in maritime contests as we then possessed, when contrasted with the like attributes or qualifications as have been since developed under a most liberal system of education, must precisely represent the value, or perhaps it may be more practically said, the necessity, of the educational system established in later years; and second, a relation of those inspiring deeds of our gallant sailors affords a suitable preface to an inquiry into the *personnel* of America's naval heroes.

Without any particular order of arrangement, some of the sailors who so brilliantly honored themselves and their country during the war which has claimed consideration in the preceding pages will be passed under brief review in the present chapter.

And first of the hero of Lake Champlain. Commodore Thomas Macdonough was the son of a Revolutionary officer who after the close of hostilities became a judge. With the mere rudiments of an English education, young Macdonough entered the United States navy at the early age of seventeen years as midshipman, and on board of a vessel he received a practical education in seamanship and the art of naval warfare. He was an apt pupil, and endowed by nature with the attributes of a successful sailor. He saw service against the Barbary pirates under Decatur, and he was one of the party who so daringly recovered the *Philadelphia* and assisted in her destruction during the night of February 16, 1804, before the city of Tripoli.

His great reputation rests upon the distinguished

victory which he achieved on Lake Champlain as narrated in the last chapter. His opponent in that engagement was Commodore George Downie, an experienced officer of the British navy who lost his life during the action. In appreciation of his great service in thwarting at the outset a most dangerous movement the American Congress promoted Macdonough, and presented him with a testimonial in the shape of a gold medal. He was also the recipient of various civic honors, while the State of Vermont presented him with an estate overlooking the scene of the battle. Had he been a less skillful seaman, he must have failed to defeat the enemy upon the occasion referred to.

Oliver H. Perry, the hero of Lake Erie, received the same practical naval education as did Macdonough. He was a midshipman at the early age of fourteen years, and also served in the Barbary war. In 1812 he had charge of a flotilla of gun-boats in New York harbor, and early in 1813 he was sent to serve under Chauncey, on Lake Ontario. Later in the same year he was given the command of the squadron on Lake Erie, and, having gotten his small fleet of nine vessels equipped and ready for action, he fought the battle and achieved the brilliant victory which so illuminates the naval annals of our country. He subsequently assisted General Harrison at the re-taking of Detroit, and commanded the *Java* in Decatur's squadron at a still later date. His victory over the foe on Lake Erie was the first refutation of the British slander that there were no sailors in the American service sufficiently versed in their profession to enable them to



THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE.

fight in squadron. The defeat itself amply demonstrated the great ability of the seaman who had received his only education upon the sea, while two actions of his in connection with the battle illustrate his gallantry as a soldier and the rare modesty of his character as a man. No more brilliant act of daring appears in the naval records of the world than that of Perry in passing in an open boat, exposed to the fire of the enemy, from his disabled ship to the *Niagara*, to which latter he transferred his flag. And certainly no great victory was ever heralded by conqueror in more simple and modest words than those used by Perry in announcing the result of the battle to General Harrison. After his defeat of the Lydian King, the conquering Cæsar wrote, "*I came, I saw, I conquered.*" The glorious Perry simply said, "*We have met the enemy and they are ours,*"—not one word of this remarkable dispatch containing the letter *I*, either large or small.

Captain Isaac Chauncey, the third of the great naval commanders who reflected such honor upon the American navy during the contest of 1812-1814 upon the waters and shores of the Northern lakes, began his naval career under circumstances still less favorable to a scholastic training than either of his distinguished colleagues Perry and Macdonough. With no opportunities whatever, for the acquisition of even a common-school education, Chauncey entered the merchant service at a very early age. So rapidly did he acquire a practical knowledge of his profession that at the age of nineteen he commanded

a ship belonging to John Jacob Astor, in which he made regular voyages to and from the East Indies. Upon the regular organization of our navy Chauncey possessed sufficient influence to obtain the appointment of lieutenant, thus skipping, as it were, the preliminary service of a midshipman in a man-of-war. As the development of his subsequent brilliant career so fully demonstrated, his case was but another example of the certainty with which genius in any direction of life overleaps adverse conditions and triumphantly asserts itself in spite of the most formidable obstacles. He acted with great gallantry in several affairs off the coast of Tripoli during the hostilities growing out of the outrages upon our commerce by the rulers of that benighted state. During the war of 1812 Chauncey had charge of our naval operations on Lake Ontario, and though he had no opportunity to distinguish himself by a single great and decisive battle, such as was given to Macdonough and Perry, his brilliant service was continuously rendered, and largely contributed to the reaping of such victories as really crowned the American arms within the scope of his scene of operations, while but for the fleet, which he so ably handled, the damage inflicted on us in that quarter would have been vastly greater than it was. At the attack upon and capture of York, now Toronto, the capital of Upper Canada and the general depot of supplies and stores for all the Western British ports, he rendered the most indispensable service. His coöperation at the attack upon Fort George enabled our troops to capture

that important post, the effect of which capture was to compel the British to evacuate the whole Niagara frontier. His skill in his profession, and the dash which distinguished him as a naval captain, were remarkably manifested in his campaigns against the British fleet upon Lake Ontario, commanded by Sir James Yeo, an English naval officer of long experience and considerable reputation. With a fleet never superior, and generally inferior to that of Yeo, Chauncey kept the latter continually on the run to avoid an engagement. The indefatigable American chased the Englishman first here and then there, in the hope to bring him to a fight. At last Chauncey succeeded in overtaking the enemy in York Bay, and immediately set upon him. A short engagement ensued, during which Chauncey managed his flag-ship with such admirable tactical skill that his achievements in that direction still form a subject of eulogy among naval men. Before the whole of the American fleet could be brought into action upon this occasion Sir James Yeo had had enough of it. Hoisting all sail, he started for the cooler regions of the lake, and with a favoring gale, which rendered pursuit impossible, he saved his fleet from the destruction which must have overtaken it at the hands of the gallant American and his men.

Turning now in the review of the naval heroes of 1812 from the interior lakes upon the north to the monarch of waters, the ever-rolling ocean, we behold one of the most conspicuous commanders that ever served our country — Stephen Decatur.

The history of this gallant seaman as it is applied to his early preparation for his subsequent career was not different from that of Perry and Macdonough. His primary education was simply such as the undeveloped school-system of the latter part of the last century afforded. At the age of nineteen he was appointed midshipman in the navy, and his education as a sailor and an officer was practical in character. The gallant services rendered by this distinguished officer are well known to every American, and need no repetition here. The author simply points to Decatur's name in illustration of the present subject of inquiry—the primal conditions underlying the career of our most remarkable naval figures.

Isaac Hull, the brilliant commander of the *Constitution* when the first capture of the War of 1812 was made—that of the *Guerrière*—was, like Chauncey, a seaman in the merchant service when made lieutenant in the American navy. He had no preliminary education save that which he had obtained on board his ship. His capture of the *Guerrière* gave him world-wide fame, and made his gallant deed the subject of universal conversation and praise among his admiring countrymen. But his great fame did not rest upon this brilliant exploit alone. He rendered distinguished service upon the coast of Barbary in the first years of the present century, and before the celebrated capture with which his name will be forever associated he made a display of seamanship which confounded the enemy and drew forth the greatest admiration. When starting upon his cruise just prior to

the capture spoken of, Hull's vessel was chased by a whole squadron of British ships, and his capture or destruction seemed inevitable. Suddenly there fell a calm of wind, and the pursuers and pursued lay almost as quiet and almost as idle

—“as a painted ship
Upon a painted ocean.”


The British commander took little heed of this, feeling secure in the belief that his prey was within his easy grasp. But a wonderful sight soon met his astonished view. In the deep calm, when scarcely enough air was in motion to shake the folds from the listless flags above, the Yankee ship began to steal away with the noiseless tread of the Arab. Slowly but surely away she went until she was far beyond pursuit by the petrified Briton, and nothing was again heard of her until the thrilling capture of the *Guerrière* became generally known. The ingenious Hull had escaped from the British squadron by a measure as novel as it was happy in conception. This consisted in sending small boats ahead with a kedge, and in then warping the ship up to it. This operation being continuously repeated, the *Constitution* walked away from the becalmed English ship, leaving its officers wholly in ignorance of the agency through which it had been accomplished.

Captain James Lawrence, of fragrant memory among his admiring countrymen, was educated with a view to the study and practice of law. At an early age, however, he gave unmistakable evidence of the bent of his inclination for the

life of a sailor, and when free to do so by the death of a father, who, however good the intention, endeavored to subvert the genius of his boy into a channel through which it was not designed to run, he adopted it. His preliminary naval education was obtained as a midshipman upon a man-of-war. The reader is well acquainted with his brilliant career up to the moment of his unfortunate end, when, before expiring, he uttered the memorable words which have become the motto of the American navy — “Don’t give up the ship!”

Commodore William Bainbridge, another of the distinguished naval heroes of our country, went to sea at the age of sixteen years in a merchantman, and in three years afterward he was intrusted with the command of a merchant vessel, continuing in that service for an additional period of five years, when he was appointed to command the *Retaliation*, of the United States navy. His subsequent brilliant career in the navy of his country from the years 1798 to 1821 is matter of our general history.

Commodore Jacob Jones, another of the naval commanders whose rare seamanship and ability lent such renown to the navy during the period under review, had an introduction to the career of a great naval captain entirely different from all of his contemporaries that have here been considered. He was educated to be a physician, graduated at a Philadelphia medical school, and practiced medicine for a time in his native State, Delaware. He was made clerk of the Supreme Court of Delaware and abandoned his profession to enter upon his new duties.



AMERICAN NAVAL HEROES.

1. Farragut. 2. Chauncey. 3. Worden. 4. Macdonough.
 5. Perry. 6. Hull.

Until he was thirty years of age he was quite unacquainted with the details of a ship's construction, and at the age of thirty-one he entered the United States navy as a midshipman. After less than two years' service in this capacity he was made lieutenant, from which position he rose rapidly to be one of the most distinguished officers of the navy. His gallant fight with and capture of the British sloop-of-war *Frolic*, a vessel greatly superior in force to the *Wasp*, which latter he commanded, has already been related in the preceding pages. This exploit was rewarded by the bestowal of distinguished honors by several of the States.

Commodore David Porter, one of the very ablest of the naval commanders during our War of 1812, was the son of a captain of a merchant vessel, and from the age of sixteen to nineteen years he learned practical seamanship on board a merchantman trading with the West India Islands. At nineteen he entered the United States navy as midshipman, and thus began his very remarkable naval career. He saw service in the action between the American ship *Constellation* and the French *L'Insurgente*, which resulted in the defeat of the latter, and for meritorious conduct upon that occasion young Porter received promotion. His capture of the British ship *Alert*, while commanding the *Essex*, has already been mentioned by the author. His remarkable cruise in the latter, which finally terminated in the destruction of his ship in a Chilean neutral port by two British men-of-war, forms one of the most interesting chapters of naval history.

Commodore Joshua Barney had a distinguished career as a naval officer through both the American struggles with Great Britain—the War of the Revolution and the War of 1812. His school life only extended to his tenth year, after which age he went to sea, and by an accident became commander of a ship at sixteen. In 1775 he was made master's mate of the American sloop-of-war *Hornet*, and from that time forward until after the close of the War of 1812 his services to his country were of the most distinguished character. He was one of the prominent defenders of the City of Washington during the British attack on the national capital, and during the battle of Bladensburg he was severely wounded and taken prisoner by the enemy.

The foregoing running sketch of American naval officers, who formed a bright portion of the remarkable galaxy of great naval captains, and whose daring deeds shed such glory upon our naval power during a critical period in our history, noways represents the full list of those who gained honorable distinction during the crisis referred to. The enumeration has been made from the names of those whose deeds have shone most brightly in American naval annals. Since the time of Hull, Decatur, Bainbridge, Jones, Lawrence, Porter, Barney, Perry, Macdonough, and Chauncey, the whole system of naval tactics and naval warfare in general has been revolutionized by the introduction of steam in war-ships, of iron casing, and of enormously heavy guns and projectiles. Since their time, too, a host of brilliant names have

adorned the American navy, as that of Dupont, of Farragut, of Goldsborough, of Rowan, of Rodgers, of Foote, of Paulding, of John L. Worden, of D. D. Porter, and of many others equally deserving of mention. Some of these learned their profession under the old system; many of them under the crude attempts at scholastic education upon ship-board, already detailed in the first part of this volume. Perhaps a few of the younger officers who saw service during the Rebellion were graduates of the Academy at Annapolis. A recital of the splendid naval feats of the American civil conflict would necessarily carry the author into a detail of the various naval engagements of that conflict, and devolve upon him a task which neither his present subject nor the limits of the present volume would permit. But without seeking to detract from the brilliant records of subsequent naval heroes, which are the legitimate heritages of the American people, yet, considered in the character of purely naval officers, it may be asked, with pertinence and propriety, how much more successful as practical seamen and successful fighters—to use that expression in default of a better—would have been those naval worthies of 1812, had they been the recipients of a vast preparatory education, covering a knowledge of various branches of learning, some of which are ornamental, and others of which include a detail of studies seldom ever used in practical application?

The author has so constantly asseverated his belief in the efficacy of preparatory education, both for the soldier

and the sailor, that he has little fear of being misunderstood in presenting such a question, except it may be by those having a purpose to distort his meaning. A knowledge of the branches pertaining to the art of war, whether practiced upon the land or sea, is indisputably necessary to success in that art. But to reiterate the position, it may be alleged that the youth or man who has the natural genius, seeking development into the noted soldier or sailor—a soldier like Nathaniel Greene, or a sailor like Jacob Jones, whose natural bent asserted itself after he had adopted another profession, and had arrived at the age of thirty-one years—will conquer the knowledge pertaining to the art early in life, if he have the facilities afforded to him, and later, if he have not. But if a youth or man have not the natural inspiration of the great naval commander, no course of drill in mathematics and its divisional branches, no course of study in navigation, nor of tactics, nor of gunnery, etc., will enable him to shine in the profession as did the blunt old Isaac Hull, or his contemporary heroes, who, though more accomplished in the book-learning and literature of the naval profession, were far less so than the modern academic standard exacts as prerequisite to the career of a naval officer.

It has already been remarked of our volunteer soldiers of 1812 that, owing to the lack of necessary discipline and to the inability of the Government to furnish the supplies and munitions of war with the requisite regularity and expedition, they generally suffered reverses in the early

engagements of the conflict, and that in consequence of this fact the hope of the nation for the first sixteen months was centered in the brilliant exploits of its small navy. Although these evils were never fully overcome, owing to the short term of enlistment of the troops, and to the comparatively brief period during which the war lasted, yet the time came when these defects were so far remedied that our land forces fully sustained the reputation of the American volunteer soldiers, and, reversing the order at the beginning of the campaign, bore off the prestige of victory from every field whereon they were not opposed by an overwhelming majority. To recount the various struggles in which our noble soldiers exhibited such splendid courage and effectiveness, both in victory and in defeat, would require an amount of space not now at the command of the author. The most that he can do is to glance at the prominent figures of the time who led our troops to honor upon every field.

William Henry Harrison, who as Major-General of the Kentucky militia bore such an important part in the War of 1812, and who subsequently became the ninth President of the United States, had no preliminary education. Designed by his father to be a physician, young Harrison was put to the study of medicine, which the lad soon discovered was not his vocation. Being offered the commission of ensign by Washington, he turned his attention to military affairs, and for the period of the succeeding six years, during which time he rose to the rank of captain, he was engaged in various battles with the

Indians, in all of which he displayed much gallantry as well as much ability as an officer. At the termination of the period mentioned he resigned from the army and was appointed to be Secretary of the Northwest Territory, from which date the political career began which was ended by his election to the Presidency of his country. After negotiating a number of treaties with the Indians he again took the field against the celebrated chief Tecumseh, and became the hero of the widely-sung battle of Tippecanoe, in the year 1811. During the War of 1812 he gathered distinguished military honors, his defense of Fort Meigs and his victory at the battle of the Thames creating immense enthusiasm throughout the country.

General Harrison was a shining example of the American citizen-soldier. Intended for another calling in life, and without any preceding education to give to his subsequent career a military direction, the inspiration came upon presentation of the first opportunity to gather glory from the battle-field. That this inspiration was not based upon a simple casualty, carrying him into the ranks as a mere incident of frontier life at that early day, is sufficiently proven by the strong logic of the record which follows the uncouth stripling from his first aspiration for a soldier's life to his high position as a military commander fully equal in ability to the veteran officers of a war-pursuing nation.

In the career of Major-General Winfield Scott we are again presented with a remarkable instance of the agency of the natural bent in giving direction to future develop-

ment. Young Scott was educated to the law, and was admitted to the bar in 1806. Two years afterward, he was appointed to be a captain of artillery, and from that time his distinguished military career commenced. This career extended over all of the wars in which our country has been engaged since the close of the Revolution. In that of 1812 his first laurels were won, and the fame of the hero of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane became known not only among his admiring countrymen, but recognized by the military talent of Europe. His splendid record in the Mexican War is one of the most flattering pages of American military history, while his greatness as a military genius was still acknowledged when, at the age of seventy-five years, he gave the first directions in the huge struggle of the Rebellion, after our Military Academy at West Point had given education and exit to many soldiers whose distinguished careers became so marked during the war between the sections. Though General Scott was a warm advocate, in later years, of an academic military education, he shone forth, in his own person, as an example, not alone of the very great military man, but, also, of the circumstance so strongly insisted upon in these pages, that true military genius will find expansion and assert its supremacy in spite of every obstacle and of every attempt to turn it from its course. Winfield Scott possessed a military reputation fully recognized by all contemporary military men. His record is that of an accomplished and brilliant officer, and one of the most sterling representatives of the volunteer soldiery

of the United States. The dark ordeal of the late Civil War brought to light many of these representative soldiers of a gallant and freedom-loving people. The names of some of these will be mentioned in the succeeding chapter.

Another of the remarkable figures of the War of 1812 was that of General Andrew Jackson, whose gallant victory over the British General Pakenham at New Orleans, upon the 8th of January, 1815, confirmed his previous reputation as a military leader of the first order. Jackson's parents, as is well known, came from Ireland in 1765. Two years later Andrew was born in South Carolina. He entered the Revolutionary army when fourteen years of age, and, having been taken prisoner, he was twice wounded with a sword for obstinately refusing to black the boots of a British officer. After the close of the war he studied law, and when nineteen years of age he was admitted to practice in North Carolina. Removing to Tennessee, he became identified with the politics of the State, and held various public positions, including that of United States senator and judge of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. He was major-general of the State militia from 1798 to 1814. His fine campaigns against the Creek Indians are well-known to all readers of American history, while his victory at New Orleans with an inferior force over Sir Edward Pakenham, an officer who had served with great distinction in all the principal engagements of Wellington during the campaigns in France and in Spain, and who led an army of British

veterans against the defenses of New Orleans, was one of the most brilliant in the history of battles. With no preliminary education pertaining to a military life, except such as he received upon the field, General Jackson's career furnishes indisputable proof of the existence of the inherent military genius which belonged to him as a natural birthright. His remarkable and happy expedient of constructing his defenses of bales of cotton, impenetrable by the shots of the enemy, displayed an originality of genius which no degree of classical education could have added to in the least. His military career is deeply cut in the pages of history, and the hero of New Orleans is another luminous exemplification of the attributes of the untaught natural soldier of America.

Richard M. Johnson, who served with such distinction under General Harrison in the campaigns upon the Canadian border, and for whom was warmly claimed the credit of putting a termination to the life of the able but bloody chief Tecumseh, at the battle of the Thames, was a practicing lawyer at the outbreak of the war, with no military experience whatever. After serving his country with most signal ability as a volunteer officer, he resumed the practice of his profession and gathered fresh laurels in civil life. His political career, which was long and useful, was crowned by his elevation to the Vice-Presidency of the United States.

To these names could be added, did space permit, a long list of other gallant *volunteer* officers whose able services lent such effectiveness to the American cause and

reflected such great honor upon the American soldiery. Such a list would embrace the names of the deeply lamented Pike, who lost his life at the capture of York; of General Greene Clay, the volunteer soldier of Kentucky; of General Isaac Shelby, the distinguished war Governor of the same State; of General Jacob Brown, born of a Quaker family, a school-teacher in early life, afterward a surveyor, then a lawyer, then a politician, and finally a volunteer soldier in the War of 1812, and whose services in this capacity were acknowledged by Congress with a gold medal and a resolution of thanks; of General Henry Leavenworth, a practitioner of law until the beginning of the War of 1812, and whose services in the Canadian campaign were so invaluable that he was continued in the regular army after the close of the war, and whose name is permanently attached to the military post on the Missouri River (Fort Leavenworth) which he established; of the brave General George Croghan, whose remarkable sortie from Fort Meigs won for him imperishable glory; of General John Swift, of the New York militia, already mentioned herein, and who lost his life after successfully cutting off a picket of the enemy near Fort George; of General E. W. Ripley, also a practicing lawyer until he volunteered to serve his country during the War of 1812, and who in recognition of his distinguished service received from Congress a gold medal, upon which were engraven the names of the battles in which he had borne such a conspicuous part — “Niagara, Chippewa, Erie;” of General William J. Worth, who

began life in the humble capacity of trader's clerk, whose scanty education scarcely covered a knowledge of the English rudiments, and whose military services, beginning in 1813 upon the Canadian border, were continued through subsequent campaigns against the Indians and through the Mexican War, and who, from a position of a purely commercial character, became one of the most distinguished military officers in the regular army of the United States, receiving a sword of honor from Congress in recognition of his brilliant deeds, as also others from the States of New York and Louisiana, and from his native county of Columbia, and whose memory is perpetuated by his native State with the splendid monument which faces Madison Square in the City of New York; of the brave old Revolutionary officer General Henry Miller, who left the practice of law to engage in the struggle for independence, and who, then an old man, commanded a brigade of militia in the defense of the city of Baltimore after the British outrage upon the National Capital; and also of many others who bore a most distinguished part in the second struggle with the British nation.

In conclusion of this hasty review of the officers distinguishing themselves in 1812, mention must also be made of the fact that our Government and people at large were no less appreciative of the valor of the men in the ranks who with such splendid courage sustained the high character of the volunteer soldier of America. The following joint resolution, passed by Congress, and approved by the President February 27, 1815, though re-

lating to the victory of New Orleans, will serve as a fit illustration of the grateful sentiments of our people to the men who had carried the musket and the flag in all the battles of the war. The full text of the resolution is herewith given :

“*Resolved*, etc., That the thanks of Congress be, and they are hereby given to Major-General Jackson, and through him to the officers and soldiers of the regular army, of the military and volunteers under his command, the greater portion of which troops consisted of militia and volunteers suddenly collected together, for their uniform gallantry and good conduct conspicuously displayed against the enemy from the time of his standing before New Orleans until his final expulsion therefrom; and particularly for the valor, skill, and good conduct on the 8th of January last, in repulsing with great slaughter a numerous British army of chosen veterans when attempting by a bold and daring attack to carry by storm the works hastily thrown up for the protection of New Orleans, and thereby obtaining a most signal victory over the enemy, with a disparity of loss on his part unexampled in military annals.”

Before closing the present chapter the author desires to devote a brief space to the war following that of 1812, after an interval of some thirty years, viz.: the war with Mexico.

The Mexican War, from 1846–1848, as has already been observed, was a conflict into which the country was also plunged by the demands and action of certain Southern statesmen and their Northern allies. It was generally unpopular in the North for the double reason that it was a war hastily precipitated upon a weak neighboring state, and that its purpose, of adding, by conquest, territory to increase the political power of the Southern States, was so apparent as to be perceived by all. Volunteering from

the Northern States was therefore slow, and it was only under the stimulus of the duty of an American citizen-soldier to maintain the honor and dignity of his flag that any general response to the call for volunteers was made in the States mentioned. It has been roughly estimated that during the war spoken of the North furnished only about one-half as many volunteers as were sent from the Southern States. However this statement may tally with the exact figures, it is certain that those who did enlist exhibited the same qualities which had marked the soldier of the Revolution as well as the soldier of 1812. At the outbreak of hostilities the country was even less prepared for war than upon the outbreak of the contest of 1812. When General Taylor was ordered to the Texas frontier in the latter part of 1845 the numerical force of the army of the United States was inferior to that of any year from 1808 to the period mentioned. As appears from the report of the Adjutant-General, dated November 26, 1845, Taylor's force in Texas, after all the available troops which could be spared by the Government from the Atlantic, the West, and the Northwest divisions had been sent to him, only amounted to about four thousand men, including the general staff. As to any provisions for increasing the efficiency of the reserve troops of the country as represented by the militia and volunteers, it may fairly be said that no advance, no progress had been made since the close of the second war with the mother country. This remark, however, does not apply to the ability of the country in 1846 to equip,

supply, and maintain a large army, and to do so with greatly more efficiency than during any previous period of its history. The Republic had increased within thirty years in population, wealth, power, and general resources, to a vast extent, and it was amply able upon the occurrence of a *casus belli* enlisting the enthusiasm of the whole people to place an army in the field beside which that which actually invaded Mexico would have been very insignificant. As it was, however, the same difficulty with raw, undisciplined troops operated against our arms in the earlier battles just as had happened in our previous experiences. The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, which resulted so advantageously to the Americans, were fought by Taylor with his small force of regular soldiers. The subsequent battles at Monterey and Buena Vista and other engagements were gained, according to the reports of the Mexican officers, because *the American volunteers wouldn't acknowledge that they were whipped* when according to every law of the schools they should have been.

As time went on, however, the work of discipline and the educating influence of actual field experience brought out, as always before, the full effectiveness of the American citizen-soldier, and in the subsequent campaigns under Taylor, and the final ones under Scott, leading to the placing of the American flag upon the palaces of the Mexican capital, the volunteers of our country reaped a renown that can never fade from the pages of our history.

The war now under consideration was marked by an

entirely new feature in American military annals. The Academy at West Point had been in operation for a period of forty-four years, and it was time that its fruitfulness should be exhibited. The first showing of the institution may be said to have been made at this crisis. Many of its graduates saw actual service for the first time during the campaigns in Mexico. They were attached in many cases to regiments by a brevet rank. Among those of the West Point graduates in Mexico were some who won everlasting fame and glory in the civil conflict so soon to shake the country like a mighty convulsion of the earth. The immortal name of Ulysses S. Grant heads the roll of honor in the field, though it never stood very high upon the records of his military *alma mater*.

The two central figures of our war with Mexico were Generals Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor. The former of these celebrated military leaders has already occupied attention and received comment in the preceding pages of this chapter, and nothing further can be said by the author which could enhance the brilliant record of that justly celebrated General.

A few words, however, will be permitted by the reader upon his great colleague-in-arms, General Zachary Taylor, the "old rough-and-ready" of the "boys in blue."

Taylor was the son of a Revolutionary soldier who reared his boy upon his plantation in Kentucky, accustoming the youth to the hard labor of a farm. With no education whatever, nor opportunity of obtaining one, young Taylor worked away to earn his living and to make

something of himself, until at the age of twenty-four years he was appointed first lieutenant, Seventh Infantry. During the War of 1812 he received the brevet rank of major for gallant conduct in the Indian assault on Fort Harrison, this being the first instance of brevet promotion in our service. He earned distinction in subsequent battles of that war. In the Black Hawk War and in Florida he gained increased military fame from his various battles with the Indians. In the year 1840 he was appointed to command the Army of the Southwest, and in 1846 he began the series of battles with the Mexicans which raised his name to the highest pinnacle of military glory—a glory which, in his case, as expressed by the poet Montgomery, led “but to the grave.” The great *éclat* and popularity which attached to his military character—for he had no political prestige or record—caused his nomination and election to the Presidency of the United States, and his death followed soon after his inauguration, probably from imprisonment in the White House after having led the active, open-air life of a soldier for so long a time.

The case of General Taylor is certainly remarkable in the confirmation it presents of the existence of a natural bent or aptitude for the military calling, which bent or aptitude will always burst the bonds of every restraint, as the river, artificially turned from its legitimate course, gathers a flood which, sweeping away every impediment, will carry the waters triumphantly to the sea.

Still another illustration of the same fact is presented

to us by the case of Major-General John E. Wool, mention of whom, though serving with great distinction in the War of 1812, has been reserved for the present connection. This distinguished soldier was, like Taylor, the son of a Revolutionary officer, who was unable to give the youth any educational advantages. Engaging in trade, young Wool managed to become proprietor of a bookstore in Troy, N. Y., by the time he had reached his majority. Having suffered the loss of his business by fire, he began the study of law, but, availing himself of the influence of Governor Clinton, he soon after received the appointment of captain in the Thirteenth Infantry, the War of 1812 being then impending. At the period of receiving his commission in the army of the United States, like Taylor again, he had reached the twenty-fourth year of his age.

His brilliant career as one of the ablest military men from that time until his death in 1869 forms an important and interesting part of the war annals of our country. As an officer of the regular army he served with distinction through the last war with England, through the Mexican War, and through the War of Secession. He organized, armed, and equipped, in the West, 12,000 volunteers for service in Mexico within a period of six weeks. He commanded in the absence of General Taylor during the first part of the battle of Buena Vista, and was breveted major-general for his gallant services at that time, also receiving swords from Congress and from his native State. His services during the Rebellion were

of the greatest value to the Union cause. As an organizer of troops it is said he had no superior.

Though the task would be one of a most grateful character, the author is compelled to forego a more detailed mention, in the present place, of a number of other gallant, able, and distinguished volunteer soldiers who figured with honor upon the battle-fields of Mexico. The names of some of these will appear in the following chapter. The campaign against Mexico witnessed the advent upon the actual stage of war of a number of young officers who had received a preparatory military education at the West Point Academy and who afterward figured with more or less prominence upon the battle-fields of the civil conflict. The Mexican War, however, bore fruit in another direction perhaps no less important to the country than the circumstance just mentioned, as it furnished a school of practical experience to a large number of volunteer soldiers whose names are now written upon an imperishable page as the heroic defenders of their country against the internal agitators who so rashly sought to destroy it.

CHAPTER XX.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL CONFLICT—MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COUNTRY AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR—THE VOLUNTEER PRESERVES THE UNION, ABOLISHES SLAVERY, AND REVOLUTIONIZES THE OLD METHODS OF WARFARE—A REVIEW OF SOME OF THE VOLUNTEER OFFICERS OF THE REBELLION—THE ACADEMIC SOLDIER AND THE SOLDIER BY NATURAL GENIUS—THE NAVAL HEROES OF THE REBELLION—CONCLUDING COMMENTARY UPON ALL OF THE FACTS.

THE assertion that the last armed conflict in which the people of the United States were engaged was also forced upon them by Southern statesmen, does not need the testimony of the author in order that it may receive confirmation. While it is far from his intention to fan the flame of sectional crimination, yet it is wholly within place in such a volume as the present to at least note the indisputable fact that since the achievement of independence the American people have been called to sustain no general war which has not been thrust upon them in the interest of an unrepudicated aristocracy resting upon the equally unrepudicated and thrice-accursed system of human slavery.

The American Republic, great in the annals of peace, admired by every nation of the world, and respected in

every land and upon every sea, was called upon in the year 1861 to meet an ordeal through which any other then living government would have tumbled into fragments so small as to be insusceptible of reconstruction. The nations of Europe looked upon the intestine conflict with utter amazement, and as they looked but one common sentiment found expression from men grown gray in the public service of states, which expression but intoned a requiem over the dying struggles of the monster Republic of America. As man was never born to die, so his last and best hope on earth was never created to perish so prematurely. The disease which had attacked the nation was terrible in its deadly strength, but the remedy was close at hand and indigenous to the soil. It lay in the patriotism of the people, and in the strong arm and courageous heart of that marvelous power, the American volunteer soldier.

It would be wholly a work of supererogation to attempt even an outline of the great civil conflict through which the country has passed within the quick memory of those now living, and while so many of the actual participants in the conflict still live to enjoy the honors they have so nobly won. Upon the detailed history of that fearful crisis in our national life it may truly be said, "of books there is no end." In that direction the field seems to have been fully covered, and it only remains to the author to preserve unbroken and intact the thread leading to the end for which the writer has been induced to undertake his present task.

In one respect at least the outbreak of the Civil War found a decided advance in the military establishment of the country over that of any other period of its history. This advance consisted of a more general diffusion of military knowledge and practical training through the militia organizations of the several States. In the fifteen years of internal and external peace that lay between the outbreak of the Mexican and Civil wars, there had been a special stimulus to military organization and drill in the principal States and cities. The youth of the country, as never before, had become attached to organizations existing under the State militia laws, which latter, under periodical remodeling and enlarged State legislation, had reached a degree of effective usefulness never before attained. It resulted from this that during the opening crisis of the conflict whole regiments of thoroughly trained soldiers, simply needing some experience with the actual blaze of battle to make them veteran troops, were placed temporarily at the service of the Government. Further than this, however, many of these same soldiers went into the permanent service of the Government for the period of the war, and from this same source were drawn many who developed into the finest volunteer officers that led our gallant troops to victory.

In another respect, too, there had been an advance in the military resources of the country, though this advance, singularly enough, was turned against the Union cause. There had been a gradual accumulation of improved arms and implements of war at the various arsenals and

posts, and new fortifications had been erected upon frontier and coast line, though it must be confessed that neither the supply of war implements and material nor the number or strength of the various fortifications was at all adequate to the actual requirements of an immense nation like our own. Such material, however, as the Government possessed was transferred by the Secretary of War to the hands of the enemies of the Union, thus leaving the Government at the commencement of the conflict in a worse condition than if it had accumulated no material whatever.

Under such conditions the Civil War began, and the American volunteer once more took the field in defense of his country and the liberty of all mankind—for this issue was fairly involved in the contest.

The scenes which followed have become a marvel for all succeeding ages. Upon the part of the South, the forces were practically raised through a draft, which, toward the close of the war, embraced every male, young or old, at all capable of bearing arms. But in the North, where every man felt himself to be the special preserver of his country, the vast armies which were marshaled to the field were raised by volunteering, with the exception of those produced by a draft unwisely ordered through a mistaken judgment. The number thus raised did not exceed 300,000, while the number of those who voluntarily entered the armies of the country was more than one and one-half millions.

The most of these brave men—indeed, an overwhelm-

ing percentage of them—were wholly unlearned in the military art, and entirely without experience in its practical employment. They possessed all the attributes of the men who had followed the fortunes of the campaigns for independence, of the men who again contended with the British foe in 1812, allied as he was with the tribes of savage Indians, and of the men who, under Scott and Taylor, had maintained the glory and honor of the American flag through the pest-dealing lowlands and the towering mountain elevations of the country with which we were precipitated into war in 1846. But, as was the case in all of the wars mentioned, the volunteer, while possessing the most remarkable attributes of a soldier, was lacking in those elements of efficiency which can only be acquired under the fire of an enemy. He was a “raw” man, in the military vernacular, though it was not long until the drill of the battle-field made the Union soldiers a body of troops such as probably had never been placed upon the march since the contention of nation with nation began. To fully recount the glorious conduct of these troops, through the various conflicts which led to the subjugation of the Rebellion, would require the space of a dozen volumes of the size of the present. Results were obtained of the most profound importance. The Union was preserved and cemented beyond the possibility of a future rupture; the system of slavery, in theory and in practice, was radically abolished; and four million bondmen were not alone blessed with freedom, but they were likewise placed upon an equality before the law with

other citizens of the Republic. But these were not the only results obtained: the great nation devoted to peace and to the pursuit of national and individual development and welfare—the nation without a navy, the nation without an army, the nation which simply existed through tolerance of the great powers—suddenly astounded the world by entirely revolutionizing the system of naval warfare, and by demonstrating a military power which no nation of the world could even hope to successfully encounter upon the soil of America. All honor to the glorious soldier who has achieved these beneficent results. Let pæans be sung to him through all the ages, and to the latest moment of his earthly existence let his benefited countrymen continue their admiration of and care for his personal welfare. Let his example be held before the youth of our country as one claiming their emulation, and let his fame and glory pass into history as the traditional legacy of a freedom-loving people.

Turning from the fascinating view of the American volunteer as a soldier in the ranks, let us take a hasty view of him as an officer during the late fearful struggle for national existence. As the limits assigned to his present task compel the author to brevity, nothing further than a running commentary upon some, though very far from all, of the prominent volunteer officers of the Civil War can be indulged in. In the review of a list of officers so comparatively few in number, the reader will bear in mind that the purpose of the present volume only leads the author to the citation of examples in illustration of

his immediate subject, and not to a eulogy of, or an attempt to render to each worthy officer the justice due him. For the same reason, no mention is made of the West Point officers who so triumphantly vindicated their military education and the justice of their first selection to be cadets at the National Academy. The honored names of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McPherson, Thomas, and of many others, need no eulogy in the present volume. Their fame is a part of the nation's history; it can never be tarnished by selfish depreciation, nor too much lauded by a grateful country.

Without any order in the selection indicative of invidiousness, let us first consider the case of General Alfred H. Terry.

The case of this highly accomplished and most successful officer, viewed from the military standpoint, must be considered to be a very remarkable one. He received a high literary education from Yale College, and, subsequently studying law, he was admitted to the bar when he was twenty-one years of age. Six years afterward, he was made clerk of the court of New Haven County, where he resided, which position he continued to fill for the six following years. During the time, however, that he was driving away at the law, the real bent of his genius was forcing him into the direction of a military life. He had become attached to the New Haven County militia, and in 1854 he was given the command of the Second Regiment, in which command he continued until the outbreak of the Rebellion, at which date his real

military career began. He was then nearly thirty-three years of age, and within the period of five years thereafter he was acknowledged to be one of the finest military men in the service of the United States. This extraordinary instance of military development after the first half of the years of an ordinary life had been devoted to the cultivation and practice of a civil profession, and when the subject of remark had had none of those special branches entering into his education which are considered by the modern world to form an indispensable part of the qualifications of every military officer, needs no extended comment in its application to the author's special subject. The mere statement of facts is sufficiently conclusive of the correctness of the author's position and argument, apart from the other numerous examples which have been herein adduced.

Every school-boy of the country is thoroughly conversant with the brilliant career of General Terry during the late war, and no general repetition of it is necessary in these pages. One of his achievements, however, is so pertinent to the author's objective point of argument, in that it directly represents a strong comparison between inherent military genius and the military art of the schools, that, without a purpose to be personally invidious, the author feels wholly justified in speaking of it at length. Every military reader of the present pages will perceive at once that the Fort Fisher incident is now referred to.

Fort Fisher and its surroundings constituted the rebel

defense of the harbor of Wilmington, N. C. During the progress of the war which, under the mighty genius of Grant, was rapidly approaching its close, the port of Wilmington was left as the only one on the Southern coast accessible to blockade-runners. As such it was of the utmost importance to the Union cause that it should be closed. But a still further importance attached to it, as connected with the comprehensive and consummate plan which General Grant had formed to finally crush the Rebellion. The General-in-Chief had determined that the same force should subdue Fort Fisher, thus closing the port, that he intended should march into North Carolina and there prevent the gathering of Confederate troops, so that Sherman, in his northward march, might crush Johnston, while he (Grant) subdued Lee at Richmond and Petersburg. Fort Fisher was a vital point, therefore, in a double sense, and Grant determined that the assault upon it should not fail. To carry out his purpose he sent one of the most powerful fleets ever got together to attack it from the sea. This fleet consisted of about sixty vessels, under the immediate command of Admiral Porter. As a land force he sent a body of selected men, numbering about six thousand five hundred, whose immediate command was given to General Godfrey Weitzel. The commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, General Benjamin F. Butler, took station upon one of the ships, where he could be in ready signal communication with the commander of the land force.

Three months before the attack General Weitzel, with General C. K. Graham, had made a reconnoissance of the work from the sea side, in order to determine its strength and the number of men necessary to take it, and a report thereon was made by these officers. That was in September, 1864, and the attempt to capture it was made in the following December.

General Weitzel, who had been especially selected for the expedition, was a high-class West Point graduate, with the reputation to be one of the most able and accomplished engineers who ever left the Academy.

Admiral Porter began the siege at the appointed time, and; as appears from the record, thought he had dismounted the enemy's guns. Weitzel landed a part of his force, and after a thorough reconnoissance of the work reported to General Butler that in his judgment, as well as in that of his officers, a successful assault with the troops at hand would be impossible, as they could not operate when the fleet was firing, while, if the fleet discontinued to fire, the guns of the fort would be turned upon the land forces, and to lead them against such a fire would be simple murder. The result was that General Butler recalled the force to the ships, and the expedition failed. General Grant was highly incensed at this result. He knew well enough that *he* could have carried the work with the means provided, and in his "General Report of the Operations of the Army" he censured General Butler for the recall of the troops, and, upon General Grant's request, the former was relieved of the

command of the department and General Ord was appointed to succeed him.

Grant requested Admiral Porter to remain until he could organize another attack. Sending a few additional troops, some twelve or thirteen hundred, as a reinforcement, the General-in-Chief selected General A. H. Terry to command the land forces during the second attack. He had chosen a brilliant engineer the first time, and he now chose a volunteer officer without any preliminary military education. The result of this wise choice of that astute man is well known to the reader. Terry went ashore with the same men that Weitzel led, under the protection of the fleet, and, instead of reconnoitering to see if the work could be carried, he burnt his ships in the figurative sense, and proceeded to carry it.

This affair gave rise to heated discussion and to much misrepresentation of facts. Regular army officers, feeling that the reputation of West Point was at stake, denounced General Butler as the cause of the fiasco. General Grant censured him because he failed to carry out the express order for the intrenchment of the troops on shore and hastily recalled them without accomplishing the end of the expedition. General Butler defended himself by adducing testimony, embracing that of the rebel General Whiting, commander *pro tempore* of the department, who was wounded and captured in the fort, which testimony was intended to show that the work at that time could not have been taken. Knowing the excellent qualities of General Butler very well, the author has never

doubted that, had he commanded in person on shore, he would have carried the work, with the assistance of the fleet, beyond a doubt. Butler's real vindication seems to rest upon the fact that he failed because he relied upon the statement of an officer whose judgment, according to report, was not to be impeached.

That distinguished and accomplished soldier, Major-General E. D. Sumner, was engaged in mercantile pursuits until twenty-three years of age, at which time he was appointed a second lieutenant in the United States army, without any previous military education or experience. From this time his brilliant career as a regular army officer, with which the reader is familiar, began. General Philip Kearney, who had few equals in all that goes to make the successful soldier, with high accomplishment and admirable intrepidity, was a student of law until he reached his twenty-second year, when he was made a lieutenant in the First Dragoons. Soon after he was sent to Europe by the Government to study and report upon the French cavalry tactics. He fought in Africa and attained the cross of the Legion of Honor. He was distinguished in the Mexican War, where he lost an arm. He fought in Italy and received additional honors. His services in the War of the Rebellion were of the highest value. In a word, he was a volunteer soldier of America, recognized in Europe as one of the finest military men of his time. General Daniel Sickles, another brilliant and distinguished soldier, was a practicing lawyer and a prominent politician until he was nearly forty years of age, at which



DEATH OF GENERAL PHILIP KEARNEY.

time he went to the Civil War as colonel of a volunteer regiment that he had raised. The eminently brilliant military career of General Sickles is well known to all Americans, and needs no eulogy from the author. Major-General J. D. Cox was also a practicing lawyer and politician until his thirty-third year. With no previous military education or experience he entered the army in 1861 as a volunteer and rose to the highest military rank. His distinguished services are so well known as to need no repetition in this place. Major-General Jeff. C. Davis left school when a little over eighteen to join Colonel James H. Lane's volunteer regiment for the Mexican War. For gallant conduct in the several battles under Taylor he was made second lieutenant in the regular army. He was one of the gallant spirits who defended Fort Sumter under Robert Anderson, and his subsequent military record covers services of the highest importance to the Government. General Lewis Wallace, who distinguished himself throughout the Civil War, was a student of law who went to the Mexican War as a volunteer. After the close of that war he became a practicing lawyer, and so remained until the civil conflict took him to the field. General W. H. L. Wallace, a young lawyer, volunteered as a private in the Mexican War, and, after earning promotion, returned to the practice of law, in which he remained until the outbreak of the Rebellion. His services were of a brilliant character up to his death, at Shiloh. General James S. Wadsworth was educated for civil pursuits, and was a most prominent public

man until the outbreak of the Rebellion, when he had reached his fifty-fourth year. At this late time in life he entered the volunteer army and rendered most distinguished service. David B. Birney practiced law until his thirty-sixth year. With no military knowledge whatever, he entered the service in 1861 as a volunteer, and through a brilliant military career he rose to the rank of major-general. After the wounding of General Sickles at Gettysburg he took command of the corps. Frank P. Blair, of Missouri, who gained distinction as a soldier during the Civil War, was also a lawyer, and, as a young man, had served as a private in the Mexican War. He attained the rank of major-general through brilliant service in the West and South. The gallant John A. McClelland was a farmer's boy who conquered a knowledge of the law and was admitted to its practice. He was a volunteer during the hostilities against the Sac and Fox Indians. Returning to the law, he was a prominent public man when the Rebellion broke out, at which time he was nearly fifty years of age. His military career was a line of distinguished successes, as all know.

The distinguished General John M. Palmer was a lawyer and public man up to the outbreak of the Rebellion, when, at the age of forty-four years, he became a volunteer soldier, achieving a brilliant record, and being made major-general in recognition of his services. The brothers Daniel and Robert L. McCook were lawyers with no military knowledge until they became volunteers in 1861. Their services were recognized by promotion

to the grade of brigadier-general. The distinguished Michael Corcoran was educated as a civilian and entered the volunteer army in 1861 as colonel of a New York militia regiment—the Sixty-ninth—which gathered imperishable garlands for gallant and invincible fighting. General Corcoran's record as a military officer of great capacity has never been called in question. General James Shields was a lawyer by profession, and had seen some military service in the Florida War. Entering the Mexican War as a volunteer, he achieved great distinction as a gallant and capable soldier, and was made brigadier-general. Returning to civil life at the close of the Mexican War, he again became a soldier at the outbreak of the Rebellion. His gallant record needs no repetition. The celebrated Irish leader Thomas Francis Meagher had no military experience until he was nearly forty years of age, when he entered the volunteer service of our country as captain in the glorious Sixty-ninth New York. His services as a soldier were of such distinction as to earn the promotion to the grade of brigadier-general. Colonel James Mulligan, the hero of the defense of Lexington in the State of Missouri, was educated to be a lawyer. When thirty-one years of age, he volunteered for the defense of his country. His distinguished record as a soldier will remain an imperishable part of American history. The gallant John A. Dix was educated to the law, and went into the War of 1812 as a volunteer. His career as a public man up to the breaking-out of the Rebellion is well known. Though over sixty years of age, he demonstrated evident

military talent during the struggle of the nation for life. Generals Benjamin Butler, Thomas Ewing, James A. Garfield, John W. Geary, John F. Hartranft, Robert B. Mitchell, M. F. Force, Richard Oglesby, General John F. Miller, General Lucius Fairchild, General John E. Smith, and many other distinguished volunteers of the late war were educated to law and were engaged in practice or in public life when entering the service in 1861. General James H. Lane, Robert H. Milroy, and many other distinguished officers of the Rebellion were lawyers by profession who had seen service in the Mexican War. General James G. Blunt, the gallant defender of Kansas and Missouri, was a practicing physician of Southern Kansas at the outbreak of the war, with no knowledge of military affairs. His career upon the border in defense of the Union was remarkable in its exhibition of rare military genius.

In the foregoing enumeration the author has selected the names presented at random as strong illustrations of the subject under consideration. Other instances equally to the point could easily be presented. The history of the civil conflict abounds with names of brilliant military men who up to the time of entering the service had received no military education, and who had enjoyed no military experience whatever.

It will be observed that such illustrations as have thus been cited are confined to citizens of the United States more or less distinguished in the capacity of the soldier. It would be easy to summon to the view of the reader

examples of great military men of all ages and countries of the world whose careers tell the same story as is revealed to us in modern times. In closing the commentary the reader's permission is asked for the mention of one example taken from the Old World—that of Baron Henri Jomini. This distinguished individual, as all know, was the author of over thirty volumes upon the art of war in its different branches and phases. His treatises are the standards of all nations. Jomini was a Swiss by birth, and he seems to have had the pure military inspiration. As a very young man he made every attempt to obtain a military education, but, being disappointed in this, he was forced into commercial pursuits for a livelihood. While serving in the capacity of broker's clerk for a firm in Paris, he made the acquaintance of General Ney, by whose aid he was brought to the notice of Napoleon. At the age of twenty-five he produced the first part of his celebrated work entitled "A Treatise upon Great Military Operations." He is the only rival Napoleon ever had in the development of those intricate plans—tactical and strategical—in the practical application of which the great Frenchman filled the military world with awe and astonishment. After reading Jomini's first book Napoleon is said to have been angry because its publication was permitted, as all of his (Napoleon's) military secrets would thus be exposed to his enemies. As a practical military man Jomini obtained great distinction in the French campaigns under the Emperor, and subsequently in the Russian service. His example is that of a man who has

given military laws to the world and who, with no preliminary advantages whatever, but by the inspiration of inherent genius, made himself the great teacher of teachers, and the acknowledged exponent of the art of war.

In the preceding citation of the names of our American heroes no mention is made of the great central figures of our naval achievements during the war of the Rebellion — of our Dupont, our Farragut, our Goldsborough, our Rowan, our Rodgers, our Foote, our John L. Worden, and our David D. Porter. These distinguished men were, without exception, reared under the old system of making sailors, and by their glorious record during that eventful struggle they proved themselves worthy representatives of those great characters who during the War of 1812 raised the standard of the American navy, small in size as it then was, to a rank inferior to none.

Even with this omission there may be some of his readers disposed to the opinion that the author has illustrated this branch of his subject with too great profuseness. It should not be forgotten, however, that the matter under investigation and argument belongs to that class of subjects which, in the establishment of fixed and safe rules of deduction, require the support of many facts all bearing upon the main proposition. The old proverb declares that "one swallow makes no spring," and it is no less true that one instance establishes no general law. It has been the author's purpose to fix beyond the reach of successful contradiction the two propositions heretofore

maintained in these pages, viz.: that the past and present life of the American Republic is the gift of its citizen-soldiery, while its future lies in the same hands; and that where the true military afflatus exists as a native endowment, it will find expansion, regardless of preliminary teaching and in defiance of every restraint. The impulse belongs to the inherent, or, more broadly stated, to the physical constitution of the individual. This fact has been stated by innumerable writers in many forms of assertion, but, perhaps, in none more simply or more poetically than in that of our own novelist, Fenimore Cooper, who makes the "Deerslayer" say, in the novel of that name, after an honest homily upon the Indian character: "All men, whoever they be, have their gifts: the white man has white gifts, and the Injun man has Injun gifts." A greater truth lay beneath the surface of the hardy frontiersman's simple homily than was dreamed of in his crude philosophy.

There is one other point that the author feels impelled to mention in closing this branch of his subject. One aspect of the question has been dwelt upon and abundantly illustrated by living reference and example. The author has admitted everywhere the great advantage of an expert education, so to express it, to the individual possessing the intimate aptitude for the military profession. Further than this, he has emphatically declared that no degree of preparatory education, nor of scholastic training, can make a competent and reliable officer of a man who is destitute of the aptitude mentioned. Beyond this

he has not gone, but he has now arrived at a point, relating to the same subject, at which he is prepared to make still another proposition. Briefly stated, this may be covered by the following assertion: that, in certain mental compositions, the extreme scholastic training for the military life is positively detrimental to the quick conception and rapid execution of those military plans and movements through which one military man accomplishes victory in opposition to another.

Upon this point the example of the British General Braddock, already cited in the previous pages, may again be brought to view. Irving, in his *Life of Washington*, says that "Braddock was a veteran in service, having been upwards of forty years in the Guards—that school of exact discipline and technical punctillos." Of Braddock's celebrated expedition Washington himself wrote: "I found that instead of pushing on with vigor, without regarding a little rough road, they were halting to level every mole-hill and to erect bridges over every brook, by which means we were four days in getting twelve miles." Irving still further remarks of Braddock's failure to adopt the wholesome advice of Washington, a soldier by nature, as the after record proves, that "the military education of the former stood in the way. He was so bigoted to the regular and elaborate tactics of Europe that he could not stoop to the make-shift expedients of a new country, where every difficulty is encountered and mastered in a rough-and-ready style, and that in consequence of adhering to technical rules and military forms General Brad-

dock consumed more than a month in marching something above one hundred miles."

But it seems unnecessary to go as far back as the time of Braddock to find much more pronounced demonstration of the assertion above made. With no personal feeling against our worthy soldiers, and dealing exclusively with matters belonging to the general people, the citation of examples from our late war certainly cannot be objected to, provided, of course, that the underlying facts be fairly stated. What significance, then, has the affair at Fort Fisher, already touched upon in the present chapter? By reference to the table of West Point graduates it will be found that General Weitzel, who commanded the land force during the first expedition, stood second in the list of *alumni* for the year 1855. As far as book knowledge of his profession was concerned, General Weitzel was a highly accomplished officer; indeed, his knowledge of engineering was exceptional, and it may be added that his personal bravery was never called in question. Then, why did he not take Fort Fisher? General Terry, a simple volunteer soldier of the war, with no elaborately cultivated knowledge of mathematics and engineering in all of their branches and ramifications, with the same fleet, commanded by the same officer, and with the identical men who composed the first force, swelled by an insignificant reinforcement of a few hundred troops to meet a like reinforcement of the enemy, took the work within a month of General Weitzel's failure. This contrast was so strongly against the present system of mili-

tary education that it was sought to cast the onus of blame upon that gallant and undoubtedly capable military man, General Benjamin Butler, who, as commander of the department, had general command of the first expedition. That this charge had no foundation in justice appears self-evident from the fact that General Butler did not go ashore at all, but that he wholly relied upon the report of his subordinate officer. There can be no dispute of the record upon this point.

The truth of the matter is that General Weitzel's judgment of the impregnability of the work was founded upon the precepts of his academic education, and not upon the comprehensive expedients and brilliant dash of the soldier, in whose lexicon the word *fail* has no place. It is a circumstance as amusing as it is well attested that during many of the battles in Mexico the Mexicans believed that, according to every law of the books and every precept of the professors of their military academy, the Americans had been whipped, and they were profoundly astonished, not to say chagrined, that the "Yengee" volunteers persisted in saying that they were not whipped, and that they had no intention of being whipped. The illustration may not be considered very apt by some, but within the narrow circle of the principle underlying the timid move upon Fort Fisher and the obstinate resistance of the volunteers in Mexico is to be found an explanation of the real difference between the over-educated academic military strategist and the soldier who has been endowed by nature with those ele-

ments of success which neither precept can give nor example impart.

Were the author disposed to follow this subject to the point of exhaustion, he could make an array of well known cases, gathered from many of the greatest battle-fields of the recent war, and he could further set forth, in strong light, the instance of a picked army—large, well equipped, well officered, and all eagerness for the conflict—compelled to lie for months in disease-breeding swamps while elaborate siege operations were being carried out by the General in command—a man distinguished for his professional accomplishments—the termination of which operations revealed the circumstance that the enemy had fled an indefinite time previously, leaving to our troops the capture of a stock of wooden artillery against whose frowning muzzles such elaborate and expensive precautions had been taken. But, having proven by the examples and facts herein cited that military education alone cannot make a military man, the author is willing to leave the subject at this point to the reflective minds of his fellow-citizens.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE INJUSTICE OF THE PRESENT MILITARY SYSTEM TO THE CITIZEN-SOLDIERY—THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF WEST POINT—THE VOLUNTEER CONSIDERED A CHARLATAN BY THE ACADEMIC SOLDIERS—THE COUNTRY IMPERILED BY FEUDS BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS OF THE ACADEMY—USURPATION OF MILITARY LEGISLATION BY WEST POINT INFLUENCE—OFFICIAL LIST OF THE RETIRED OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, SHOWING THEIR NAMES, RANK, AND ANNUAL PAY AND ALLOWANCES—A STARTLING EXHIBIT OF INJUSTICE TO THE VOLUNTEER.

THE military power of the Republic, then, has always resided, does now reside, and must continue to reside, as long as the present form of government exists, in the volunteers—the citizen-soldiers of America. Every obligation which is imposed by national and personal protection belongs in the main to them—the strong right arm of our free institutions. It is no part of the author's purpose to complain that the people at large have not been duly grateful to their benefactors for the sacrifices made by the latter. The national cemeteries, the beautiful monuments, the pension lists of the Government, the touching services of appreciation annually performed at the graves of the nation's defenders, all attest

the pervading gratitude of our people. But, unconsciously to the latter, our military system, which has been so fully discussed herein, has been so formed and so conducted as to impose upon our volunteer soldiery the most flagrant injustice. To the showing of this point the present chapter will be devoted.

Though the American soldier, volunteer and regular, receives a higher rate of money compensation while in service than does the soldier of any European nation, this compensation is by no means adequate to the nature of the case; nor does the sum paid by our people upon account of military defense and protection even nearly approximate the yearly average of the sum paid by any first-class nation upon the same account. The explanation of this fact is sufficiently obvious, being found in the circumstance that while the pay of the European soldier is small, his service and the resulting expense to his government are continuous, while the pay of the American volunteer is periodical, the Government only being called to disburse it when a state of actual war exists. In this respect the Government enjoys the favorable position of a private employer who is able to call to his service at any moment an employé for a limited period, and who is free to dismiss him when the service is performed. This privilege is one resulting from our republican Government. The people constitute the Government: to them belongs the purse, and upon them devolves the duty of maintaining their privileges.

The foregoing statements concerning the pay of our

volunteer soldiers are made in this connection not because of any complaint against the rate of emolument, but to emphasize the demand that their present emoluments, being none too great, should not be endangered by the attempts of individuals or parties to manufacture political capital upon the basis of an economy as false as it is pernicious and as unjust as it is dangerous to the best interests of the country.

Beyond all this, however, which the author has thrown in as an incidental suggestion, the volunteer soldiery has ever been placed in a false position, involving, as before said, the most flagrant injustice to a body of men without whose patriotic services the Republic could not survive an armed attack of any strength by its enemies.

Strangely enough the military interest of the governing classes of our country has always centered in the small body of men—a mere national police force—called the “regular” army of the United States. Since the effective establishment of the Academy at West Point this institution has been constituted the special repository of the entire military establishment. Instead of its functions being limited to imparting an education in the science and art of war to such pupils as may be sent there for the purpose of receiving it, the institution, arrogating to itself the sole military knowledge of a people military by natural impulse and by the general habits and surroundings of their life, has for years past taken possession of the military interests of the Government and has conducted those interests as the sole property of the

select circle which by the decrees of West Point has been constituted the only true exponent of the art of war upon the American continent.

Now, this may seem a harsh statement, and by some it may be deemed an ill-natured one. The author sincerely wishes that the facts were not such as to compel it, but there is no volunteer soldier in our country who does not know that they are. The matter now under consideration is one of great importance to our country; and it is the duty of every citizen to become familiar with the question embraced in it, as this question, soon or late, must be met and solved by our people.

The assertion just made that the West Point influence had become the dominating power of our military interests does not need much argument for its support, as a superficial investigation of the facts will be amply sufficient to demonstrate its truth. This influence, in virtue of our military system, by which expert military knowledge of the country is confined by the Government to the small number of individuals whose names constitute the official roster of the United States army, has usurped the military organization of the country to an extent not realized by a superficial observer. Giving the institution personality, it may be said that West Point has pushed itself to the head of the various executive bureaus of the War Department. It has installed itself in the Quartermaster-General's office, in that of the Paymaster-General, of the Commissary-General, of the Adjutant-General, of the Inspector-General, etc., etc. Its officers, with some recent

exceptions, fill the whole army, and while it has not as yet taken the Cabinet portfolio of the War Department, it practically directs that department, as, because of the circumstance that the War Secretary is generally a civilian, the actual administration of the office falls upon the military advisers of the Government. But West Point goes farther than this, and by means of its potent and extended influence it manages to control to a very large extent the military legislation of Congress.

The effect of this preëminence has been, and still is, to prevent any development of the volunteer service. Regarding no man as a competent soldier who does not pass the sacred portals of West Point, an *ex-cathedra* ban is pronounced by the institution against the volunteer officer, who is then registered as an empyric in the profession of arms.

At the outbreak of the late Civil War, the whole organization of the army was thus in the hands of West Point. Such being the case, the entire roster of the institution was exhausted in officering the various divisions of the army before an important command was given to a volunteer. This is a well-known fact. But the evil went farther than that, and the hostility of West Point to the volunteer officers openly manifested itself in attempts by — perhaps we may say — the majority of the “regular” officers to prevent any volunteer from being a successful officer. It is a shame upon us that in that dreadful crisis of our country’s fate there were many flagrant instances of failure to our arms, and consequent peril to the nation,

arising from a determination to prevent the success of the volunteer officers.

This utter sacrifice of the country's fate upon the altar of professional jealousy by those who had been reared by the nation expressly to defend it, was cruel and most wicked. But the jealousy spoken of was not confined to hostility against the volunteer officers. This green-eyed monster, so perversive of the noblest impulses of man, was extended, in not a few instances only, to the ranks of the elect themselves; and it is a notorious fact that the nation's life was seriously imperiled upon at least one momentous occasion by the feuds between the partisans of different West Point commanders. This latter circumstance is in itself a strong argument against the impolicy of confining the military interests of a great nation to so select a circle of individuals as constitute the military peace establishment of our country.

The effect of the West Point system, then, has been to manacle and even to crush, as far as possible, the volunteer and his aspirations for recognition. For years we have been compelled to witness a systematic elevation of the regular over the head of the volunteer, without regard to questions of fitness and ability, in every instance where the two classes have come in competition. Through the constant assertions of West Point, the people at large had arrived at the belief of the superiority of the academically educated soldier, and it required the brilliant deeds of the volunteer hosts of the civil struggle to prevent the general acceptance of that belief. It has been a part of the task

of the present work to explode this false pretension of the Military Academy.

It has been said herein that the West Point influence has controlled the military legislation of the General Government. The statute books furnish ample demonstration of the truth of this assertion. But, apart from the usurpation of the government machinery of our military system, the oppression of the volunteer officers is nowhere more flagrantly exhibited than in the discrimination between the two classes of officers in the matter of pay, etc. The facts relating to this point are so little known by the general people that the author has caused to be prepared an official list of the retired officers of the United States, showing their rank and annual pay and allowances, to December 31, 1885. This interesting table, which the author appends to this chapter, marked Table XII., tells its own story, and therefore admits of but little argument. The reader will doubtless ask why a captain, for instance, of the regular army, disabled by a wound in a certain battle, should be retired upon a pay of \$2,100 or of \$1,800, while a captain of the volunteer service, perhaps wounded in a precisely similar manner, upon the same day and in the same battle, should receive as a pension the miserable pittance of \$240 per year, and possibly be compelled to struggle pretty hard for even that sum.

The author has asked that question a great many times of those who should be able to answer it, but he has never received any satisfactory explanation. If it be

alleged, as it usually is, that the regular officer makes a life profession of the military calling, and therefore deserves subsequent support, it may be replied that the volunteer soldier, in the ranks or as an officer, is much more deserving, upon all accounts, of the generous support of his country. During the period that his services are not actually needed he contributes to the maintenance of the Government in the capacity of a private citizen, and draws nothing from its treasury. When danger threatens the nation he leaves his private business, his family, friends, home comforts—everything, to render vital service to that nation. Returning to his home after an absence sufficiently prolonged to break up his business, disabled from his wound and without a competence—with a family to support, perhaps—what must be the future of that man?

There is something here that calls upon us in tones that we should not disregard to look to the interests of the nation in this very direction. Knowing that the very life of the Government rests in the hands of its volunteer soldiery, is it wise, is it just, is it safe, to tamper with a subject of complaint wider, deeper than many dream of?

The subject thus presented is one of vast importance to the American people, and the author urges upon his fellow-citizens the supreme duty of investigating our military system and remodeling it so as to bring it fully to rest upon a firm basis of justice, as well as of wise expediency. The attached table will amply repay the reader for a careful perusal.

TABLE XII.

List of retired officers of the United States Army—Rank, pay, and allowances per annum, to December 31, 1885.

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pension to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
1. Sherman, William T.	General	\$13,500	
Sherman, William T.	General, quarters.	1,500	
Sherman, William T.	Total	\$15,000	
1. Ricketts, James B.	Major-General	\$ 5,625	\$360
2. Sickles, Daniel.	Major-General	5,625	360
3. Robinson, John C.	Major-General	5,625	360
4. Carroll, Samuel S.	Major-General	5,625	360
5. McDowell, Irvin.	Major-General	5,625	360
1. Paul, Gabriel R.	Brigadier-General	5,500	360
Paul, Gabriel R.	Brigadier-General, q'trs	720	360
Paul, Gabriel R.	Total	\$ 6,220	360
2. Harney, William S.	Brigadier-General	\$ 4,125	360
3. Fessenden, Francis.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
4. Long, Eli.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
5. Johnson, Richard W.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
6. Wood, Thomas J.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
7. Sweeney, Thomas W.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
8. McIntosh, John B.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
9. Hardin, Martin D.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
10. Brice, Benjamin W.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
11. Crawford, Samuel W.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
12. Cooke, Philip St. J.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
13. Hott, Joseph.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
14. Emory, William H.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
15. Hammond, William A.	Brigadier-General	Without pay	
16. Townsend, Edward D.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
17. Marcy, Randolph B.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
18. Dunn, William McK.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
19. Meigs, Montgomery C.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360
20. Brown, Nathan W.	Brigadier-General	4,125	360

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pension to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
21. Rucker, Daniel H.....	Brigadier-General.....	\$4,125	\$360
22. Ingalls, Rufus.....	Brigadier-General.....	4,125	360
23. Wright, Horatio G.....	Brigadier-General.....	4,125	360
24. McKenzie, Ronald S...	Brigadier-General.....	4,125	360
25. Augur, Christ. C.....	Brigadier-General.....	4,125	360
26. Davis, Nelson H.....	Brigadier-General.....	4,125	360
1. Sewell, Washington....	Colonel	3,375	360
2. Day, Hannibal.....	Colonel	3,375	360
3. Morrison, Pitcairn....	Colonel	3,375	360
4. Cady, Albemarle.....	Colonel	3,375	360
5. Walker, Moses B.....	Colonel	3,375	360
6. Hunter, David.....	Colonel	3,375	360
7. Yates, Theodore.....	Colonel	3,375	360
8. Alexander, Edward B..	Colonel	3,375	360
9. Swords, Thomas.....	Colonel	3,375	360
10. Clary, Robert E.....	Colonel	3,375	360
11. Lewis, John R.....	Colonel	3,375	360
12. Catlin, Isaac S.....	Colonel	3,375	360
13. Dawson, Samuel K....	Colonel	3,375	360
14. Swayne, Wager.....	Colonel	3,375	360
15. Carrington, Henry B..	Colonel	3,375	360
16. Shepherd, Oliver L....	Colonel	3,375	360
17. Graham, Lawrence....	Colonel	3,375	360
18. Hinks, Edward W.....	Colonel	3,375	360
19. Starr, Samuel H.....	Colonel	3,375	360
20. Rodenbaugh, Theoph. F	Colonel	3,375	360
21. Kilpatrick, Robert L...	Colonel	3,375	360
22. McNett, Andrew J.....	Colonel	3,375	360
23. Pulford, John.....	Colonel	3,375	360
24. Reeve, Isaac V. D.....	Colonel	3,375	360
25. Granger, Robert S.....	Colonel	3,375	360
26. Doubleday, Abner.....	Colonel	3,375	360
27. Cullum, George W.....	Colonel	3,375	360
28. Wallen, Henry D.....	Colonel	3,375	360
29. Bomford, James V.....	Colonel	3,375	360
30. Whiteley, Robert H. K.	Colonel	3,375	360
31. Brooks, Horace.....	Colonel	3,375	360
32. Reynolds, Joseph J....	Colonel	3,375	360
33. Roberts, Joseph.....	Colonel	3,375	360
34. Allen, Robert.....	Colonel	3,375	360

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pension to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
35. Pitcher, Thomas G....	Colonel	\$3,375	\$360
36. De Trobriand, Phil. R.	Colonel	3,375	360
37. Floyd-Jones, De Laney.	Colonel	3,375	360
38. Palmer, Innis N.....	Colonel	3,375	360
39. Woodward, George H..	Colonel	3,375	360
40. Elliott, Washington L..	Colonel	3,375	360
41. Gregg, John I.....	Colonel	8,375	360
42. Oakes, James	Colonel	3,375	360
43. Vodges, Israel	Colonel	3,375	360
44. Schriver, Edmund	Colonel	3,375	360
45. Van Vliet, Stewart....	Colonel	3,375	360
46. Woods, Samuel	Colonel	3,375	360
47. Smith, John E.....	Colonel	3,375	360
48. Crittenden, Thomas L.	Colonel	3,375	360
49. Hagner, Peter V.....	Colonel	3,375	360
50. Fry, James B.....	Colonel	3,375	360
51. Haller, Granville O....	Colonel	3,375	360
52. Lugenbeel, Pinkney...	Colonel	3,375	360
53. King, John H.....	Colonel	3,375	360
54. Flint, Franklin F.....	Colonel	3,375	360
55. Brannaer, John M.....	Colonel	3,375	360
56. Kilburn, Charles L....	Colonel	3,375	360
57. Wood, William H.....	Colonel	3,375	360
58. Macomb, John N.....	Colonel	3,375	360
59. King, William S..	Colonel	3,375	360
60. Howe, Albion P.....	Colonel	3,375	360
61. Conrad, Joseph	Colonel	3,375	360
62. De Russey, Gustavus ..	Colonel	3,375	360
63. Laidley, Theodore T. S.	Colonel	3,375	360
64. Tower, Z. B.....	Colonel	3,375	360
65. Thom, George	Colonel	3,375	360
66. Van Voast, James	Colonel	3,375	360
67. Pennypaker, Galusha..	Colonel	3,375	360
68. Ekin, James A	Colonel	3,375	360
69. Hunt, Henry J.....	Colonel	3,375	360
70. Getty, George W.....	Colonel	3,375	360
71. Dent, Frederick F. ...	Colonel	3,375	360
72. Reynolds, William F..	Colonel	3,375	360
73. Clarke, Henry F.....	Colonel	3,375	360
74. Hammond, John F.....	Colonel	3,375	360
75. Bartlett, William H. C.	Colonel	3,375	360

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pension to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
76. Weir, Robert W.	Colonel	\$3,375	\$360
77. Kendrick, Henry L.	Colonel	3,375	360
78. Forsyth, John	Colonel	3,150	360
79. De Janon, Patrice	Colonel	3,375	360
80. Wheeler, James B.	Colonel	3,375	360
81. Head, John F.	Colonel	3,375	360
82. Andrews, George P.	Colonel	3,375	360
83. Clitz, Henry B.	Colonel	3,375	360
84. Campbell, John	Colonel	3,375	360
1. Chapman, William	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
2. Whiting, Daniel P.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
3. Sitgreaves, Lorenzo ...	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
4. Hill, Bennett H.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
5. Wallace, George W.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
6. Woodruff, Dickinson ..	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
7. Gibson, Augustus A. ...	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
8. Maley, Thomas E.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
9. Shea, Thomas	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
10. Gile, George W.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
11. Avery, Robert	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
12. Wessells, Henry W.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
13. Hayman, Samuel B. ...	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
14. Duncan, Thomas	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
15. Montgomery, Alexander	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
16. Bootes, Levi C.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
17. Wyse, Francis	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
18. Stewart, Joseph	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
19. Prince, Henry	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
20. Potter, James B. M. ...	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
21. Myers, William	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
22. Evans, Andrew W.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
23. Brotherton, David H. .	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
24. Dallas, Alexander J. ...	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
25. Moore, Orlando H. ...	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
26. Alexander, Andrew J. .	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
27. Layton, Caleb R.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
28. Dana, James I.	Lieutenant-Colonel.	3,000	360
1. Judd, Henry B.	Major	2,625	300
2. Austine, William	Major	2,625	300

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pension to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
3. Edgar, William F.	Major.	\$2,625	\$300
4. McArthur, Joseph H.	Major.	2,625	300
5. Whittlesey, Joseph H.	Major.	2,625	300
6. Caldwell, James N.	Major.	2,625	300
7. Prince, William E.	Major.	2,625	300
8. Tracy, Albert	Major.	2,625	300
9. Clark, Joseph C., Jr.	Major.	2,625	300
10. Lynde, Isaac.	Major.	2,625	300
11. Larned, Frank H.	Major.	2,625	300
12. Freedley, Henry W.	Major.	2,625	300
13. Randall, Burton.	Major.	2,625	300
14. Hudson, Edward McK.	Major.	2,625	300
15. Williams, George A.	Major.	2,625	300
16. Fleming, Hugh B.	Major.	2,625	300
17. Lane, William B.	Major.	2,625	300
18. Lee, Samuel P.	Major.	2,625	300
19. Bissell, Lyman.	Major.	2,625	300
20. Collins, Joseph B.	Major.	2,625	300
21. Prime, Frederick E.	Major.	2,625	300
22. Morris, Robert M.	Major.	2,625	300
23. Brua, John P.	Major.	2,625	300
24. Burbank, Jacob E.	Major.	2,625	300
25. McKibbin, David B.	Major.	2,625	300
26. Enos, Herbert M.	Major.	2,625	300
27. Seymour, Freeman	Major.	2,625	300
28. Walker, Robert C.	Major.	2,437.50	300
29. Dunn, Thomas S.	Major.	2,625	300
30. Latimer, Alfred E.	Major.	2,625	300
31. Robertson, James M.	Major.	2,625	300
32. Nugent, Robert	Major.	2,625	300
33. Ludington, Elisha H.	Major.	2,625	300
34. Potter, Joseph A.	Major.	2,625	300
35. Hambright, Henry A.	Major.	2,625	300
36. Stanhope, Philip W.	Major.	2,437.50	300
37. Judd, Edwin D.	Major.	2,625	300
38. Hawley, William.	Major.	2,625	300
39. Belger, James.	Major.	2,625	300
40. Bankhead, Henry C.	Major.	2,625	300
41. Eaton, Joseph H.	Major.	2,625	300
42. McLaughlin, Nap. B.	Major.	2,625	300
43. McMillan, James.	Major.	2,625	300

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pension to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
44. Clarke, Robert D.....	Major.....	\$2,625	\$300
45. Brooke, Edmund H....	Major.....	2,625	300
46. Ingersoll, Edward.....	Major.....	2,625	300
47. Vedder, Nicholas.....	Major.....	2,625	300
48. Smith, Thomas C. H..	Major.....	2,205	300
49. Bridgman, Frank.....	Major.....	2,625	300
50. Tourtellote, John E...	Major.....	2,625	300
51. Gould, William P.....	Major.....	2,625	300
52. Eckerson, Theodore...	Major.....	2,625	300
1. Tidball, Joseph L.....	Captain	1,890	240
2. Symmes, John C.....	Captain	2,100	240
3. Garland, John S.....	Captain	1,890	240
4. Churchill, Charles C...	Captain	1,890	240
5. Drake, Alexander E...	Captain	1,890	240
6. Pease, William R.....	Captain	1,890	240
7. Walker, Thomas W....	Captain	1,890	240
8. Dickinson, William...	Captain	1,890	240
9. Bates, Francis H.....	Captain	1,890	240
10. King, Benjamin.....	Captain	2,100	240
11. Holmes, Charles	Captain	1,890	240
12. Hendershott, Henry B.	Captain	1,890	240
13. Murry, Alexander...	Captain	1,890	240
14. Thompson, A. B.....	Captain	1,890	240
15. Stivers, Charles B....	Captain	1,890	240
16. Brand, Thomas T.....	Captain	1,890	240
17. Quirk, Paul.....	Captain	2,100	240
18. Walcott, William H...	Captain	1,890	240
19. Townsend, Alfred.....	Captain	1,890	240
20. Kellogg, Josiah H....	Captain	2,100	240
21. McGown, George.....	Captain	1,890	240
22. Bailey, Thomas C. J...	Captain	1,890	240
23. Lowe, William B.....	Captain	1,890	240
24. McNally, Christ. H....	Captain	2,100	240
25. Powell, James.....	Captain	1,890	240
26. Morgan, Henry C.....	Captain	1,890	240
27. Reeves, Thomas H....	Captain	1,890	240
28. McDonald, John.....	Captain	2,100	240
29. Huxford, William P...	Captain	1,890	240
30. Watson, Malbone F...	Captain	2,100	240
31. Culbertson, Howard...	Captain	2,100	240

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pensions to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
32. Noble, Henry B.....	Captain	\$1,890	\$240
33. Walker, John H.....	Captain	1,890	240
34. Badeau, Adam	Captain	2,100	240
35. Dodge, Theodore.....	Captain	1,890	240
36. Butler, John H.....	Captain	2,100	240
37. Sprague, Willington G.	Captain	1,890	240
38. Judd, George E.....	Captain	1,890	240
39. Norton, Thomas H....	Captain	1,890	240
40. Sundberg, William R..	Captain	2,100	240
41. Pyne, Charles M. . . .	Captain	1,890	240
42. Bates, James A.....	Captain	1,890	240
43. Greene, Charles T.....	Captain	2,100	240
44. Gardner, Hezekiah....	Captain	1,890	240
45. Crone, Louis E.....	Captain	1,890	240
46. Catlin, Robert.....	Captain	1,890	240
47. Barnitz, Albert.....	Captain	2,100	240
48. Gelray, Joseph W.. . .	Captain	1,890	240
49. White, George Q.....	Captain	1,890	240
50. Minor, William C.....	Captain	1,950	240
51. Cleghorn, John F.....	Captain	1,890	240
52. Von Schirach, Frederick	Captain	1,890	240
53. Hoag, John M.....	Captain	1,890	240
54. Kelliher, John.....	Captain	1,890	240
55. Tyler, Richard W.....	Captain	1,890	240
56. Niles, Alanson E.....	Captain	1,890	240
57. Keller, Jacob W.....	Captain	1,890	240
58. Gaskill, Edwin C.....	Captain	1,890	240
59. Dawes, William J.....	Captain	1,890	240
60. Bourne, William R....	Captain	1,890	240
61. McLaughlin, George H.	Captain	1,890	240
62. Rives, Wright.....	Captain	1,890	240
63. Hearn, James A.....	Captain	1,890	240
64. De Gross, Jacob C....	Captain	2,100	240
65. Conway, Edwin J.....	Captain	2,100	240
66. Merrell, William H....	Captain	1,890	240
67. Hill, George D.....	Captain	2,100	240
68. Atwell, William P....	Captain	1,755	240
69. Johnson, William S....	Captain	2,100	240
70. Brown, Andrew M.....	Captain	1,890	240
71. Meyer, Edward S.....	Captain	2,100	240
72. Nelson, William.....	Captain	1,890	240

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pensions to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
73. Rittenhouse, Benj. F.	Captain	\$1,890	\$240
74. Hascall, Herbert A.	Captain	1,890	240
75. Thompson, William	Captain	2,100	240
76. Sturgeon, Shelden	Captain	2,100	240
77. Schwenck, Samuel K.	Captain	2,100	240
78. Gallupe, George S.	Captain	1,890	240
79. Boehm, Peter M.	Captain	2,100	240
80. Catlin, Lynde	Captain	1,890	240
81. Kerin, Joseph	Captain	2,100	240
82. Clarke, Charles E.	Captain	1,890	240
83. Reynolds, Frank	Captain	1,950	240
84. Armstrong, Samuel F.	Captain	1,890	240
85. Johnston, John L.	Captain	1,890	240
86. Lafferty, John	Captain	2,100	240
87. Bristol, Henry B.	Captain	1,890	240
88. Parker, Richard C.	Captain	1,890	240
89. Miller, John	Captain	1,890	240
90. Stewart, James	Captain	1,890	240
91. Van Wiele, John B.	Captain	2,100	240
92. Thompkins, James S.	Captain	1,890	240
93. McCleave, William	Captain	2,100	240
94. Schreiner, Herman	Captain	2,100	240
95. Ford, George E.	Captain	2,100	240
96. Merritt, Thomas E.	Captain	1,890	240
97. McGinnis, James T.	Captain	1,890	240
98. McConnell, William	Captain	2,100	240
99. Irwin, David A.	Captain	2,100	240
100. Vanderslice, Joseph H.	Captain	1,890	240
101. Wells, Elijah R.	Captain	2,100	240
102. Taylor, Alfred B.	Captain	2,100	240
103. Fitzgerald, Michael J.	Captain	1,890	240
104. Ward, Edward W.	Captain	2,100	240
105. Krautinger, Adolph W.	Captain	1,890	240
106. Bowen, Edgar C.	Captain	1,890	240
107. King, Charles	Captain	2,100	240
108. Hottsinpiller, Chas. W.	Captain	1,890	240
109. Mallery, Garrick	Captain	1,890	240
110. Rendlebrock, Joseph	Captain	2,100	240
111. Trimble, Joel G.	Captain	2,100	240
112. Coster, John H.	Captain	2,100	240
113. Shoemaker, William R.	Captain	2,100	240

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pensions to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
114. Potter, Reuben M...	Captain	\$2,100	\$240
115. Gilbreth, Benj. H....	Captain	2,100	240
116. Ellsworth, Ephraim...	Captain	2,100	240
117. Whyte, Frederick....	Captain	2,100	240
118. Biggs, Herman.....	Captain	1,650	240
119. Falck, William	Captain	1,890	140
120. Rollins, James H....	Captain	2,100	240
121. McConnell, Charles C.	Captain	1,890	240
122. Goodloe, Archibald H.	Captain	1,890	240
123. Lee, D. Mortimer ...	Captain	1,890	240
124. Adams, Williams....	Captain	2,100	240
125. Armes, George A....	Captain	1,890	240
126. Pollock, Robert	Captain	1,890	240
127. White, John C.....	Captain	1,890	140
128. Walker, John P.....	Captain	2,100	240
129. Faulk, Wm. L.....	Captain	1,950	240
130. Strang, Edward J....	Captain	2,100	240
131. Taylor, Rodney M....	Captain	1,890	240
132. Clift, Emory W.....	Captain	1,890	240
133. McGilway, John	Captain	1,890	240
134. Steelhammer, Chas...	Captain	1,890	240
135. Whipple, Stephen G..	Captain	2,100	240
136. Lee, John	Captain	2,100	240
137. McArthur, Malcolm ..	Captain	1,890	240
138. Monahan, Dean	Captain	2,100	240
139. Morse, Chas. E.....	Captain	1,890	240
140. Gunther, Sebastian ...	Captain	2,100	240
141. Nixon, John B.....	Captain	1,890	240
142. Kendall, Frederick A.	Captain	1,890	240
143. Spencer, James H....	Captain	1,890	240
144. Abbott, Lemuel A....	Captain	2,100	240
145. Gibson, Edwin O. ...	Captain	1,890	240
146. Hunt, Thos. B.....	Captain	1,950	240
147. Ewing, Evarts S.....	Captain	1,890	240
148. Hawkins, Chas.....	Captain	1,890	240
149. Azpell, Thos. F.....	Captain	2,100	240
150. Shorkly, George.....	Captain	1,890	240
151. Lynde, Fred'k M.....	Captain	1,890	240
152. Nave, Andrew H.....	Captain	2,100	240
153. Kingsbury, Wm. E....	Captain	1,890	240
154. Benson, Henry M....	Captain	1,890	240

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pensions to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
155. Martin, Wm. P.....	Captain	\$2,100	\$240
1. Brownell, Francis E..	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
2. Williams, George.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
3. Fitch, Wm. G.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
4. Hutchinson, Merrill N.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
5. Douglass, Wm. O....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
6. Pennock, Wm. T.....	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
7. Davis, Robert.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
8. Perkins, Rollins.....	First Lieutenant	1,462.50	204
9. Coffman, Jos. C.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
10. Campbell, Geo. I....	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
11. Leavey, Jas. T.....	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
12. Halleck, Walter F....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
13. Converse, Oscar I....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
14. Kennicutt, Ransom...	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
15. Shurly, Edmund R. P.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
16. Williams, Ephraim...	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
17. Knox, Edward B....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
18. Curtis, Chas. A.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
19. Dubois, Richard C....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
20. Mulikin, Jas. R.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
21. Leonard, John	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
22. Hogarty, Michael J...	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
23. Bowker, Hugh D....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
24. Rice, Frank R.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
25. Cortelyou, David H..	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
26. Williams, Henry R...	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
27. Hays, Jos. H.....	First Lieutenant	1,560	204
28. Smith, Jos. M.....	First Lieutenant	1,462.50	204
29. Crawford, Alex. McL.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
30. Walter, Isaac N.....	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
31. Keyes, Chas. W.....	First Lieutenant	1,462	204
32. Kuhn, Henry H.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
33. Hoppy, Edward	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
34. Mellen, Henry B....	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
35. Rice, Jas. H.....	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
36. Tyler, John	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
37. Cattel, Hampden S...	First Lieutenant	1,350	204
38. Carter, Robert G....	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
39. Olmstead, Freeman E.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pensions to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
40. Jones, Henry R.	First Lieutenant	\$1,575	\$204
41. Ezekiel, David I.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
42. Marcotte, Henry.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
43. Abbie, George E.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
44. Gross, Frank P.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
45. Walton, John M.	First Lieutenant	1,560	204
46. Allsworth, Edward.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
47. Budd, George W.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
48. Dunton, Warren R.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
49. Yeckley, Jonathan A.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
50. Duff, George.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
51. Jennings, Gilbert S.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
52. Rutherford, Robert G.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
53. Craycroft, William T.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
54. Braden, Charles.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
55. Boswell, Benjamin D.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
56. Miller, William H.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
57. Whitman, Royal E.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
58. Nelson, William H.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
59. Cresson, Charles C.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
60. Stephenson, William.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
61. Abbott, Asa T.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
62. Von Luctwitz, A. H.	First Lieutenant	1,560	204
63. Orelman, Louis H.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
64. Lewis, Granville.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
65. Bamister, John.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
66. Bronson, Nelson.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
67. Trout, John F.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
68. Griffith, David A.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
69. Briggs, Thomas B.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
70. Love, George M.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
71. Clark, Edwin R.	First Lieutenant	1,462	204
72. Barnard, Phineas P.	First Lieutenant	1,680	204
73. O'Brien, Michael.	First Lieutenant	1,462	204
74. Curry, James.	First Lieutenant	1,575	204
1. McQuiston, Henry.	Second Lieutenant	1,575	180
2. Davison, James.	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180
3. Moore, Michael.	Second Lieutenant	1,479	180
4. Hogarty, William P.	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180
5. Madden, Frank.	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180

<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Annual pay and allowances.</i>	<i>Pensions to Volunteers of equal rank.</i>
6. Mangan, Michael.....	Second Lieutenant	\$1,470	\$180
7. Walker, Samuel	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180
8. Bayne, Andrew C	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180
9. Magnitzky, Gustave ...	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180
10. Reed, Thomas B	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180
11. Williams, William N...	Second Lieutenant	1,470	180
12. Benjamin, Edward A..	Second Lieutenant	1,260	180
1. Gilmore, Alexander....	Chaplain	1,755	240
2. Van Wyck, George P..	Chaplain	1,890	240
3. Wright, Alpha.....	Chaplain	1,755	240
4. Collins, Gamaliel.....	Chaplain	1,575	240
5. Kelley, Moses J.....	Chaplain	1,755	240
6. Chase, Dudley	Chaplain	1,890	240
7. White, David.....	Chaplain	1,890	240
8. Reynolds, Charles.....	Chaplain	1,890	240
9. Woart, John	Chaplain	1,890	240
10. Porter, Jeremiah	Chaplain	1,755	240
11. Blake, Charles M.....	Chaplain	1,620	240
12. Van Horn, Thomas B..	Chaplain	1,890	240
13. Baldrige, Benjamin L.	Chaplain	1,485	240

CHAPTER XXII.

AN APPEAL MADE TO THE PEOPLE — THE REMODELING OF OUR PRESENT MILITARY SYSTEM A NATIONAL NECESSITY — A GLANCE AT THE SCHOOLS AND SYSTEMS OF FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND PRUSSIA — THREE CARDINAL PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THE AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEM SHOULD BE BASED — A VAST ARMY OF CITIZEN-SOLDIERS — THE SPECIAL EDUCATION OF OFFICERS WITH THE INBORN MILITARY SPIRIT — CONCLUDING COMMENTS.

SHOULD the perusal of the foregoing pages result in drawing the attention of the American people, first, to the fact of the deficiency of our present military system, together with its possible dangers, and, second, to the dependence of the Republic upon its volunteer soldiery, together with the great injustice to which that all-important element of our liberties has been and still is subjected, the author will feel amply repaid for the labor which the preparation of the present volume has cost him. A volunteer soldier himself, he has waited in the vain hope that some other pen more able than his own would be applied to the work herein undertaken. Having thus broken the ground of a great subject, he entertains the hope that others may enter a field which has long invited laborers.

Having treated the subject upon the plan developed through the preceding pages, the reader may naturally ask that the author elaborate and present a plan of organization which may at one and the same time abolish the evils of the present system, and likewise do justice to the volunteer soldiery in whose behalf the volume has been prepared. But the purpose of the author has been to stop short of the point indicated, for two principal reasons which appear to him to be sufficiently cogent to justify him in following the plan determined upon. The first of these reasons is that the subject is one which must be preceded by long discussion, general conviction, and popular demand, before legislation can be framed and successfully enacted to meet it. The second of them is that the author has no desire to weaken whatever force his preceding arguments and his general showing of the subject may possess by subjecting himself to the charge that he is the victim either of a hallucination of wrong where no real wrong exists, or of a theory with which he has rushed into print for the purpose of astonishing his countrymen by a display of zeal and sagacity.

But while refraining from the task of detailing a system to meet the requirements, of our great and progressive nation, it certainly cannot be objected to should the author state some general principles which he believes must underlie any intelligent, just, and feasible effort toward the accomplishment of the desired end.

But, first of all, let there be no delay whatever upon the part of the people to demand of our legislators that

the official oppression of the volunteer soldiery shall cease at once, and that the unwise and unjust discrimination against them in the matter of pecuniary emolument as well as in all other respects be removed. The abuse is so deeply seated and is sustained by such wide-spread influence that action belongs to the people at large; and the author thus appeals to them in behalf of his fellow-soldiers, in the name of justice, and in the higher interests of the Republic itself.

In the fabrication of a military system for the United States which shall be wholly adapted to the necessities of our peculiar form of government, but little aid can be borrowed from the nations of Europe. One great mistake of many of our public men has lain in the direction of endeavoring to follow the precedents of monarchical governments in establishing the institutions of a republic. As has heretofore been stated in the present volume, the original idea of creating a military school in the United States was borrowed from the example of France, which nation, under Napoleon, at that time was exciting the military enthusiasm of all the world.

Schools for the purpose spoken of had been in operation in France from the time of Louis XV. The first of these was founded by that monarch at Vincennes about the year 1761. It soon had some five hundred pupils, all of whom were sons of noblemen. At a later period it was removed to the Champ de Mars, Paris, and it remains the principal military school of that country. The school at St. Cyr, near Versailles, was established by the great

Napoleon himself at Fontainebleau in the year 1802, but not long afterward it was removed to St. Cyr. It has some three hundred pupils whose ages range between eighteen and twenty years. After a course of two years at St. Cyr, some of these pupils go to the *École d'Etat Major*; others are sent to the cavalry school at Laumur, and still others to the army, with the grade of sub-lieutenant of infantry. In 1764 there was also a school at La Flèche founded by Louis XV. Even before the "Seven Years' War" between France and England, there was an artillery school in every town of France where a regiment of artillery was stationed.

The feature connected with the present French system, which is so far in advance of our own, is that the military education by the state is subject to universal competition, not being, as under our own law, vested in public men to be used as a constituent of political patronage. In the army two-thirds of the line commissions and one-third of those for the scientific corps are given to non-commissioned officers. The remaining commissions in the line and scientific corps, and all appointments to the staff, are conferred by competition after a thorough course of education. After an open competition, candidates for the army are sent, according to the degree of merit exhibited, either to the infantry school at St. Cyr or to the widely-celebrated Polytechnique. At both of these institutions the pupils have a right to the support of the state.

The English law is similar as to competition. All

candidates for admission to the Royal Artillery or to the Royal Engineers must go through the Military Academy at Woolwich. Entrance to this institution is obtained by competitive examination. This feature is radically different from our own. Instead of being supported by the state, as with us, the pupil must pay a large sum annually during the whole time that he remains at the institution. This payment is sufficiently large to bar out any pupil of small means. It amounts to about £120 for the son of a civilian, though the son of a military or naval officer is entered at a less rate. The curriculum of studies embraces the general branches of a liberal education, and includes the higher mathematics, fortification, gunnery, etc. When the course is completed the cadets may compete for vacancies in the engineer and artillery corps. Those who best pass the examination have the choice of the former, which is, as with us, the favorite corps. Those who obtain commissions in the engineer corps go to Chatham to complete their course, being under pay, while the artillery cadets join the artillery regiments at once with the commission of lieutenant. The cost of the school to the government is almost nothing. There is also a higher school at Sandhurst, where theoretical knowledge of the science of war is imparted. A staff college was also established in 1858.

The Prussian system is much more elaborate than either of the preceding, and in the feature of universality of military tuition more nearly represents the necessities of our own country, though the enforced service of every

citizen is too closely allied with the methods of monarchy to find any imitation in a republican government.

In devising a system for the United States three cardinal considerations must underlie the whole fabric. First, the system of military education must be entirely divorced from politics; second, the entrance to the army, and, it may be added, to the navy as well, must be free to all, and actual merit and fitness must be constituted the test of official place and rank in either branch of our national service, so that all vestige of class-favoritism and class-distinction in America may be swept away and the positions of honor and trust in the army and navy be open to the general competition, through merit, of our citizens, as are all positions of our Government, from that of President to the lowest on the list; and third, military knowledge must be diffused among the general people to the double end that they may be better prepared for military duties upon the outbreak of hostilities with any adversary, and that the dangers arising from reposing military education solely in a small class of individuals may be forever averted.

These fundamental conditions of a military system for the United States should not be difficult of accomplishment. Observing his purpose to refrain from the presentation of a plan in detail, for the reasons already stated, the author may, nevertheless, be permitted to offer a few general views upon the subject, which must be considered as mere suggestions by his fellow-citizens.

In urging the removal of cadet appointments from

the circle of politics, the writer hopes that the discussion of this branch of the subject already indulged in may be sufficient to win the acquiescence of every citizen of the Republic. The proper method, and the only one promotive of the selection of candidates for the army and navy upon the basis of a special aptitude for those callings, which qualification has been so largely dwelt upon in this volume, is that of general competitive examination by a qualified and impartial national board. This suggestion is to be supplemented by another, presently to be mentioned, which will cover the idea to give to every American youth the opportunity of acquiring, at the State and national expense, the knowledge pertaining to the rudimentary branches of military education, which knowledge, of necessity, must be at the base of such a competitive examination as is contemplated by the author.

Merely for the purpose of demonstrating the entire feasibility of erecting a military system which, while being in harmony with the principles and practices of a pure republican government, would be instrumental in developing to the fullest extent the enormous military strength of the United States, thus making of the nation what of right it is entitled to become, and what of necessity it should quickly be made—one of the first war powers of the world—let us draw, with no pretense to a perfection which only comes through time and sad experience, the rough outlines of a comprehensive military establishment.

To begin, then, with the draft of the plan, though the actual measure proposed would not stand first in order for obvious reasons, the present functions of the academies at West Point and Annapolis, as the first and only sources of military and naval education, should cease, and those institutions be reserved for the functions presently to be mentioned. Let the General Government obligate itself to establish and maintain, at its own expense, a military department in every State university, upon a scale proportionate to the population of each particular State. Let this department be accessible to every youth of the State of a certain age who desires to enter it. Let the branches there to be taught, by competent professors, embrace the rudiments of a military education, to include a thorough gymnastic training, the elementary and higher mathematics, drawing, natural and experimental philosophy, military and civil engineering, ancient and modern history, infantry tactics, the use of the sword, as much of a knowledge of ordnance and of gunnery as it is practicable to teach in such an institution, etc., etc.

After the completion of a specific course let there be held, by a national board expressly constituted for this purpose, a competitive examination for the grade of military and naval cadet upon which to enter the finishing schools at West Point and Annapolis—the number of admissions to be regulated by the necessities of the service, as, from time to time, they may require. At these two higher schools let the completing studies be pursued. At

West Point, in addition to a review of previous branches, there should be taught, as there now is, cavalry and infantry tactics, practical military engineering, ordnance and gunnery, the French and Spanish languages, to which should also be added the German language, the elements of law, of ethics, etc. At Annapolis such branches of knowledge as are technical to the naval profession should be added to the studies previously pursued, including the practical training at sea, etc., etc. Upon the completion of the whole course at either institution, and the passing of the prescribed final examination, the cadet to be admitted, as now, to the selected branch of the public service, with its established grade and pay.

In addition to this portion of the general scheme the several States should remodel their public schools so as to include, as a part of the education given by them, the daily practice of gymnastics and the regular drill of the infantry soldier, under competent teachers. By wise action in this direction, and with but little extra expense, every youth of the country could be instructed in the elementary training of the soldier. Further than this, by more attention to general hygiene and the physical development of the pupil, through athletic exercise, the body would expand in power with the mind of the boy, and, as a result, while we should rear intellectual men, we should also rear a nation of strong, healthy, powerful citizens. The world progresses undoubtedly. It does move, as Galileo said, and in more directions than one, but in the

matter now being considered we could well go back two thousand five hundred years and adopt the manual training, the physical development system of the iron men of ancient Greece, who ruled their puny contemporaries by virtue of strong arms and strong bodies, and the fire of whose intellectual power has shone resplendently through all the growing centuries. In the direction of reform as now indicated, there is an immense field for the American statesmen of today. The author knows no more certain road to fame in the annals of history than successful work in the channel now pointed out.

In addition to the action by States in the matter of physical and military training, as just dwelt upon, each State should extend and improve its militia system, and encourage young men, by favoring legislation, to become attached to the militia service.

Without indulging in more extended remarks, the author may point to the advantage of a system founded, in some degree, within the lines above marked out. The result of placing it within the power of every youth to obtain the elements of a military or naval education, with which to offer himself as a candidate for permanent service in the army or navy of his country, would infallibly be to correct the evils of our present system, first, by removing the appointments from politics, and second, by bringing to the front the youth who, in seeking of their own free will the military or naval career, would thus to a very large degree indicate the possession of that inherent fitness or aptitude in a particular direction which has

been so lengthily discussed in the present pages. Other advantages to be secured from such a system must be very obvious. One of the most important of these would be to diffuse a military knowledge throughout the masses of the people, to make of every youth an inchoate and available soldier, and thus to remove the evil of reposing the whole military knowledge, and with it the military resources of the nation, to the keeping of a comparatively small number of men, who, believing themselves to hold the destiny of the country within their charge, must be disposed to arrogate to themselves the attributes of a select society. The existence of this feature is wholly inconsistent with the ideas of republican government.

Two leading objections to a system as above marked out may be brought to bear against it. The first of these may allege the difficulty of harmonizing the attributes of the National Government with those of the State governments in order that the prerogatives of each may remain unimpaired. To this it may be answered that while the National and State governments are distinct in existence and in functions, the *people* of the United States *are the same* wherever resident, and that, when once they are convinced of the necessity of any particular national measure, they are not very slow in bringing fastidious State rulers into accord with general sentiment. But, as the author is fully aware that consideration and discussion of a national measure, with a view to final harmony of all classes, involve a lapse of time more or less considerable, he has, at the beginning of the

present chapter, presented this as one of the reasons for hesitancy to offer at the present moment a definite plan of military establishment.

The second of these objections might allege the increased expense which would be entailed upon the General Government. To this it can be replied that this is one of those measures of governmental policy in the establishment of which any small economy is apt to be attended with disastrous results to the general welfare. As the nation of fifty million inhabitants cannot be run upon the scale of the young Government embracing only three millions, neither can the defensive establishments of the former be bound within the narrow limits of the latter. But further than this, it may be successfully maintained that the highest economy exists in the greater outlay, which operates to prevent war entirely or to reduce it to the minimum of time and of expenditure which the prosecution of war certainly entails.

If, however, the question of outlay be examined a little more critically, the location of the actual economies will be found to be a subject open to considerable discussion. In addition to the objections herein alleged against our military and naval systems, a perusal of the expenses of the academies, as given in the previous pages, will amply demonstrate the great wastefulness of the systems spoken of. From the year 1802 to the year 1876—the author has no record since the latter date—there were graduated from West Point only 2,613 cadets, which number, as shown by the record, is less than one-half of

those who entered the institution during the period mentioned. In computing the cost to the Government of each graduate, from his entry into the institution to his admission to the army, it would not be fair, of course, to take the total of appropriations and pro-rate it upon each graduate, because there are embraced within the appropriations amounts expended for buildings, improvements, apparatus, books, etc., etc., which remain for the benefit of future pupils. But the reader who has any particular interest in the inquiry will find it possible to make some curious as well as instructive deductions relative to both academies from the tables of expense to be found in detail in the volumes of Revised Statutes. And it is further to be remarked that under the present system, whereby pupils are sent to be educated into soldiers and sailors with no assuring probability that they have any fitness for those professions, this proportion of rejected students, whose education costs the Government so large a sum, must continue to be at least as great in the future as in the past, so that for every soldier or sailor actually made the Government must pay the cost of educating two. Such a system is wasteful and extravagant upon its very face.

A new difficulty—one legitimate to such a system, and which might have easily been foreseen, has of late presented itself in connection with the academies. From the lack of any regulation covering the question of supply and demand, both institutions have been overcrowded with students for some time past. The naval school was

the first to feel the difficulty attending this influx of young graduates into a service already full, and, instead of meeting the question in a rational manner and upon a statistical basis, a thorough Procrustean operation was resorted to, whereby the nether extremities of the unduly elongated naval infant were cut off, to correspond with the length of the downy bed of the American navy. Pupils were admitted upon the old basis, but a law was passed providing that only the highest ten upon the final examination should receive commissions, while the remainder of the graduates should receive one thousand dollars in money, and with their educations be told to go their way. During the present year, the same difficulty presented itself with the school at West Point. There were more graduates than commissions.

Under such a state of affairs, what folly it seems to endeavor to patch a rent in the official military and naval uniforms which is so hopelessly large and so painfully visible. Under the make-shift provision just spoken of, what would the American people have suffered by the loss to the army of Ulysses S. Grant, who only stood twenty-first in his class? If the author, disagreeing with the fallacy that scholastic education alone makes the soldier, did not believe that General Grant possessed the inherent attributes of a great military genius, which would have found certain vent if he had never seen West Point, he would be disposed to tremble for the future of the country, lest some military type of the "mute, inglorious Milton" might suffer untimely extinguishment through

failure to reach a standard of class-merit largely based upon punctillos of decorum. The measure of legislation above referred to, as the author well knows, received the sanction of many legislators, because it was felt that the time had not come for the sweeping change which intelligent law-makers have for some time realized must be made in the whole system of military and naval education. But the time of open discussion, at least, seems to have arrived, and the author has ventured to begin it in the present pages.

The simple plan of a more comprehensive system which has been presented in mere skeleton form, and lacking all of the beautiful details of a completed organism, is contemplated to embrace within it the present naval school, placed upon the higher plane indicated in the preceding pages. Upon a proper basis the author believes in the efficacy of naval education, though all must admit that the system which produced the naval heroes of 1812 and of 1861 has not been excelled as yet by the national establishment at Annapolis. Not only is separate naval education a creation of modern progress, but the separation of the two branches of the military service is an outgrowth of the same progress. The following quotation from Macaulay's *History of England* illustrates this fact very fully. In speaking of the era of Charles II., Macaulay says: "Most of the ships which were afloat were commanded by men who had not been bred to the sea. This, it is true, was not an abuse introduced by the government of Charles. No state,

ancient or modern, had before that time made a complete separation between the naval and military services. In the great civilized nations of antiquity, Cymon and Lysander, Pompey and Agrippa had fought battles by sea as well as by land. Nor had the impulse which nautical science received at the close of the fifteenth century produced any new division of labor. At Flodden the right wing of the victorious army was led by the Admiral of England. At Jarnac and Moncontour, the Huguenot ranks were marshaled by the Admiral of France. Neither John of Austria, the conqueror of Lepanto, nor Lord Howard of Effingham, to whose direction the marine of England was confined when the Spanish invaders were approaching our shores, had received the education of a sailor. Raleigh, highly celebrated as a military commander, had served during many years as a soldier in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland. Blake had distinguished himself by his skillful and valiant defense of an inland town before he humbled the pride of Holland and of Castile on the ocean. Since the Restoration the same system has been followed. Great fleets had been entrusted to the direction of Rupert and Monk—Rupert, who was renowned chiefly as a hot and daring cavalry officer, and Monk, who, when he wished his ship to change her course, moved the mirth of his crew by calling out ‘wheel to the left.’”

The great future, always before us, is constantly filled with surprises. Forty years ago a distinct academy was established at Annapolis for imparting a special naval

education. Large sums of money have since been expended by the National Government to make it complete in all of its departments. Graduates have been annually turned out from this institution who, as it has been supposed, would represent the highest degree of expert naval culture, and who would be able to carry success to the American arms in all our future naval contests. Our people have entertained the belief that under the system of naval education at Annapolis they possessed a model institution fully up to the developments of the age. With the introduction of steam into naval vessels, the Government hastened to supply the facilities for an adequate engineer education. But oh, the irony of experience! After forty years of naval education at Annapolis, embracing in its course the whole age of steam in war-ships, it has been found necessary to establish a Naval College at Newport, R. I., for the purpose of teaching *naval war*. This institution was founded in September last, by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, commander of the North Atlantic squadron, and organized with a superintendent and a staff of naval professors, as also with a corps of *civilian* lecturers. In his opening address, Admiral Luce said that by the study of the land campaigns of Alexander the Great, and the stories of the maneuvers, the play and counter-play of Turenne and his great opponent Montecuculli, and of other materials, it was proposed to build up the science of naval warfare. "For, having no authoritative treatise on the art of naval warfare under steam," said the Admiral, "having no rec-

ognized tactical order of battle, being deficient even in the terminology of steam tactics, we must perforce resort to the well-known rules of the military art with a view of their application to the military movements of a fleet, and from the well-recognized methods of disposing troops for battle ascertain the principles which should govern fleet formations," etc., etc.

The author refrains from the extended comment which this phase of the subject so plainly invites, and contents himself with presenting the facts to the consideration of his fellow-citizens. That a radical reform in our whole system of military and naval education is urgently demanded, no reflecting mind will dispute after a careful perusal of the facts relating to those branches of the public service which have been massed in the present volume, and the author but manifests his confidence in the enlightened judgment of the citizens of the United States when expressing the belief that, after their attention has been called not alone to the requirements of the public situation, but also to the plain demands of justice, the American volunteer—as the pivotal point upon which the security of our people and the perpetuation of their liberties so safely rest—will receive the full meed of appreciation and the exact measure of justice to which his patriotism and his self-sacrifice so richly entitle him.

THE END.



GENERAL LOGAN AT ATLANTA.

APPENDIX.

MILITARY REMINISCENCES

OF

THE WAR IN THE WEST

FROM THE JOURNAL OF

JOHN A. LOGAN,

LATE MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS, U. S. A.

MILITARY REMINISCENCES.

These Reminiscences have been compiled by the editor from the journal of General Logan. The manuscript covers a complete history of the military operations of the Union armies of the West, from the battle of Belmont to the surrender of General Johnston. The very limited space at the present command of the editor has necessitated a condensation of material which presents the merest outline of General Logan's valuable contribution to the history of the War in the West. But the extracts here given, in the form of Reminiscences, brief as they are, cannot fail to be of great interest to the readers of "The Volunteer Soldier."

C. A. L.

THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.

CAIRO was the most important military point in the West at the outbreak of the War of the Rebellion. Its topographical situation is remarkable. It is the point where the Mississippi and the Ohio rivers meet, after having received into their floods the tributary streams which drain more than one-half of the great interior valley of our country. It is also the center from which a circle may be drawn, with a diameter of less than 350 miles, within which will be included parts of the States of Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Arkansas.

General Grant was appointed Brigadier-General of Volunteers on the 7th of August, 1861, but his commission was dated back to May 17th. The military district of Southeastern Missouri was constituted of Southeastern Missouri, Southern Illinois, and all of Western Kentucky and Tennessee that the Union army might be

able to hold. Cairo was the headquarters of the district. By order of General Frémont, General Grant was assigned to the command of the district named, which command he formally assumed on the 1st of September, 1861, although he did not reach Cairo until the 2nd, when he at once established his headquarters at that point. Several regiments of Union troops, including my own, the Thirty-first Illinois, were already there, and had been under course of drill, and of formation into brigades by McClelland.

On the day that General Grant reached Cairo, the rebel General, Leonidas Polk, with a considerable force from Western Tennessee, entered Kentucky and seized the towns of Hickman and Columbus, upon the left bank of the Mississippi, the former being about twenty-seven miles and the latter about twelve miles south of Cairo.

General Grant at once notified the Kentucky Legislature, through the proper channel, of this violation of the neutral soil of the State, when a resolution was adopted declaring that "Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally." To this fulmination Polk paid no attention, a course which, doubtless, the legislative body expected that he would pursue.

General Grant then seized Paducah, in the State of Kentucky, situated at the confluence of the Tennessee with the Ohio River, and General C. F. Smith was placed in command at that point. Soon afterward General Smith occupied Smithland, situated at the north of the Cumberland River. General Grant then asked permission of General Frémont to make an attempt to capture Columbus, which permission, however, was not granted. Polk had begun to fortify Columbus with all the means at his command, while General Grant spent most of his time in organizing and disciplining the raw troops which were continually arriving.

Nearly opposite to Columbus, on the right bank of the Mississippi, and situated in the State of Missouri, was a place

called Belmont, which had been a mere steamboat landing, and around which had clustered a group of houses. Belmont was situated upon a river flat, with marshes almost entirely cutting it off from the mainland. The place was commanded by the works erected on the bluffs at Columbus by Polk, who had succeeded in putting into position to command the river at that point nearly one hundred and fifty guns, nearly all of which were thirty-two and sixty-four-pounders. After the completion of these formidable works, Polk began the fortification of other points upon the river, between Columbus and Memphis, among which were included Fort Pillow, just above Memphis, Hickman, Island Number Ten, and New Madrid. These points were located in bends of the river, and at distances varying from fifteen to twenty-three miles below Columbus.

General Grant had been no less active than his rebel opponent. He had fortified Paducah and erected Fort Holt, on the Kentucky side, and had also built some works at Bird's Point, on the Missouri side, opposite Cairo. He had also constructed a fleet of vessels, composed of river steamboats, with a heavy plating of iron, to render them capable of resisting the enemy's shot. These were armed as well as the opportunity permitted; while ramming-vessels and convoys were also improvised.

General Frémont was in pursuit of Sterling Price in the southwestern part of Missouri, and, fearing that the Confederates would be reinforced by Polk, *via* the landing-place called Belmont, Frémont instructed General Grant, under date of November 5th, to make a strong feint upon Columbus. Grant had previously sent Colonel Oglesby into Missouri, some fifty miles southwest of Cairo, to drive out a body of rebels reported to be congregated there. After Frémont's order, Grant sent another regiment to Oglesby, with an order to march toward New Madrid, and thus to threaten Belmont from the west and south, while Grant himself advanced upon the same place from the north. The 7th of November was fixed as the day upon which to make the combined dem-

onstration. General Grant had three transports, some five regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a section of artillery, 3,114 men all told. These were formed into two small brigades, commanded by General McClelland and Colonel Dougherty, and convoyed by two gun-boats.

The weather was not all that could be desired, but the men composing our force were in good condition, and eager for a trial of strength. The boys of the Thirty-first Illinois were in splendid spirits, and were determined to give a good account of themselves.

General Smith was directed to make a feint from Paducah to the rear of Columbus, while General Grant was making a demonstration in front of the place. Polk, however, had learned of Oglesby's advance toward New Madrid, and, with the purpose of intercepting the Union force, he had sent a considerable body of men across the river to land at Belmont, who were in camp at that place. Under this phase of affairs General Grant determined that, instead of making a mere feint against Columbus, he would attack the rebel force at Belmont direct, capture or disperse the troops defending it, and again retire to Cairo.

At 6 o'clock A. M. we moved down the river, and at Hunter's Landing, on the Missouri side, sheltered from the batteries at Columbus by the woods, we debarked our force. Leaving one battalion at the landing as a reserve and guard for the transports, we marched upon the enemy's camp direct, situated some three miles down the river. It was located on the river flat in a large clearing, and was protected on the land sides by abattis and breast-works, and upon the river side by the formidable batteries of Columbus. The ground over which we were compelled to travel was wooded and marshy.

The rebel force consisted of a regiment of infantry with a battery of six guns, but this force was added to after the commencement of the battle by three additional regiments from Columbus, under General Pillow.

Our advance—deployed as skirmishers—was met by a hot reception from the rebels, but the latter were driven back, step by step, upon their camp. After three hours of hard fighting, during which our brave volunteers, under lead of their officers, fought with the effectiveness of trained veterans, an order of assault was made; our boys with desperate valor charged and cleared the abattis, took the camp with several hundred prisoners and all of the rebel artillery, and drove the remnant of the enemy over the river bank, forcing them to leave a well-cooked breakfast behind them. This remnant might also have been captured had our troops pursued the enemy immediately. But, fatigued with the hard march and fight, hunger invited them to the untouched breakfast, which seemed to have been especially prepared for them, and many of our men proceeded to devour it. After this, speech-making was indulged in, and loud cheers given for the Union.

The flying rebels, under protection of the river bank, had safely gained the woods while all this was going on. General Grant, fully aware of the danger, and feeling that the direct object of the expedition had been accomplished, attempted to restore discipline among his men, and then gave order to fire the camp preparatory to a return. Up to this time the Confederates at Columbus had refrained from firing, lest their own soldiers might suffer as severely as the Unionists; but now that the flames of the burning camp announced the defeat and dispersion of the rebels, the heavy guns at Columbus opened a severe fire, which soon recalled our men to their sense of danger. So general had been the jubilation that only one regiment of our troops, the Thirty-first Illinois, had retained its formation in ranks.

The order to return to the transports was now given by General Grant, but the rebel commander at Columbus determined to retrieve the day for General Pillow, if possible. He therefore sent a force of about four thousand men, under General Cheatham, up the river in steamboats to intercept the return of our force to the transports at Hunter's Landing. In consequence of the bend of

the river near Belmont this movement was concealed from the view of our men, though General Grant observed it. Pillow's defeated forces that had escaped to the wood had re-formed, and, having been joined by Cheatham's reinforcements, they formed a line of battle between our troops and the transports.

The situation was serious, and the cry "We are surrounded" being passed from mouth to mouth, many of our men became discouraged. At this point offers were made to General Grant, by officers of the command, to lead the way in the effort to cut through the rebel line. General Grant, realizing the temper of his officers, restored full confidence to the men by the utterance, "We have whipped them once, and can do it again." The Thirty-first Illinois charged the enemy, and cleared a passage for the retreat of our troops; but Polk's troops continued to harass the rear and flank of our retreating columns, though every attempt to gain a decisive advantage was foiled by the gallant Thirty-first Illinois, which cleared a way no less than three times through a vastly superior force of the enemy.

At length, reaching the transports, our men rapidly embarked, carrying with them the two pieces of artillery with which they commenced the march and two rebel guns, the other four of the six captured having been spiked on the retreat. General Grant then rode back alone to withdraw the guard left in the morning, but found that they had already hurried on board. The rebels having been still further reinforced, General Grant rode with all haste to the transports, and, sliding down the steep bank with his horse, he rode over a gang plank pushed out for him from the last transport as it was leaving.

It was about four o'clock when the transports shoved off, and the fire of the rebel musketry was not at all comfortable. Very soon our gunboats, under command of Lieutenant Walke, threw grape and canister into the enemy with such effect that they precipitately sought the shelter of the woods. One of our brave boys was killed, and three were wounded on board the vessels by the

rebel fire, which almost invariably overshot us. The expedition reached Cairo without further molestation.

The numbers engaged upon both sides, as also the numbers of killed and wounded, have been variously estimated. General Grant claimed that we had about 2,500 men engaged, exclusive of the guard left at the transports. The rebel journals called the battle a great victory for the Confederates. The truth is that it was a most disastrous defeat of the rebel troops, and a victory of almost the first magnitude for the Union cause.

According to the statements of the various Confederate officials, their whole force, including subsequent reinforcements, numbered at the least 7,000 men, which was more than double the numbers of the Union force. Our own loss in killed, wounded, and captured could not have exceeded 550, while it was probably less than that figure. The loss of the enemy, according to the most trustworthy estimates, was not less than 640. Apart from these advantages to the Union cause, however, there are others to be reckoned among the first in importance. Oglesby was not cut off, Price was not reinforced by Polk from Columbus, and the fruit of victory, as relating to these prime objects, was wholly with us.

The battle was important to us in still other respects. It had been the constant claim of the Southern people that one of their men could whip five Northerners. The battle of Belmont, if it did not demonstrate to the rebels themselves that one Union soldier could whip two Confederates, proved to the satisfaction of our own men that they were at least equal to the enemy man to man. The battle gave many, if not the most of our men then engaged, their first smell of powder. It inspired confidence in their own abilities as soldiers, as well as in the skill of their officers. It taught a lesson concerning the value of discipline which our men remembered and repeated to others upon almost every subsequent battle-field, for their position at Belmont, owing to their own lack of caution, had been very perilous.


These were the general fruits of the conflict, but the foregoing

statement of them hardly represents full justice to the Union troops who participated in that initial conflict. A few words will suffice to show more in detail the advantages gained. General Grant, with about the same number of men, had attacked and defeated the force of General Pillow, protected by abattis and the guns of Columbus. He had fired and sacked the enemy's camp; he had cut his way through a force more than double the number of his own, composed of fresh men from Columbus, unfatigued by marching as ours were; he had brought off two guns safely, and spiked four others; he had defeated the rebel reinforcement of Price, the successful accomplishment of which reinforcement would have been a calamity to the Union cause the extent of which none could foresee. If this were a Confederate victory, there could scarcely be too many of them.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

Soon after the battle of Belmont, General Frémont was replaced by General Hunter. The latter fell back upon Rolla from the position before Price. Upon November 12th, 1861, Major-General Henry W. Halleck superseded Hunter, and assumed command of the Department of the Missouri, which had been made to include Arkansas and the part of Kentucky lying west of the Cumberland River. The State of Tennessee and the eastern part of the State of Kentucky were erected into a command under General Don Carlos Buell. These changes ensued upon the retirement of Major-General Winfield Scott from the chief command of the armies and the succession of General George B. McClellan thereto.

After the battle of Belmont the Confederate commanders in the West formed their great strategic line, which was in fact but an extension of a line from the Potomac to the Mississippi. The left of the line in the West rested at Columbus, Ky., and its right at Bowling Green in the same State. At Columbus was Polk, with his fortifications and armament of one hundred and forty guns covering the river passage to Memphis and the farther South. A



ENTERING VICKSBURG AT THE HEAD OF THE ARMY.

Bowling Green, General Buckner was in command, under General Albert Sidney Johnston, with a large army, the place being in communication by rail with Memphis and Columbus, and situated at a distance of ninety miles from Louisville and sixty miles from Nashville. Near the center of this line, and crossing it at right angles, ran the two important rivers known as the Cumberland and the Tennessee, which meander in their course through most of the Southern States above the cotton-belt. These two rivers flow into the Ohio at points not very far apart; and at a distance of about seventy miles on a straight line from where they empty into the Ohio the two streams are not more than eleven miles apart. At the points of closest approach the Confederates had established two very strong posts. These posts commanded the two rivers, respectively, and also the Memphis and Ohio Railroad, which crossed both rivers just above the newly erected fortifications. The fortification on the Tennessee River was called Fort Henry, and that upon the Cumberland River Fort Donelson.

General Grant, as also other officers under his command at Cairo, realized from the first establishment of this line that the taking of these two points by the Union forces would be attended with momentous consequences. The rebel line would be cut in two, and the enemy be compelled to retire below the line of the border slave States, whereby the war in the West, instead of being carried to the banks of the Ohio and of the Mississippi rivers, with all of the sad consequences to the North that ultimately followed, would have been confined to the States where the spirit of secession was the most rampant.

Had General Grant been invested at this early stage with full and single authority to carry on the campaign according to his own views and plans, there can be no doubt that the Rebellion would have been crushed, if not within "the ninety days" prescribed by Secretary Seward, at least within a twelvemonth from its origin. But he was under the command of an officer who possessed many of the worst qualities of the professional soldier.

A mere book-worm, with no practical tact whatever, he was responsible to as large an extent, if not indeed to a larger extent, for the great proportions the Rebellion ultimately assumed, than any individual, either in or out of the army. Absolutely unfitted to direct any important military movement, he was vain beyond counsel, and jealous to a surprising degree. He hampered General Grant from the moment he realized the energy of the young officer up to the time that he no longer had power to molest him. Up to a certain point of the early operations in the West, Grant went through a continuous struggle to do what his judgment told him ought to be done.

The latter foresaw from an early moment the necessity certain to arise for vessels with which to carry on hostile operations upon the various navigable water-courses. Hence, while disciplining his troops at Cairo, he pushed forward, under supervision of Flag Officer A. H. Foote, the construction of those iron-clad gun-boats, transports, and convoy vessels which rendered such invaluable service in the subsequent operations against the enemy.

General Grant's district of Cairo had been enlarged by various additions and then denominated the district of Southern Missouri. He had previously made a demonstration toward Mayfield and Murry in two columns, the one being under General McClelland and the other under C. F. Smith, which had at least a favorable result as a reconnoissance at these points. The movements were made, however, under the most difficult circumstances, the roads being almost impassable and the weather stormy and cold. By threatening the enemy's railroad communications between Columbus and Bowling Green, the reinforcement of either Buckner or Zollicoffer, on his right, from Columbus, was prevented; and thus General Thomas was enabled to meet and disperse Zollicoffer's army at Mill Springs in Eastern Kentucky. At length General Grant's long-sought permission to advance upon the enemy's center was given, and on the first of February the following order, authorizing the advance, was received by General Grant :

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

“ ST. LOUIS, January 30.

“ BRIGADIER-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, *Cairo, Ill.*:

“ You will immediately prepare to send forward to Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, all your available forces from Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort Hope, Bird’s Point, etc. Special garrisons must be left to hold these places against an attack from Columbus. As the roads are now almost impassable for large forces, and as your command is very deficient in transportation, the troops will be taken in steamers up the Tennessee River as far as practicable. Supplies will also be taken up in steamers as far as possible. Flag-Officer Foote will protect the transports with his gun-boats. The *Benton*, and perhaps some others, should be left for the defense of Cairo. Fort Henry should be taken and held at all hazards. I shall immediately send you three additional companies of artillery from this place. The river front of the fort is armed with twenty-pounders, and it may be necessary for you to take some guns of large caliber, and establish a battery on the opposite side of the river. It is believed that the guns on the land side are of small caliber and can be silenced by our field artillery. It is said that the north side of the river, below the fort, is favorable for landing. If so, you will land and rapidly occupy the road to Dover and fully invest the place, so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, United States Engineers, will immediately report to you to act as chief engineer of the expedition. It is very probable that an attempt will be made from Columbus to reinforce Fort Henry, also Fort Donelson, at Dover. If you can occupy the road to Dover you can prevent the latter. The steamers will give you the means of crossing from one side of the river to the other. It is said that there is a masked battery opposite the island below Fort Henry. If this cannot be avoided or turned, it must be taken.

“ Having invested Fort Henry, the cavalry forces will be sent forward to break up the railroad from Paris to Dover. The bridges should be rendered impassable, but not destroyed.

“ A telegram from Washington says that Beauregard left Manassas four days ago with fifteen regiments for the line of Columbus and Bowling Green. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that we get that line before he arrives. You will move with the least delay possible. You will furnish Commodore Foote with a copy of this letter. A telegraph line will be extended as rapidly as possible from Paducah east of the Tennessee River to Fort Henry. Wires and operators will be sent from St. Louis.

H. W. HALLECK,

“ Major-General.”

On the 2nd of February, only twenty-four hours after receiving the official order, General Grant with fifteen thousand men, carrying three days’ rations in their haversacks, left Cairo on steam transports, convoyed by a fleet of seven gun-boats under Flag-Officer Foote, and started up the Ohio River for the mouth of the Tennessee, some forty-five miles distant by water, and for Fort

Henry, some sixty or more miles up, and on the eastern bank of the Tennessee.

After a brief pause at Paducah for the better disposition of the forces, the evening of Monday, the 3d, found the fleet steaming rapidly up the muddy waters of the Tennessee and through heavy rains, under the protection of the gun-boats *Essex*, *St. Louis*, *Cincinnati*, *Carondelet*, *Tyler*, *Conestoga*, and *Lexington*, the *Cincinnati* being the flag-ship. On the morning of Tuesday, the 4th, the fleet was moored some ten miles below the fort. The attack having been set for Thursday, the 6th, General Grant, with the *Essex* and two others of the gun-boats, made a reconnoissance on Tuesday toward the fort, shelling the woods on each side of the river as they advanced, in order to unmask concealed batteries, if any existed, and subsequently shelling Fort Henry, so as to draw its fire and ascertain the range of its guns. During this operation the *Essex* was struck by a thirty-two-pound shot. Wednesday was consumed in debarking the troops about three or four miles below the fort, a short distance below Panther Island, which occupied the center of the river. They were landed on both sides of the river. Meanwhile two of the gun-boats proceeded to clear the stream of rebel torpedoes, and General Grant and Commodore Foote arranged the plan of battle for the following morning. The Comte de Paris says of Fort Henry that, "set upon low and marshy ground, its sides protected by two streams, that work presented the appearance of a regular bastioned pentagon. It had an armament of seventeen guns, placed *en barbette*, twelve of which pointed toward the river. Three thousand Confederates occupied the fort, under General Tilghman." Tilghman, in his own report made to the Confederate War Department, places his garrison at 2,734 men, and states that eleven of his heavy guns bore on the river, while Colonel Gilmer, the rebel engineer, acknowledges twelve. On the west or Kentucky side of the river, on the heights commanding Fort Henry, stood unfinished works known as Fort Heiman. The town of Dover was an important station connecting

with the railroad communication between Bowling Green and Columbus, and was within the outer lines of Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, ten miles or more away. The Dover road was, therefore, the Fort Donelson road also. The plan of battle was as follows: On the morning of the 6th General C. F. Smith was to advance with two brigades along the western or Kentucky bank upon Fort Heiman, while the main body of the Union forces, under General McClernand, was to advance at eleven o'clock A. M. from Bailey's Ferry, and cross Panther Creek to the Dover road, which led up to the center of the land side of Fort Henry, and, continuing to the large creek behind, complete the investment of the latter fort, and cut off the escape of the garrison or its succor by any available reinforcements from Fort Donelson. At the same time the gun-boats were to attack from the water side. Smith was to bring his artillery to bear upon the fort from the heights of Fort Heiman, and at the opportune moment the position was to be carried by assault of the military forces from the land side. This programme, however, miscarried. The Union forces, upon reaching the west bank of the river, found that Fort Heiman had already been evacuated and Fort Henry had surrendered. On the east or Tennessee side of the river the ground was badly cut up with slippery hills and miry ravines, nearly all the distance to be marched being either under water from the overflow of the Tennessee or thoroughly soaked by the tremendous storm of the previous night, and in consequence of this fact McClernand was also too late. The march was well described in these words by one who was with McClernand's column :¹

“Our route was along a rough cart path which twisted and turned about among the high wooded hills in a most perplexing manner. The storm of the previous night had soaked the alluvial soil of the bottoms, until under the tread of the troops it speedily became reduced to the consistency of soft porridge of almost

¹ The army correspondent of the *Cincinnati Gazette*.

immeasurable depth, rendering marching very difficult for the infantry, and for the artillery almost impassable. For some three hours we thus struggled along, when suddenly the roar of a heavy gun came booming over the hills, and another and another told us that the gun-boats had commenced the attack. For an instant the entire column seemed to halt to listen; then, springing forward, we pushed on with redoubled vigor. But mile after mile of slippery hills and muddy swamps were passed over, and still the fort seemed no nearer. We could plainly hear the roar of the guns and the whistle of the huge shells through the air, but the high hills and dense woods completely obstructed the view. Suddenly the firing ceased. We listened for it to recommence, but all was still. We looked in each other's faces and wonderingly asked, what does it mean? Is it possible that our gun-boats have been beaten back? For that the rebels should abandon this immense fortification, on which the labor of thousands of negro slaves had been expended for months, after barely an hour's defense, and before our land troops had even come in sight of them, seemed too improbable to suppose. Cautiously we pressed forward, but ere long one of our advance scouts came galloping back, announcing that the rebels had abandoned the fort and seemed to be forming in line of battle on the hills adjoining. With a cheer our boys pressed forward. Soon came another messenger, shouting that the enemy had abandoned his intrenchments completely and was now in full retreat through the woods.

“On we went, plunging through the deep mud and fording swollen creeks until, on the summit of a hill higher than any we had previously surmounted, we came upon the tattered line of the rebel fortifications. An earthen breastwork defended by an immense, long rifle-pit stretched away on either side, until it was lost to sight in the thick woods. Outside of this the timber had been felled in a belt of several rods in width, forming a barrier very difficult for footmen and impassable for cavalry. This breastwork inclosed fully a square mile. Crossing it and pushing forward, we

came soon to another similar line of defense, and further on still another, before we reached the fort itself, and, crossing a deep slough which protected it on the land side, we stood within the rebel stronghold."

While McClelland's column was thus struggling with the difficulties interposed by nature and art to their advance upon the land side of Fort Henry, and C. F. Smith's column on the other side of the river was laboriously marching upon Fort Heiman, the scene taking place during the river attack was, briefly, as follows: Commodore Foote had under his command seven gun-boats. Of these three were unarmored, and four were iron-clad, though not wholly so. His plan of advance was for three of the iron-clads, the *St. Louis*, *Carondelet*, and *Essex*, to keep side by side with his own iron-clad, the *Cincinnati*, and to steam slowly up the river, "bows on," toward the fort—their speed to be regulated by that of his own vessel—while the unarmored gun-boats *Tyler*, *Conestoga*, and *Lexington* were to form side by side a second line in the rear of the first, and, from a position of comparative safety, to bombard Fort Henry and the rebel encampment over the heads of the advance division of "turtle" iron-clads. This programme was carried out to the letter. Immediately after passing the upper end of the wooded island called Panther Island, which was about a mile and a quarter below the fort, the *Cincinnati* opened fire at 12.30 P. M., throwing a shell with a fifteen-second fuse from an eight-inch Dahlgren into the fort. The *St. Louis* and *Carondelet* threw similar missiles, while the *Essex* fired eighty-pound shells. The rebel guns instantly replied, and the firing soon became general. Twelve guns of the fort were trailed upon the attacking squadron, whose van could only bring to bear upon the enemy the bow guns, some seven or twelve in number, the accounts varying. The fire from the slowly but steadily advancing gun-boats was very deliberate, accurate, and destructive, their shells plunging into the fort and camp with all the precision of target practice. "And now," says the *Boston Journal's* graphic account, "there was a visible

commotion in the rebel camp. The first shell from the *Cincinnati* threw the troops into disorder, and at the fourth round, unable to stand the terrible hail which was bringing sure destruction, they broke and fled, leaving arms, ammunition, provisions, blankets, tents, everything, and poured out of the intrenchment a motley, panic-stricken rabble, taking the road toward Dover. A portion jumped on board a small steamboat which was lying in the creek above the fort, and escaped up the river. * * * Straight onward moved the boats, swerving neither to the right nor to the left. As they neared the fort their firing became more and more destructive. The sand-bags and gabions were knocked about, covering the guns and smothering those who served them. At an early moment in the fight the rifled gun of the rebels burst. * * * The gun-boats were repeatedly hit, and those portions which were not plated with iron were badly riddled.

“The fight had lasted fifty minutes with scarcely a casualty on our part, when a twenty-four-pound shot entered the *Essex*, passed through the thick oak planking surrounding the boilers and engines, and entered the starboard boiler, instantly disabling her, filling the entire boat with steam, and scalding twenty-nine officers and men of her crew. She at once dropped behind and floated down with the stream until taken up by a tug and towed to the encampment.

“The rebels were greatly encouraged by this circumstance. They revived their flagging fire and evidently felt that victory was still to be theirs. But the fleet did not falter for a moment. It kept on straight forward to the batteries as if nothing had occurred. The vessels were now at close range. Their shells tore up the embankments as they exploded directly over the guns. One eighty-pound shell killed or wounded every person serving one of the guns; while the shots of the enemy which struck the iron plating of the gun-boats glanced off, doing no harm. There were no signs of retreat, none of stopping, on the part of Commodore Foote, and those who beheld the fleet supposed from the indica-

tions that he was going to run straight on to the shore and pour in his fire at two rods' distance.

"Such coolness, determination, and energy had not been counted on by the rebel General, and at forty-six minutes past one, or one hour and twelve minutes from the commencement of the fight, when the gun-boats were within three or four hundred yards of the fort, the rebel flag came down by the run.

"In an instant all firing ceased. * * * The *St. Louis*, being nearest, immediately sent a boat on shore, and the stars and stripes went up with a wild huzzah from the crews. General Tilghman, who commanded the rebels, asked for Commodore Foote. Word was sent from the *Cincinnati* that Commodore Foote would be happy to receive him on board that gun-boat, and the gig of the *Cincinnati* was sent to the shore. The rebel General entered it, and soon stood before the Commodore. General Tilghman asked for terms. 'No, sir,' was the Commodore's reply; 'your surrender must be unconditional.' 'Well, sir, if I must surrender, it gives me pleasure to surrender to so brave an officer as you.' 'You do perfectly right to surrender, sir, but I should not have surrendered on any condition.' 'Why so? I do not understand you.' 'Because I was fully determined to capture the fort, or to go to the bottom.' The rebel General opened his eyes at this remark and replied: 'I thought I had you, Commodore, but you were too much for me.' 'But how could you fight against the old flag?' 'Well, it did come hard at first, but if the North had only let us alone there would have been no trouble. But they would not abide by the Constitution.' Commodore Foote assured him that he and all of the South were mistaken."

There were some seven hundred shots, in all, fired during this gallant fight, some four hundred by the attacking squadron, and over three hundred by the fort. The fort was badly damaged, while four of the gun-boats were struck, to-wit: the *Cincinnati* in thirty-one places, the *St. Louis* in seven, the *Carondelet* in six, and the *Essex* in fifteen, one of which disabled the latter. The rebel

General Tilghman afterward stated that his reasons for concentrating his fire on the *Cincinnati* were because she was the flag-ship and he hoped to disable her; and thus by getting her and the Commodore out of the way, the other vessels would be an easier prey to his guns; and because, also, she had got the range of the fort better, and her fire, especially just before the surrender, was most terrific. One of the rebel shots split the muzzle of one of the largest guns on the flag-ship; another completely decapitated one of the gunners; while a third, a hundred-and-twenty-eight-pounder, struck without penetrating the iron-clad pilot-house at a point only a few inches from the head of the Commodore, who was inside with the pilots, the violence of the concussion eliciting from them all a "very decided grunt."

The *Essex*, besides the twenty-nine officers and men of her crew scalded, according to the report of Commodore Foote, also had nineteen soldiers on board who were injured. The *Cincinnati* lost only one killed and nine wounded by the enemy's fire. This comprised the total Union loss. The enemy's casualties were comparatively small, being five killed and sixteen wounded. The rebel General Tilghman and staff, with sixty artillerists, were taken prisoners, and there were also captured twenty guns and seventeen mortars, the guns being mostly of heavy caliber; a hospital ship, with sixty rebel sick, and barracks and tents capable of accommodating 15,000 men, all of which were turned over to General Grant half an hour or more after the surrender, upon his arrival in force.

The Thirty-first Illinois Regiment was the first to enter the breastworks, and also among the first to enter the fort. The same night it was my privilege to take Warren Stewart's cavalry and part of the Thirty-first Illinois, and to press the enemy on the direct road to Dover, in the performance of which duty ten pieces of the enemy's artillery were taken and secured. General Grant's report, written from Fort Henry, was as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

“FORT HENRY, February 6, 1861.

“CAPTAIN J. T. KELTON, *St. Louis, Mo.:*

“Enclosed I send you my orders for the attack upon Fort Henry. Owing to dispatches received from Major-General Halleck and corroborating information here, to the effect that the enemy were rapidly reinforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not up at eleven o'clock last night when my orders were written; therefore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than eleven o'clock to-day to commence the investment. The gun-boats started the same hour to commence the attack, and engaged the enemy at not over six hundred yards.

“In a little over one hour all the batteries were silenced, and the fort surrendered at discretion to Flag-Officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp equipage, etc. The prisoners taken were General Tilghman and staff, Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced the retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning. Had I not felt it an imperative duty to attack Fort Henry to-day, I should have made the investment complete and delayed until to-morrow so as to have secured the garrison. I do not now believe, however, that the result would have been any more satisfactory.

“The gun-boats have proved themselves well able to resist a severe cannonading. All the iron-clads received more or less shots, the flag-ship some twenty-eight, without any serious damage to any except the *Essex*. * * *

“I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry with the forces employed, unless it looks possible to occupy the place with a small force that could retreat easily to the main body. I shall regard it more in the light of an advanced grand guard than as a permanent post. * * *

“U. S. GRANT,

“Brigadier-General.”¹

In General Grant's dispatch to Halleck he simply said: “Fort Henry is ours. The gun-boats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed. * * * I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry.” His written report of the same date contains similar language.

It was subsequently decided, however, that the land advance upon Fort Donelson must be delayed, and that the gun-boats should first start down the Tennessee, along the intervening bend of the Ohio, and up the Cumberland toward Donelson, convoying transports with reinforcements turned back or gathered on the way down, which should be landed on the west bank of the Cumberland just below Fort Donelson, establishing a new supply-base

¹ Badeau's Appendix.

there, and coöperating with the other forces that would, in the interim, march entirely overland to that fort.

Meanwhile, and immediately upon the surrender of Fort Henry, Commodore Foote had ordered Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, with his division of three unarmored gun-boats, to steam up the Tennessee River to Benton, "to remove the rails, and so far render the bridge of the railroad for transportation and communication between Bowling Green and Columbus useless, and afterward to pursue the rebel gun-boats and secure their capture if possible"—orders which not only resulted in the destruction of the railroad bridge, and the capture or destruction of the rebel vessels and much material of war, but also in the triumphant carrying of the Union flag through the State of Tennessee and into Alabama, until the shallow water at Muscle Shoals, near Florence, prevented a farther ascent of the river.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.

Polk with a large rebel army was at Columbus, on the Mississippi, which point constituted the rebel left, covering Memphis. Albert Sidney Johnston was at Bowling Green, Ky., which constituted the rebel right, impreguably fortified, and occupied by another army of at least fifty thousand effective men. The Union General George H. Thomas (under Buell's orders) had annihilated Zollicoffer's forces at Mill Spring. Thomas having turned one flank of the enemy's position at Bowling Green, Grant's capture of Fort Henry threatened the other.

An immediate result of the fall of Fort Henry was the evacuation of Bowling Green and its occupation by the Union forces under Buell, while part of Sidney Johnston's rebel army fell back upon Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, which city, besides being located on the Cumberland River, was one of the great railroad centers of the Southern and border States. While being forced to this retrograde movement, however, Johnston was fully aware of the great importance of holding Fort Donelson, both for defensive

and offensive reasons—defensive of the new rebel right at Nashville by the Cumberland River approach, and offensive because it was a point from which as a base either Fort Henry might be taken or other and stronger rebel works on the Tennessee might be constructed. In the accomplishment of that end, both streams being once more placed under rebel domination, the threatened Union advance through the border States of Kentucky and Tennessee upon the Gulf States would be checked if not prevented, and the rebels would then dominate both States, besides being able to threaten Missouri. Hence Johnston lost no time, after he had evacuated Bowling Green, in sending from that and the intermediate towns of Russellville and Cumberland City, on the line of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad, strong reinforcements—all the troops, in fact, which he could spare—to Fort Donelson, under Generals Buckner, Pillow, and Floyd; and these officers, successively upon their arrival, by reason of seniority in rank, assumed chief command of the fort and the rebel forces there assembled. But while Johnston, on the one hand, hurried all the rebel troops possible to be sent in order to defend Fort Donelson, so, on the other, Grant's repeated and urgent demands for reinforcements ultimately brought such Union troops by rail and water as could be spared from Hunter's command in Kansas, from other commands in Missouri under Halleck, and even by the long circuit of the Green, the Ohio, and the Cumberland rivers, from Buell's Department of Eastern Kentucky. In the immediate present, however, Grant could only be absolutely certain of the fifteen thousand men that he had with him, and with these, in case he could get no other assistance, he intended to attack, as soon as possible, at least an equal force of rebels sheltered behind massive earth-works and protected by numerous guns of heavy caliber. The undertaking was a desperate one. Grant's original intention, as may be gathered from his dispatches, was to march immediately across from Fort Henry after its fall, and to carry Fort Donelson by storm. But delay was necessitated, first, by the deeply


flooded condition of the country; second, by the non-appearance of the three gun-boats that had gone up the Tennessee on their brilliantly successful expedition; and third, by the uncertainty as to whether and to what extent Commodore Foote, who had gone to Cairo with his new gun-boats or iron-clad "turtles" for repairs, would coöperate by naval attack with the land forces. The position as it then existed may be briefly described as follows: At the outer point of an elbow or rounded right angle formed by the Cumberland River, where, after running for hundreds of miles westwardly with the evident design of emptying into the Tennessee at Fort Henry, the Cumberland suddenly changes its course when twelve miles distant from the latter river, and then runs parallel with it northward to the Ohio.

Upon a circular, bluff-faced eminence stands the town of Dover, looking eastwardly up the Cumberland and northwardly down that stream. Closely encircling the broad round eminence upon which Dover rests is a marshy ravine, opening out in spots to a quarter of a mile or more in width, and through which two small creeks rising in its western part fall away respectively north and south across the land side of the town, both then running eastwardly above and below it into the river. An irregular ridge, shaped like a horse-shoe, its ends touching the river, next surrounds the town. Outside this horse-shoe ridge of hills there exist marshy ravines and land overflowed by the creeks. At a point at the foot of this ridge or range, to the southwestward of the town, and about a mile from the river, into which it flows eastwardly, is Wynn's Creek, then much swollen. At the same point rises the south fork of another and much larger creek, called Indian Creek, which fork, running westwardly and then sweeping around to the northward and eastward, empties easterly through Indian Creek into the river below the town, just as Wynn's Creek empties above Dover, thus forming, as it were, a second water-ditch encircling the town. Beyond this, inland, is a range of hills extending from the river all the way around to the upper part of Indian Creek. About

two and one-half miles from the river-elbow, where Dover is located, and down the river on its eastern bank, is the mouth of a very large creek known as Hickman Creek, which was so backed up by the high water of the river, and filled with the waters of recent rains, as to be impassable save by boats or bridges; and about half-way between its mouth and the town of Dover is the mouth of Indian Creek, also greatly swollen at that time. In order to properly appreciate what both nature and science had done for Fort Donelson, it must be remembered that the fort, which inclosed about one hundred acres, with its massive bastioned earth-works, frowned from the summit of the high river bluffs which tower one hundred feet above the Cumberland, its flanks protected by these swollen creeks; that the guns of the fort itself, as well as those of the two water batteries lower down the bluff—some twenty heavy guns in all—owing to a slight deflection of its downward course, completely raked and swept the river as far as they could carry down the stream in the direction whence any attacking fleet must approach. The river defenses of Fort Donelson were, therefore, very much stronger than those of Fort Henry, whether the number of guns that could be brought to bear on the hostile fleet, the raking position they held, or their greater elevation and plunging power be considered. In fact, on the water side Donelson may be said to have been almost impregnable. Of the land side of the fort, where danger from the coming attack was to be mainly apprehended, it may be said that some three and a half miles inland, and almost due west from the fort, rise both of the two streams before mentioned, to-wit: Hickman and Indian Creeks. Hickman Creek runs due north two miles, and then, having passed the small house that became General Grant's headquarters, turns abruptly and runs a little south of east into the river just *below* the fort. Indian Creek, rising at almost the same point, runs due south for over a mile, and then as abruptly turns and runs north of east into the river just *above* the fort. Between the north and south lines of the upper waters of these overflowed

creeks are three successive hill ranges, very irregular, full of arms and spurs, yet preserving some general features of parallelism the one to the other, as well as to the convex land front of the hill crowned by the fort. Between these parallel hill ranges are marshy ravines or valleys, and through all these marshy ravines, flowing north and south, are other forks or feeders liable to be flooded, and emptying into Hickman and Indian Creeks, respectively. Here, then, was a succession of defenses provided by nature, and independent of the dense timber which covered both hill and ravine.

But art and military science had hurriedly completed the rebel works. Their right and center extended along the second irregular ridge in front of the fort, their flanks, like those of the fort, protected by Hickman and Indian Creeks, and the left extended from Indian Creek along that second hill range which nature herself has provided for the defense of Dover. Except where broken by Indian Creek and its south fork, the rebel line of defense ran along the selected ridge, at a mean distance of two miles from the river face, from Hickman Creek down to and across Indian Creek, and then, crossing the south fork thereof, sweeping around on the abutting ridge to the west and south of Dover (constituting the south leg of the horse-shoe ridge before mentioned), rested on the river bank or bottom, between Wynn's Creek and the creek still nearer Dover. Thus the line of rebel works inclosed a space of about two and one-half miles broad by three and one-half miles in length, up the river from Hickman to Wynn's Creek. Within this inclosed space of some nine miles square Fort Donelson stood near one end and Dover near the other, and the intervening spaces were filled with ridges, ravines, creek-forks, and hastily constructed road-ways, in addition to the regular roads w^hich led from Dover to the south or northwestwardly toward Fort Henry. There was also a regular road running along the entire line inside of the rebel works. Secondary lines as well as various detached works erected at commanding points overlooking the outer line of defenses added



THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION HILLS.

greatly to its strength, while the abattis formed of the dense tree-growth was another element of safety for the fortifications and their defenders. The works themselves were principally rifle-pit intrenchments, but at nine points in the line were batteries armed with the artillery of eight field batteries. The entire number of rebel guns on the lines of works in the main fortifications and otherwise, including the light batteries, was some sixty-five pieces. The outer line of works followed the exterior face of the ridge aforesaid, thus dominating its slope of fifty to eighty feet depth, and the broad forest-covered creek bottoms and ravines beyond. In these miry depressions as well as upon the outer ascent of the ridge forming this defensive line, the dense brush, small oaks, and other trees, having been slashed breast-high, with the tops felled toward an advancing enemy while the butts remained fixed to the stumps, formed lines of rough abattis, which, with the tangled under-brush, slippery hill-side, and boggy creek beds, made the difficulties of approach to these outer works almost insurmountable, especially as in some parts, where the ravines widen into valleys, the entire space was obstructed with this entangling abattis. Furthermore, the woods, and the rough, broken character of the hills, spurs, and ravines, for a distance far beyond the works, enabled field batteries to be masked, and used to great advantage against an advancing enemy, long before he could reach the ridges that faced the rebel intrenched line. Securely and comfortably camped upon the ridges within this line of outer works, the rebels had gathered by the night of the 12th of February an army which, comprising the original garrison of nearly four thousand, and augmented by the fugitives from Fort Henry, together with the subsequent additions of 1,860 from Polk's army at Columbus, Ky., and of twelve thousand under Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, from Johnson's army at Bowling Green and points between it and Fort Donelson, numbered over twenty thousand men. Such was the fort and garrison, commanded by three rebel brigadier-generals,

against which Brigadier-General Grant was audaciously moving with fifteen thousand men.

The time which circumstances had compelled him to consume at Fort Henry before proceeding to march upon Fort Donelson had not been lost by the Union commander. He had reorganized his forces, besides making strenuous efforts to provide for augmenting them from Cairo and elsewhere. He had now formed his army, thereafter to be known during the war as the Army of the Tennessee, into three divisions.

THE FIRST DIVISION, under Brigadier-General John A. McClermand, comprising three brigades, to-wit:

First Brigade, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby, including five infantry regiments, to-wit: The Eighth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank L. Rhodes; Eighteenth Illinois, Colonel Michael K. Lawler; Twenty-ninth Illinois, Colonel James S. Reardon; Thirtieth Illinois, Colonel P. B. Fonke; and Thirty-first Illinois, Colonel John A. Logan; and eight companies of cavalry, two of them belonging to the Second Illinois Cavalry, two to the regular army, and four of them independent Illinois companies; and two Illinois batteries of light artillery, under Captains Schwartz and Dresser.

Second Brigade, Colonel W. H. L. Wallace, including four infantry regiments, to-wit: The Eleventh Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas E. G. Ransom; Twentieth Illinois, Colonel C. Carroll Marsh; Forty-fifth Illinois, Colonel John E. Smith; and Forty-eighth Illinois, Colonel Isham N. Haynie; also the Fourth Regiment Illinois Cavalry, Colonel T. Lyle Dickey; and two Illinois batteries of light artillery, under Captains Taylor and McAllister.

Third Brigade, Colonel William R. Morrison, including two infantry regiments, to-wit: the Seventeenth Illinois, Colonel Leonard F. Ross; and the Forty-ninth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Phineas Pease.

THE SECOND DIVISION, under Brigadier-General Charles F. Smith, comprised five brigades, to-wit:

First Brigade, Colonel John McArthur, including three

infantry regiments, to-wit: the Ninth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Jesse J. Phillips; Twelfth Illinois, Colonel A. L. Chetlain; and Forty-first Illinois, Colonel Isaac C. Pugh.

Second Brigade, Colonel Lewis Wallace (left at Fort Henry, and subsequently merged into the Provisional or Third Division).

Third Brigade, Colonel John Cook, including five infantry regiments, to-wit: the Fifty-second Indiana, Colonel James M. Smith; Seventh Illinois, Colonel Andrew J. Babcock; Fiftieth Illinois, Colonel Moses M. Bayne; Thirteenth Missouri, Colonel C. J. Wright; and Twelfth Iowa, Colonel Joseph I. Woods. Also three Missouri batteries of light artillery, under Captains Richardson, Welker, and Stone.

Fourth Brigade, Colonel Jacob G. Lanman, including four infantry regiments, to-wit: the Twenty-fifth Indiana, Colonel James C. Veatch; Second Iowa, Colonel James M. Suttle; Seventh Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Parrott; and Fourteenth Iowa, Colonel William T. Shaw. Also Birge's sharp-shooters.

Fifth Brigade, Colonel Morgan L. Smith, including two infantry regiments, to-wit: the Eighth Missouri, Major John McDonald; the Eleventh Indiana, Colonel George F. McGinnis.

THE THIRD DIVISION, under Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, comprised three brigades, to-wit:

First Brigade, Colonel Charles Cruft, including four infantry regiments, to-wit: the Thirty-first Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel John Osborne; Forty-fourth Indiana, Colonel H. B. Reed; Seventeenth Kentucky, Colonel John H. McHenry, Jr.; Twenty-fifth Kentucky, Colonel James M. Shackelford.

Second Brigade (attached to the Third Brigade, under Colonel Thayer), including three infantry regiments, to-wit: the Forty-sixth Illinois, Colonel John A. Davis; Fifty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Cyrus D. Baldwin; and Fifty-eighth Illinois, Colonel William F. Lynch.

Third Brigade, Colonel John M. Thayer, including four infantry regiments, to-wit: the First Nebraska, Lieutenant-Colonel

William D. McCord; Fifty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Valentine Bausenwein; Sixty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Samuel H. Steadman; and Seventy-sixth Ohio, Colonel William B. Woods.

Also attached to this division, but not brigaded, Company A of the Thirty-second Illinois infantry, and Battery A of the First Illinois Light Artillery, Lieutenant P. P. Wood.

As early as the seventh, the day after the capture of Fort Henry, our cavalry, fording the two miles of heavily flooded land at the rear, had advanced across the neck of land between Forts Henry and Donelson, to reconnoiter and feel the position of the enemy. Scarcely a day had passed without a brush between them and the enemy under Forrest, or with the rebel pickets or outposts. On the eleventh of February General Grant sent the greater part of General Lewis Wallace's division down the river on the transports to meet Foote's gun-boats, now on the way from Cairo, with instructions to follow them up the Ohio and the Cumberland to a point on its west bank below the mouth of Hickman Creek, where they were to land and effect a junction with the main body of the army before Donelson, the balance of the division being detailed for garrison duty at Fort Henry. McClernand's and Smith's divisions were ordered to advance from the swamps of Fort Henry, and camp for the night on the comparatively dry ground beyond. The men of the Union army were in the best possible spirits. Somewhat chagrined at having reached Fort Henry only to find it captured by the naval forces, and by the delay that had since unavoidably ensued, they burned for a chance to show their mettle to the enemy, and now that they were upon the eve of meeting him, our boys joyfully shouted and sang the refrain, "On to Donelson," while the elasticity of their swinging step showed the confident and martial spirit that animated each one, from their great commander to the smallest drummer-boy. Night settled upon the small Union army in bivouac. The morning sun of Wednesday, the twelfth of February, found the tentless Union army, which moved without transportation and depended solely upon the

knapsack and haversack for sustenance and comfort, somewhat chilled by the inclement night, but disposed not to complain, in view of the glorious prospect so near ahead. At an early hour the order to advance was given, and with exultant cheers the line of march was taken up on the "Ridge Road" and on the "Telegraph Road" to Dover. To McClelland's division fell the honor of leading the advance of both columns. Colonel Oglesby's brigade, with its companies of Illinois light cavalry, was at the front, followed by its five Illinois infantry regiments. Schwartz's and Dresser's batteries of Illinois light artillery led the column on the Ridge Road, while Colonel W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, with the Fourth Regiment of Illinois cavalry, was at the front, followed by its four Illinois infantry regiments, and Taylor's and McAllister's batteries of Illinois artillery, heading the column on the Telegraph or direct road. It was about noon when W. H. L. Wallace's brigade came in sight of Fort Donelson, and found itself barred by the impassable waters of Hickman Creek from nearer approach to the outer rebel line of works, whose right safely rested upon them. Turning to his right, Wallace marched his brigade up to and around the head of the creek to the Ridge road, where, joining Oglesby's brigade, the two columns united into one and repulsed a brisk cavalry attack made by Forrest, after which the column moved slowly southward, feeling its way toward Indian Creek and Dover. General Force has described the incidents of the afternoon as follows: "The day was spent feeling through the thick woods and along deep ravines and high, narrow, winding ridges. At times a distant glimpse was caught through some opening of the gleam of tents crowning a height. At times a regiment tearing its way through blinding undergrowth was startled and cut by the sudden discharge from a battery almost overhead, which it had come upon unawares. The advancing skirmish line was in constant desultory conflict with the posted picket line. Where an opening through the timber permitted, our batteries occasionally took a temporary position and engaged those of the

enemy. The afternoon passed in thus developing the fire of the line of works, feeling toward a position, and acquiring an idea of the formation of the ground. By night, Smith's division was in line in front of Buckner, and McClernand's division had crossed Indian Creek and reached the Wynn's Creek road. The column had marched without transportation. The men had nothing but what they carried in knapsack and haversack. Shelter tents had not yet come into use. The danger of drawing the enemy's fire prevented the lighting of camp-fires. The army bivouacked in line of battle. The besieged resumed at night their task, which had been interrupted by the afternoon skirmishing, of completing and strengthening their works."

The night was chilling, yet, weary with the march across from Fort Henry and the toilsome movements of the afternoon and evening, our men slept soundly on their arms. Thursday, the thirteenth day of February, dawned upon our weary troops, who, hastily consuming their scant and uncooked rations, began to inquire if there was any news of the fleet. None having arrived, our brave boys resolutely turned their faces to the enemy and commenced another day, the second of the siege, which, like the previous afternoon, was largely spent in pressing our right forward to the south and east along the Ridge and the Wyman Creek roads, in prodding the enemy at various points to keep him employed, in attempting to uncover his line and reveal his strength, as well as, under the cover of a heavy cannonade, to secure points of advantage for our own more extended, and, therefore, weaker line of investment.

While McClernand's division, with Oglesby's brigade in advance, still cautiously pushed southward, Lanman's brigade of C. F. Smith's division pressed directly forward to the front until opposite the extreme right of Buckner's line, held by the rebel Colonel Hanson, when Veatch's Twenty-fifth Indiana gallantly advanced down the outer ridge, across the slashed timber of the creek bottom, and up the abattis-protected slope of the ridge

crowned by the enemy's works, under a galling fire from above. But it was impossible to struggle through the tangled abattis under such a fire as was poured out, and, after maintaining his position for two hours, Veatch was forced to retire. Parrott's Seventh Iowa, supported by Shaw's Fourteenth Iowa, subsequently advanced to the left of Veatch's former position, protected by the fire of Birge's sharp-shooters, but later the regiment was withdrawn. Meanwhile, on Lanman's immediate right, Cook's brigade made a demonstration against the enemy's works in front. Babcock's Seventh Illinois, on the right of the brigade, woke a rebel battery and retired, while the balance of the brigade took a position on a ridge some fifteen hundred feet from and overlooking the rebel breastworks. Upon the right, McClernand's batteries of both light and heavy artillery being served with such effect as to completely silence some of the rebels' best served batteries, besides spreading consternation in the enemy's intrenched camp by a well-timed shower of shells, that officer determined to carry the position by storm. To his Third Brigade (Morrison's) was assigned the honor of the perilous assault, Colonel Haynie, of the Forty-eighth Illinois (Morrison's senior), being ordered to join him and take command. Haynie, with Ross' Seventeenth Illinois, and his own Forty-eighth Illinois, was to storm the right face of the rebel salient, and Morrison, with his Forty-ninth Illinois, was to carry its left face, McAllister's battery covering the assault. At the word of command the two small columns advanced almost simultaneously, firing across the intervening timbered valley, and upon emerging from their partial cover they attempted to scale the opposite sides of the acclivity. But the steep slopes were tangled with obstructed timber and slashed abattis. Our brave men struggled through and over line upon line of it, tearing through the prickly boughs under a storm of shot from Maney's battery above, and the cross-fire of rebel batteries and musketry along the rebel line for hundreds of yards on either side; but the fire at last drove them back. John E. Smith's Forty-fifth Illinois advanced to sup-

port the Forty-ninth. On the double-quick the four spirited regiments dashed forward again, when the plunging cannonade and musketry volleys from above, crossing with the fire from battery and rifle-pit beyond, once more drove back our gallant boys. But again they advanced with a wild rush up the steep hillside, their intrepid commanders leading, and this time the blazing line of rifle-pits was actually reached by part of the command. But the fire grew hotter and hotter. For half a mile on either side the rebel line concentrated its lateral, enfilading artillery and infantry fire upon the storming columns, and Maney's battery belched grape and cannister and shrapnel into their very faces. Morrison was wounded. Our men, in the teeth of this withering fire, failed to scale the intrenchments and fell back in good order, but leaving most of their wounded on the slope. Suddenly the dead leaves on the slopes caught fire, and, blazing fiercely for awhile, put an end to the sufferings of most of our wounded men, though not before some humane rebels were able to drag a few into their lines. The rebels lost about one hundred killed and wounded during these various spirited attacks upon their positions.

Evening approached, and our artillery was strongly posted so as to command the various roads leading away from the rebel intrenchments, and especially those to the south. Our lines extended from Hickman's Creek along the irregular ridges which surrounded and were almost parallel to the crescent-shaped line of the enemy, almost reaching to the bank of the Cumberland above Dover. Our men, hungry and cold—for their rations were about exhausted, and the weather had suddenly changed from that of crisp spring to mid-winter—again laid down on their arms in line of battle, within musket range of the enemy's line, without camp-fires, and many of them without covering. On Friday, the 14th of February, the gun-boat *Carondelet* had arrived at the landing, with the rest of the gun-boats and transports close behind. Scarcely had our poor fellows received their scant supply of rations and ammunition, and proper attention been paid to such of the

wounded as had survived the terrible all-night's exposure to the icy blast and pitiless sleet, than the preliminary battle on the water front of Fort Donelson began. Steadily and slowly the four great iron "turtles" advanced, opening fire from their twelve large bow guns upon the water batteries mainly, but not neglecting those which crowned the bluffs. The lower water battery, whose thick ramparts of earth and sand-bags stood thirty feet above the water, responded briskly with its nine thirty-two-pound guns and twenty-inch Columbiad, while the upper water battery of two thirty-two-pounders and one rifled one-hundred-and-twenty-eight-pounder, and the eight other heavy guns, mounted on the upper works of the bluff, joined in the fierce fire. Nearer and nearer came the apparently invulnerable floating steam-forts; faster and faster flew the missiles of destruction and death; louder and more discordant grew the sounds of battle. The booming of the guns, the hissing of the shot, the scream of the shell, and the peculiar harsh, metallic thud which distinguished the impact of the rebel shot upon the coat-of-mail of our Union iron-clads, were heard. Gallantly the latter came on with their twelve guns, against twice as many heavy ones, whose raking cross-fire was both plunging and direct, fighting bravely against heavy odds, their brave crews resolved to conquer or to sink. After two hours of the concerted attack all of our iron-clads, despite their iron coating, were badly hulled, though not disabled by the plunging shot. For a time it appeared that the fort must fall, when a shot from the lower water battery snapped the rudder chains of the *Louisville*, and in an instant she drifted helplessly down the rapid current of the river. Almost at the same moment another rebel shot entered the pilot-house of the flag-ship *St. Louis*, killing the pilot, laming Commodore Foote with a falling timber, and destroying the wheel and additional steering-tackle. The whole rebel fire was then concentrated upon the *Carondelet* and *Pittsburg*, which were both already badly damaged. It seemed useless to continue the fight under such overwhelming disadvantages. The gallant flag-officer signaled the vessels to retire; and

thus, after a brilliant engagement of more than two hours, with an enemy in an elevated fortified position admirably chosen, mounting many more guns than his own — or at least able to bring into action nearly two guns to his one — our gun-boat squadron was forced to withdraw, fairly riddled by the enemy's shot. The *Pittsburg* was struck twenty-one times, the *Carondelet* twenty-six times, the *Louisville* thirty-five times, and the *St. Louis* fifty-nine times, while we had lost fifty-four men killed and wounded.

But this brilliant naval attack, though not a success, was far from a failure. It created a diversion in favor of Grant's army that led to eventual success. It covered the debarkation, three miles below and out of sight, of large and constantly arriving Union reinforcements, and their junction with others at the front, and kept the rebels so busy that Grant had ample time to strengthen and extend his investing line and bring up more supplies of ammunition. The coming of evening found his forces swollen to 22,000 men in three divisions — that of C. F. Smith at his left, that of Lew. Wallace filling the gap in the center, and that of McClelland at the right. But in order to push our investing line more closely to the right, McArthur's brigade of Smith's division was sent from our left to the rear and around to our extreme right, where it subsequently came into line, having on its left Oglesby's brigade, which in turn had W. H. L. Wallace's brigade on its left. The day had been more or less occupied in digging rifle-pits and throwing up wide intrenchments, and properly posting and protecting our batteries with earth-works. Night came none too soon for our worn soldiers, but with it again came the heavy downfall of drifting snow and cutting sleet.

At this early period of the war, when army purveyors and quartermasters neither understood the necessities of troops nor how to meet and supply them, the life of the soldier, always hard enough, was at its hardest. But exceptionally hard was the experience of our poor fellows at Donelson. Heavy rains, pelting hail-storms, driving sleet, piercing blasts, and pitiless snow had attacked

them by turns. They had been forced to struggle through almost impassable mud. They had been without blankets and without overcoats. Their rations had been exhausted, yet much of the time, when shivering, freezing, and benumbed, they had been under fire, even during the bitter cold watches of the night. The arrival of the transports in the early morning had staved off further hunger, but, half-starved as they had been, the poor fellows were ravenously hungry and the supplies were far from adequate. So, too, in the matter of ammunition. There had been some improvidence in its use, and the supply was not sufficient to make up for the waste of which raw troops are always more or less guilty. Wholly fagged out, hungry, and freezing, our men lay sleeping, unsheltered, through the sleeting night.

General Floyd had called a council of war. It was unanimously decided by the rebel officers to make a sortie, to cut their way out, and then retreat southwardly to Charlotte, half-way between Dover and Nashville. Failing to do this, they realized that Grant, who already had them almost completely invested on the land side, would soon erect works commanding the Cumberland above Dover and thus cut them off from supply or retreat, by way of the river, when capitulation would be a simple matter of time. The sortie was to have been made on Friday, the 14th, in the afternoon, after the repulse of the Union gun-boats, and the movement had already commenced when the order was countermanded and the attack postponed until the early dawn of Saturday, the 15th. The delay proved fatal to the enemy's plan, as it not only enabled Grant to make the admirable disposition of his troops and reinforcements already noticed, but also gave time for the arrival and debarkation during the night and early morning of still more fresh Union troops and supplies.

Twelve thousand rebel infantry, under Pillow, were astir at five o'clock in the morning. Two thousand rebel cavalry, under Forrest, were stealing away through the overflowed marshes of the river, near its bank, bound toward the south and rear of the Union

right, while Buckner, with six thousand more, occupied the works near the junction of our right and center. Pillow's column, in light marching order with three days' rations, formed on open ground back of his trenches on his own extreme left, and filed out of his works along a road-way which crossed the valley between the hostile lines and led up the slope to the Union right. McArthur, who had come up the previous night, when darkness prevented him from knowing exactly where he was, moved into position, and formed his brigade in line of battle on the right of Oglesby's brigade. Pillow's line advanced to assault the position of Oglesby and McArthur on the ridge, but was driven back by their destructive fire. Advance after advance was pluckily made with the same result. The enemy was invariably repulsed by our brave boys. At last the enemy attempted a new maneuver. His long front not only covered the fronts of Oglesby's and McArthur's brigades, but by reason of superior numbers extended much farther to his own left toward the river bank. Informed of the existence of a depression or ravine running parallel with the river and between it and the Union right flank, he marched the superfluous left of his column through it, unseen by the Union troops, changed its front to the right, and advanced at right angles to the Union line of battle up the ridge, firing upon McArthur's front and rear, while the remainder of his column assaulted our front. Thus overwhelmingly flanked and taken both in front and reverse, McArthur's brigade, running short of ammunition, fell back upon Oglesby's brigade, which had been McClernand's center. Pillow still advanced steadily and surely, rolling back McArthur's regiments until he struck Oglesby's right. Buckner sallied forth, under cover of the concentrated fire of Porter's, Maney's, and Graves' batteries, and with his six thousand men advanced across the valley to attack W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, McClernand's left, but was driven back in confusion by the difficulties of approach offered by the slippery and frosted earth, the ice-crusts and snow-covered abattis-bouges, the deadly discharge of the

Union musketry, and the well-served fire of the Union batteries. Pillow pressed forward, however, enveloping Oglesby's front, flank, and rear. With desperate courage the men of this Union brigade, as also of the others, resisted the odds against them of numbers and position. The language of Pillow himself, touching the conduct of our Union boys in this sanguinary conflict, was: "They did not retreat, but fell back fighting and contesting every inch of the ground."

Hour after hour passed, and still the battle raged. The Ninth, the Twelfth, and the Forty-first Illinois regiments, comprising McArthur's brigade, as has been seen, had long since retired for more ammunition. The Eighth, the Eighteenth, the Twenty-ninth, and the Thirtieth, one after the other, were forced back by the terrible cross-fire of the enemy, when the last regiment of the brigade—the Thirty-first Illinois—was almost reached. Then occurred, perhaps, the most critical moment of the battle. W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, having repulsed Buckner's attack, still stood on the left of McClernand's division line, while his right and center, all except the Thirty-first Illinois and Schwartz's battery, were swept back beyond the hope of recovery. At that moment a maneuver was executed which for a time held the enemy in check. The Eleventh Illinois was on the right of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade. The Thirty-first Illinois—the remnant of Oglesby's brigade—was on the right of the Eleventh Illinois. By suddenly throwing back the right of the Thirty-first on its center, at right angles to its left, Schwartz's battery was supported, and at the same time a front was presented to the enemy's flanking advance, while the rear of the Eleventh, as well as its own rear, was protected from the enemy's reverse fire. At the very instant of making this rapid movement, the Thirty-first Illinois received the full shock of the advance of Pillow, as well as that of Buckner, who had been ordered by Pillow to renew his assault upon W. H. L. Wallace's brigade; but upon that regiment also presenting a wedge-like double face to the combined attack of the enemy, it was able to

protect the well-served battery, as also the right of Wallace's brigade, for a considerable period. Four hours had now elapsed since the battle opened, and still W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, covered by the Thirty-first Illinois, and aided by the batteries of Schwartz, Taylor, and McAllister, now fast running out of ammunition, heroically maintained this unequal contest against the combined attacks of the infantry divisions of Pillow and Buckner, supported by the fire of the three rebel batteries at Heiman's salient, while Forrest's cavalry, two thousand strong, hovered in the Union rear. There were less than three thousand Union troops, weak with hunger and exposure, against twenty thousand well-fed rebels. The disadvantages, including those of position, were much too great. It was impossible to win against such odds, yet assault after assault was met and hurled back by the deadly fire of our determined troops, who thus gained time, which was a help to us and a loss to the enemy. Meanwhile McClernand had begged help from Lewis Wallace, who commanded the Third Division of the Union army, which formed the center of the entire original Union line. But Grant was not present, and Lewis Wallace doubted his authority to proceed without further orders from headquarters, as he had been ordered to act on the defensive, and no one of Grant's staff, although both McPherson and Rawlins were upon it, was willing to assume the responsibility asked for. The moment arrived, however, when Lewis Wallace, seeing the critical condition of affairs, determined to take the responsibility, and sent one of his two brigades—that of Cruft—embracing the Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana, and the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky Regiments, to McClernand's support. Cruft went into line of battle on the right of the Thirty-first Illinois, which, true to an agreement between its Colonel and Colonel Ransom, of the Eleventh Illinois, to stand by one another, was still tenaciously "standing by" the Eleventh, which latter, failing to receive W. H. L. Wallace's order to the brigade to fall back, also stuck by the

Thirty-first Illinois. These two slim regiments alone fought during a brief interval the whole rebel army.

At last Cruft came up on the double-quick. It was then that the Thirty-first Illinois, having fired its last remaining round of ammunition, was withdrawn, "marching steadily from the field," but only after the lieutenant-colonel (White), the senior captain, and thirty of the men had been killed, nearly three hundred of the latter wounded, and I, too, had been wounded in two places.

The Eleventh Illinois, which still had ammunition, having been engaged less time than the Thirty-first, gallantly essayed to continue the unequal contest, but, unable to stand its ground, fell back in disorder under pressure of a rebel cavalry charge, while Cruft's brigade also retired half a mile, upon the new line of Lew. Wallace's division.

Lew. Wallace had in the interval, since sending Cruft's brigade to McClernand's support, formed his remaining brigade—a strong one of seven regiments, being two brigades in one under Colonel Thayer—into line of battle, on a cross-spur of the range and at right angles to the line which he had previously occupied. This new line now faced the victorious enemy, who, having rolled back the Union right upon its center, according to the original plan of Floyd, now rested in weariness and exhaustion upon the ground from which at great cost McClernand had been driven.

Behind Lew. Wallace's new front of fresh troops McClernand's fagged-out brigades were re-formed, and supplied with ammunition with which to renew the stubborn and bloody contest. Cruft's brigade then rested on the right of Thayer's brigade, which had been rapidly deployed, formed in line of battle at right angles to its former line, and was resolutely facing our former right.

The Union center, having changed front, with its fresh troops was in condition to renew the battle. McClernand's division was re-formed behind Lew. Wallace's battle line, and after being supplied with cartridges was anxious again to meet the enemy.

When the victorious rebel troops advanced upon Lew. Wallace

the new programme failed, and instead of the Union forces giving way they themselves were driven back in disorder, the First Nebraska especially distinguishing itself in the repulse. Again the rebel troops advanced, and again they quailed and were driven back in confusion by the withering fire of the Union musketry and artillery. A third time they came, only to be hurled back by the rain of Union grape, cannister, and minie balls.

The enemy for a while seemed paralyzed. Then Buckner commenced to reënter his trenches while Pillow stood hesitating.

General Grant, having been in consultation with Admiral Foote upon his flag-ship, had received no information of the impending disaster, but Captain Hellyer, one of the aides, galloped up and informed the commanding General that the enemy had attacked and driven back his right shortly after daybreak. General Grant ordered C. F. Smith to prepare for an assault with his division upon the rebel right, and then galloped on. By the time he reached Lew. Wallace, whose troops had checked the enemy, there was a lull in the battle. He was told that the rebel troops had with them their knapsacks and haversacks. Upon learning this he at once made up his mind that the enemy had advanced from their works in order to cut their way out. It was about three o'clock in the afternoon when General Grant ordered a forward move upon the enemy.

A little later Wallace's command advanced to carry the position. Colonel Morgan L. Smith's Fifth Brigade, comprising the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana, which Lew. Wallace had brought with him from garrison duty at Fort Henry; Cruft's Brigade; the Third Brigade of McClernand's Division (the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois), now commanded by Colonel Leonard F. Ross, being in support and reserve, made up the storming party.

The enemy, fearing a more general attack, retired slowly and unwillingly within his trenches, our brave boys driving them over the rough, thickly-wooded hills until after five o'clock, when Wal-



EXPLOSION IN THE CRATER AT VICKSBURG.

lace, having reached a spot within four hundred feet of and overlooking the rebel trenches, halted and posted his picket line, he and McClernand together having by this time recaptured from the now weary and dispirited foe the six pieces of artillery which, with thousands of small arms and hundreds of prisoners, had earlier in the day been lost by us, and having also resumed possession of the ground from which McClernand had been driven. On our extreme left was Cook's brigade of C. F. Smith's division, then opposite the extreme right of the enemy's works. Under cover of the fire from the batteries of Richardson, Welker, and Stone (commanded by Major Cavender), the Seventh and Fiftieth Illinois, Twelfth Iowa, and Thirteenth Missouri, comprising the main strength of that brigade, were maneuvering and threatening him without intending a serious attack.

On the right of Cook's position was Lanman's brigade, to which the Fifty-second Indiana had been temporarily attached. General C. F. Smith himself, a gallant gray-haired veteran of the regular army, who had been the commandant at West Point during Grant's cadetship at the Military Academy, was with Lanman's brigade. He had arranged that, while Cook's brigade was making a demonstration against the enemy's extreme right, he himself would in person take Lanman's brigade and make the real assault upon the enemy's works at its front. Smith then ordered the advance to sound. Instantly the forward movement commenced under Grant's own eye. With Birge's sharpshooters deployed on either flank as skirmishers, the storming column, with quick, determined step, moved silently and steadily down the ridge-side to the valley.

Up the steep slope pressed the assaulting column with fixed bayonets, the white-headed old General electrifying his dauntless men with waving hat and burning words, as he rode erect and fearless at their head, undisturbed and untouched by the storm of leaden hail which decimated their ranks—up the acclivity, steadily despite the deadly fire, through and over every obstruction, firmly,

indomitably, resistlessly, up to the very mouths of the belching rebel artillery and muskets, at the very crest of the trenches, and then with a wild hurrah over into the enemy's works at last.

The advance of our victorious storming columns formed into line, still driving the rebel Tennesseans before them, when Buckner, with Hanson's rebel regiment, returning from the sortie against our right wing, reached that part of the rebel works. But they were too late—the rebel intrenchments had been carried.

At last night fell upon the scene. Buckner still held the second or inner ridge, and was busy throwing up intrenchments. C. F. Smith held the elevated rebel works, the "key" to Fort Donelson, which he had stormed, and was now strengthening for attack. Wallace was in possession of another commanding point, just outside the rebel works at the center. McClernand had re-occupied all his old line, and pushed it nearly to the river. Such was the situation at night-fall.

Sunday, the 16th of February, was faintly dawning, and preparations were making along the Union line to renew the assault upon the enemy's position, when the men on our advanced left—Lanman's brigade—heard the clear notes of a bugle, and observed a flag of truce approaching from Fort Donelson. It accompanied an officer sent by Buckner as bearer of his letter to Grant. Directing their eyes toward the enemy's position, our brave boys saw with bounding hearts the white flag flying from the fort itself, and soon it was rumored along the whole Union line that the enemy was asking terms of capitulation.

By the surrender of Fort Donelson there fell into our hands, besides that stronghold, the men and material of the whole opposing army, save the 6,500 escaped and killed or wounded, to wit: 14,623 men, sixty-five cannon, and 17,600 small arms; besides vast stores of supplies of all sorts, all of which had been gained at a loss to the Union side of 3,329 men in killed, wounded, and missing. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was at the least 2,500.

“THE SIEGE OF CORINTH.”

It was three days after the battle of Pittsburgh Landing that, recovered from wounds received at Donelson, I reached Pittsburgh Landing and reported, having in the meantime been promoted to be a Brigadier-General, upon the especial recommendation of General Grant, for “meritorious services.”¹

On the 19th of April I was assigned to, and took command of the First Brigade of McClelland's First Division Reserve Corps, which brigade comprised the Eighth, Eighteenth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Illinois (my old regiment), and the Twelfth Michigan.

Meanwhile General Halleck had reached Pittsburgh Landing, and in person had assumed the chief command. He fixed his headquarters at the bluff near the landing. Savannah was devoted mainly to hospital purposes.

During the ensuing two months General Grant was entirely ignored in all of the military operations against Corinth. This was due, in part, to an unreasoning and senseless clamor against him, founded upon exaggeration and falsehood, and inspired and

¹ The following is a copy of General Grant's official recommendation.—C. A. L.

“HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,
“FORT HENRY, March 14, 1862.

“HON. E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.* :

“I have been waiting for reports of sub-commanders at the battle of Fort Donelson to make some recommendation of officers for advancement for meritorious services. These reports are not yet in, and, as the troops under my command are actively engaged, may not be for some time. I therefore take this occasion to make some recommendations of officers who in my opinion should not be neglected. I would particularly mention the names of Colonel J. D. Webster, First Illinois Artillery; Morgan L. Smith, Eighth Missouri Volunteers; W. H. L. Wallace, Eleventh Illinois Volunteers; and John A. Logan, Thirty-first Illinois Volunteers. The two latter are from civil pursuits, but I have no hesitation in fully indorsing them as in every way qualified for the position of Brigadier-General, and think they have fully earned the position on the field of battle. There are others who may be equally meritorious, but I do not happen to know so well their services.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.”

fed by an envy which sought to remove him from command entirely. The splendor of his achievements at Belmont, at Donelson, and at Pittsburgh Landing was temporarily obscured. He was again "under a cloud," but it was the last that was to hang over and depress his martial spirit during the continuance of the war.

He still commanded the District of West Tennessee, but his old army, the Army of the Tennessee, was his only in name.

He was appointed "second in command" of Halleck's grand army, and thus it was that in the advance upon Corinth Halleck managed to wreak his pitiful spite against him.

This advance was, perhaps, the most ludicrous feature of the whole war. From an inexcusable lack of caution we fell into the other extreme, and became recklessly over-cautious. Halleck had here an opportunity, which he improved to the fullest extent, of proving that the stock of caution stored in his own person more than equaled any lack of it existing in the combined Union armies of the West. Although it was little more than twenty miles from Pittsburgh Landing to Corinth, yet every step of the slow advance of the great Union army of 120,000 men, which he had gathered at the former point and thereabouts — an advance which consumed no less than six weeks, being equivalent to about half a mile per day throughout — was punctuated and underscored with intrenchments. It was so much like the slow and methodical-looking pushing forward of line after line of parallels in a regular set siege, that, in order to disarm hostile criticism and ridicule, Halleck himself termed it "the Siege of Corinth." And this worm-like movement, this slow, fortified advance, was made by an army that numbered two to one of the enemy against whom it was approaching. No wonder the Union officers and men were alike restive under such a condition of things.

It was late in April before Halleck's combined armies commenced this tedious advance. On the 23d of that month the long-wished-for marching orders came.

On the morning of the 24th my brigade, carrying all camp and garrison equipage, after constructing a road across a branch of Owl Creek, moved forward two miles and went into camp at "Camp Stanton," where we constructed the first field fortification, comprising enfilading rifle-pits and lunettes.

On the 26th I sent Colonel Lawler, of the Eighteenth Illinois, with six regiments of infantry, three companies of cavalry, and one section of artillery, to reconnoiter in front and to the left of our position, in the direction of Monterey (Pea Ridge), and to feel the enemy. But while on the march executing his instructions Lawler was halted and sent back to camp by an order from headquarters of the Army of the Tennessee.

On the 30th my command, with the rest of the First Division of the Reserve Corps, again moved forward some three miles toward Monterey, where the division went into camp, its left resting on the Monterey road, some nine miles distant from that place, my brigade being on the right of the division. Here we were engaged for several days in repairing and constructing roads from this camp back toward Pittsburgh Landing.

On the 2d of May, McClernand, being assigned to the command of the Reserve Corps of the Army of the Tennessee, assigned me by seniority of rank to the command of the Third (late First) Division. On the following day, however, Brigadier-General H. M. Judah was assigned by special field orders from the department headquarters to the command of the division, and I subsequently assumed command of my brigade at Camp No. 4, on the south bank of Lick Creek, on the main Corinth road, one mile to the rear of Monterey. The construction of bridges and roads now consumed several days, during which frequent cavalry reconnoissances were made.

On the 11th of May the division moved forward and occupied a camp lately occupied by General W. T. Sherman, at the crossing of the old State line with the Purdy and Farmington road. We completed the fortifications commenced at this camp by General

Sherman, constructed additional rifle-pits, and made frequent reconnoissances, which met and almost invariably drove in the enemies' pickets.

From this camp two companies of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, with Dollin's, and O'Harnett's, and Carmichael's Independent Companies of Cavalry, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. McCulloch, made a reconnoissance toward and beyond Purdy, destroyed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad bridge across Cypress Creek, five miles south of Bethel, captured a locomotive with four men on it, placed the men under guard, and ran the engine into the creek, thus destroying it. Subsequently, the rebels being discovered drawn up in line of battle, our force advanced, giving them a volley which broke their lines. They scattered in all directions, continuing, however, to fire from cover of the trees. McCulloch's dismounted cavalry, deployed as skirmishers, advanced, the enemy still slowly retreating and firing, until, our men gaining on them, the rebels turned and fled in rout through Purdy, dispersing in all directions. The cavalry again mounted, charged through the town, and, advancing to the bridge aforesaid, destroyed it, and returned to the camp without loss.

With the object of driving the enemy beyond and destroying the track of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, my brigade, with that of General Ross in advance, accompanied by a battery of eight guns and a battalion of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, moved from the camp at four o'clock in the morning, marched seven miles, drove in the enemy's pickets, destroyed the road, and were back in camp again by ten o'clock A. M. On the 21st of May my command again advanced, with all camp and garrison equipage, to the position vacated that day by Major-General Sherman, near Easel's house, on the road to Corinth. On the 28th, at half-past one o'clock in the morning, orders reached me to move up the First Brigade, without camp equipage or transportation, to the extreme right of General Sherman's division, by or before eight o'clock A. M., with instructions to assist in driving the rebels from a loop-holed block-

house on Sherman's right front; also in driving back their pickets and making a strong demonstration against or feint of attacking Corinth. General Ross' brigade was at the same time ordered to and came up in my rear. Through some misdirection we advanced too far to the right, and approached the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Boey's Cut. The rebel pickets were in sight at a house on the hill on the opposite side of the road. They retired, and we occupied the position. Subsequently, General Ross' brigade occupied this position, where fortifications were thrown up under the direction of Brigadier-General Judah, and my brigade reached the position assigned to it on the right of General Sherman, my left resting on the right of General Denver's brigade and my right resting on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

Light skirmishing immediately commenced at my front, growing heavier in the early afternoon, and still heavier just before night-fall. The men of my command lay on their arms all night in expectation of further attack.

During that night some men of my brigade, by applying their ears to the rails of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which ran from my position southward through Corinth, and on to Mobile, had discovered and reported to me—and I at once verified their report by like means—that a great commotion which we could plainly hear from the direction of Corinth, of trains entering and leaving it, with accompanying shouts of rebel soldiers, believed by some of our generals¹ to indicate the heavy reinforcement of Beauregard, was

¹ In fact, from the night of the 26th to the morning of the 30th of May, Halleck, Sherman, and Pope were completely at sea as to what that commotion meant. Thus Sherman on the 27th reports to Halleck: “I cannot tell what the cars were doing last night. They seemed to come from the south to a point this side of Corinth, back down, and depart on the Memphis road. They were plainly heard all night, and although I listened for hours, I confess I cannot give a reasonable guess at their movements. * * * My picket officers report hearing the march of troops, the sound of trains, etc., but they are unreliable. We can only guess at what they were about last night.” The same day Pope reports to Halleck: “You no doubt heard last night the signal guns and rockets of the enemy. From midnight to daylight they were running trains rapidly, I think, *south* on the

really caused by the *coming into Corinth of empty trains, which were loudly cheered upon their arrival, and the departure thence in silence of loaded trains.* This made it plain that the enemy, instead of receiving reinforcements, was actually leaving Corinth.

This information I communicated to General Grant, requesting at the same time permission to advance and attack the enemy's works at my front; but authority to do this was refused.

Early in the morning of the 29th I again asked leave to advance, believing only a small force of the enemy to be at my front, but, as upon the previous day, permission was refused.

Desultory firing occupied the forenoon, but about four o'clock P. M. my picket line, immediately in front, was attacked with great vigor, volley after volley being fired by the enemy into our ranks, and many of his bullets passing over the heads of the men standing in line of battle in the rear. The fire was returned with great effect, and the enemy was forced to retire with a loss of some forty men. This was the last skirmish that occurred on the right of the line occupied by General Sherman and myself. My command, being now relieved by McDowell's brigade, marched back to camp at sundown.

Next morning, May 30th, the evacuation of Corinth and its fortifications, which had been quietly proceeding for days, without let or hindrance from Halleck, was definitely ascertained, and the Union flag at last waved from its deserted works.

The rebels had escaped, leaving nothing behind them save some empty tin pans and a number of "Quaker guns," consisting of dummies made by cutting lengths of trees, blackening their centers, and mounting them on wheels, like so many frowning can-

Mobile Road." Even as late as one o'clock A. M. of the 30th, Pope informed Halleck: "The enemy is reinforcing heavily by trains in my front and on my left. The cars are running constantly, and the cheering is immense every time they unload in front of me. I have no doubt from all appearances that I shall be attacked in heavy force at daylight." And it was not until six o'clock the same morning that he had reached the more correct conclusion that "everything indicates evacuation and retreat."

non, for the evident purpose of increasing the ultra caution that had already loaded down Halleck's advance, and but for which caution we might have captured Beauregard's army with Corinth.

Had the permission heretofore referred to been granted, the onset of my brigade would undoubtedly have brought on at once a general attack, and a great battle must have ensued, which, under all the circumstances, could scarcely have ended otherwise than in the defeat and surrender of Beauregard and his army, with the capture of his material of war, and this again would probably have resulted in the speedy collapse of the Rebellion itself.

As it was, however, Beauregard, completely outwitting Halleck, had eluded us and fallen back along the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Baldwin and Guntown, and finally to Tupelo, some fifty miles south of Corinth, where, with good water and a better chance for supplies of meat and provisions, the rebel forces rested and were reorganized for future operations against the Union armies.

All that we had gained, apparently, was the barren honor of occupying an abandoned position, during the entire advance upon which there had been very little fighting, save what has been here mentioned, together with a brisk affair at Russell's in which two of Sherman's brigades participated, and some sharper fighting on two or three occasions at and near Farmington by some of Pope's brigades on the Union left.

The story of the termination of Halleck's achievement was fairly told, May 30th, by an army correspondent of McCook's division of Buell's corps at the Union center:

"On the day the Second Division moved out, advances with heavy cannonading were made by Thomas on the right and Pope on the left, but not a response of any kind was elicited from the enemy. During that night we could hear teams being driven off and boxes being nailed in the rebel camp. Deserters, however, I understand, reported that they were making a stand and would fight the next day. Considerable cannonading was done by our

forces, and yet no response, and yesterday the same. Last night the same band sounded retreat, tattoo, and taps, all along the rebel lines, moving from place to place, and this morning suspicion was ripened into certainty when we saw dense volumes of smoke arise in the direction of Corinth, and heard the report of an exploding magazine. Corinth was evacuated, and Beauregard had achieved another triumph. I do not know how the matter strikes abler military men, but I think we have been fooled. The works are far from being invulnerable, and the old joke of Quaker guns has been played off upon us. They were only wooden guns with stuffed 'Paddies' for gunners. I saw them. We approached clear from Shiloh, in line of battle, and made preparations to defend ourselves, compared with which the preparations of Beauregard sink into insignificance. This morning we could have poured shot and shell from over three hundred guns into works that never saw the day when General Cook could not have taken his division into them. The indications are that the rebel force here did not exceed sixty thousand men. With what light I had I regarded the mode of our advance upon Corinth as deep wisdom; with the light I now have I do not."

Beauregard's own report of the evacuation, written June 13, 1862, at Tupelo, gives the reasons which impelled the evacuation in these words: "The purposes and ends for which I had occupied and held Corinth having been mainly accomplished by the last of May, and by the 25th of that month having ascertained definitely that the enemy had received large accessions to his already superior force, while ours had been reduced day by day, by diseases resulting from bad water and inferior food, I felt it clearly my duty to evacuate that position without delay. I was further induced to this step by the fact that the enemy had declined my offer of battle twice made to him outside of my intrenched lines, and sedulously avoided the separation of his corps, which he advanced with uncommon caution under cover of heavy guns, strong intrenchments constructed with unusual labor, and with singular

delay considering his strength and our relative inferiority in numbers. * * * At the time finally prescribed the movement commenced and was accomplished without the knowledge of the enemy, who only began to suspect the evacuation after broad daylight on the morning of May 30th, when, having opened on the lines from his formidable batteries of heavy and long-range guns erected the night previous, he received no answer from any direction; but as our cavalry pickets still maintained their positions of the previous day, he was not apparently fully satisfied of our movements until some stores of little value in the town were burned which could not be moved. It was then to his surprise the enemy became satisfied that a large army, approached with such extraordinary preparations, expense, labor, and timidity, had disappeared from his front, with all its munitions and heavy guns, leaving him without knowledge, as I am assured, whither it had gone."

On the night of the 27th of May, Pope had sent a cavalry force of two regiments under Colonel W. L. Elliott, to-wit: the Second Iowa under Lieutenant-Colonel E. Hatch, and the Second Michigan under Colonel Philip H. Sheridan, to ride around Corinth on our left, tear up the Mobile Railroad, some twenty-two miles to the south of it, and to do whatever further damage to the enemy might be possible.

These cavalry raiders accordingly struck the line of railroad at Booneville about two o'clock in the morning of May 30th. They captured the town, finding in and around it from two thousand to twenty-five hundred convalescent and sick rebel soldiers, as well as a guard of from five hundred to seven hundred rebel infantry, and some two hundred and fifty cavalry.

The raiders found near the railroad depot a train of twenty-six large cars, with locomotive attached. Ten of the cars were loaded with boxed and unboxed small arms and ammunition, besides a platform car with three field pieces of artillery, the rest of the cars being packed with "officers' baggage, clothing, provisions, and

quartermaster's stores." The depot itself was stored with munitions, subsistence, and other stores.

The enemy's sick were removed to a place of safety, the locomotive and cars were run into the ditch, and after the track and switches above and below the town, as well as the platform, had been well destroyed, Elliott's raiding party set fire to the depot and cars and galloped away, having insured the destruction of nearly half a million dollars' worth of property valuable to the enemy for military purposes. It was in this dashing exploit that Colonel Phil. Sheridan first attracted attention and began his career of renown.

Upon the first of June, Halleck received from Pope an enthusiastic report of the Elliott cavalry raid. This he at once telegraphed in full to Secretary Stanton, and was rewarded the following day by a telegram from the latter, saying: "Your brilliant and successful achievement gives great joy over the whole land. Every one is anxious to hear the latest news, and I hope you will telegraph frequently. The President would be glad to have the news every hour. * * * General McClellan was attacked yesterday; he had a hard battle, but drove the enemy back. He is not yet in Richmond, but we hope he soon will be."

Meanwhile it became generally known that besides the divisions of Rosecrans and Hamilton, and Granger's cavalry, belonging to Pope's army, there had been added to it, to strengthen the pursuit of the enemy — now supposed to be vigorously pressed — the divisions of Davies and W. T. Sherman, of Thomas' corps. Hence public expectation of decisive results waxed high. And when the following dispatch was published the agitation of the public mind in the North was extreme, as it seemed to presage the speedy capture or utter dispersion of the rebel forces under Beauregard, Bragg, Polk, Van Dorn, Hardee, and Breckinridge, with all the mighty consequences which in that event must have ensued:

“HALLECK’S HEADQUARTERS, June 4th, 1862

“HON. E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR :

“General Pope with forty thousand men is thirty miles south of Florence (Corinth), pushing the enemy hard. He already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and fifteen thousand stand of arms captured. Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their arms. A farmer says that when Beauregard learned that Colonel Elliott had cut the railroad on his line of retreat he became frantic and told the men to save themselves the best way they could. We captured nine locomotives and a number of cars. One of the former is already repaired and is running today. Several more will be in running order in a few days. The result is all that I could possibly desire.

“H. W. HALLECK,
“Major-General Commanding.”

The effect of this sensational dispatch, artfully manufactured for the purpose, apparently, of at one stroke obscuring whatever glory McClellan might have gained in his recent repulse of the enemy near Richmond, and at the same time of disarming public criticism touching his own comparatively inglorious campaign against Corinth, was even greater than Halleck had anticipated. It at once elicited the following replies from Secretary Stanton and President Lincoln :

“WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

“Your glorious dispatch has just been received, and I have sent it into every State. The whole land will soon ring with applause at the achievement of your gallant army and its able and victorious commander.

“EDWIN M. STANTON,
“Secretary of War.

“To Major-General Halleck, Corinth.”

“WASHINGTON, June 4, 1862.

“Your dispatch of today to Secretary of War received. Thanks for the good news it brings.

“A. LINCOLN.

“To Major-General Halleck.”

It soon transpired, however, that the glowing expectations raised in the public mind by Halleck’s sensational dispatch were doomed to disappointment; that some of its statements were exaggerations; and that the principal one, touching Pope, to-wit: that “he already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy,” was absolutely and wholly untrue.

Beauregard's report of the 13th of June, made at Tupelo, although taken with the allowances usually made for statements coming from the enemy, helped to satisfy the public mind of the untruthfulness of a part, at least, of that dispatch. It further helped, however, to unjustly fix the odium upon the shoulders of both Pope and Halleck, instead of upon those of Halleck alone.

In that report Beauregard declared, touching the Elliott raid on Booneville (May 30th), that instead of "ten thousand stand of small arms" reported destroyed there, "the truth is, not to exceed fifteen hundred, mostly inferior muskets, were lost on that occasion." This statement is entirely upset, however, by the reports of Colonel Elliott and Lieutenant-Colonel Hatch, of the Second Iowa Cavalry.

Beauregard's report more justly described Halleck's telegraphic reports just given as "equally inaccurate, reckless, and untrustworthy," touching the quantities of property and stores alleged to have been destroyed by the enemy at Corinth, and touching "General Pope's alleged pressing pursuit" of the enemy. "Major-General Halleck's dispatch of June 4th," continues Beauregard, "was particularly described as disgracefully untrue. Possibly, however, he was duped by a subordinate. Nothing, for example, can be wider from the truth than that ten thousand men and fifteen thousand small arms of this army were captured or lost in addition to those destroyed at Booneville. Some five hundred inferior small arms were accidentally left by convalescents in a camp four miles south of Corinth. No artillery of any description was lost, no clothing, no tents worth removal were left standing."

While, therefore, it was generally acknowledged, at the time that Beauregard's report was quoted from in the Northern as well as Southern papers, that some of these dispatches, especially that of June 4th, were gross exaggerations, yet so completely was Halleck master of the art of wheedling the press, that very few supposed him to be guilty of absolute falsification, and the public was

brought to believe that, as Beauregard himself intimates, Halleck must have been duped by Pope.

Halleck took occasion, moreover, to confirm this false impression early in July, in the following deliberately penned letter:

"CORINTH, Mississippi, July 3, 1862.

"In accordance with your instructions I telegraph you daily what information I receive of events in this department, stating whether official or unofficial, and if official giving the authority. I am not responsible for the truth of the statements thus communicated. I have seen a published statement of General Beauregard that my telegram respecting the capture of locomotives, prisoners, and arms, contained as many lies as lines. The number of locomotives captured was reported to be nine, and I so telegraphed you. General Beauregard says only seven. It turns out on full investigation that we captured eleven. *In regard to the number of prisoners and arms taken I telegraphed the exact language of General Pope. If it was erroneous, the responsibility is his, not mine.*


"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

"TO HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

It may hardly be believed, save by those who already know of his base duplicity toward General Grant, that in this letter Halleck uttered an unmitigated falsehood. It must be evident upon reflection, however, that he who could be guilty of the course that Halleck pursued toward General Grant, must have been capable of pursuing a similar course toward any other army officer.

It is a fact susceptible of abundant proof that General Pope never reported to Halleck, nor to any one else during the so-called "pursuit" of the enemy from Corinth, "ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy and fifteen thousand stand of arms captured," which Halleck here says is "the exact language of General Pope," and which the former telegraphed on the 4th of June, 1862. It is due to a brave, able, and truthful soldier, that history shall set General Pope right in the estimation of his countrymen by at least rendering to him this scant and long-delayed justice. It can be broadly alleged that General Pope never made any such statement of fact as that attributed to him by Halleck. No such report or statement can be found. The most careful search of the official documents fails to develop anything, directly or indirectly,

warranting either the language of Halleck's sensational dispatch of the 4th of June, or his attempted defense of himself, of July 3d, against Beauregard's charge of disgraceful falsification, by trying to shift the blame upon General Pope's innocent shoulders.



THE BATTLE OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

THE MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN.

IN the attempt to take Vicksburg in the rear made by General Grant in the fall of 1862, I commanded the First Division of the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps, so denominated, which was organized at Bolivar, Tennessee. This command consisted of the following troops: First Brigade, Colonel C. C. Marsh commanding; John E. Smith, Forty-fifth Illinois; L. S. Ozburum, Thirty-first Illinois; Captain Conrad, Twentieth Illinois; J. H. Howe, One-hundred-and-twenty-fourth Illinois; Elias H. Evans, Thirtieth Illinois. Second Brigade, M. D. Leggett commanding; C. S. Chandler, Seventy-eighth Ohio; M. F. Force, Twentieth Ohio; ——— Shook, Sixty-eighth Ohio; W. P. Davis, Twenty-third Indiana. Artillery—Ninth Indiana Battery; De Golyer's Michigan Battery; W. S. Williams, Third Ohio Battery; W. H. Bolton, Company D, First Illinois Artillery; G. C. Gunback, Company E, Second Illinois Infantry; besides Norton's Seventeenth Illinois Infantry, detached.

Upon the arrival of the command at Memphis, Tennessee, the Seventeenth Corps, under orders from the War Department, was organized, I being assigned, on the 11th of January, to the command of the Third Division, consisting of the following troops, which remained with me intact until the fall of Vicksburg, and until I was assigned to the command of the Fifteenth Army Corps, on the 14th of November, 1863:

First Brigade, General John E. Smith commanding, consisted of the Twenty-third Indiana, Colonel William P. Davis; Twentieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Richards; Thirty-first Illinois, E. S. McCook; Forty-fifth Illinois, J. A. Maltby; One-hundred-and-twenty-fourth Illinois, G. J. Sloan.

Second Brigade, M. D. Leggett commanding: Twentieth Ohio, M. F. Force; Thirtieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Warren Shedd, Seventy-eighth Ohio, Z. M. Chandler; Sixty-eighth Ohio, Colonel R. K. Scott.

Third Brigade, Colonel John D. Stevenson commanding: Seventh Missouri, Colonel W. S. Oliver; Eighth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Sturgis; Thirty-second Ohio, Colonel B. F. Potts, and the Eighty-first Illinois, Colonel J. J. Dollins. C. J. Stolbrand, Chief of Artillery; "D" of the First Illinois Artillery, H. A. Rogers Captain commanding; "L" Second Illinois Artillery, Captain W. H. Bolton; Third Ohio Battery, Captain W. S. Williams; "G" Second Illinois, Captain F. S. Sparrestron; "A" Second Illinois. Captain R. Hotaling.

I landed with my troops at Lake Providence, La., on the 22nd of February, 1863, and moved to Milliken's Bend on the 25th of April, thence by the way of Carthage and Perkins' Plantation to Hard Times Landing, below Grand Gulf. In the meantime, the transports had passed the rebel batteries at Vicksburg, the former being commanded, almost exclusively, by volunteers from my own division.

On the morning of the 1st of May, my division was ferried over the river, landed at Bruinsburg, and immediately pushed toward Fort Gibson, where General John A. McClernand was engaging the enemy, and attempting without success to drive him from his position.¹

¹ The official report of General Grant gives full credit to General Logan, as follows: "McClernand, who was with the right in person, sent repeated messages to me before the arrival of Logan to send his and Quimby's divisions to him. Osterhaus, of McClernand's corps, did not move the enemy from the position occupied by him on our left until Logan's division of McPherson's corps arrived. However, as soon as the advance of McPherson's corps, Logan's division, arrived, I sent one brigade of the division to the left. By the judicious disposition made of this brigade under the immediate supervision of McPherson and Logan, a position was soon obtained, giving us an advantage, which drove the enemy from that part of the field, to make no further stand south of Bayou Pierre, and the enemy was here repulsed with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. He was pur-

BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

On the 12th of May, I struck the enemy again, at Raymond, under Gregg and Walker, and after several hours of hard fighting, drove him back, with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, many of the rebels throwing down their arms and deserting. My own division alone participated in the fight.

CHAMPION HILLS.

On the 14th, we were at Jackson, Miss., and participated in the fight of that day; and after the capture of Jackson, on the 15th of May, we marched toward Vicksburg, coming up with the enemy at Champion Hills on the 16th. General Hovey, of McClernand's corps, engaged the enemy first, and was about to retire from exhaustion of his troops, when I came up, and by a movement on the right I succeeded in turning the enemy's flank, and in capturing a large number of guns and prisoners.¹

sued toward Fort Gibson, but, night closing in, and the enemy making the appearance of another stand, the troops slept upon their arms until daylight. Major Stolbrand, with a section of one of General Logan's batteries, had the pleasure of firing the last shot at the retreating enemy across the bridge, on the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, just at dusk of that day."—C. A. L.

¹ General Grant, in his official report, says: "The battle of Champion Hills was fought mainly by Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps, and Hovey's division of McClernand's corps. During the hottest part of the engagement Logan rode up and told me that if Hovey could make another dash at the enemy he could come up from where he then was and capture the greater part of their force. I immediately rode forward, and found the troops, that had been so gallantly engaged for so many hours, withdrawn from their advanced position, and were filling their cartridge-boxes. I desired them to use all dispatch, push forward as soon as possible, and explained to them the position of Logan's division. I proceeded still further forward, expecting every moment to see the enemy, but when I reached what had been his line I found he was retreating." It was thus by Logan's movement on the right that the battle of Champion Hills was won. The enemy did not halt in his retreat until he had reached his stronghold at Vicksburg.—C. A. L.

VICKSBURG.

On the evening of the 17th, after the successful engagement at Big Black, my division took the Jackson road, moved forward upon the enemy's lines at Vicksburg, and at night on the 18th went into position on the center of the circumvallating line which enveloped Vicksburg. We then made the unsuccessful assault of the 19th and 22nd of May, and subsequently commenced our trenches and mines for a regular siege. Upon the 4th of July, 1863, we had the satisfaction of entering the city of Vicksburg.¹

¹ The ground in General Logan's front was recognized as the commanding position of the entire line, and the battery constructed there was named "Battery Logan." A nine-inch navy gun was planted in his front, served by the First U. S. Infantry. His position was regarded by the enemy as a shining target for all their missiles. A shell exploded in his tent during the siege. His quarters were within a few yards of the main parapet, and became the station of observation for the officers of the entire line. Indeed, General Grant occupied that position during the two days' assault, on the 19th and 22d of May, as being the most commanding point. It was from the front of General Logan's headquarters that the mine was sprung which created such disaster to the enemy on the 25th day of June, and which resulted in a flag of truce on the 3d of July, followed by the surrender of Vicksburg on the 4th. General Logan was selected by General Grant for consultation during the interviews with General Pemberton, in command of the rebel force, looking to the surrender, and the terms of the surrender were written and dictated near "Battery Logan." In consideration of the services of General Logan during the siege, his command, by general orders, took the lead in marching into Vicksburg on the 4th of July, and he was immediately afterward assigned to the command of that city. This command he held, discharging its delicate duties until the 14th of November, 1863, when he was, by orders from the War Department, assigned to the command of the Fifteenth Corps.—C. A. L.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

RESACA.

WE were now about to enter upon the famous Atlanta Campaign. I had moved my headquarters to Huntsville, Alabama, and therefore was the first to take up the march for Chattanooga, the starting-point. The Army of the Tennessee, composed of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Army Corps, under command of General McPherson, was employed during this entire campaign, in the language of General Sherman, as "the snapper to the whip with which he purposed to punish the enemy," and its movements to the right and left of the other armies, constantly reaching and occupying the most difficult and perilous positions, entailed upon its several commanding officers delicate and exhausting duties. The commanders of the three corps of the Army of the Tennessee were, respectively, as follows:

Major-General John A. Logan, commanding the Fifteenth Corps; Major-General G. M. Dodge, commanding the Sixteenth Corps; Major-General Frank P. Blair, commanding the Seventeenth Corps.

While the main army, under the immediate supervision of General Sherman, was confronting the enemy at Dalton and Buzzard's Roost, the first flank movement of the series made by the Army of the Tennessee was to the right through Snake Creek Gap, upon the town of Resaca.

The attempt to break the railroad at Resaca, and thus cut off the retreat of the enemy, failed, not because of the timidity of any one, as has been unjustly suggested, but because the place was found so completely fortified that it ultimately required the best efforts of Sherman's whole army to dislodge the enemy from that

position, and but for the splendid flank movement of the Fifteenth Corps upon the right of the line, on the 16th of May, the attack upon the enemy's position must have consumed days instead of hours, before he would have been compelled to retreat.

The unsuccessful onslaught of General Hooker and General Howard, on the 13th of May, proves the wise discretion of General McPherson in not attempting to carry the works with a single army when first he reached Resaca, while the brilliant charge made by the Fifteenth Corps, by which we were enabled to turn the enemy's position, vindicates the previous action of McPherson.

[The scene of the movement has been described as follows: "Logan moved first and drew the first fire. In front of his Second Division was an open field in which were the enemy's skirmishers, and across in the woods his line of battle. At the bugle the division fell into line, deployed skirmishers, and swept across the field, driving the enemy in splendid style. General Logan accompanied the line. At the same time Harrow, who had fallen back of the main road to allow Morgan L. Smith to move to the right, moved on double-quick to the left of Osterhaus, the two divisions pushing into the thick wood on the left of the Second. Dodge moved his command from the Ferry road down through the forest to fill up the space between the Fifteenth and the Oestonala, his Fourth Division, under General Veatch, having the advance. After crossing the field, General Morgan L. Smith entered the wood, and pushed rapidly for the hills in his front, and the whole Fifteenth then moved suddenly forward, driving the enemy for a mile and a half, until the corps were in position on the hills which they had been ordered to take. The remainder of the afternoon was occupied in intrenching the line, and putting batteries into position, while skirmishers and pickets were constantly exchanging shots.

"The next day about noon General Logan received orders to make an assault upon the rebel lines in his front. He directed the assault to be made by one brigade from each of the First and

Second Divisions—General Charles R. Wood's brigade of the First Division, and General Giles A. Smith's of the Second. The remainder of the command was placed in position to give such immediate support to the charging party as circumstances might require. General Logan was in front, busy along the line. It being very difficult to cross the creek which ran between the attacking column of the enemy, the troops were carried over to the opposite bank on logs, or in any other feasible manner, under cover of the fire from the batteries. It was six o'clock when the skirmishers were advanced to the foot of the hill, and commenced driving the rebels. At the order of General Logan the brigade sprang up from the bank under which they were covered, deployed, and moved forward at double-quick. Very soon strong forces displaying seven regimental colors were discovered moving in column by regiments. The whole force of two brigades of General Logan was deployed in the front. The rebel column would strike it in a few minutes. If it broke our lines, the position was gone and the two brigades lost. Logan hurried along the front. His command reserved its fire until the enemy were within sixty yards. The rebel column staggered, fell back, re-formed, and renewed the assault. They were again repulsed, and made a last attempt to turn Logan's flank. They were again driven back with great loss, and under cover of the night, for it was then dark, they left the field in possession of General Logan's troops, who advanced and placed the flag of the Fifty-seventh Ohio on the abandoned redoubt. At two in the morning Resaca was destitute of rebels. Our loss in the Fifteenth Corps was something over three hundred, while the rebels admitted casualties to the number of more than twenty-five hundred. Thus ended the first fight of any moment in the Atlanta campaign."—C. A. L.]

DALLAS.

As at Resaca, so at Dallas, the glorious Fifteenth Corps took the brunt of the movement. I was again on the extreme right,

and marched to Dallas, on the 27th of May, at four p. m., the whole rebel army confronting me as we went into position beyond the town. The 28th was spent in closing up my line, and preparing for any attack which might be made. The enemy endeavored during the whole day to feel my line, and not a moment passed without shots between the skirmishers. I held the right with the Sixteenth Corps under Dodge on my left, while Sherman was waiting and expecting the Army of the Tennessee to move to the left to close up on the enemy, whom he (Sherman) supposed to be on his immediate front, that is to say, in front of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio. But the fact is that Johnston's entire command was centered upon our right flank, with a determination to break through and to prevent any movement to the left. Repeated and impatient orders were sent to McPherson during the time he was hotly engaged with Johnston's army, to move to the left and join Sherman.

On the 28th, Hardee's corps moved with twenty-three thousand men upon my front, and then there ensued one of the severest struggles of the entire campaign. Never did men fight more desperately than did the rebels to drive us from our position, as the field of battle after the contest plainly showed. We found five color-bearers, at the close of this sharp engagement, dead in their places. We buried three hundred of the enemy and would have buried more had not the rebels fired upon our stretcher-bearers, driving them and all burying parties from the field. Fifty-four rebels were buried in front of the Sixty-sixth Indiana. I had no time to get up my artillery, and in this repulse of the repeated attacks of the enemy I was compelled to depend almost entirely upon the musketry.¹

¹ The report states that General Logan's leadership contributed greatly to the success of the day. He rode along the entire line with an electric word for each brave regiment, swinging his hat and cheering when the bullets were thickest, while his strong voice rose high above the roar of the fight. The splendid enthusiasm of the man inspired such of the troops as required the inspiration with a like temper.—C. A. L.

The rebel loss was over twenty-five hundred. Three times the enemy attacked, and were as often repulsed. One hundred and fifty prisoners were taken. We lost two hundred and thirty-eight brave fellows. The following commissioned officers were killed: Colonel Dickerman, of the One-hundred-and-third Illinois; Major Grisy, of the Forty-sixth Ohio; and Lieutenant Louell, of the Twenty-seventh Ohio. At this place there occurred a night attack upon us, which was brilliant as well as beautiful. A streaming line of fire along the whole front, with a blaze of musketry and artillery, lit up the sky with lurid glare. It accomplished nothing for the rebels, however, save to cause loss of sleep to the tired soldiers of both sides. The three attacks were only intended to prevent the movement contemplated by the Army of the Tennessee to the left, as General Sherman had proposed. The Dallas fight was the third of the three successive attacks of the enemy since the opening of the campaign south of the Etowah, up to the evening of the 28th. On the 25th Hooker was engaged in the center, and on the 27th, Wood upon the left flank.

THE ASSAULT ON KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

On the 27th of June the attempt of General Sherman to carry Kenesaw Mountain took place. The propriety of this movement, as well as that of the attempt to dislodge the enemy from Buzzard's Roost, has been hotly discussed by those of opposite views. However, the orders having been given, the disposition of the troops of the Army of the Tennessee was perfected with a view to secure success in the assault if possible. The alacrity with which the troops moved out to an attack which was universally considered ill-advised, to say the least, was one of the strongest proofs exhibited during the campaign of the complete discipline and soldierly qualities of the volunteer soldier of the Western army. My corps moved promptly at eight o'clock in the morning, and after an hour and a quarter had cleared two lines of abattis, carried a line of earthworks by a charge, followed the rout of the enemy up his rugged

strongholds, under a murderous cross-fire of artillery and a storm of bullets, conquered every obstacle, planted the flag at the foot of the insurmountable array of cliffs, threw up defenses of logs and stones, and held the line despite the persistent efforts of the enemy to dislodge us. We lost sixty officers and four hundred men, killed and wounded. One of my regiments came out of the fight with but five line and field officers fit for duty. The losses were: Colonel Rice, of the Fifty-seventh Illinois, mortally wounded; Colonel Parry, Fifty-fourth Ohio, and Colonel Walcott, slightly wounded; Colonel Parnhill, Fortieth Illinois, and Captain Augustine, commander of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, killed. The Eighty-third Indiana lost two color-bearers while ascending the mountain.

The average perpendicular height of the precipice against which the charge was made was thirty feet. Along the verge of this the enemy had drawn his line of battle, and his troops, as our own approached, hurled down rocks, clubs, and every conceivable species of missiles, injuring, killing, and maiming many of our men. The position of the enemy was turned by General Sherman's "whip-snapper," the Army of the Tennessee. By another flank movement this army was at Nickajack Creek on the 4th of July, celebrating the anniversary of our independence by an artillery fight with Johnston's rear guard, while he, with his main army, was safely and quietly moving across Chattahoochee toward Atlanta. The next movement was to the left flank through Marietta, crossing the bridge at Rosswell built by Dodge, advancing through Decatur, and going into position on the 21st of July, after a severe fight, with which we contested the range of hills that overlooks the city of Atlanta.

On the night of the 21st I occupied an intrenched position, the Army of the Ohio, under General Schofield, being upon my right, and the Seventeenth Corps, under General Blair, upon my left. The left flank was to have been occupied by General Dodge, commanding the Sixteenth Corps, who had been left out on the march

of the preceding day by the connection of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps of the Army of the Tennessee. The cavalry command which was covering the flanks of the Army of the Tennessee — reporting to General McPherson — had been sent off by General Sherman's orders to destroy the bridge near Covington, thus leaving the left flank "in air." The trains were stopped at Decatur and guarded by Sprague, of Ohio, with a brigade. The severe fighting for the position which the Army of the Tennessee occupied, and which it did not secure until dark of the 21st, led the commanding officers of that army to believe that the enemy was in force in our immediate front, and General Blair and I made disposition of our troops accordingly, under direction of General McPherson.

THE FIRST BATTLE OF ATLANTA.

Very early on the morning of the 22d of July, 1864, Lieutenant Willard Warner, of General Sherman's staff, came to the headquarters of General McPherson, and gave the following instructions from General Sherman to General McPherson, to-wit: "General Sherman believes that the enemy have evacuated Atlanta, and desires you to move rapidly forward beyond the city toward East Point, leaving General Dodge, of the Sixteenth Corps, upon the railroad, to destroy it effectually." This communication was received by McPherson with a great deal of surprise, and he expressed, without reservation, his doubts as to the correctness of the report of the evacuation. However, he issued an order to me to carry out the instructions received from General Sherman.¹

Not satisfied, however, McPherson immediately ordered his horse, and with his staff started to ride down to my headquarters to talk over the instructions which he had already given me in writing. Before he arrived at my headquarters, however, firing was exchanged between our own and the enemy's pickets. In a moment General McPherson was convinced that General Sherman

¹ This order has been quoted in the Memoir of General Logan.—C. A. L.

was mistaken in the report that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta. McPherson therefore instructed me to go into position for battle (though I had already prepared my troops for the march), regardless of the order issued in the morning, which instruction I immediately commenced to carry out, my command going into line under fire. The order was also handed to General Blair, and General Dodge was directed to leave the railroad and with all possible dispatch to take up his position on the left of the Seventeenth Corps, in order to protect that flank, which was even then being turned by the enemy, in the absence of Garrard's cavalry.

In the meantime McPherson had ridden over to General Sherman's headquarters and reported to him the disposition he had made of his troops, in violation of the orders of the morning, and to secure the assent of General Sherman to his course. After this he rode back to see that his orders to Generals Blair, Dodge, and to me were being promptly and correctly carried out. The exposed position of the Seventeenth Corps, heretofore referred to, owing to the absence of the cavalry under Garrard, had not been wholly covered, when McPherson, about one o'clock (the firing along the line having become general), rode out almost alone, his staff all being occupied in the execution of previous orders. In passing through a narrow bridle-path, McPherson came upon a body of the enemy's troops—a stray company from Claiborne's division of Hardee's corps—lying down in the woods, who, upon seeing him approach, immediately arose, and commanded him three times to halt. McPherson, at first supposing them to be some of his own troops, lifted his hat in his usual courteous manner, but, at once perceiving that he was in the presence of the enemy, wheeled his horse, when he was immediately fired upon and killed. The rebel company was captured afterward, and the facts as here stated were given by the officers of the company. Colonel Clark, McPherson's chief-of-staff, hearing the firing, seeing McPherson's horse come back riderless, and satisfied that McPherson was either killed or a prisoner, gave orders for the re-

covery of the body, then rode to General Sherman and reported the facts, and was directed by him to place General Logan in command of the Army of the Tennessee, I being the ranking officer present. Before leaving General Sherman, Colonel Clark secured a division of the Army of the Ohio, commanded by General J. D. Cox, to march to a position where he could support the Army of the Tennessee in case of emergency.¹

General Sherman, in his report of the battle, said:

“On the morning of the 22nd, somewhat to my surprise, this whole line [meaning the line occupied by the armies on the day preceding] was found abandoned, and I confess I thought the enemy had resolved to give me Atlanta without further contest, but as General Johnston had been relieved of his command and General Hood substituted, a new policy seemed resolved upon, of which the bold attack upon our right was the index. Our advanced ranks swept across the strong and well finished parapet of the enemy, and close upon Atlanta we occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about two miles radius, when we again found him occupying a line of finished redoubts which had been prepared for

¹ General Logan assumed command just as the engagement of that day became general, and in person gave the orders and made disposition of the troops that achieved victory in the hardest-fought battle of the Atlanta campaign.

In person he recovered the position lost by the right of his corps, and recaptured the twenty-four-pound Parrott battery of Captain De Gress. In person, too, he directed the movement of the troops that repelled the seven successive attacks of the enemy upon his line; and not until twelve o'clock at night, when the weary soldiers were finally at rest, did he leave his command to go to General Sherman in order to report the successes of the day. He was received at General Sherman's headquarters with enthusiasm, and for his noble conduct during the critical hours of the battle he was complimented in the highest terms by the General-in-Chief, and assured, as General Logan has frequently related to the editor, of the permanent command of the army, which he had upon that eventful day proved himself fully capable to lead.

Of this memorable battle General Grant said in his official report: “About one P. M. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him and commanded the Army of the Tennessee throughout its desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard on the 27th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division.”—C. A. L.

more than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta, and after that we met him also busy in connecting those roads with curtains strengthened by rifle-trenched abattis and *chevaux de frise*."

The report of General Sherman as to the position of his troops on that day is substantially correct, but his information is derived entirely from reports of subordinates, because he was not on any part of the line during the fight, either by himself or by staff. He says: "I rode over it," meaning the line, "the next day, and it bore the marks of a bloody conflict. The enemy retired during the night inside of Atlanta, and we remained masters of the situation outside."

In referring to his orders to me, concerning the battle of the 22nd, General Sherman says in his "Memoirs": "I soon dispatched one of my own staff to General Logan, telling him to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle holding fast to Leggett's hill with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would personally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would reinforce him if he needed it." Decatur, where the trains were parked, was seven miles distant.¹

¹ The opinion has been expressed in military circles that the place of the General-in-Chief, during so fierce and important a battle as that of the 22d, was near the front, to supervise the conflict then raging, instead of at the rear, among the quartermasters, commissaries, and other non-combatants. This opinion seems to be strengthened by the circumstance that the able commander of the Army of the Tennessee had been killed, and his place had been assumed by a volunteer—or, to put it more broadly, by a "political general"—whom the General-in-Chief failed to promote to the permanent command of the army that had won victory under him on the 22d, because, as the General-in-Chief alleged ten years afterward, he did not consider the volunteer General equal to the command of *three* corps. The consequences of rebel success in the battle then in progress would have been most disastrous to the Union cause; and in leaving the issue to an officer incompetent to handle so many troops, the General-in-Chief, by the irresistible logic of the facts, was guilty either of a grave error, or of a great injustice. If General Logan were incompetent to discharge the trust, as alleged in the "Memoirs" of General Sherman, the General-in-Chief was highly censurable in committing the direction of the battle to him. But if the General-in-Chief were justified, by reason of General Logan's ability, in committing the direction of a battle that might have been the turning-point of the Western campaign to the single hands of

The battle of Atlanta, fought on the 22nd of July, 1864, must be recorded as one of the "decisive battles of the war"—in fact, the only decisive battle in 1864. It resulted in the fall of Atlanta and enabled General Sherman to accomplish his march to the sea.

My report of the battle of the 22nd of July is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
" BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., JULY 24, 1864.

"*General*: I have the honor to report the following summary of the result of the battle of the 22d inst.: Total loss in killed, wounded, and missing, three thousand five hundred and twenty-one (3,521), and ten (10) pieces of artillery lost. We have buried and delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce sent by them, in front of the Seventeenth Corps, one thousand (1,000) of their killed; the number of their dead in front of the Fourth Division of the same corps, including those on ground not now occupied by our troops, General Blair reports will swell the number of their dead on his front to two thousand (2,000). The number of dead buried in front of the Fifteenth Corps, up to this hour, is three hundred and sixty (360), and the commanding officer reports at least as many more unburied. The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps was four hundred and twenty-two (422).

"We have over one thousand (1,000) of their wounded in our hands; a large number of the wounded having been carried off during the night of the engagement by them.

"We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now; we also captured five thousand (5,000) stands of arms.

"The attack was made on our line seven times, and was seven times repulsed. Hood's, Hardee's, and Wheeler's cavalry engaged us. We have sent to the rear one thousand (1,000) prisoners, including thirty-seven (37) commissioned officers of high rank. We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits.

"Our total loss is three thousand five hundred and twenty-one (3,521), the enemy's dead thus far reported, buried or delivered to them, is three thousand two hundred and twenty-two (3,222). Total prisoners sent north, one thousand and seventeen (1,017); total prisoners wounded in our hands, one thousand (1,000); estimated loss of the enemy, ten thousand two hundred (10,200).

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN A. LOGAN, Major-General.


"To Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi."

The actual loss of the enemy was, however, acknowledged to be greater than the number indicated in my report.

General Logan, the General-in-Chief was no less censurable in openly maligning the military character of one of the most distinguished soldiers of the Republic.—
C. A. L.

The time was occupied until the 26th in reorganizing the various commands, in performing the last offices to the gallant dead, and in preparing for another movement, which was by the flank, though this time to the right. It is but truth to say that a more difficult and delicate movement of the army was not undertaken during the war. The enemy were intrenched closely in our front, almost within speaking distance on many parts of the line, when the order came from General Sherman to withdraw under cover of the night from our position, and move the three corps seven miles to the right. It was necessary to deceive the enemy entirely as to this movement, and the wheels of the gun-carriages and caissons were bound with whisks of hay and straw, in order that the utmost silence might prevail as the Army of the Tennessee moved out from this position. I was in the saddle all night, and with my staff personally superintended the movement of every corps which drew out from its position, until all were withdrawn without the slightest confusion. By daylight on the morning of the 27th, the three corps of the Army of the Tennessee were safely upon their respective roads, prepared to go into their new positions, and this without any casualty, while the enemy was left in complete ignorance of the withdrawal.¹

¹ Great praise must be given to General Logan for the military skill that he exhibited upon that occasion. When it is considered that the darkness of the night required the entire command almost to feel its way — it being impracticable to use any light, even that of a torch, to guide the troops — the movement was certainly one of the most remarkable of any made during the war, not excepting those made by officers graduated from West Point. Worn by anxiety resulting from the responsibility of the command so suddenly devolved upon him during the battle of the 22d, and wearied by the labor of the night movement above related in face of the enemy, General Logan was informed on the morning of the 27th, at the White House, where General Sherman was quartered, that General O. O. Howard had been appointed to the command of the Army of the Tennessee. It is needless to say that the announcement of General Howard's assignment was not enthusiastically received, though the army, probably, had no personal objection to him. Without a word General Logan resumed command of his old corps (the Fifteenth), and during the 27th he went into position on the right of the line, General Blair of the Seventeenth Corps being on his left, while General Dodge, of the Sixteenth, was upon the left flank.—C. A. L.



THE SECOND BATTLE OF ATLANTA.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF ATLANTA.

Rain poured in torrents as the army took up its position upon that day, and it was late in the evening before the troops were all deployed. Again the Army of the Tennessee was, by its right flank, "in air." The enemy was again discovered late in the day upon that flank, and as the Army of the Tennessee could not reach so as to secure a position not easily turned, General Sherman ordered General Jeff. C. Davis with his division to move at once to support the right flank.

The morning of the 28th found the Army of the Tennessee again confronting the enemy. Hardly had the Fifteenth Corps thrown up their earth-works, with logs and rails covering the front, when Hood came at us again. By eleven o'clock the fighting became general along the entire line, and then there occurred another desperate battle in which my brave Fifteenth Corps was exclusively engaged, for, though two or three brigades from the Seventeenth had been ordered to its support, circumstances rendered it unnecessary for the latter to take any part in the general engagement. Six times did the enemy deploy from the woods in our front; six times, with words of encouragement and threats from their commanding officers, did they march up to receive the deadly fire of the Fifteenth Corps, and as many times were they repulsed. Perhaps in the history of the war there was never more persistent and desperate gallantry displayed upon the part of the rebels. Their defeat was complete, and the reports of the fight show that the gallant Fifteenth Corps was chiefly entitled to the credit of the victory of July 28th.¹

The following is my official report of the battle:

¹ General Sherman says in his report of this battle: "General Logan on this occasion was conspicuous, as on the 22nd, his corps being chiefly engaged, but General Howard had drawn from the other corps, the Sixteenth and Seventeenth, certain reserves which were near at hand but not used."—C. A. L.

“HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

“BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., JULY 29, 1864.

“*Colonel*: I have the honor to report that in pursuance of orders I moved my command into position on the right of the Seventeenth Army Corps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field on the night and morning of the 27th and 28th inst., and during my advance in line of battle to a more desirable position we were met by the rebel infantry from Hood’s and Lee’s corps, who made a desperate and determined attack at half past eleven o’clock of the morning of the 28th.

“My lines were only protected by logs and rails hastily thrown in front of them. The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commenced and lasted until about three o’clock in the afternoon. During that time six successive attacks were made, which were six times gallantly repulsed, and each time with fearful loss to the enemy. Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted vigorously, but each assault terminated with like result. The most of the fighting occurred on General Harrow’s and Smith’s fronts, which formed the center and right of the line. The troops could not have displayed more courage nor greater determination not to yield. Had they shown less they would have been driven from their position. Brigadier-General Wood’s, Harrow’s and Smith’s division commands are entitled to great credit for gallant conduct and skill in repelling the assaults. My thanks are due to Major-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending me reinforcements at a time when they were much needed. My loss was fifty killed, four hundred and thirty-nine wounded, and eighty-three missing — aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.

“The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags. There were about one thousand five hundred or two thousand muskets captured; one hundred and six prisoners were taken, exclusive of seventy-three wounded who have been removed to hospitals and are being taken care of by our surgeons. Five hundred and sixty-five rebels up to this time have been buried, and about two hundred are supposed to be yet unburied. Large numbers were undoubtedly carried away during the night, as the enemy did not retire until nearly daylight. The enemy’s loss could not have been, in my judgment, less than six or seven thousand.

“I am very respectfully your obedient servant,

“JOHN A. LOGAN,

“Major-General Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.

“To Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Clark, Assistant Adjutant-General.”

The indorsement upon the report is as follows:¹

“HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,

“BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., July 29, 1864.

“In forwarding the within report I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the troops engaged. I never saw better conduct in battle.

¹ The suggestion seems natural that the officer that was acknowledged by both of his superiors to have been the principal actor in two of the most decisive, and, in fact, in the only battles of the Atlanta Campaign, must have been qualified to command permanently the army which he had successfully led to victory.—C. A. L.

"The General commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps, though ill and much worn out, was indefatigable, and the success of the day is as much attributed to him as to any one man. His officers, and in fact all the officers of his army that commanded my observation, coöperated promptly and heartily with him.

"O. O. HOWARD, Major-General."

JONESBORO.

What General Sherman has called his flank movement was now to take place. Failing to cut off the enemy's retreat by the use of his cavalry, the General-in-Chief determined to throw his whole army upon the railroad south of Atlanta. The method of accomplishing this result has been indicated by General Sherman in his "Memoirs."

Again the Army of the Tennessee had the wide swing, outside, and traveled the greater distance, and again struck the enemy first.

The several columns moved on the 29th of August—the Fifteenth Corps in advance—and passed the Renfro place, at which point the orders were to stop. I pushed forward, saved the bridge across Flint River, and went into position within half a mile of Jonesboro.

On the 31st, I went into a fortified position, and was attacked by Lee's and Hardee's corps. After two hours' hard fighting, we repulsed the enemy, who withdrew, leaving four hundred dead on the field, his total loss being over twenty-five hundred, as admitted at the time.

General Sherman, in his report, says: "Hearing sounds of battle at Jonesboro about noon, orders were renewed to push the other movements of the left and center, and about 4 P. M. the report arrived that General Howard had utterly repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro."¹

¹ It appears from this narration that General Logan, with the Fifteenth Corps, fought another battle, with the results which had been previously obtained on the 22d and 28th of July; and that upon this occasion the engagement was commenced and terminated without the knowledge of the General-in-Chief, other than that conveyed to him by the victorious guns of the Fifteenth Army Corps. General Howard, to whom the credit is given, had no suspicion, even, of the movement.—C. A. L.

As usual, the enemy disappeared before morning. He made a stand at Lovejoy's Station. We followed him to that point, and again had him in flank. I wished to attack him again, in order to achieve, if it were possible, what the army had failed to accomplish on the 31st, by reason of the want of coöperation of the other troops; but, in the meantime Atlanta had fallen, and the General-in-Chief decided to fall back. We then went into camp at Atlanta, with the purpose to prepare for an excursion through Georgia, to the sea.

CAPTURE OF FORT McALLISTER.

It remains to make mere mention of the last engagement of the Fifteenth Army Corps, so long commanded by me. It is a fact worthy of note that the troops composing this corps were originally organized at Belmont and took part in the engagement at that place. There was never any distinct change in the organization of the command from that time until it was mustered out in 1865. The men and officers came to know and love each other, and to form attachments which have never been broken.

General Hazen's Division of the old Fifteenth Corps captured Fort McAllister, which gave us Savannah. This was the last important engagement in which the Army of the Tennessee participated during the war.

After my arrival in camp, at Atlanta, the following congratulatory order was issued:

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
"EAST POINT, GA., Sept. 11, 1864.

"Officers and Soldiers of the Fifteenth Army Corps:

"You have borne your part in the accomplishment of the object of this campaign, a part well and faithfully done.

"On the 1st day of May, 1864, from Huntsville, Ala., and its vicinity, you commenced the march. The marches and labors performed by you during this campaign will hardly find a parallel in the history of war. The proud name heretofore acquired by the Fifteenth Corps for soldierly bearing and daring deeds remains untarnished — its luster undimmed. During the campaign you constituted the main portion of the flanking column of the whole army. Your first move against the enemy was around the right of the army at Resaca, where, by your gallantry,

the enemy were driven from the hills and his works on the main road from Vilanow to Resaca. On the retreat of the enemy, you moved on the right flank of the army by a circuitous route to Adairsville, in the same manner from there to Kingston and Dallas, where, on the 28th day of May, you met the veteran corps of Hardee, and in a severe and bloody contest you hurled him back, killing and wounding over two thousand, besides capturing a large number of prisoners. You then moved around to the left of the army, by way of Acworth, to Kenesaw Mountain, where again you met the enemy, driving him from three lines of works, capturing over three hundred prisoners. During your stay in front of Kenesaw Mountain, on the 27th of June, you made one of the most daring, bold, and heroic charges of the war, against the almost impregnable position of the enemy on Little Kenesaw. You were then moved, by way of Marietta, to Nickajack Creek, on the right of the army; thence back to the extreme left by way of Marietta and Roswell, to the Augusta Railroad, near Stone Mountain, a distance of fifty miles, and after effectually destroying the railroad at this point, you moved by way of Decatur to the immediate front of the rebel stronghold, Atlanta. Here, on the 22d day of July, you again performed your duty nobly 'as patriots and soldiers' in one of the most severe and sanguinary conflicts of the campaign. With hardly time to recover your almost exhausted energies, you were moved around again to the right of the army, only to encounter the same troops against whom you had so recently contended, and the battle of the 28th of July, at Ezra Chapel, will long be remembered by the officers and soldiers of this command. On that day it was that the Fifteenth Corps, almost unaided and alone, for four hours contested the field against the corps of Hardee and Lee. You drove them discomfited from the field, causing them to leave their dead and many of their wounded in your hands. The many noble and gallant deeds performed by you on that day will be remembered among the proudest acts of our nation's history. After pressing the enemy closely for several days, you again moved to the right of the army, to the West Point Railroad, near Fairburn. After completely destroying the road for some distance, you marched to Jonesboro, driving the enemy before you from Pond Creek, a distance of ten miles. At this point you again met the enemy, composed of Lee's and Hardee's corps, on the 31st of August, and punished them severely, driving them in confusion from the field, with their dead and many wounded and prisoners left in your hands. Here again by your skill and true courage you kept sacred the reputation you have so long maintained, viz.: "The Fifteenth Corps never meets the enemy but to strike and defeat him." On the 1st of September, the Fourteenth Corps attacked Hardee; you at once opened fire on him, and by your coöperation his defeat became a rout. Hood, hearing the news, blew up his ammunition trains, retreated, and Atlanta *was ours*.

"You have marched during the campaign, in your windings, the distance of four hundred miles, have put '*hors du combat*' more of the enemy than your corps numbers, have captured twelve stands of colors, 2,450 prisoners, and 210 deserters.

"The course of your march is marked by the graves of patriotic heroes who have fallen by your side; but at the same time it is more plainly marked by the blood of traitors who have defied the Constitution and laws, and insulted and trampled under foot the glorious flag of our country.

“ We deeply sympathize with the friends of those of our comrades-in-arms who have fallen; our sorrows are only appeased by the knowledge that they fell as brave men, battling for the preservation and perpetuation of one of the best governments of earth. ‘Peace be to their ashes.’

“ You now rest for a short time from your labors. During the respite prepare for future action. Let your country see at all times by your conduct that you love the cause you have espoused; that you have no sympathy with any who would by word or deed assist vile traitors in dismembering our mighty Republic or trailing in the dust the emblem of our national greatness and glory. You are the defenders of a Government that has blessed you heretofore with peace, happiness, and prosperity. Its perpetuity depends upon your heroism, faithfulness, and devotion.

“ When the time shall come to go forward again, let us go with the determination to save our nation from threatened wreck and hopeless ruin, not forgetting the appeal from widows and orphans that is borne to us upon every breeze to avenge the loss of their loved ones who have fallen in defense of their country. Be patient, obedient, and earnest, and the day is not far distant when you can return to your homes with the proud consolation that you have assisted in causing the old banner to again wave from every mountain’s top and over every town and hamlet of our once happy land, and hear the shouts of triumph ascend from a grateful people, proclaiming that once more we have one flag and one country.

“ JOHN A. LOGAN,
“ Major-General Commanding.”

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
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